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Sebastian Toby Nichols 
‘The Gods of the Nations are Idols’ (Ps. 96:5): Paganism and Idolatry in Near Eastern 
Christianity 
 
This thesis will explore the presentation in Christian literature of gentile religious life 
in the Roman Near East in the first few centuries AD. It will do so by performing a close 
study of three sources – the Syriac Oration of Meliton the Philosopher, the Syriac translation 
of the Apology of Aristides, and the Greek Address to the Greeks of Tatian. It will compare 
their presentation of a number of areas of gentile religious life – focussing particularly on 
iconolatry, sacrifice, and morality – and attempt to build a coherent picture of Christian 
attitudes to these areas. It will then compare these attitudes with a variety of non-Christian 
evidence: the majority of this will be literary sources, and in particular Lucian of Samosata, 
but will also include epigraphic evidence from the region. Other Latin and Greek sources will 
be compared when applicable, but the focus will remain on religious life in the Roman Near 
East. In the process, this dissertation will not only determine whether it is possible to talk 
about a single Christian ‘attitude’ towards gentile religious life in the area, but also develop a 
more detailed picture of the perception of that religious life by its gentile participants. 
This dissertation will also help to improve our understanding of the relationship 
between Christians and their gentile neighbours in the Roman Near East. In particular, it will 
explore the role that Christian literature played in the development of hostility towards the 
cult in this period. It will conclude by exploring the reasons for this hostility, and placing 
Christian literary attitudes in their proper context, by demonstrating that Christian literature, 
and the attitudes that it promotes, could have had a significant impact on their interaction 
with gentiles, and that this impact has largely been overlooked in scholarship on the 
development of Christianity. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1  Introduction 
Religious life in the Roman Near East is a notoriously thorny business. Writing about 
the Near East itself is troublesome enough; Millar, in his work on the area, demonstrated that 
producing a coherent history of a region with so much ethnic and linguistic variation would 
be impossible, not least because of the ‘amnesia’ that inhabitants often demonstrate of pre-
Hellenistic history.
1
 Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to write about religious life, 
independently from socio-political or cultural developments, in a society that had no sense of 
the secular.
2
 The issue is complicated by the arrival, in the first and second centuries, of a 
new and seemingly dangerous cult: Christianity. Scholarship is divided as to the impact that 
Christianity had on religious life, both in the Near East and in the Graeco-Roman world as a 
whole; Holm argued that Christianity, and the process of conversion, needed to be examined 
at a civic level,
3
 while Nock and MacMullen considered it a primarily personal experience.
4
 
This debate is most clearly seen in the studies of Franz Cumont, whose Religions Orientales
5
 
examined a number of cults of oriental origin
6
 and attempted to identify parallels with 
Christianity. It has long been demonstrated that this approach gives a misleading 
understanding of these so-called ‘oriental cults’,7 and that it distorts our perception of the 
interaction between early Christians and their neighbours. 
                                                 
1
 Millar 2003:6. This is further complicated by a tendency to abandon history which was incompatible with the 
Hellenistic world (Butcher 2003:280). 
2
 Berlin 1996a:2. That is not to suggest that the Western Graeco-Roman world did have a sense of the secular: as 
Davies argued, such a concept would make little sense in ancient thought (2004:230). 
3
 Holm 1996:137 
4
 Nock 1933:7; MacMullen 1984:95-7. See also Butcher 2003:366-7. 
5
 I refer to the 2006 5
th
 edition, edited by Bonnet and Van Haeperen, which is identical to the 1929 4
th
 edition. 
For convenience’s sake, however, I cite the 1911 English translation. 
6
 These cults were not necessarily oriental in nature, and as such Cumont’s work is not directly relevant to the 
question at hand: however, it does serve to show the uncertainty over the degree of impact that early 
Christianity had in the Graeco-Roman world as a whole. See Beard, North and Price 1998a:246. See below, 
1.2.1. 
7
 For more on some of these cults and the relationship with Christianity, see below, 3.3.4. 
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Fortunately, we are in a position to assess, at least to some degree, the attitudes of 
early Christians to local religious life in the Near East, and therefore to better understand the 
impact that Christianity may have had in this area. We are in possession of texts (or 
translations of texts) that, on some level, relate to exactly this topic (because they are written 
either by, or about, inhabitants of the Near East). By using these texts, we can better assess 
the attitudes that these early Christians had towards religious life in the Levant. At the same 
time, we can compare this attitude with that seen in non-Christian sources,
8
 which will help 
us to build up a better picture of Near Eastern Christian attitudes, and what role they played 
in the developing dialogue with their non-Christian neighbours. 
This thesis will take the three most relevant of these texts – namely, the Syriac 
Oration of Meliton the Philosopher, Tatian’s Address to the Greeks and the Syriac translation 
of the Apology of Aristides – and examine them in detail. I aim to establish the degree to 
which it is possible to identify Christian attitudes to local religious life in the Roman Near 
East, and whether these attitudes match the picture given by the limited non-Christian sources 
that we do have. By doing so, I aim to build on our understanding of Near Eastern 
Christianity in the early period, and to investigate how the attitudes such texts display could 
improve our overall understanding of religious life in the Roman Near East. Finally, my 
thesis will examine the role these attitudes may have played in the relationship between 
Christianity and their opponents, and whether or not it could have contributed to persecution. 
It will focus on three key ideas within the texts: traditional polytheistic attitudes to the statues 
of their gods, to the powers and efficacy of their gods, and to the morality of the gods and of 
                                                 
8
 As Kaizer noted, “research into religious life in the Classical Levant seems handicapped by the nearly 
complete absence of sources which may hint at what the inhabitants of the region in the Hellenistic and 
Roman periods actually ‘believed’” (2008a:25). However, as I shall show, I am not interested in what people 
believed, for such a word is dangerous in this context; I am primarily concerned with how religious life was 
perceived. See below, 1.6. 
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the worshippers themselves.  It will combine these studies with the limited information that 
we find in relevant polytheistic literary sources, both contemporary and older ones, as well as 
epigraphic and archaeological evidence where appropriate. In the process, I hope to establish 
the role such texts played in the developing dialogue with the non-Christian world. 
 
1.2       The Roman Near East 
Thus far, I have used the terms ‘Near East’ or ‘Roman Near East’ with little 
explanation. I use Millar’s definition of the region, as “the region, or series of linked 
regions… between the Taurus Mountains and the Red Sea”,9 which overlaps with the modern 
countries of Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. However, I 
will also use texts and inscriptions which relate to Asia Minor, namely the so-called 
‘confession inscriptions’, as well as to the Latin- and Greek-speaking parts of the Empire to 
the west of the Near East. Even in the three texts named above, their focus is not solely on the 
Near East, and so it will be important to keep a broad perspective. 
 
1.2.1 Religious life in the Roman Near East 
Some discussion is needed of the current state of scholarship on religious life in the 
Roman Near East. Much modern scholarship has been concerned with the approach of Franz 
Cumont, who discussed ‘Oriental cults’ (meaning, primarily, the so-called ‘mystery cults’ 
associated with Cybele, Isis, Mithras and others). To call these cults ‘Oriental’ implies firstly 
that they share a unity in theology or practice, and secondly that this unity is distinctive to the 
East. Cumont argued that it was the influence of these ‘Oriental’ cults which corrupted 
                                                 
9
 Millar 1993:3. For a similar geographical definition, see Butcher 2003:11-12. 
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Western religious practice and led to the decline apparent in the first Christian centuries.
10
 
This position has been comprehensively undermined in the last century: MacMullen was 
extremely critical of the term ‘oriental cults’, which “has meaning only for those who think 
that most of the Levant and Near East, with Egypt and parts of the Middle East tossed in, 
shared religious beliefs and practices sufficiently similar all to fit better together than any of 
them might fit with the Greco-Roman – that is, that Mithra was more like Sarapis than like 
Dionysus, the Syrian triad more like Isis than like the Capitoline triad”.11 MacMullen’s 
attitude is generally shared by scholars, who suggest that the variety of religious practice in 
the Roman Near East is too vast to attach such a handy label. However, it is worth 
highlighting some of the characteristics which Cumont attributed to these ‘oriental cults’, as 
they will feature to some extent in the Christian material which this thesis examines. In 
particular, Cumont suggests that these cults share a pre-occupation with immortality,
12
 and a 
tendency towards aniconic worship (characterised by the worship of water, high places and 
trees as well as the baetyls more commonly associated with aniconic practice).
13
 It is 
certainly true that these features are prominent in these ‘oriental religions’, but, as I shall 
show, they are far from characteristic, and in no way can they be used to distinguish ‘Eastern’ 
from ‘Western’ religious life and practice.  
                                                 
10
 Cumont 1911:10. In particular, Cumont argued that these cults thrived because they fulfilled a spiritual need 
which the “cold and prosaic” traditional cults were unable to do (1911:28-9); this interpretation was shared 
by Godwin (1981:38). As I shall show below, however, such Oriental cults may fulfil a different, but no 
more important, need. To characterise traditional cults as purely “prosaic” is to misunderstand the potential 
significance of religious practice to the individual in the Graeco-Roman world. 
11
 MacMullen 1981:127. See also Estienne 2006:151. On modern ‘triadomania’ and the tendency to view triads 
as characteristic of the Roman Near East, see Butcher 2003:342 
12
 Cumont 1911:43. 
13
 Ibid: 116. Stewart argued that such depictions were characteristic of the Near East (2008:298), whilst Butcher 
similarly argued that Near Eastern cults shared a tendency to depart from “the norms of classical 
representations” (2003:336). An example of this distinctiveness may be seen in Herodian’s attitude to the 
statue of Elagabal: he observes that    λ          ,          ʼ  λλ                (5.3.5, ‘it was no 
statue of the sort that Greeks and Romans put up’  on the use of    λ  , see below, 2.3.1). See also Millar 
1993:12, who argued that this question was “essential” to our understanding of religious life in the area. 
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A second issue with the characterisation of ‘Eastern religions’ is found in the apparent 
conflict between ‘indigenous’ and Hellenistic or Roman cult, since “the religious history of 
the Hellenistic and Roman Near East has invariably been analysed in terms of an intersection 
between ‘indigenous’ and ‘foreign’”.14 To what degree should we envisage a ‘culture clash’ 
between indigenous, Semitic-speaking locals, and Hellenistic settlers? We must address this 
question in order to produce a meaningful assessment of religious conditions in the Roman 
Near East. 
Before we do so, however, some discussion of the terms ‘Semitic’ and ‘Hellenistic’ is 
required. By ‘Semitic’, I do not intend to refer to any specific racial group, as there is little 
evidence that ancient authors did so.
15
 ‘Semitic’ will therefore refer only to a linguistic group 
(including primarily Hebrew, Syriac and Aramaic). ‘Hellenism’, however, is more difficult to 
define  it has what Sartre describes as a “variable geography”.16 Although derived from 
 λλ       , ‘to speak Greek’, it cannot be reduced to a simple literary phenomenon,17 since it 
also entails religious and cultural processes.  
Bowersock argued that ‘Hellenism’ in the Near East was the result not simply of 
Hellenistic influence, but of mediation by later Roman occupiers,
18
 which makes it 
                                                 
14
 Kaizer 2008a:21. 
15
 Although Strabo, quoting Posidonius, perhaps comes closest to identifying ethnic consistency, kinship or 
common characteristics amongst the peoples of the Near East (Geog. 1.2.3 ):        δʼ    δ                
     δ    ,                                                           λ    .                      
                              β     λλ      φ λ      φ     ,             δ  λ               β         
                            (‘Poseidonius seems to say it best, in looking for the etymology of names in 
nations of one stock and community. For the race of the Armenians, that of the Syrians, and that of the Arabs 
display a great similarity, through their language, their way of life and the build of their bodies’). See also 
Sartre 2008:34. 
16
 Ibid: 26. 
17
 Ibid: 26. See also Butcher 2003:278. 
18
 Bowersock 2008:22. Similarly, Millar argued that “the “Hellenistic” Syria, with a distinctive mixed culture, 
which our evidence allows us to encounter, is that which evolved under the Roman Empire” (2006:29). 
 15 
 
impossible to identify the degree of influence of this process on indigenous religious life.
19
 
Nevertheless, Sartre maintained that “native cults succeeded in resisting, whether or not they 
were modified under the influence of Hellenistic fashions”.20 This would imply a conflict 
between Hellenistic religious life and local, indigenous practice, some of which was 
modified, or superseded, by the introduction of Hellenism. This raises the question of 
whether or not it is possible to identify an ‘indigenous’ form of religious life, or indeed of 
social life. Bradford Welles argued that in places like Dura-Europos, Greek culture was 
exclusive to the governing classes, while the ‘locals’ spoke in Semitic tongues, and continued 
to worship their indigenous gods.
21
 Butcher argued that religious practice was surprisingly 
resilient to the influence of Hellenism, and that this was therefore one means through which a 
local identity could be expressed in an otherwise Hellenistic social setting.
22
 However, Millar 
also observed the difficulties in distinguishing between ‘indigenous’ and ‘Hellenistic’ 
religious life: he highlighted a phenomenon of ‘amnesia’, particularly in the cities of the 
Syrian Decapolis, whereby the inhabitants of the region display a lack of awareness their 
                                                 
19
 Similarly, Butcher argued against the suggestion that Hellenism was merely a ‘veneer’ covering an otherwise 
indigenous set of social and religious practices (2003:274). 
20
 Sartre 2008:43. 
21
 However, he suggested that, in the Roman period, the ruling class began to display an increasingly ‘Semitic’ 
character (Bradford Welles 1951:261). Notwithstanding his use of ‘Semitic’ as an ethnic, rather than 
linguistic, marker, Bradford Welles’ model of the Hellenistic ruling class, based largely on the prominence 
of names in inscriptions, ignores the question of ‘subscribed’ rather than ‘factual’ identity: Pollard 
questioned whether any of the inhabitants of Dura-Europos could trace their ancestry back to the original 
Macedonian settlers, but that these “manifestations of identity”, whether real or not, were equally significant 
(2007:88); bilingual inscriptions represented deliberate adherence to Hellenistic cultural norms as a means of 
social advancement (ibid. 95) and therefore cannot confidently be used to identify changes in the ethnic 
make-up of Dura-Europos’ population, as Bradford Welles attempts to do: such a distinction is impossible to 
drawn in the Roman period (Lichtenberger 2008:151). On subscribed identity, see also Millar 1993:5 and 
1998:7. 
22
 Butcher 2003:335, although he also noted that this did not imply a general culture of such resistance.  
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history.
23
 Outside the Jewish territories (and perhaps the cities of the Phoenician coast), 
genuine continuity with the pre-Hellenistic period can only be seen in Mabog/Hierapolis.
24
  
 
It would therefore be impossible to identify an indigenous religious heritage in the 
Roman Near East: the influence of Hellenism (whether ‘true’ or ‘Roman’ Hellenism) 
modified such traditions to the extent that the inhabitants themselves subscribed to a 
Hellenistic model of civic religious life. That is not to say that the introduction of ‘new’ gods 
caused the old gods to be abandoned. This is an inadequate model for describing the 
relationship between two traditions;
25
 it is better to think in terms of a ‘hybridization’ of two 
cultures.
26
 As such, we should not consider that Hellenism in the Near East was identical to 
the Hellenism of the Western Greek world: if indigenous religious life was influenced by 
Hellenism, then undoubtedly Hellenism in the region was influenced by local conditions. I do 
not therefore intend to distinguish between Semitic-speaking and Greek-speaking culture 
during this thesis, as this would create a misleading impression of the situation in the Roman 
period. 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 Millar 1993:2; he highlighted Damascus as the most prominent example of this phenomenon (2006:21). 
Butcher argued that such cities deliberately abandoned any history which did not fit the ‘new’ Hellenistic 
model (2003:280), but there is little evidence of this.  
24
 Millar 2006:22, although when Lucian, in On the Syrian Goddess, asks the locals about the origin of the 
temple of Atargatis, they display very little concrete awareness, and the author is presented with a variety of 
stories. 
25 As seen, for example, in the altar from  ura-Europos dedicated to                     λ  (‘Zeus Baetylos, 
the ancestral god’) (SEG 7.341). The juxtaposition of the Greek Zeus with the Semitic ‘Baetylos’ 
demonstrates a tendency to interpret through association rather than suppression; the same phenomenon may 
be seen in the erection of a temple on Jebel Sheikh Barakat (in North-western Syria) to ‘Zeus Madbachos 
(from the Aramaic mdbkʼ, ‘altar’) and Selamenes, the ancestral gods’ (IGLS 2.465). See Millar 1993:1-2 and 
254-5. 
26
 Sartre 2008:41; see also Butcher 2008:48. 
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1.3       Discussion of source material 
Christian sources tend to be discussed in two separate groups. The first group, internal 
texts, are written between Christians, whether to an individual or a community; they are often 
referred to as hortatory texts, because their purpose is usually to encourage the recipient to 
hold fast in their faith, and to reaffirm Christian identity and doctrine. The most famous 
examples of internal texts are the New Testament epistles, some of which were written to 
individuals and others to communities. The second group, external texts, are addressed to an 
outsider, one or more non-Christians.
27
 This group of texts can have a variety of purposes: 
they may aim to convert (as, for example, John states in the conclusion to his Gospel)
28
 
through a variety of means, or they may aim to defend Christians against accusations of 
improper religious or moral conduct. Such texts are usually categorised as polemic or 
apologetic. 
 
1.3.1    Apologetic and polemic 
Extensive scholarship has been done on the nature of Christian apologetic and 
polemic.
29
 The basic definition of these terms is clear: apologetic is intended to act primarily 
as a legal defence against charges (as was the case in Plato’s account of Socrates’ apology), 
while polemic is an attack on the beliefs, practices or standards of an external group.  
However, this distinction often fails to function in practice:
30
 apologetic aims can often be 
                                                 
27
 It may well be that such texts were never actually intended to be read by the alleged addressee(s): for more on 
this, see below, 1.4. 
28
 John 20:31:       δ                                                                     ,         
                                           (‘these things have been written so that you might believe that 
Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and so that as you believe you might have life in His name’). 
29
 See esp. Edwards, Goodman and Price1999, Fiorenza 1976. 
30
 Price 1999:106-7  Frede argued that the classification of apologetic and polemic “often seems so vague as to 
be useless” (1999:132), because apologetics and missionary propaganda “functioned like two sides of the 
same coin” (Fiorenza 1976:3). However, Bitz argued that apologetic was essentially at odds with a religion 
with claims to absolute truth, because it required the admission of deficiencies; it also required a logical, 
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achieved by using polemic to deflect criticism from Christians back onto their accusers.
31
 
There is also a positive aspect to apologetic: it is regularly used to advertise the appeal of a 
Christian way of life, and thus to win converts, so it should not be treated as a purely 
defensive approach. I do not intend to talk about either as a fixed category. I shall highlight 
instances when the texts display characteristics of one (or both), but it would be dangerous to 
label a text apologetic, even when it gives its own title as an Apology. 
 
1.4       The nature of the Christian sources 
All of my sources, both Christian and non-Christian, present a variety of different 
problems which must be addressed before we can use them as source material for this 
dissertation. There is a remarkable amount of Christian literature from which to choose: 
however, in order to properly address the questions posed by this dissertation, they must fulfil 
three main criteria, in that they must be: 
1) Of an early (pre-third century) date. By the end of the second century AD, and 
particularly after the events at Lyons in 177,
32
 genuine apologetic as a defence against 
accusations became extremely prominent in Christian texts. As a result, later texts are 
more concerned with providing a defence of Christian doctrine and practice than 
giving insights (genuine or otherwise) into the religious life of the non-Christians 
                                                                                                                                                        
reasonable justification of the irrational: “apologetics is the defense of the indefensible” (1976:100). In 
addition, as Edwards et al. pointed out, genres change over time (1999:2), and the setting is often fictional (a 
‘scenario’ rather than a ‘genre’) (Alexander 1999:24). Young argued that apologetic is difficult to identify as 
a genre before the emergence of Christian apologists in the second century, but the existence of Jewish 
apologetic (such as Philo’s Embassy to Gaius) indicates that this is not the case (1999:82; cf. Fiorenza 
1976:2). 
31
 It will be seen below that both Aristides and Tatian use this approach in their texts. Suddith highlighted a 
distinction within the category of apologetic itself: ‘positive’ (which asserted that God was true) and 
‘negative’ (which defended the beliefs and practices of the Christians) apologetic (2003:299). Most authors, 
however, rely on both policies, which renders this distinction particularly unhelpful. 
32
 For an account of these martyrdoms, see Euseb. Hist. eccl. 5.1. For more on Christian persecutions in general 
in the first and second centuries, see below, Chapter 5. 
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around them.
33
 As such, as useful as they may be for defining Christian identity in this 
formative period, they offer little to the questions at hand. 
2) External texts (that is, addressed to non-Christians). Johnson has highlighted three key 
features of internal or hortatory Christian text: staying in touch with one another; 
instructing or educating; or defining group identity.
34
 However, such texts contain 
little discussion of non-Christian religious life, and cannot often tell us about Near 
Eastern Christian attitudes towards their gentile neighbours. These attitudes are, 
however, considerably more prominent in external texts. As noted above, these texts 
fall into two main categories: apologetic and polemic. It might be argued that the 
majority of external texts were rhetorical exercises designed to remind other 
Christians of the wickedness of gentiles and were never in fact intended to be read by 
their gentile addressees,
35
 which would make them in actual fact internal texts.  
However, although this may be that case, two points must be raised against this 
objection. Firstly, such texts would inevitably influence Christian attitudes towards 
their non-Christian neighbours; they would therefore at the very least reach the 
addressee indirectly (or second-hand, as it were).
36
 Secondly, regardless of the 
addressee, the discussion of religious life in the world around them remains relevant 
                                                 
33
 Although, as noted above, the two should not be entirely distinguished. 
34
 Johnson 2009:173. See also Fiorenza 1976: : “the understanding of early Christian mission rests on the 
dichotomy between inside and outside”. Lieu agreed that identity formation is a key part of all Christian 
texts, both in defining the identity of the group and in reinforcing the ‘correct’ version of the truth (2004:73-
87). This goal can be accomplished whether the supposed addressee is a Christian or non-Christian; we 
therefore see another reason for removing the distinction between apologetic and polemic. However, a 
distinction between internal and external text remains integral to the question of this thesis, because 
explicitly internal text will not allow us to examine Near Eastern Christian attitudes to local polytheistic 
religious life. 
35
 Beard, North and Price 1998a:310. 
36
 “It is the texts’ own presupposition that they will shape their audiences’ self-understanding, even if their 
authors must have taken for granted how few would actually read them” (Lieu 200 :10). Furthermore, as 
Cameron pointed out, if apologetic text were written only for the converted, it would not explain the success 
or the spread of Christianity (1991:45). 
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whether it is Christians or non-Christians who are understood to be reading these 
texts. 
3) Written by, or addressed to, inhabitants of the Roman Near East. The aim of this 
dissertation (to assess Christian attitudes towards religious life in the Near East) can 
only be achieved by using texts with a specific relevance to that region. As self-
explanatory as this may sound, it requires a little elaboration. This relevance may be 
because the author is Near Eastern himself (in which case we would expect at least 
some understanding of that religious life to be evident in the text), or because the 
addressee, either rhetorical or actual, is (in which case we would expect an attempt to 
make it relevant to that readership).  
There are three key texts that seem to fulfil these three criteria better than any others, namely 
the Syriac translation of the Apology of Aristides, the Oration of Meliton the Philosopher, 
and the Address to the Greeks of Tatian.  
 
1.4.1    The Syriac translation of Aristides’ Apology. 
This text is, in some respects, the most complicated of the three on which I focus, at 
least in terms of its provenance. It is a Syriac translation, found at the convent of St. 
Catharine on Mt. Sinai,
37
 of a lost Greek apology, and is transmitted in Rendel Harris’ 1893 
edition, as well as by Pouderon and Pierre in a 2003 French edition.
38
 We know little of the 
author himself. Eusebius records two apologists, named Aristides and Quadratus, presenting 
apologies to the emperor Hadrian during a visit to Athens in AD 124.
39
 We know little more 
                                                 
37
 For discussion of the manuscript tradition, see Rendel Harris 1893:3-6 and Pouderon and Pierre 2003:32. 
38
 For the Syriac text, I use Rendel Harris’ edition. My own translation is provided in the appendices, and all 
chapter references are taken from that translation. 
39
 Euseb. Hist. eccl. 4.3.3:            δ   δ ,                    ʼ                    β    ,      δ     
     λ                          λ         φ        δ          λ λ     . (‘Aristides too, a man of 
faith and devoted to our religion, like Quadratus, left an apology for our faith addressed to Hadrian’). The 
dating depends upon a fragmentary reference to Aristides which appears in the Armenian fragments of the 
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of Quadratus, although both men are also mentioned by Jerome.
40
 However, although the 
original may be missing, we have a collection of other versions: we have a number of 
fragments of the text in Armenian, and, most significantly, what appears to be a quotation, in 
Greek, of large portions of the Apology is found in the novel Barlaam and Josaphat, which is 
often attributed to the eighth-century author John of Damascus, but is almost certainly earlier 
than this.
41
 This quotation takes the form of an extended speech by the monk Barlaam to an 
Indian prince, pleading with him to convert, and, although extensive, accounts for only two-
thirds of the text as found in the Syriac, which is by far the longest account. 
If the text had a Greek original, however, are we justified in exploring it as an 
‘Eastern’ text? I shall attempt to answer this by means of an exploration of the date and 
character of the text itself. Dating the original Greek apology to the reign of Hadrian, and 
certainly to the mid-120s as Eusebius does, is problematic, as Rendel Harris demonstrated.
42
 
Firstly, the Syriac is ambiguous in its addressee. While the title gives hdryns mlkʾ,43 the 
speech itself appears to be addressed to qsr ṭṭws hdrynws ʼnṭwnynws sgydʼ wmrḥmnʼ.44 This 
does not refer to Hadrian, whose name was Publius Aelius Hadrianus, but to his successor, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Chronicon, in which he is referred to as a philosophus Atheniensis, giving apologeticas before Adriano. It 
appears only in the Latin rendering of the Armenian version for the year AD 124; the fragmentary Greek has 
no record of it. One of the Armenian manuscripts (N) moves the date to 125, which matches better with a 
known visit of Hadrian in 125-6 (Rendel Harris 1893:6). Pouderon and Pierre argued, based on the Latin 
cognomen ‘Marcianus’, which appears as mrqynws in the Syriac manuscript, that we must conclude that 
Aristides was a westerner (2003:29). 
40
 Jer. De vir. ill. 20: Aristides Atheniensis, philosophus eloquentissimus et sub pristine habitu discipulus 
Christi, volumen nostri dogmatis rationem continens eodem tempore quo et Quadratus, Hadriano principi 
dedit, id est, apologeticum pro Christiani (‘Aristides of Athens, a most eloquent philosopher and a follower 
of Christ in his traditional clothing, presented to Hadrian, at the same time as Quadratus, a book containing 
an account of our beliefs; that is, an apology on behalf of the Christians’. This is so similar to Eusebius’ 
account that we may safely assume that Jerome based his account on that found in Church History. On the 
false dichotomy between oral and written tradition in Christian literary history, see Downing 2000:15. 
41
 Rendel Harris 1893:70. The passage is quoted in Barlaam and Josaphat 27.238-255. For an excellent edition 
of the text, with translation and notes, see Pouderon and Pierre 2003:256-303 (references to the Greek 
version use this edition). For the Armenian fragments, see ibid. 305-13. For a fuller discussion of the various 
versions, see ibid.23-4. 
42
 Rendel Harris 1893:13. 
43
 Aristides 1.1: ‘Hadrian the king’. 
44
 Ibid. 1.2: ‘Caesar Titus Hadrianus Antoninus Augustus Pius’. 
 22 
 
Antoninus Pius.
45
 The apology could possibly have been addressed to both of them,
46
 with 
Eusebius losing the second part and the Syriac translator having lost the first. This would 
make sense of the fact that the adjectives applied to the addressee are pointed in the plural. 
However, the last two adjectives which are applied to the addressee, sgydʼ and mrḥmnʼ, 
translate as ‘Augustus’ and ‘Pius’ respectively:47 the latter title was not awarded to Antoninus 
until after the death of Hadrian in AD 138, for a variety of different reasons.
48
 Robinson 
concluded from this that since the speech was unlikely to be delivered on the emperor’s 
deathbed, it is most likely to have been presented to Antoninus Pius on a visit to Smyrna (a 
conclusion based, somewhat tenuously, on a reference in a letter of Irenaeus to a royal house 
at Smyrna) early in his reign.
49
 However, if Eusebius is wrong about the speech being 
delivered to Hadrian in Athens, we lose our only witness that the speech ever was delivered 
in person before the emperor. In fact, it is not at all clear that Eusebius’ account supports a 
spoken address at all: Aristides is described as having ‘left behind’ (    λ λ     ) the 
speech, which does not seem to me to suggest the delivery of a speech as much as a letter.
50
 
                                                 
45
 Assuming, of course, that the translation of mrhmnʼ as ‘Pius’ is correct (see below); however, the combination 
of other names would suggest that no other understanding is as plausible. This would also fit with 
Lightfoot’s observation that the majority of speeches of which we are aware were addressed to either 
Antoninus Pius or Marcus Aurelius (2007:62). Hennecke argued that the Apology was dated to the last years 
of Hadrian’s reign, but was presented to Antoninus Pius after the former’s death (1893:98-101); Kerestzes 
was not certain of the date, but agreed that it was addressed to Antoninus Pius (1989:131). 
46
 Justin Martyr’s First Apology, for example, addresses Antoninus Pius and his two (adopted) sons, Lucius 
Verus and Marcus Aurelius. For a fuller discussion of this possibility, see Rendel Harris 1893:8. On the 
whole, however, the idea that both Eusebius and the Syriac scribe each lost (opposing) halves of the name 
seems rather implausible. 
47
 Neither sgydʼ (‘Augustus’) nor mrḥmn (‘Pius’) are understood as technical terms. Payne Smith defines sgd as 
‘to worship’, ‘to honour’ or ‘to pay obeisance’: the passive participle sgydʼ therefore means ‘worshipful’ or 
‘revered one’, and is therefore the Syriac translation of Augustus (or, more accurately, of the Greek 
  β     ). Similarly, mrḥmnʼ is defined as ‘merciful, tender, compassionate, or benevolent’. This lacks 
some of the semantic range of the Latin pius (such as one’s duty to the gods), and one could argue that this 
would be uncomfortable for a Christian, but Augustus would surely present more problems (I shall return to 
this topic in a later chapter). I can only conclude that both Augustus and pius have been given their closest 
possible translation, but that pius does not have a precise translation in Syriac. 
48
 Including his attention to his father-in-law and his exceptional clemency: see SHA Antoninus Pius 2.3-5. 
49
 Rendel Harris 1893:17. 
50
 In support of this, the Latin translation has rendered it conscripsit. Jerome clearly understood that Aristides 
presented a written document rather than a speech, for in his account (which, as noted, almost certainly 
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However, it is worth noting that the ‘address’ to Hadrian (   φ        δ     ) does suggest 
oratory of some form. In short, Eusebius’ account cannot conclusively prove whether or not 
the Apology was delivered in person.
51
 
Another possibility is that, as Eusebius supposes, the original apology was delivered 
to Hadrian in Athens (in some form, at least), but that the Syriac translator, writing during the 
reign of Antoninus Pius, attempted to make the speech more relevant. However, the 
Armenian version is clearly addressed to Hadrian,
52
 and the only evidence we have to suggest 
that Hadrian was not the original addressee is the single reference in the Syriac text. The most 
likely interpretation, therefore, is that the scribe may simply have inserted the wrong name.
53
 
What of the relationship between the Syriac and the original? Unfortunately, any 
conclusions will inevitably be hypothetical; we can base them only on a comparison of the 
Syriac, the Armenian translation and the Greek quotation in Barlaam and Josaphat. Josaphat 
was an Indian prince who encountered a wandering monk, Barlaam. The monk was led to 
Josaphat’s father, the king, and promptly delivered a long oration that almost exactly 
corresponds to the Syriac translation of Aristides. However, the relevant section in the Syriac 
is approximately one and a half times the length of the Greek. We are left with two possible 
interpretations: that the Syriac author modified the Greek, or that the author of Barlaam and 
Josaphat considerably reduced the original. Robinson was undecided, and pointed to the 
                                                                                                                                                        
depends upon Eusebius), he uses the term volumen (De vir. ill. 20). However, it is worth remembering that 
the dichotomy between oral and written tradition in Christian literary history is a false one (Downing 
2000:15). 
51
 Pouderon and Pierre argued that this would be extremely unlikely: if the addressee was Hadrian, then the 
attitude which is seen in the Rescript to Minucius Fundanus would have made delivery in person impossibly 
dangerous (2003:41-2), given that Christians who confessed were to be punished: for fuller discussion of the 
Rescript and the threat of persecution, see below, 5.2. 
52
 Pouderon and Pierre. 2003:306-7. They conclude that Hadrian was the addressee, and therefore date the 
Apology to 124-5 (ibid. 32).  
53
 Ibid. 35: they argued that the Syriac address to Antoninus Pius is “trop étrange pour être credible” (ibid:3 ). 
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usual reliability and accuracy of the Syriac translators; however, it is significant that the 
major expansions in the Syriac version, by and large, are found in the histories of the Greek 
gods. It may, therefore, simply be the case that the author felt that his (non-Greek) readership 
required more explanation of the doings of Classical deities. Alternatively, it may simply 
reflect a tendency of Syriac translators to expound on their source material: the Syriac 
translation of the Address to the Nations, usually attributed to Justin Martyr, is similarly one 
and a half times the length of the Greek original.
54
 Rendel Harris admitted that “a Syriac 
translator, finding an early Greek Apology and desiring to reproduce it in his own language, 
might have no scruple whatever in dealing very freely with his author, in expunging 
sentences which he was not able or did not care to translate, and in supplementing the 
original here and there out of his own resources”.55 As noted, we cannot be certain that these 
differences were not features of the original. However, in the absence of any significant 
amount of original material, I suggest that we are justified in addressing the Syriac translation 
of Aristides as a text in its own right, and comparing it with other, similar sources. For 
convenience’s sake, therefore, I shall refer to the Syriac text simply as Aristides’ Apology 
unless further clarification is needed. 
Finally, a brief note on the Christianity of Aristides’ Apology. O’Ceallaigh argued 
forcibly that the text was originally a piece of Jewish apologetic to which a later Christian 
scribe added the concluding passages on the lifestyle of Christians. This would, in 
O’Ceallaigh’s view, explain Aristides’ apparent lack of hostility towards the Jews, and the 
focus on God rather than on Christ.
56
 However, although the tone towards the Jews is indeed 
                                                 
54
Rendel Harris 1893:72. See below for further discussion. 
55
Ibid:74. 
56
 O’Ceallaigh 1958:227. On Aristides’ attitude towards the Jews, and particularly their moral practices, see 
below, 4.5.1. 
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mild, this may simply be a consequence of its early date.
57
 Furthermore, O’Ceallaigh is 
wrong to suggest that there is no hostility towards the Jews: although Aristides approves of 
their morally upstanding lifestyles, he clearly observes that the object of their worship is not 
God, but angels.
58
 Finally, O’Ceallaigh’s argument relies on the assumption that the entire 
tradition, which has the Apology addressed to Hadrian in the extant text, as well as in the 
works of Eusebius and Jerome, is mistaken, and this is immensely unlikely.
59
 
 
1.4.2   The Syriac Oration of Meliton the Philosopher
60
 
 escribed by Millar as “remarkably frustrating”,61 this is a much shorter Syriac 
apology, approximately half the length of that of Aristides. The text is found in a sixth- or 
seventh- century manuscript, along with Bardesan’s On the Laws of the Nations62 and the so-
called Letter of Mara Bar Serapion;
63
 these texts are all presented in Cureton’s 1855 
edition.
64
 The author is commonly referred to as Pseudo-Melito,
65
 on the assumption that the 
text appears to be “pretending”66 to be the apology of Melito, Bishop of Sardis, made to 
Marcus Aurelius.
67
 It is clear that the two texts are not the same: Lightfoot demonstrated this 
on the basis of tone (which in the Syriac version is considerably more hostile than the 
                                                 
57
 Rendel Harris gave the lack of hostility as a reason for preferring an early date (1893:13). If the text is to be 
dated to 124-5, then it comes only 50 years after the destruction of the temple, and before the banishment of 
the Jews from Jerusalem (which was to be renamed Aelia Capitolina) in 135, which was a major turning 
point for the relationship between Jews and Christians. See Hunt 2003:7.  
58
 Aristides 23.1. For more on the relationship between morality and the worship of God in Aristides, see below, 
4.5.1. 
59
 O’Ceallaigh “supposerait en effet un concours de circonstances assez extraordinaire” (Pouderon and Pierre 
2003:31). On whether the compliments to the Jews were part of the original apology, see ibid: 57-8. 
60
 For fuller discussion of the identity of the text, see Nichols: forthcoming.  
61
 Millar 1993:243. 
62
 On this text, and on Bardesan himself, see Drijvers 1966, 1970 and 1971. 
63
 The Letter of Mara Bar Serapion has received coverage in a recent volume edited by Merz and Tieleman 
(2012). 
64
 My own translation of the Syriac is found in the appendices, and all chapter references are taken from that 
translation. 
65
 Lightfoot, in her two articles on the text, does so consistenctly (2007, 2009), as does Kaizer, in his brief 
discussion of the Euhemeristic account of the origin of local cults (2006:35ff). 
66
 Kaizer 2008a:1. 
67
 This apology exists only in fragments transmitted by Eusebius (Church History 4.26). 
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respectful Greek apology), content and style, none of which match.
68
 I do not intend to repeat 
Lightfoot’s arguments, which were thorough and conclusive; however, I do intend to 
demonstrate that it is unnecessary to associate the two authors in the first place. This 
perceived association is based entirely on the similarities in both addressee and author. The 
author of the Syriac gives his name as mylyṭwn pylswpʼ (‘Meliton the philosopher’), while the 
Greek apologist is given as Μ λ    .69 However, in neither text is the addressee clear: 
according to Eusebius, the Greek was addressed               ,70 who is understood to be 
Antoninus Verus (or Marcus Aurelius); in similar fashion, the Syriac gives the addressee as 
ʼntwnynws qsr. However, ‘Antoninus Caesar’ does not necessarily refer to Marcus Aurelius, 
for it could refer to any one of a number of emperors: Antoninus Pius, Marcus Aurelius, 
Commodus, Caracalla, or Elagabalus.
71
 On two occasions in the text, the emperor’s children 
are mentioned;
72
 it is possible that the sons are Commodus and Annius Verus, but since the 
latter died young, this is less likely. Far more probable is that ʼntwnynws qsr refers to 
Antoninus Pius, and the ‘sons’ to his adopted children, Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus. 
This conclusion would give the text a still earlier date, and make the association with the 
Bishop of Sardis still more tentative. We are left with two possible conclusions: either one 
accepts that there were indeed two Melitos who wrote separate addresses to (possibly) 
different Antonine emperors, or one concludes that a later scribe, based on the reference 
within the text to ʼntwnynws qsr (‘Antoninus Caesar’), presumed that this was the lost 
                                                 
68
 For Lightfoot’s thorough analysis of these areas, see 2007:59-60. See also Jacobi 1856:107-8. Lightfoot 
argued that the original language of the Oration was Syriac (2007:77); however, there are a number of close 
similarities between Meliton’s text and the LXX text of Wisdom of Solomon, with a number of key phrases 
appearing in both works. From this we must deduce that Meliton was at least familiar with Greek (and the 
LXX), even if this does not mean that he wrote in Greek. On the Wisdom of Solomon, see Grabbe 2003 and 
Laudun 1983. 
69
 Note that in Syriac final n is often omitted in latinisation of the script, as is the case with Greek final  . 
70
 Euseb. Hist. eccl. 4.26.2. 
71
 Lightfoot (ibid:61) discusses all these possibilities. Although Jacobi favoured Caracalla or Elagabalus 
(1856:107), either of these would be unlikely; as I shall demonstrate below, an early date for the text is 
preferable, and the reference to the sons of the emperor would seem to exclude these two. 
72
 Meliton 9.5, 10.2. 
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apology of Melito of Sardis and added the title mylyṭwn pylswpʼ (‘Meliton the Philosopher’), 
to the introductory and concluding paragraphs, which are the only instances in which the 
name is given at all.
73
 The Syriac author certainly makes no claim to associate himself with 
Melito of Sardis; referring to himself as a pylswpʼ does not appear to me to suggest that he 
viewed himself within the Church hierarchy.
74
 Similarly, he does not claim that his work is an 
   λ    : this has a Syriac equivalent, mpq brwḥʾ (which Aristides uses to describe his 
Apology). Meliton, however, uses mʾmrʾ, which is simply a speech with no legal setting, or 
even an element of defence. Either way, I see no reason to assume that the Syriac author was 
“sheltering behind Meliton’s [sc. the Bishop of Sardis’] name”.75 Rather than Pseudo-Melito, 
therefore, I refer to him as Meliton (as I have done in the heading of this section), to 
distinguish the Syriac author from the Bishop of Sardis. 
What of the date of the text? If one accepts the conclusion that the subject of the 
Oration is either Antoninus Pius or Marcus Aurelius, then one must conclude a mid- to late- 
second-century date, although Millar suggested that it was perhaps written in the early third 
century.
76
 Other than this, there is no internal evidence at all for the date (a subject Lightfoot 
largely avoided). As Lightfoot pointed out, however, there is no reference whatsoever to 
persecution within the text. This would suggest either an early (pre-third century) or late 
(probably post-Constantinian) date: any date after the late second or early third century would 
                                                 
73
 Lightfoot admitted this possibility, but gave it no further attention: she favoured the interpretation of a 
pseudonymous claim on the author’s part (2007:61). 
74
 Kaizer suggested that the use of pylswpʼ (philosopher) may indicate that the text was written soon after its 
model, the apology of the Melito of Sardis, became known in the Near East (2006:33). However, pylswpʼ is 
by no means a rare title (Lightfoot 2007:60): the Syriac translator of Aristides gives this as his own title. 
Furthermore, in the case of Meliton, there is no need to ascribe deliberate pseudonymity at all. 
75
 Lightfoot 2007:60. Lightfoot does not go into great detail on the reasons why the author might make a 
pseudonymous claim, merely stating that he “wanted his work to appear to emanate from one of the 
apologists who spoke of Christianity in such terms, perhaps because their audience also had philosophic 
pretensions” (ibid:60). Again, however, one would expect much greater similarity between the pretensions of 
the Syriac Meliton and the (admittedly fragmentary) Greek of Melito of Sardis. 
76
 Millar 1993:243. Kaizer (2006:33) endorsed this possibility, although Drijvers put it in the second half of the 
second century (1996:173). 
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surely refer to increased persecutions.
77
 In the latter case, one would expect more formalised 
reference to Christian doctrine, another feature which, as Lightfoot observed, is entirely 
lacking; nor is there any note of Christianity triumphant, which we might expect at such a late 
date. This makes a second-century date for the text far from implausible.
78
 
The addressee, as discussed, is imprecise at best. However, it is far from clear that the 
text was ever delivered to an emperor.
79
 Lightfoot discussed this in considerable detail, and 
concluded that no emperor was ever involved, and that the emperor’s name was added as an 
advertisement, in order to give the text rhetorical weight. This raises further questions. 
Assuming (as is likely) that Lightfoot is correct in her conclusion, is the text to be understood 
as internal or external (that is, addressed to Christians or gentiles)? If we consider the three 
features of internal text which Johnson highlighted, and which were discussed above (namely 
staying in touch with one another; instructing or educating; or defining group identity), then 
we see that none of these features are present in the text; indeed, so limited is reference to 
Christian thought that Lightfoot drew attention to similarities with Philo and questioned 
                                                 
77
 For discussion of the dates of Christian persecution, see Clark 2004, and especially the debate of Sherwin-
White (1964) and de Ste Croix (1963/1964). For fuller discussion of the motivations behind these 
persecutions, see below, 5.2-4. Cameron claimed that the second century became a “battleground” in which 
Christians struggled to control their discourse (1991:25), but this does not necessarily suggest that this 
battleground was founded upon persecution. Although Hunt argued that Christianity in the second century 
was “forced underground by frequent persecution” (2003:1), this is clearly not the case. This does not imply 
that persecution did not occur, or that it was particularly rare, but that it was sporadic rather than systematic 
until the reign of Decius (Beard, North and Price 1998a:237-8; Rives 2007:199; see also Keresztes 1964 for 
more on the sporadic pattern of legal trials in the second century). Indeed, the persecution of Christians 
under Marcus Aurelius, for example at Lyons in AD 177 (Euseb. Hist. eccl. 5:1), was such that this may be 
another reason for preferring Antoninus Pius, and not Marcus Aurelius, as the addressee. 
78
 Although the majority of extent Syriac texts (such as the writings of Ephrem or Bardesan) were created 
during, or after, the third century, Drijvers suggested that, by the end of the second century, Syriac 
Christianity, particularly centred around Edessa, was already a “many-colored pattern” (1982b:175). It is 
conceivable that a text like Meliton’s Oration could have formed part of this pattern. 
79
 Lightfoot (2007:63) calls the situation “at best ill-defined, at worst implausible”.  espite her reservations 
about the addressee, Lightfoot continued to treat the attempt to convert an emperor as one of the most 
strikingly novel, and brash, features of the text (ibid:62). See also Palmer 1983:237, who argued that 
although apologies may have been addressed to emperors, it is impossible to consider them wholly as 
petitions setting out the legal basis of Christianity. 
 29 
 
whether we might consider a Jewish authorship for the work.
80
 However, the consistent 
presence of key words, such as šrrʾ (‘truth’) and ṭybwtʾ (‘grace’), which would become 
important terms in the Syriac church,
81
 together with apocalyptic themes which are strongly 
emphasised throughout, would strongly imply a Christian authorship.  
Lightfoot has also raised questions about Meliton’s textual integrity: she argued that 
the central section, which consists of a series of short Euhemeristic historiolae,
82
 may have 
been a later addition by a scribe. I shall discuss this conclusion below,
83
 but I wish to 
highlight the fact that both Kaizer and Lightfoot have focussed their studies of the text on 
these historiolae at the expense of the text as a whole;
84
 I intend to deal with the text in its 
entirety as far as possible. 
 
1.4.3  Tatian’s Address to the Greeks  
The Address to the Greeks (henceforth Address) is a second-century text written in 
Greek by Tatian, the pupil of Justin Martyr; the text is found in Whittaker’s 1982 edition and 
Markovic’s 1995 edition.85 It is an extensive philosophical exploration of Christianity that 
sets it up as a philosophy to rival the schools of the gentile world, which Tatian claims to 
have dabbled in. It also deals extensively with gentile cults and myths in a variety of forms, 
while there is also considerable discussion of Christian theology, and a determined attempt to 
demonstrate that Moses was older than Homer (and that he was thus imbued with more 
                                                 
80
 Lightfoot 2007:66. 
81
 This may of course be put forward as an argument for proposing a later date for the text; however, there is no 
way of knowing how far such terms were in common usage by the end of the second century, and so this 
does not necessarily discredit the early date I have tentatively proposed. 
82
 This is her word to describe the short stories on the origin of cults.  
83
 Below, 3.2.1 
84
 Lightfoot insisted that this was the “real curiosity” of the text (2007:59). Kaizer, in his admittedly brief 
discussion of the text, similarly focussed almost exclusively on the central section on local cult, despite 
acknowledging that the remainder constitutes the “longest and very wordy” part of the text (2006:35). 
85
 All references are to Whittaker’s 1982 edition. 
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authority). The Address is the most extensive of Tatian’s work still extant: he was, however, 
better known as the author of the Diatessaron, the harmony of the gospels which became the 
main text used by the Syriac church.
86
 
The Address would appear to be easier to date than either Meliton’s Oration or 
Aristides’ Apology, because we know more of Tatian himself: he lived from AD 120-180, 
and studied in Rome under Justin Martyr (c. 100 - c. 165). However, there is considerable 
debate about when exactly the Address was written. Grant argued that it must have been 
written after late 176 (possibly in 177 or 178),
 
based on an allusion to the emperor’s paying a 
salary to philosophers.
87
 However, the amount named (six hundred gold pieces) does not 
match the amount which the Historia Augusta suggests was given,
88
 and would therefore 
require scribal error; equally, we know of several other emperors whose habit it was to give 
philosophers stipends,
89
 and so the allusion to this sum should not be taken as evidence of a 
date in 177 or 178. It has widely been concluded that there is insufficient internal evidence 
for dating the text;
90
 possibly the only satisfactory evidence is found in an allusion to the 
philosopher Crescens, who was seeking to put Tatian and Justin to death.
91
 Although 
Crescens was successful in having Justin executed, there is no evidence in the text that he had 
already achieved this when the Address was written, or Tatian would presumably have 
                                                 
86
 Hunt claimed that the creation of the Diatessaron was due to Tatian’s objection to the internal inconsistency 
of the gospels (2003:16); see also Hawthorne 1964:164. Hawthorne argued that, such was the importance of 
the Diatessaron, we might even view Tatian as the founder of Assyrian Christianity (ibid: 165). On the 
relationship between the Diatessaron and the Dura fragment, see below, 5.4. 
87
 Tatian Or. 19.1; see Grant 1953:99-100. He also argued that the discussion of bodily resurrection (Tatian Or. 
6.2) may be an allusion to the martyrdoms at Lyons in 177, and that the Address should be considered part of 
a small body of material published in response to these events (including the Martyrdom of Polycarp and 
Athenagoras’ Embassy (Grant 1953:99). However, there is no evidence within the text to support this 
position, and little discussion of persecution at all (Clark 1967:123). 
88
 SHA Marcus 7.6-7. 
89
 SHA Hadrian 16.8; SHA Ant. Pius 11.3; SHA Alex. Sev. 44.4. The second-century emperors were “notorious” 
for this practice (Clark 1967:124). 
90
 Hunt 2003:3; see also Clark 1967:128. Puech argued a date of 172 (1903:8-9; 1912:151), but there is still less 
evidence for this.  
91
 Tatian Or. 19.1. 
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mentioned it. Hunt argued that, since Justin was executed in c. 165, we may tentatively place 
the writing of the Address before this date.
92
 
The date of the Address is critical for our understanding of Tatian’s relationship with 
Christianity.
93
 It is commonly accepted, based on Irenaeus’ Against Heresies, that soon after 
Justin’s martyrdom Tatian abandoned Rome and seceded from the church.94 Irenaeus accused 
Tatian of a Valentinian focus on invisible aeons, of rejecting marriage as fornication,
95
 and of 
denying the salvation of Adam. However, there are reasons to challenge the assumption that 
Tatian was a heretic, at least at the time of the writing of the Address. Tatian’s own student, 
Rhodo, is presented by Eusebius as a model of orthodoxy, vigorously challenging the 
heresies of Marcion;
96
 in the process, Rhodo presented Tatian himself as orthodox. Secondly, 
if Hunt is right to date the Address to before Justin’s death, then according to the tradition 
based on Irenaeus, Tatian was not considered heretical at the time that he wrote the 
Address.
97
 
Given that Tatian wrote in Greek, and that the Address was probably written in Rome, 
are we justified in associating this with other ‘Eastern’ texts? For the following reasons, I 
                                                 
92
 Hunt 2003:3. 
93
 Some scholars are more sceptical of this relationship than others: Hawthorne, for instance, argued that, but for 
an allusion to the incarnation, and another to the suffering Christ, one might miss the fact that Tatian was a 
Christian (1964:161). 
94
 Irenaeus Adv. haer. 1.28. 
95
 Grant attempted to identify the source of this accusation, and claimed to find it in the mockery of the ethical 
conduct of the gods (Tatian Or. 8.1-2; see Grant 1954:64). However, there is nothing here to suggest an 
association of marriage and fornication; indeed, the two are kept quite separate. 
96
 Euseb. Hist. eccl. 5.14. On Rhodo and Tatian, see Elze 1960:113-6. 
97
 Although Whittaker argued that it is possible he seceded in 150 (1982:ix), based on Epiphanius (Panarion 
1.3.46). There is insufficient evidence to challenge the Irenaeus tradition, however. Hunt strongly challenged 
the position that we should view Tatian as heretical at all, partly because, at a time with such doctrinal 
fluidity, it was very difficult to identify orthodoxy and heresy at all (2003:13); see also Clark 2004:2. For 
discussion of Tatian’s heresy, see Hunt 2003:10-19, Hawthorne 1964:165-7 and Grant 1954. Clark argued 
that, although accusations of heresy may have formed part of internal power struggles, they also brought into 
focus key beliefs (2004:23). 
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suggest that we are. Firstly, Tatian identifies himself, not as a Westerner,
98 but as an Assyrian 
(                  ῇ               ῇ).99  There is disagreement as to the precise meaning of 
this word: Fergus Millar has argued that it simply means he originated from the Roman 
province of Syria (that is, west of the Euphrates),
100
 although Whittaker argued that 
‘Assyrian’ meant precisely that, and that he was from the East of the Euphrates.101 Given his 
identification of his addressees specifically as ‘Greek’ (for more on which, see below), it is 
tempting to agree with Whittaker. However, On the Syrian Goddess, commonly attributed to 
Lucian, describes its author as           if the attribution is correct, then we know that 
Lucian hailed from Samosata, in the former kingdom of Commagene, and therefore West of 
the Euphrates.
102
 Ultimately, however, Tatian’s precise point of origin is unimportant 
compared with his perspective: being ‘Assyrian’ is an important part of his self-identification 
as        β  β      φ λ   φ  ,103 and, in this context, self-identification is just as 
important as the actual historical reality.
104
 It seems fair to give Tatian at least the benefit of 
                                                 
98
 ‘Westerner’ in this context meaning an inhabitant of the Greek-speaking world of the Mediterranean, rather 
than the Western regions of the Empire. 
99
 Tatian Or. 42.1: ‘for I was born in the land of the Assyrian’. 
100
 Millar 1993:227  “was he in origin therefore a Syriac- or Aramaic-speaking ‘Oriental’ from outside the 
Roman Empire? Not at all. ‘Assyria’ and ‘Assyrioi’ were common terms for Syria and its inhabitants, which 
is why, like so many other people from that area, he had a name which is in origin Latin, with an extended 
ending, and transliterated into Greek”. Millar followed N ldeke, who argued that the distinction between 
      ,       and          was inconsequential: “an beiden Gegenden haftet denn auch der Name der 
Assyrer und Syrer zum deutlichen Zeichen, dass beide Formen dasselbe bedeuten” (1891:   ). These 
arguments depend upon Herodotus’ claim that ‘Syrian’ is simply a Greek synonym for the Assyrians’ self-
designation:       δ           λλ       λ             ,     δ      β  β                λ       
(‘they are called ‘Syrians’ by the Greeks, and ‘Assyrians’ by foreigners’, Hist. 7.63). On Tatian as Syrian, 
see also Drijvers 1982b:172. 
101
 Whittaker 1982:ix.  
102
 Lucian makes the claim in Hist. conscr. 24; for a fuller discussion of the attribution, see Lightfoot 2003:184-
208. See also below, 1.5.1. 
103
 Tatian Or. 42.1: ‘one who is a philosopher amongst the barbarians’. 
104
 As observed above, in another context Millar himself argued that “the question of ascribed identity, of 
belonging or not to some identifiable group persisting through time, is of crucial importance to what the 
population of the Roman Near East was. The question is not a factual one, of actual biological descent 
(which is both wholly unanswerable and of limited importance anyway) but of identity and ‘ethnicity’” 
(1993:5). Similarly, Andrade argued that many Near Easterners advertised their Hellenism through adhering 
to Greek cultural norms rather than through actual biological descent (2010:350). The same suggestion may 
be said to apply here. What matters in this context is not Tatian’s biological descent, but his claim to be an 
Assyrian writing to Greeks. See also Butcher 2003:337.  
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the doubt until it can be shown that his is a ‘Western’ text. Secondly, and far more 
importantly, the Address is directed at the Greeks (  δ    λλ    ).
105
 However, it is not clear 
whether ‘Greeks’ here refers to ‘gentiles’ (as in the case of Augustine’s City of God, for 
example),
106
 or ‘to the inhabitants of the Greek world’. The overwhelming focus on   δ    
 λλ    , repeated frequently throughout the text, suggests that it is used as a synonym for 
both Greeks and Romans, although the Romans are mentioned by name on numerous 
occasions.
107
 However, it is most implausible that ‘Greeks’ was intended to exclude Romans: 
as Whittaker pointed out, Tatian was certainly not making a racial distinction between Greeks 
and Romans.
108 
The distinction is racial only in the sense that the Christians are now defined 
as a new race,
109
 and the border is drawn along those lines.
110
 In short, I suggest that the 
  δ    Ἓλλ     should be understood as ‘gentiles who live in the Greek- or Latin-speaking 
regions of the empire’: Tatian’s focus on Greece in contrast to the Barbarians, of whom he is 
one, strongly implies that he cannot mean ‘gentiles everywhere’. 
                                                 
105
 This argument does not imply a firm racial distinction between ‘Western’ Greeks and ‘Eastern’ Syrians: as 
noted above, it is impossible to draw such a distinction (1.2). ‘Syrian’ can encompass everyone who lives in 
Syria, whether the descendant of a colonist of a Hellenised native (Sartre 2008:29). Frye has suggested that 
Greek use of the word ‘Syrian’ was based on the distinctive use of Aramaic as a lingua franca (1992:282); 
however, it is abundantly clear from bilingual epigraphy that there is no evidence for a separate ‘Aramaic’ or 
‘Syrian’ culture.  Andrade has discussed at length the complexity in the use of ‘Greek’ as a racial label; he 
argued that “people of Syrian ethnic origin often classified themselves as both Greek and Syrian” 
(2010:343), and that the concept of what it meant to be ‘Greek’ could be redefined to include a number of 
seemingly Aramaic cultural characteristics (ibid:350). If this is accepted, however, it is even more significant 
that Tatian does not identify himself as a Greek. In a society where one could happily be both Syrian and 
Greek, setting the two up in opposition, as Tatian does, gives considerable weight to the argument that he 
was writing as a self-perceived outsider, whether or not that distinction existed in reality. 
106
 It is occasionally used in this sense in the New Testament: in Acts 16:1, for example, Timothy’s mother, who 
is a believer, is contrasted with his father, who is a Greek. 
107
 See e.g. Tatian Or. 19.1, 28.1, 35.1-2. I suggest that Tatian mentions Romans in these instances primarily for 
the purposes of rhetorical variety: for example, it is significant that in his rejection of  ῇ         
    λ           ῇ               λ     (‘Roman arrogance and cold Athenian logic’, 35.2), Tatian 
distinguishes between Romans and Athenians, not Romans and Greeks. Christians in the East attempted to 
relate to Greek, rather than Roman, identity if they wished to move into mainstream cultural and social life 
(Edwards et al. 1999:2). See also Young 1999:85. 
108
 Whittaker 1982:xii. 
109
 As in the case of the Syriac translator of Aristides, who distinguishes between Greeks, Barbarians, Jews and 
Christians (3.2). 
110
 This is in keeping with Andrade’s observation that in the time of Josephus, distinctions between Greek and 
Syrian were blurred, and the line was instead drawn between Gentile and Jew (2010:350). 
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Regardless of the precise identity of the   δ     λλ    , Tatian’s relationship to 
them is clear: he portrays himself as an outsider to the world of his addressees, both 
spiritually and geographically.
111
 In this sense, Tatian’s text serves as the perfect compromise 
between eastern and western sources: a text written by an Easterner, but addressed to 
Westerners. As a result, I argue that it is perfectly legitimate to compare Tatian with Aristides 
and Meliton, as each is written (or translated) by an Easterner and addressed (technically, at 
least) to non-Near Easterners, be that an emperor or the wider gentile community at large. 
 
1.4.4  Other Christian sources 
As mentioned above, I focus on these three sources because they fit three specific 
categories: they are of an early (second-century) date, they are addressed to outsiders (at least 
ostensibly), and they are written (or expanded) by inhabitants of the Near East. There is a 
huge abundance of other texts which do not fit all three categories: for example, much of the 
other literary output of the Syriac church, amongst which Ephrem is the most prominent, 
dates considerably later than this. Such texts may nonetheless prove to be useful in 
elaborating the portrayal of the gentile world that we find in Eastern Christianity. There are a 
number of other Syriac texts which I do not intend to deal with to any great degree: these 
texts include the Acts of Mar Mari the Apostle and the collection of Syriac martyr acts.
112
 
These cover a broad time span, and do not fulfill the three criteria established above: the 
dates in particular make them problematic for the purposes of this dissertation. For the same 
reasons, New Testament sources will play only a limited role: they are internal and hortatory 
                                                 
111
 This is reinforced by Tatian’s self-identification both as an Assyrian and as a barbarian, a traditional 
‘outsider’ to the Greek world. 
112
 These include the Martyrdom of Habbib the Deacon and the Martyrdom of the Holy Confessors Shamuna 
and Guria. As noted, these texts, along with Mar Mari, are significantly later: for example, Harrak dates 
Mar Mari to the late sixth century, albeit cautiously (2005:xiv), while Burkitt dated the death of Habbib to 
310 and Shamuna and Guria to 309 (1913:29-30). Nevertheless, it will be important to compare them when 
appropriate in order to identify the development of Christian attitudes to the religious world around them. 
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texts, rather than being directed towards the non-Christian world. However, they may help to 
construct a picture of general Christian attitudes of the period towards certain features of 
gentile religious life. Therefore I will use a number of the letters that are addressed to 
communities in the eastern half of the empire (in particular 1 Peter). On occasion our authors 
make specific reference to the New Testament, but these exceptions aside, excessive reliance 
on this material will inevitably lead to a view of Christianity which focusses on its unity and 
consistent doctrinal ideas, which, as I argued above, would not be the case at this early date. 
 
1.5  Non-Christian sources 
1.5.1  Lucian of Samosata 
The most prominent author (in terms of output) on religious life in the Near East is 
Lucian of Samosata. Very little of his work is a discussion of religious life in the same way as 
the Christian material, although On the Syrian Goddess is an extended discussion of the 
origin of the cult of Atargatis at Hierapolis, and as such will be the most important of his 
works for the purposes of comparison (particularly since, as will be seen, Meliton, refers 
explicitly to the cult at Hierapolis). However, much of Lucian’s satirical work deals with key 
religious themes such as sacrifice and the powers of the gods: these works will therefore be 
very important for comparing his attitude with those of the Christian authors. The importance 
of Lucian is found in the fact that, like Tatian, he identifies himself as an Assyrian
113
: he 
claims to hail from Samosata, as noted above. Unlike Tatian, however, his Syrian origin does 
not prevent him from claiming Greek identity.
114
 As a result, he interprets cult “in a perfectly 
                                                 
113
 He makes this explicit at the start of On the Syrian Goddess:    φ  δ               (‘I myself that write 
am an Assyrian’, Syr. D. 1, tr. Lightfoot). 
114
 Sartre 2008:47. 
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Hellenocentric way”.115 Lucian’s satire has caused discomfort to some scholars: as Richter 
noted, we must not assume that “the many voices of Lucian’s dialogues are each somehow 
Lucian’s own”.116 The criticism is raised against those who would construct a biography of 
Lucian from his text, but applies equally here. Furthermore, MacMullen insisted that 
Lucian’s work was “quite ill-suited to the demands of our curiosity”.117 MacMullen raised the 
same objection to Apuleius and Aelius Aristides, both of whom will appear frequently in this 
thesis. MacMullen’s arguments were based on the principle that none of them give an 
accurate reflection of religious practice. However, as I shall demonstrate below, I am 
primarily concerned with how authors perceived local religious life: Lucian, Apuleius and 
Aelius Aristides are extremely useful in achieving this purpose. 
One final observation needs to be made on the subject of Lucian’s On the Syrian 
Goddess: Lightfoot has convincingly demonstrated that the work is a skilled imitation of 
Herodotus, adopting his “dialect, style and mannerisms… to describe its subject”.118 Given 
this, it is clear that we must exercise caution in assessing Lucian’s treatment of cult: we must 
at all times ask how much this treatment depends upon his model and not his own 
viewpoint.
119
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
115
 Ibid. 45. See also Lightfoot 2003:87. 
116
 Richter 2005:76. 
117
 MacMullen 1981:9. 
118
 Lightfoot 2003:88. 
119
 Although Kaizer argued that Lucian nevertheless needed to provide a realistic picture, even if details are 
often rather tongue-in-cheek (2008a:27). 
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1.5.2  Philo of Byblos’ Phoenician History 
A key author for the perception of certain areas of religious life is the first- or early 
second-century AD Euhemeristic writer Philo of Byblos.
120
  His Phoenician History, which 
exists only as quoted by Eusebius in his Preparation for Evangelism,
121
 tells a series of 
stories of the origins of the cults of the gods in cities throughout the region. These stories, he 
claims, are a simple translation of the work of the Phoenician author Sanchuniathon. As such, 
it will be useful comparative material for the similar Euhemeristic sections of Aristides and 
Meliton;
122
 it is, however, limited in its treatment of the practical and theological functioning 
of these cults, and therefore offers less to this dissertation than Lucian, since it tells us little of 
local religious attitudes. Indeed, perhaps the most prominent feature in this respect is the 
evidence of Euhemerism as a phenomenon in its own right. Similarly, if Sanchuniathon was 
indeed a real figure and the source of Philo’s work,123 his antiquity is such that the 
Phoenician History is less useful as directly comparable material.
124
 
 
 
 
                                                 
120
 For a fuller discussion of Philo’s fragmentary bibliography, see Baumgarten 1981:31-5; Philo was probably 
born under Nero but survived to write about Hadrian. 
121
 “By surveying the pagan religions, Eusebius hopes to show that the Christians acted correctly in deserting 
them… Eusebius will demonstrate the error of paganism by quoting the works of believers in paganism” 
(Baumgarten 1981:36). I cite the text given by Brill’s New Jacoby, translated and edited by Kaldellis and 
López. 
122
 The Euhemeristic approach, which claimed that the gods were originally men given divine honours in 
recognition of the benefits which they gave to mankind, is far from uncommon, especially in Christian 
literature. Klauck argued that we see the same tendency in the association of Paul and Barnabas with Hermes 
and Zeus by the Lystrians in Acts 14:8-13 (Klauck 2000:12). Spyridakis argued that this was the logical 
outcome of “the rationalistic tendencies of the Hellenistic world which had witnessed the superhuman 
achievement and subsequent deification of Alexander” (1968:337). Nevertheless, the approach is not always 
popular: Plutarch accused Euhemerus of atheism (Mor. 360a), an attack which Baumgarten attributed to the 
similarity between Euhemerism and Plutarch’s allegorising approach (1996:97-99). 
123
 A claim which was questioned by Baumgarten (1981:2): he discussed at length Philo and Porphyry’s 
accounts of Sanchuniathon (ibid. 41-93). 
124
 Although its date does not make it incomparable: as I shall demonstrate below, it is legitimate to use source 
material from different periods for this purpose. On the issues presented by the text, see Millar 1993:277-
279. 
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1.5.3  Other sources 
It is impossible to comprehensively list here the number of other sources which I will 
make use of in this study. I also intend to make limited use of a range of Latin and Greek 
sources from the Western world. These include, but are not limited to, Plato, Aristophanes, 
Plutarch, Cicero, Varro, Livy, Tacitus, and Seneca.
125
 It may appear problematic to use 
western Latin and Greek sources to understand the perception of religious life in the Near 
East.
126
 However, as discussed above, it is clear that we should not form a clear distinction 
between ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ forms of religion.127 Certainly, the deities involved change, 
and certain features of rite, mythology or iconography vary (considerably, at times),
128
 but 
this variation nonetheless covers a set of core religious systems that shared familiar features. 
As an example, the alleged tendency towards aniconic imagery in the Near East, which 
certain scholars argued was characteristic of the region,
129
 might seem unusual to those used 
to anthropomorphic statues of Jupiter or Minerva, but they would certainly recognise the 
desire to honour the deity, to provide them with sacrifice, and to pray to them for goods or 
blessings. Certainly, as will be demonstrated, similar attitudes in this respect are shared by 
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 Each of these must be treated independently; we cannot, for example, treat the writings of Seneca and 
Aristophanes as immediately comparable, since each has an entirely different purpose. Furthermore, as 
Gradel observed, philosophical treatises in particular can be particularly troublesome in reconstructing an 
image of religious life (2002:2). 
126
 As Davies observed, in studying these texts we need to “reconstruct the cultural knowledge that informed the 
text in antiquity” (200 :2), and this cultural context will differ from text to text. 
127
 It is virtually impossible to identify ‘Near Eastern’ religion as we might with ‘Greek’ or ‘Roman’ religion 
(Kaizer 2008a:2). Teixidor argued that religion in the cities of the east was characterised by a piety largely 
absent from the Greek and Roman world, and epitomised by the prominence of mystery in local inscriptions 
(1979:ix). However, this is a rather simplistic interpretation: see below (n.132) for the danger in talking 
about ‘belief’ or ‘piety’ in this sense; on the dangers of characterising ‘mystery cults’ in this manner, see 
below, 3.3.4. 
128
 These differences are very often due to the difference in Hellenistic assimilation achieved by local 
populations (ibid. 8). Friedland uses this difference to explain the variety of artistic styles found in the Near 
East: most depictions reveal an interest “not in wholesale assimilation (as we see in the larger coastal cities 
of Palestine and the nearby Decapolis city of Philadelphia/Amman in Arabia), but in negotiating between 
their native religion and that of their Roman rulers” (2008:3 1-2).  
129
 See above, 1.2.1. 
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Philo and Pliny, or Lucian and Livy.
130
 There is nothing inappropriate about applying 
characteristics of one to the other, as long as variations in local conditions are borne in 
mind.
131
 As noted above, there is no sense in which an indigenous ‘Semitic’ world (and 
particularly in the religious sense) can be compared to or contrasted with a Hellenistic one 
which intruded and suppressed it:
132
 it is therefore legitimate to use sources from different 
areas, particularly since Meliton, Tatian and the Syriac translator of Aristides do not appear to 
distinguish between local religious life and religious life at large. 
The same may be said of different chronological periods. As well as first- and second-
century sources, I also intend to use sources of considerably earlier dates, albeit with certain 
restrictions. These include the Homeric poems, Plato, Xenophanes and Aristophanes. It might 
be argued that these texts have little value in clarifying the religious context of early 
Christianity, but there is no evidence that key religious conditions had changed sufficiently to 
make them inapplicable: many of the themes found in Plato or Aristophanes, for example, 
                                                 
130
 Alston made the point that use of Latin sources in this context tends to a Romano-centric view of the Near 
East (2007:1): however, his argument applies to the socio-political conditions of the region, and not to 
religious life, which appears to remain consistent. 
131
 Trombley was extremely critical of the mixing of evidence, “as though Greek, Latin, Arabic, Aramaic, 
Egyptian, and Armenian religiosity conformed to some quasi-uniform standard of “Graeco-Roman” 
polytheism that was invariably interchangeable and homogenous” (1993a:xi). Trombley’s point is a good 
one, but it does not mean that such evidence cannot be compared: it simply means we must be careful in 
doing so. On the differences between cult (particularly civic cult) in the East and West, see Beard, North and 
Price 1998a:339ff. 
132
 A brief example may further demonstrate some of the problems in assuming a contrast between ‘alien’ Greek 
and indigenous religious culture. An inscription near the Great Colonnade at Apamea, although fragmentary, 
reads ‘...on the orders of (the) Greatest God, Sacred Belos, Aur(elios) Belios Philippos, priest and successor 
in Apamea of the Epikoureioi’ (see Rey-Coquais 1973:66ff). Not only does this refer to ‘Bel’, the 
Babylonian supreme deity, but the priest mentioned identifies himself with a combination of Greek 
(Aurelios... Philippos) and Semitic (Belios) names. The mention of the ‘Epicureans’, although there is no 
previous evidence of an Epicurean school at Apamea (see Millar 1993:263), shows interaction between two 
apparently different elements, in the Greek Epicurean school and the indigenous deity Bel, but the author has 
no qualms about expressing both elements simultaneously; the name of the priest also implies that there was 
no apparent stigma in his use of a Semitic name such as ‘Belio’, albeit transliterated into Greek. This 
suggests that the writer was expressing his identity as an adherent of the indigenous god Bel whilst 
simultaneously subscribing to a Graeco-Roman cultural feature; the two are not in contrast, and there is 
certainly no suggestion that one ‘suppressed’ the other. It is clearly not possible to draw such a firm 
distinction between ‘East’ and ‘West’: the author of this inscription did not see it in those terms, and as such 
I argue that it is perfectly legitimate to use sources from both ‘halves’ of the Empire. 
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continue to resonate in the second century AD. Not only this, but, as I shall demonstrate, the 
Near Eastern Christian texts occasionally allude directly to such works, and to Plato in 
particular. 
 
1.6  Other types of evidence 
It will be observed that the majority of the evidence used in this thesis is literary. 
Ando argued that studies with an exclusively literary focus produce a limited and misleading 
effect.
133
 Firstly, however, it is not strictly true to say that my focus is exclusively literary: 
given the limited availability of literary sources on religious life in the Roman Near East, I 
will also deal with archaeological, iconographical and particularly epigraphic sources. 
Secondly, this dissertation is concerned primarily with the perception of religious life, rather 
than its factual reality.
134
  For example, in accounts of walking statues, there is almost 
certainly some mechanical trickery at work.
135
 However, for the purpose at hand, it is far 
more significant that our sources perceived it to be possible that a statue would walk, sweat, 
talk or bleed than whether or not it actually did.
136
 This tension is particularly prominent in 
our historical authors, because they consistently raise issues surrounding omens, as I shall 
discuss below. In these cases, the question is not ‘did this omen actually occur in reality?’ but 
‘what is the significance of the fact that our author has raised it at this point?’ In this regard, it 
                                                 
133
 Such studies “tend to develop theories that privilege discursive interpretations of ritual over and against 
cognition-in-performance” (Ando 2008:xiii). These are not the only problems raised in a textual approach: 
these texts come from “not only a tiny minority within the whole population but one whose members 
generally felt themselves to be different from the majority, different in culture, sometimes aggressively so” 
(MacMullen 1981:9). See also Keel and Uehlinger 1998:10-11: such approaches “ought to get little or no 
hearing”. 
134
 Lieu (200 :8) observed that a textual approach has an additional value in “warning us against looking for 
some essential and abiding reality independent of the texts”, although she acknowledged that texts tend to 
privilege the understanding of the literary elite. 
135
 See below, 3.2.1.1; see also Weddle 2010:91-2 for fuller discussion. 
136
 “The first assumption appears to be one of divine involvement in the vocal communication of images, over 
and above any desire to raise the kinds of questions implied in accusations of religious fraud” (ibid:101). See 
also MacMullen 1984:22, Engberg 2007:23. 
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is significant that Christian authors deal almost entirely with the perception of gentile 
religion, rather than its reality.
137
 They do argue that, for example, it is clearly impossible for 
statues to move, or feed themselves: but for this claim to make any sense at all it relies 
entirely on the assumption that their audience perceived that they could. This is an important 
distinction that will become more apparent during close study of the texts in question. It 
should be noted that, when I discuss the religious mentality of these authors, I am not 
interested in what our ancient authors ‘believed’: ‘belief’ is a word that causes considerable 
discomfort in Classical scholars.
138
 I do not intend to debate whether or not Livy or Lucian 
‘believed’ the gods would respond to sacrifice, as this is a question that is unlikely to yield a 
helpful answer. Instead, this study focusses on our authors’ understanding of the theology and 
practice of daily religious life.
139
 
 
 
                                                 
137
  rijvers highlighted this as a limitation of using Christian source material: “attacks by Christian authors on 
their pagan opponents are mostly of a very general character mentioning pagan deities and sacrifices, but 
they are not informative on what really took place in a pagan temple” (1982a:35). 
138
 The majority of scholars tend to dismiss belief as “profoundly Christian in its implications” (Price 198 :10), 
which, as a monotheistic construct, is inappropriate in a religious system which operated through ritual 
practice and worried little about orthodoxy (Ando 2008:ix, Beard, North and Price 1998:x; Davies 2004:5); 
“it is hard to know what religious conviction might mean in a world where no religious affiliation resulted 
from it” (ibid: 2). However, there is a growing tendency to recognise that in our determination not to allow 
Christian concepts to influence our understanding of Graeco-Roman religious life, we have perhaps been 
guilty of throwing out the baby with the bathwater (Rives 2007:48; Versnel 2011:5): Ando recognised that 
the rejection of faith had produced an impasse, and that we should ask not whether the Romans had faith, but 
what they had instead” (2008:xi). Both Rives and King challenged the understanding of ‘belief’ and argued 
that it simply meant “a proposition that a person accepts as true even without proof” (ibid.  8), or 
“conviction that an individual (or a group of individuals) holds independently of the need for empirical 
support” (King 2003:278). Therefore a belief is not a purely religious construction and can be held of the 
weather forecast, for example. It is to be distinguished from faith, which implies a deeply held conviction 
with personal significance (although Johnson argued that it was wrong to “privilege Christianity by terming 
it “faith” in contrast to “religion”” (2009:131). Even a system based on practice functioned only if a set of 
key beliefs were upheld: that the gods existed, that they were generally benevolent towards mankind, and 
that they would respond to sacrifice; Cicero’s Academic Cotta makes this point in Nat. D. 1.115-6. In Rives’ 
estimation, what distinguished Graeco-Roman religion from Christianity was “the absence not of religious 
beliefs, but of pressures to define and scrutinize those beliefs” (2007: 8). Our ancient authors simply did not 
feel the need to talk about it; as a result, Davies argued that the very question of whether one ‘believed’ or 
was a ‘sceptic’ imposed a dichotomy that did not exist in our ancient sources (2004:6). 
139
 As Beard, North and Price pointed out, it is not chance that very little ‘religious biography’ exists: it is a sign 
that such reflection was not considered important (1998a:78). 
 42 
 
1.7  Key definitions 
1.7.1  Christian 
It was made clear in the discussion of Tatian above that it is very difficult indeed to 
distinguish between orthodoxy and heresy at this period, in part due to doctrinal fluidity.
140
 
This makes it extremely difficult to determine what identified a Christian.
141
 Today, with the 
presence of formalised sets of belief set out in the canonised Bible and through established 
creeds, the categorisation of ‘a Christian’ is considerably easier. The discussion of the 
identification of ancient Christianity (or, we might even say, ancient Christianities) would 
comfortably fill a thesis or more in its own right. In order to avoid this issue, by ‘Christian’ I 
here mean a person who holds one or more beliefs founded on Biblical (and particularly New 
Testament) concepts. 
 
1.7.2  Pagans and Gentiles 
If defining a Christian is troublesome, defining a non-Christian is even more so. The 
most commonly used term, ‘pagan’, requires extreme caution. Firstly, we cannot talk about a 
single religious system, namely ‘paganism’, which these ‘pagans’ followed. It will rapidly 
become clear that the sheer variety of religious life within a single region, let alone the entire 
Graeco-Roman world, makes it impossible to talk about a system that would be comparable 
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 Hunt 2003:1. Cameron argued that it was exactly this fluidity and multiplicity which contributed to 
Christianity’s success (1991:9). 
141
 Scholars often tend to talk in terms of variants of Christianity: Pauline Christianity, Johanine Christianity, 
and so on: “if Christianity is ‘unique’ with respect to other religions, then apostolic (or Pauline) Christianity 
is ‘unique’ with respect to other (especially later) modes of Christianity” (Smith 2003:29). Similarly, Beard, 
North and Price argued that early Christianity was “much less familiar in its doctrines, morality or 
organisation than we might care to imagine” (1998a:x). However, it is misleading to talk about ‘Jewish 
Christianity’ as a ‘form’ of Christianity, since all Christianity is Jewish. Instead, it is best to ask: “when and 
why did Christianity and Rabbinic Judaism stop considering themselves, and recognizing the other, as 
belonging to the same religion?” (Lieu 200 :2). 
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to Christianity or Judaism, notwithstanding their own levels of internal variation.
142
 Of the 
three authors under consideration, Meliton comes closest to identifying a unified opposition 
to Christianity, although even he refers to them simply as ‘men’ or ‘sons of men’ with no 
further qualification. Secondly, the word paganus had no significance for authors of this 
period. Simply meaning ‘farmer’ (or perhaps ‘country bumpkin’),143 it came to be used only 
later as a derogatory term for the opponents of Christianity. It is significant that Aristides and 
Tatian both define the non-Christian not by adherence to a religious system but by their 
ethnicity: Aristides as either Greek or Barbarian, and Tatian as Greek. This reflects the use of 
ethnic terminology throughout the New Testament, and particularly in Paul. The closest thing 
to a term for the ‘non-Christian’ is        , the Latin translation of which, gentes, gives us the 
term gentile. In the Hebrew Bible, its equivalent, hʽmym, is used for the non-Jew (as in the 
title of this thesis, Psalm 96:5, but Paul reappropriates its meaning, since the Christians have 
become the new Israel, the chosen people of God.
144
 Halbertal and Margalit justified the use 
of ‘pagan’ by observing that “the concept of “pagan” has changed from a purely derogatory 
concept to a qualitatively differentiating one, that is, to a concept that divides people into 
grounds with respect to their positive or negative attitude towards its connotations”.145 It 
would be wrong to suggest that ‘pagan’ is less than derogatory, but Halbertal and Margalit 
correctly observed the ethnic, characterising sense of         as used by Paul. In keeping 
with this approach, I will restrict myself to the use of gentile (as both a noun and adjective), 
and gentile religious life. While this may seem considerably less neat than ‘paganism’, it 
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 “To describe both Greek and Roman polytheists as ‘pagans’ implies that one perceives the Greek and Roman 
religious systems as sharing common characteristics” (Petropolou 2008:217). See also  rijvers: it is 
“impossible to speak of pagan cults and practices in Syria as a well-defined entity” (1982a:37). 
143
 For more discussion, see Clark, who argued that it may have been military slang for a civilian (i.e. one who 
was not enlisted in the army of Christ) (2004:35).  
144
 The establishment of God’s covenant with the ‘new’ Israel is found most explicitly in Hebrews 8. 
145
 Halbertal and Margalit 1992a:8. 
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avoids a great deal of unnecessary (and misleading) complication,
146
 since it is “more suitable 
to view the Greco-Roman cults and their religious conception as a religious world rather than 
as faith-based religions”,147 and ‘gentile religious life’ better captures this sense.148 
 
1.7.3  Religion. 
Religion is an immensely problematic word in its application to Graeco-Roman 
society. It is derived from the Latin religio, but this does not mean ‘religion’ in the sense of a 
formalised (let alone unified) religious system or ‘-ism’, like Judaism, Islam or Christianity. 
Numerous scholars have attempted to put a definition to religio: Ando defines it as “a set of 
practices developed in response to the gods’ immanence and action in the world”,149 whilst 
Rives describes it as an “obligation with respect to the divine”.150 It is therefore best 
understood as a set of practices that help define one’s relationships with the gods.151 When 
practiced properly, this is characterised as pietas, and, when practiced wrongly or 
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 Not all scholars agree: Trombley saw no reason to avoid using ‘pagan’ and ‘paganism’ as synonyms for the 
polytheistic opponents of Christianity, the “pre-Christian Aramaic-speaking rustics who worshipped the 
local Baals and Astartes” (1993a:x). To avoid doing so, he suggested, was pedantic: “if some scholars are 
troubled about hurting the feelings of generations long past, I cannot discern any scientific or empirical 
necessity for such compunctions” (ibid:x). However, his argument is based on the derogatory significance of 
the terms ‘pagan’ and ‘paganism’ and not on whether or not they accurately capture the sense of religious 
life. 
147
 Engberg 2007:25. 
148
 Although, as Green pointed out, we should not allow this to lead to a concept of gentilitas: “they did not 
think of gentiles as followers of another religion (paganism), for they knew that the polytheistic practices of 
their neighbours did not constitute a set of beliefs or a structured system of worship” (2010:139). As a result, 
he preferred to refer to heathens. However, it is clear that non-Christians were defined ethnically, and gentile 
best captures this sense. Lieu argued that the label ‘gentile’ can “come to act as the signifier of anything that 
is alien and rejected; that it denotes licentious or incestuous practice, or polytheistic identification of images 
(idols) with deities, is an accepted part of the image, and so can be assumed to require no further 
demonstration” (200 :281). Many of these characterisations are indeed found in our texts, but unless these 
points are made explicitly, we should be careful about assuming them to be universal. 
149
 Ando 2008:15.  
150
 Rives 2007:13-14. 
151
 Ando suggested that we might read it as “the sum total of current cult practice” (2008:2): he highlighted Val. 
Max. 1.1.1a-b and Cic. Dom. 121 as evidence of this. See also Rives 2007:14 and Gradel 2002:4. 
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dangerously, as superstitio.
152
 I will more fully explore the definition and usage of superstitio 
later in this thesis: in brief, it is best defined as I have done here, as religio performed 
wrongly or excessively.
153
 My use of the word ‘religion’ will therefore be limited to 
Christianity or Judaism; in describing the relationships between the gentiles and their gods, it 
is safer to use the somewhat looser ‘religious life’ or ‘polytheistic cults’. 
 
1.7.4 Gods, demons and monotheism. 
Gentiles, then, are generally defined ethnically
154
 (for the term encompasses all those 
who are not the children of God, now defined through Christ rather than Abraham),
155
 albeit 
not with so much consistency that they can be comfortably labelled. However, there is even 
less consistency in the terminology used to define the beings that they worship, and this is 
reflected in our English terminology. Deities not identified as God or Christ are variously 
labelled ‘gods’, ‘demons’, ‘idols’ and so on. In this thesis, God (or, in an Old Testament 
context, YHWH) is used to refer exclusively to the Judaeo-Christian Creator God; gods is 
used to refer to the deities of gentile religious life. Similarly, both in the thesis and in 
translations, the third person singular pronoun will be used with a capital letter only for God 
                                                 
152
 We must, however, be careful with the terms under which religion is classed as ‘proper’ or ‘improper’: they 
are “loaded, shifting terms, whose precise definitions were as much a matter of dispute between Romans as 
between modern historians; they were discursive categories which framed religious arguments, as well as 
being labels of approval or disapproval” (Beard, North and Price 1998a:215). 
153
 See below, 5.2.5.1. 
154
 Berlin argued that in the Near East, “to define a particular people was to define that people’s gods” (1996:1)  
Block, similarly, argued that particular gods were associated with particular territories, and that the 
association of YHWH with Israel as a people was unique (2000:21-2). However, it is not as simple as this: it 
is impossible to ‘allocate’ one set of gods to one set of people, and to delineate them in this way (Kaizer 
2008a:1): the “fractionation” of divine worship did not reflect cultic reality. For more on ethnic identity in 
the Near East, see above, 1.2. 
155
 As seen in the Syriac translator of Aristides, who sets Christ against Abraham as the founder of the 
Christians, the fourth race (Apol. 3.2). The idea of the Christians as a tertius genus is common amongst 
apologists (Young 1999:103). However, Aristides is unusual in distinguishing between Greeks and 
Barbarians; Lieu argued that these categories are not mutually exclusive but must be defined in relation to 
one another (2004:21), but this is not Aristides’ approach. As we shall see, the four ethnic groups are defined 
individually with little reference to one another. 
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the Father and the person of Jesus Christ (that is, ‘He’ as opposed to ‘he’) in order to aid 
clarification. Aristides explicitly refers to the recipients of gentile worship as ʼlhyn (‘gods’), 
whilst, as I shall show, Meliton tries not to refer to them at all; only in Tatian do we find any 
variation. Although he occasionally attacks the         (‘gods’), he refers far more 
consistently to the    δ        (‘demons’). It is made explicitly clear on several occasions 
that the demons are synonymous with the gods of the gentiles.
156
 For the purposes of this 
dissertation, then, I shall substitute the word ‘gods’ as consistently as possible, including 
Tatian’s use of ‘demons’. 
This raises a further problem in terminology. I have previously used the word 
monotheism with little further discussion, but at this point I must highlight a distinction. 
Monotheism, particularly in a Christian context, tends to refer to the sole worship of the one 
true God. However, this does not necessarily preclude an acknowledgement of the existence 
of other spiritual beings, even if one does not worship them. This is seen throughout the New 
Testament, from Jesus’ defeat of the spiritual forces of evil in the gospels to Paul’s admission 
that  λλ᾿     ἃ             , δ              .157 We even find it in the First Commandment: lʼ 
yhyh lk ʼlhym ʼḥrym ʽl pny.158 This is sometimes reinterpreted in a moralistic sense (that one 
should regard nothing as one’s god except God), but given the prominence of other gods such 
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 Tatian Or. 12.3-4; 13.3; 21.2. Burkert argued that from Xenocrates onwards, δ        were associated with 
the unclean (1985:76), and that ultimately the understanding of the δ      as harmful originated with Plato 
(ibid:179). However, this association is inconsistent. Burkert defined δ        by their sphere of activity 
rather than as a specific class of beings (as they appear in Hes. Op. 122-6): every god can act as a δ     , 
but not every act reveals that he is a god (Burkert 1985:180). As a result,   δ      and        are not 
interchangeable, something Tatian has seemingly ignored. See also MacMullen 1981:79-80 and Petropolou 
2008:249. 
157
 1 Cor. 10.20: ‘what the gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to demons’. I shall return to this verse later in the 
thesis. 
158
 Exod. 20:3: ‘you shall have no other gods before me’ (my italics: lit. ‘before/above my face’). Rabbinic 
theology tended to replace ʼlhym ʼḥrym, which appears to acknowledge the existence of other gods, with 
‘bwdh zrh (‘strange worship’), in order to eradicate precisely this issue (Furstenberg 2010:340). See also 
Halbertal and Margalit 1992a:3, who also observed that while it was possible that the Bible denied the 
existence of other gods (as opposed to prohibiting their worship), this was by no means certain (ibid:22). 
Keel and Uehlinger also argued that Ps. 82 and 89 suggest similar ideas (1998:3). 
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as Ba’al and Astarte throughout the Old Testament, it is unlikely that this is the sole 
significance of the commandment. In this sense, Porter was correct to observe that the 
fundamental difference between monotheism and polytheism is to be found in the definition 
of what counts as ‘god’.159 That is not to say that either Jewish or Christian traditions 
regarded these gods as rival powers: in comparison to God, they are utterly powerless. This 
sort of monotheism is what I shall term relative monotheism: the gods, in comparison to the 
Creator God, are so weak that they might as well not exist. More rarely, we find a form of 
absolute monotheism: in this understanding, the other gods do not exist at all.
160
 This 
distinction will prove to be vital: as I shall show, it plays an important role in highlighting the 
differences between Meliton, Tatian and Aristides. 
At the other end of the spectrum of religious mentality, we find true polytheism: an 
acknowledgement that an abundance of gods exist and the determination to worship as many 
as possible. Hand in hand with this mentality is the recognition that, if a god is accidentally 
left out of offerings, they may take offence. It is this true polytheism which gives rise to 
inscriptions which leave the god unnamed: the most famous example of this phenomenon is 
the altar established in Athens ‘to the unknown God’ (᾿Α          ), found in Acts 17:23 
                                                 
159
 Porter 2000:2. 
160
 Versnel questioned whether such ‘pure’ monotheism could exist at all (2000:85); as I shall show, Meliton is 
one of the very few who demonstrates absolute monotheism, and such statements are extremely elusive 
(Geller 2000:292). As Pollini pointed out, neither Judaism nor Christianity were strict in their insistence on 
the existence of only one god; indeed, certain Christians were happy to accept the genius of the emperor 
(2008:167-8). Clark termed this sort of religious attitude ‘soft monotheism’: a monotheism which allowed 
lesser divine entities (2004:91), and under these conditions both Judaism and Christianity could be 
incorporated (to some degree) into the Graeco-Roman world. However, relative monotheism, in the sense 
that I understand it in this thesis, is slightly different, in that such beings are no less forbidden than in the 
case of absolute monotheism; the fact that Christianity was not incorporated into the gentile religious world 
shows that Clark’s approach to ‘soft monotheism’ is inaccurate. Beard, North and Price highlighted a 
spectrum of phenomena, ranging from “an extreme form of polytheism (where all of a large number of 
deities are treated as effectively equal) and an equally extreme position that insists on the existence of only 
one god; and, in practice, it rarely draws a clear distinction between those who believe that their particular 
deity is by far the most important and powerful (perhaps, like Isis, incorporating all others) and those who 
believe that their deity is literally the only one” (1998a:286). This is much more in keeping with my 
approach: I have simply given labels to various points on the spectrum. 
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and attacked by Paul. In their determination not to leave any god without offering, the 
dedicator allows the god to choose their own moniker.
161
 
Somewhere between the two polarities we find a phenomenon which Versnel labelled 
henotheism.
162
 Strictly speaking, this expresses the mentality that ‘there is no god like X’. 
This position first emerged (outside philosophical circles, at least) in Asia Minor in the 
imperial period,
163
 but later became considerably more popular in the growing popularity of 
mystery cults, and particularly the cult of Isis.
164
 In this mentality, one god was more 
prominent than others (considerably more so, in some cases), but at the same time, the 
worshipper acknowledged that these others existed and was happy to offer them worship 
while maintaining the superiority of the more prominent deity.
165
 
 
1.8  Script, texts, and translations 
As a final note: all translations given in this thesis, unless otherwise specified, are my 
own. I have provided translations for the Oration of Meliton the Philosopher and the Syriac 
translation of Aristides’ Apology in the appendices, since translations of these texts are not 
particularly accessible. Translations of Tatian’s Address to the Greeks are more readily 
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 As Versnel pointed out, under these circumstances, one might ask the question ‘to which god should I 
sacrifice?’ (just as Moses asked of the burning bush in Exod. 3) and the question may have had several 
answers (1981:13). “It was better to be too extensive than to risk forgetting one god”: as an example he 
highlights Oineus’ mistake in omitting Artemis in Il. 15.534f. See also Teixidor 1979:115ff. For more 
discussion of the ‘unknown’ or ‘anonymous’ god, see below, 3.3.3. 
162
 Versnel 1981:12-3. On the characteristic hallmarks of henotheistic cult, including personal submission and 
the invincibility of the deity, see Versnel 2000:138-45. 
163
 Versnel 1981:12. 
164
 Versnel 2000:132ff. For these cults, and the devotion to Isis seen in Apuleius’ Metamorphoses, see below, 
3.3.4.2. 
165
 Dandamayev argued that this was an inevitable feature of political life in the Near East: cities competed to 
elevate ‘their’ god above others, leading to the prominence of the Supreme God, such as we see in the form 
of Dushara in Nabataea (1996:36); Clark argued that this was a tendency which became considerably more 
marked in the first two centuries AD (2004:14). On the prominence of Dushara in Nabataean cities, see 
Healey 2001 and Alpass 2013. 
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available. All chapter titles, including the title of the thesis, are Biblical quotations taken from 
the English Standard Version. I have done this in order to demonstrate the Christian (by 
which I mean ‘Biblical’) standpoint on the issues at hand, but also the influence of that 
standpoint on modern use of terminology: the effect of this will clearly be seen in subsequent 
chapters. I have provided transcriptions of all Greek texts, but have transliterated Hebrew, 
Aramaic and Syriac texts. The reason for this is to be found in the sheer variety of scripts: 
although Aristides and Meliton are both written in Syriac, the former appears in the 
manuscript in the Serto script, and the latter in Estrangela: direct transcription would 
therefore make comparison considerably more difficult. The same consideration is made of 
Aramaic inscriptions: these are found in a number of different fonts and dialects, none of 
which are easily comparable (and none of which bear much resemblance, if any, to the more 
familiar Imperial Aramaic script.
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1.9  Concluding remarks 
Using the definitions provided in this section, we may now turn to the texts of 
Aristides, Meliton and Tatian and begin to establish what they can tell us about Christian 
attitudes to gentile religious life in the Roman Near East in the first few centuries AD when 
we compare them with other, non-Christian material. To that end, we shall begin with one of 
the most prominent features of the text: attacks on the worship of images and cult statues. 
 
                                                 
166
 As Healey observed, “it would have been possible to create fonts for Nabataean, Palmyrene, and Hatran… 
but especially in the Nabataean case there is such variability in the script – several different basic scripts are 
involved, not to mention the frequent variations in the forms of individual letters – that to choose particular 
letter-forms as the norm for printing would be an artificial procedure” (2009:vii). 
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Chapter Two: ‘Do not make for yourselves gods of cast metals’ (Deut. 19:4): Near 
Eastern Christianity and image worship 
2.1  Introduction 
The title to this thesis (‘the gods of the nations are idols’, Psalm 96:5) alludes to 
Christian criticism of the practice of ‘idolatry’, and suggests that, for Jewish and Christian 
writers, gentile religious practice can best be described by this term. However, it is far from 
clear what an idol actually is: the term is often used of both physical images and false gods. I 
have yet to adequately define the practice; in order to properly understand Near Eastern 
Christian attitudes to image-worship, which is the aim of this first chapter, we must have a 
sufficient definition of the terms involved. For the purposes of this thesis, and for reasons that 
I shall demonstrate below, I define idolatry as ‘the worship of anything other than the true 
God’.1 This category thus incorporates, but is not limited to, iconolatry, which is strictly ‘the 
worship of images in any form’. The confusion between idolatry and iconolatry is largely due 
to the central role that image worship has played, both in classical cults (or, more accurately, 
in our perception of them), and in Christian polemic and apology. It is therefore an obvious 
starting point in the study of the attitudes of our texts. However, before we progress some 
further discussion of the two terms idolatry and iconolatry is required to expand upon the 
distinction drawn here. 
 
                                                 
1
 Barton defined it as “worship wrongly directed or worship wrongly practiced” (2007a:1  see also Halbertal and 
Margalit 1992a:1), although Hartshorne observed that distinctions between sound and unsound religion (or 
piety and idolatry) are misleading, since it is inevitable that the religion of the ‘other’ will be classified as 
idolatry (1970:3; see also Rubiés 2006:571). As shall be seen, Christian authors are primarily, although not 
universally, concerned with the recipient, rather than the manner, or worship. Not all scholars agree with this 
definition, however: “if “idolatry” is to have any identifiable content at all, it must entail the use of physical 
objects and not just the worship of some god other than YHWH” (Greenspahn 200 : 81). While idolatry 
must include iconolatry, it is not limited to it. Rowland highlighted the range of issues covered by idolatry 
(2007:163-8), which is therefore not to be identified with iconolatry (Faur 1978:13; Rubiés 2006:577).  
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2.2  Defining an idol 
Idolatry is, at risk of stating the obvious, the worship of an idol, our understanding of 
which derives from the Greek   δ λ  . This is used throughout the Septuagint translation of 
the Old Testament, as well as the New Testament, to refer to a variety of beings and objects, 
ranging from carved images to illusions. Part of the problem in our understanding is the 
inconsistency of the use of   δ λ   by the Septuagint translators.2 Hayward conducted a 
study of the LXX Pentateuch, in which the word appears on twelve occasions, and is used to 
translate very different words. In Exodus 20:4, it translates psl (meaning a carved image); in 
Numbers 33:52 it translates ṣlm’ (‘likeness’). In both these instances, it appears to be 
connected with a physical image or object, as it does in both Leviticus 26:30 and 
Deuteronomy 29:16, when glwlym (literally ‘log’, and therefore used of images in the round) 
is translated   δ λ   3 in the latter passage, numerous materials are given from which the 
glwlym could be fashioned, again suggestive of a physical image. Three of the twelve uses in 
the LXX Pentateuch translate trpym.
4
 It is unclear what the teraphim are, and descriptions are 
inconsistent, although they are clearly physical objects of sorts.
5
  
However,   δ λ   is also used to translate ʼlwh,6 meaning an illusion or phantom, 
whilst in Deut. 32:21, it translates bhblyhm (‘emptinesses’, ‘hot air’). These two usages, 
                                                 
2
 “It is important to remember that the English word idol derives from a transliteration, not a translation, of the 
Greek word eidolon, which had a history of its own before it became a Christian technical term. The Greeks 
did not use the term idol to designate a class of religiously abhorrent images” (Kennedy 199 :198). See also 
Pfeiffer 1924:227-37. 
3
 Hayward 2007:50: “the Hebrew word is strongly pejorative, carrying with it notions of uncleanliness, filth and 
defilement which are thereby directly related to pagan cult objects”. In contrast, Kennedy argued that the 
Greek only acquired such connotations under Tertullian, who also began the tradition of transliterating, 
rather than translating, the term (1994:202-4). 
4
 Gen. 31:19, 34, 35. 
5
 In Gen. 31:19-35, Rachel is able to sit on them to cover them from Laban; outside the Pentateuch, they also 
appear in 1 Sam. 19:13-16, where Michal disguises one as David using a duvet and a wig to baffle Saul’s 
soldiers. For further discussion of the teraphim, see Hayward 2007:46. 
6
 Nb. 25:2. 
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whilst closest in sense to the Greek   δ λ  , meaning a ‘phantom’ or ‘illusion’,7 are very far 
removed from the sense of psl: a carved image, by its very nature, must have substance. psl 
and hbl do appear alongside one another in Jer. 8:19: mdwʽ hkʽswny bpslyhm bhbly nkr.8 
Hayward argued that this verse may have been responsible for informing the Septuagint 
translators. He also suggested that the teraphim were connected with divination and (false) 
prophecy, and that they may be connected to the ‘empty’ idols in this sense.9 
Hayward’s attempts to link the uses of   δ λ   in the Septuagint translation of the 
Pentateuch are useful but inconclusive. The very range of possible understandings of   δ λ   
suggests ambiguity, and nowhere is this ambiguity more apparent than in the Biblical 
prohibitions at the heart of Judaeo-Christian iconoclasm, found in Exod. 20:4 and Lev. 19:4.
10
 
The two are, however, not identical: some discussion of the two verses side by side may help. 
Exodus reads lʼ tʽśh lk psl wkl tmwnh ʼšr bšmym mmʽl wʼšr bʼrṣ mtḥt wʼšr bmym mtḥt lʼrṣ.11 
Leviticus, in contrast, reads ʼl tpnw ʼl hʼlylm wʼlhy mskh lʼ tʽśw lkm ʼny yhwh ʼlhykm.12 Lev. 
19:4 appears to be an amalgamation of Exod. 20:3-4: lʼ yhyh lk ʼlhym ʼḥrym ʽl pny (‘you shall 
                                                 
7
 The word is used of the ghosts in the Homeric underworld, for example: Od. 11.475. This is the meaning 
suggested by Brown: it can mean any unsubstantial form, an image reflected in a mirror or water, an image 
or idea in the mind” (1976:28 ). 
8
 ‘Why do they grieve me with their carved images and foreign phantoms?’. 
9
 Hayward 2007:46. See also Kennedy 1994:200. 
10
 Andrade argued that Jewish attitudes were more ambiguous than the Biblical prohibition suggested: “despite 
widespread concerns about anthropomorphic and zoomorphic images among Jews, some Jews nonetheless 
interacted with figurative art in ways that would not have distinguished them from Greeks at all. In fact, 
Jews of this period had differing views concerning what human and animal likenesses signified, and they 
disputed whether iconic images were idolatrous likenesses or simply artistic representations that were not 
problematic so long as they were not actively worshipped. Also, what constituted an idolatrous image could 
be a point of contention” (2010:360). Josephus, in particular, appears to have objected to the association of 
the image with the divine rather than their creation (Barclay 2007:83). Noy highlighted similar ambiguity in 
discussing the imagery of the synagogue at Dura-Europos, which presented numerous anthropomorphic 
depictions (2007:75-6), and Sartre argued that the story of the Rabbi Gamaliel, who was asked why he was 
willing to bathe near a statue of Aphrodite, demonstrated a willingness on the part of the Jews to make 
iconographic allowances in order to assimilate better (2008:47). See also Greenspahn 2010:485-6; on 
Gamaliel’s comments, see Lapin 2012:126-132. 
11
 ‘ o not make for yourself a carved image (Gk.   δ λ  ), or any likeness of whatever is in the heavens above, 
or on the earth below, or in the water below the earth’. 
12
 ‘Do not turn towards phantoms (Gk   δ λ   ), and do not make for yourselves gods of cast metal. I am the 
LORD your God’. 
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not have any gods before [or above] me’. This is the only verse in the Exodus version to use 
ʼlhym of false gods, which is one reason for the suggestion that Lev. 19:4 has incorporated the 
sense of this verse. Thus, in both versions, there is an apparent separation between the 
‘empty’ gods and gods of cast metal. The difference is found in the LXX translation, for in 
Exod. 20.4, it is the ‘carved images’ which are translated as   δ λ , whilst in Lev. 19: , the 
  δ λ  are apparently separate from the ‘gods of carved metal’. This further highlights the 
inconsistency in terminology, and suggests that at the very root of polemic against images 
lies uncertainty as to what the ‘idol’ was: was it the god or the statue? It may also reflect the 
idea that, to the LXX translators at least, the concepts were interchangeable. We should not, 
therefore, be surprised to find similar uncertainty in our sources, as I shall demonstrate. 
Furthermore, this ambiguity appears in the use of   δ λ  in the New Testament, as well as 
the word ‘idol’ in English translations, which use the word not only to cover at least the 
majority of uses of the Greek word, but also a variety of others. Nowhere is this clearer than 
in the quotation used as the title to this thesis. Taken from Ps. 96:5, the Hebrew reads ky kl 
ʼlhy hʽmym ʼlylym wyhwh šmym ʽśh, and the LXX  ά                       δ   ό   ,   δ  
 ύ                      ί    . However, the English Standard Version gives us ‘for all the 
gods of the peoples are worthless idols, but the LORD made the heavens’, whilst the New 
International Version has ‘for all the gods of the nations are idols, but the LORD made the 
heavens’. The Hebrew uses ʼlylym, ‘illusions’, for which one might expect the translation 
  δ λ , but the Septuagint translators have rendered this as δ       .13 The relationship 
between demons and idols is unclear, but, as Hayward demonstrated, is clearly connected to 
                                                 
13
 Curiously, Clement quotes Ps. 96:5 as                          δ                 δ λ  ( .5 ). It is unclear 
as to whether he is using an alternative textual tradition: no other version of Ps. 96:5 appears to use   δ λ . 
Outler points out that some of Clement’s quotations of the Platonic Dialogues are occasionally mistaken, and 
that this is due to error rather than ignorance (1940:223): perhaps the same interpretation should be applied 
here. On the translation of this verse, see Johnson 2009:2, who argued that the LXX translators regarded 
gentile gods as part of the daemonic world. 
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the emptiness of idols: “demons cannot normally be seen, but are often associated with the 
air, wind or vapour; hence their introduction into a translation of a poem which speaks of hbl, 
‘vapour’. But they can manifest themselves, becoming visible or even tangible; hence ‘idol’ 
is a good word for them, appearing to partake of solid reality, but in reality being nothing”.14 
I noted in the introduction that δ        can encompass a wide variety of concepts, and does 
not need to be associated with demons: elsewhere, it can translate ʼlhym, ‘gods’ (despite the 
fact that this is applied throughout the Old Testament to YHWH as well as to foreign 
deities).
15
 Here it provides an excellent example of the breadth of the term ‘idol’. 
New Testament understandings of   δ λ  are similarly vague. Of all the uses of 
  δ λ , or its derivatives, in the New Testament, fourteen are found in the Pauline letters, 
with a further four in Revelation, two in Acts and a sole occurrence in 1 Peter. Of the fourteen 
Pauline uses, a startling eleven appear in 1 Corinthians.
16
 Given that over half of the 
occurrences of the word occur in a single letter, this would appear an obvious starting point. 
However, even within this single letter, Paul’s attitude is remarkably inconsistent. The use of 
  δ λ λ      in 5:10-11 and 6:9 does not worry us here, for it refers to the immoral practice 
of ‘the idolater’. From 8:1 onwards, however, Paul’s attention turns to the practice of eating 
‘idol food’ (  δ λ      ).17 There has been considerable discussion about the precise nature 
of this food, but the key point here is that Paul appears to permit the eating of food offered to 
‘idols’ on the grounds that   δ           δ     δ λ           ,           δ         ἕ      
       ἷ .18 Since the ‘idol’ to which it is offered has no real existence, how can one be 
                                                 
14
 Hayward 2007:44, n. 12. 
15
 Examples of this process are extremely numerous; examples of its use of specifically foreign deities may be 
found in Exod. 12:12, 15:11, 20:3, Deut. 12:3, 12:31, Joshua 24:20. 
16
 Derivatives of   δ λ   are found in Acts 15:29, 21:25; 1 Cor. 5:10, 5:11. 6:9, 8:1, 8:4, 8:7, 8:10, 10:7, 10:14, 
10:19, 10:28; Gal. 5:20; Eph. 5:5; Col. 3:5; 1 Pet. 4:3; Rev. 2:14, 2:20, 21:8, 22:15. 
17
 This word does not appear in pre-Pauline literature, and may be of Christian origin (Horrell 2007:121). 
18
 1 Cor. 8:4: ‘we know that an idol is nothing in the world, and that there is no God but one’. 
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affected by it? The matter is considerably confused just two chapters later, however, when 
Paul writes:  λλ᾿     ἃ             , δ                                λ  δ                 
    δ                 .19 Why this apparently sudden change of heart? The matter has 
caused considerable debate amongst scholars, with interpretations ranging from the 
suggestion that two different kinds of meals are meant,
20
 to the possibility that 1 Cor. 10-16 
was originally a separate letter which has become fused to 1 Cor. 1-9.
21
 It is impossible to 
solve this dilemma here, but I suggest, given the ambiguity apparent in the Old Testament, 
two different ‘kinds’ of   δ λ  are meant here: in 1 Cor. 8, Paul is talking about food offered 
to an ‘idol’ in the sense of food placed before a statue, or perhaps sharing a meal at a 
Gentile’s house (which would commonly involve images of the gods). These images are 
clearly powerless, and placing food before them, whilst potentially harmful to a new convert 
(as Paul himself suggests), would have no effect whatsoever. In 1 Cor. 10, by contrast, Paul 
is prohibiting the participation in worship of the ‘idol’ represented by the image, or the 
partaking of sacrificial meat that would often follow.
22
 It is clear that (unless we assume that 
Paul has become confused, or changed his mind) two different kinds of ‘idolatry’ are 
intended here. Paul’s approach is hugely ambiguous, largely because the Old Testament 
material with which he was so familiar is ambiguous. 
                                                 
19
 Ibid. 10:20: ‘but what the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to demons and not to God. I do not want you to 
become companions of demons’. Cheung highlighted a similar theme apparent in Deut. 32:17 and Ps. 
106:28: these are likely the source of Paul’s interpretation (1999:41). Garrison argued that it was 
“undeniable” that Paul viewed the former objects of worship as dead (1997:13), but as I have shown, the 
matter is more ambiguous than that. Johnson highlighted the contradiction, but failed to provide a 
satisfactory explanation (2009:7). 
20
 Willis 1985:47-56: Cheung accepted Willis’ argument but favoured the view that it is “very clear that an 
objective separation between social dining in temples and meals involving religious rites was extremely 
unlikely” (1999:36). 
21
 Cheung (1999:8 ) provides a brief survey of the evidence but concludes that “there is no textual evidence 
whatsoever for the composite nature of the section in a comparatively full manuscript tradition”. 
22
 Naiden has demonstrated that, on the basis of sheer numbers, not all meat in the ancient world would once 
have been offered in a temple, as other scholars have previously supposed: we can therefore assume that it 
would have been perfectly possible to avoid eating sacrificial meat sold at markets (2011:9). 
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It is therefore evident from both the Septuagint and New Testament that   δ λ  can 
encompass both physical images and phantom powers, and the vagueness of the English term 
‘idol’ reflects this. Indeed, there is little evidence of any consistent terminology in either Old 
or New Testament to refer specifically to an image independent of the deity it represents. 
Perhaps the closest we come to reference to an image is the      : this word translates ṣlm’ in 
Genesis 1:26 of the ‘likeness’ into which man is fashioned.23 However, although ṣlm’ has a 
particular significance for Meliton in particular, as I shall shortly demonstrate, there is little 
evidence that the same is true of       in Tatian. This confusion over what constitutes an 
‘idol’ is used by Christian authors to serve their own rhetorical and philosophical purposes. 
However, it is essential to recognise that there is a distinction, in theory and practice, between 
‘idolatry’ and ‘image-worship’ (which I shall term ‘iconolatry’). By definition, since idols 
can include icons, all iconolatry is idolatry, but not all idolatry is iconolatry. Given this 
ambiguity, I will avoid the English word ‘idol’ where possible, with the exception of the title 
of this thesis (and the final sentence of this paragraph!). I will render Hebrew or Syriac words 
such as ʼlylym and hbl as ‘illusions’ or ‘phantoms’, and where it is necessary (to translate the 
Greek   δ λ  , for example) I will endeavour to clarify the original phrase. Defining these 
terms at this stage will allow us to assess more clearly the way in which similar terms are 
used by Christian authors. This is essential, as it will become clear that all three of the major 
authors have different approaches to the representation of the divine and the nature of ‘idols’. 
 
 
                                                 
23
 Fletcher-Louis argued that, in fashioning Adam and Eve into the ṣlm’ of God, they are intended to serve the 
same purpose as gentilic image (2007:59). This has considerable repercussions for ethical conduct, for we 
are to treat our fellow man as we would a cult image (ibid:60). See also Kennedy 2004:201.  
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2.3  Near Eastern Christian attitudes to image-worship 
2.3.1  Meliton 
Image-worship or iconolatry is one of the most evident features of Meliton’s text. 
Before we examine his presentation of these images, it is worth taking a few moments to 
examine his use of terminology. Meliton does not use any word which captures the sense of 
the Greek   δ λ  : none of those interpreted in this manner by the LXX translators appear 
here, save ʾlhyn, which is best understood as ‘gods’ rather than ‘idols’.  
By far the most prominent term used by Meliton is ṣlm’ (‘image’ or ‘likeness’), which 
appears no fewer than twenty times, a remarkable frequency given the comparative shortness 
of the text. It is this term which is translated as       in the LXX of Genesis 1:26, to describe 
the likeness of God into which man has been fashioned. Another term that appears on 
occasion is glypʾ (‘carving’): for example, kl gyr mṭʾ bʼydwhy. wšrkʼ dṣbwtʼ ʼyk mʼ dʼytyhyn 
hkwt ntḥšbn lk. ṣlmʼ ʼyk ṣlm: wglypʼ ʼyk glypʼ.24 Both times that this word is used,25 it appears 
alongside ṣlm’, which raises the question as to whether a clear distinction is intended. 
Estienne has observed a tendency in the Latin historians to distinguish between simulacra 
and ornamenta:
26
 according to this argument, the former belong to the temple or cult site, and 
are themselves objects of reverence, whilst the latter are merely decorative gifts, which could 
be removed, for instance, by renovators, without risking sacrilege.
27
 Her argument is 
convincing: she surveyed the use of terms for religious iconography in Livy, Tacitus, and 
Suetonius, and discovered that virtually all of the uses of simulacra were reserved for images 
of the gods, whilst statua was almost exclusively used of images of humans (including 
                                                 
24
 Meliton 5.1: ‘for everything is in His hands. Reckon all other things according to what they are: images as 
images, and carvings as carvings’. 
25
 Ibid. 5.1, 9.8. 
26
 Estienne 2010:258. 
27
 Ibid. 2010:262. See also Weddle 2010:14. 
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human rulers), and ornamenta for purely decorative depictions and reliefs. Could such a 
distinction be at work in Meliton’s separation of ṣlm’ (‘images’) and glypʼ (‘carvings’)? 
Although a tempting conclusion, it is an unlikely one; in the only other use of the word glyp’ 
in the text, Meliton suggests that they too are objects of reverence: wn’qdwn bnynšʼ ʽm ṣlmʼ 
dʽbdw: wʽm glypʼ dsgdw.28 Is glyp’, then, a synonym for ṣlm’, used for a rhetorical flourish? 
This is unlikely; Meliton’s style is elsewhere so repetitive that one would expect a similar 
flourish to occur on more than just two occasions. It is clear that they are an alternative form 
of image to the ṣlm’, but their precise identity is unclear. However, it is very likely that 
Meliton’s use of the word ṣlm’ is restricted to purely anthropomorphic images. Although he 
mentions zoomorphic images,
29
 the word ṣlm’ is not used, nor is it used when he describes 
the worship of celestial beings or the elements.
30
 
Admittedly, only rarely does ṣlm’ appear explicitly of human images: ʼn’ dyn ʼmr ʼn’. 
d’p swlʾ ʼmrt ʽlyhwn dlṣlmʼ hw dmlkʼ dmytw sgdyn.31 However, in each of the other 
occurrences, it is at most ambiguous, and entirely plausible that anthropomorphic images are 
at least included. Although this argument from silence is not conclusive, I suggest that, given 
                                                 
28
 Meliton 9.8: ‘the people will be burnt up together with the images which they made, and the carvings which 
they worshipped’. 
29
 Meliton 5.8: ʼn mṭl dʼtdmy lḥywt knpʼ. mṭl mn’ lh lḥywt knpʼ lʼ sgd ʼnt. wʼn mṭl dʼtdmy lḥywṭ šnʼ. hʼ ḥywt  šnʼ 
qnwmh qdmyk (‘if it is because it resembles a winged beast, why do you not worship the winged beast? If it 
is because it resembles a beast of prey, the beast of prey itself is before you’). 
30
 Ibid. 2.2-2.4: ʼn gyr lnwrʼ ʼnš nqrʼ ʼlhʼ. lʼ hwt ʼlhʼ. mṭl dnwrʼ hy. wʼn  lmy’ ʼnš nqr’ ʼlh’. l’ hww ʼlh’ mṭl  dmy’ 
ʼnwn. w’n l’rʽ’ hd’ ddyšynn : w’n lšmy’ hlyn dmtḥzyn ln: w’n  lšmš’  ʼw  lshr’: ‘w lḥd mn kwkb’ hlyn 
dbpwqdn’ rhṭyn wl’ mštlyn. wbṣbyn npšhwn l’ mhlkyn... ʼykn’ hkyl hlyn ʼlh’ ʼnwn (‘for if a man should call 
fire ‘god’, it is not god because it is fire; if a man will call water ‘god’, it is not god because it is water. And 
if [we call gods] this earth which we tread upon, and these heavens which we see, and the sun and the moon 
and one of these stars which run along according to the commandment, and do not stop, not journeying by 
their own will... how are these things gods?’). A similar passage appears in the Wisdom of Solomon:  λλ    
                                 λ            β       δ     φ                                 
               (‘but they consider that fire, or wind, or swift air, or the circle of stars, or rushing water or 
the lights of heaven are the gods which rule the world’, Wis. 13:2). A number of phrases from Wis. 13-15, a 
section which deals with both iconolatry and idolatry, appear in very similar form in Meliton’s Oration, 
suggesting that the apologist was influenced by the apocryphal text. 
31
 Ibid. 3.2 (‘I say that the Sybil says about them that they worship the images of dead kings’). ṣlmʾ is also used 
of the images of kings in 3.5, and of the images of Orpheus and Zaradusht which are worshipped at 
Hierapolis as Nebo and Hadran respectively (4.6). 
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Meliton’s heavy use of the word elsewhere, linguistic variety is not enough to explain the 
absence of the word ṣlm’ precisely at the two moments at which non-anthropomorphic 
images are explicitly mentioned (namely in discussing zoomorphic images and the elements). 
The reason for this almost certainly comes from its use in the Gen. 1:26: man is fashioned in 
the image (ṣlm’) of God, and so ṣlm’ is, for Meliton at least, explicitly restricted to 
anthropomorphic imagery. According to this argument, then, glyp’ is a blanket term intended 
to encompass all forms of image which are not anthropomorphic in form.
32
 Seemingly, ṣlm’ 
does not need to refer to the divine explicitly: in her study of the statues found at Hatra, 
Dirven observed that twenty-one of the extant statues were inscribed with the formula ṣlm’ dy 
(‘image of’).33 Of the three hundred or so free-standing statues at Hatra, roughly half, 
according to Dirven, are explicitly of gods, with the remainder being of kings or other 
prominent inhabitants, including the twenty-one with the relevant inscriptions: Dijkstra 
argued that the latter were secular,
34
 whilst Dirven attempted to blur the distinction, 
suggesting that “it is this very intimate connection between the socio-political and the 
religious spheres that is typical of Hatra”.35 It is possible, although by no means provable, 
that ṣlm’ has connotations which enable the anthropomorphic image to be associated with the 
divine (just as    λ   can be the recipients of worship as well as purely honorific images): 
the distinction between honorific and cult image is clearly not as distinct as in Latin.
36
 At 
present it is perfectly reasonable to suggest that it has an almost exclusively anthropomorphic 
sense, but more evidence, both literary and epigraphic,
37
 would be needed to argue more 
                                                 
32
 This has implications for aniconic forms of imagery, to which I shall return later in the chapter. 
33
 Dirven 2008:218. Similarly, the author of Mar Mari uses ṣlm’ to refer to bronze statues of a woman (1). 
34
 Dijkstra 1995:219. 
35
 Dirven 2008:210. 
36
 For more discussion on cult terminology in Latin and Greek, see below. 
37
 Payne Smith’s Syriac dictionary suggests that the word can be used of human depictions on coins, but this 
does not necessarily rule out a connection with the divine. 
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convincingly that ṣlm’ has a specific connection with the divine, and the discovery of such 
evidence is hugely improbable.  
Meliton’s focus on ṣlm’ is startling: the word is used twenty times, compared to two 
occurences of the word glyp’ (‘carving’) and a handful of instances where no word is 
explicitly used to define the objects of cult.
38
 Regardless of the distinction, Meliton’s interest 
is explicitly in images: unlike the Old Testament, which tends to speak of other gods as ʼlhym 
(although often with the disclaimer that they are false or empty, in order to distinguish them 
from YHWH, the true ʼlh’), Meliton reserves all derivatives of ʼlhʼ for the true God, and so 
does not even allow gentile deities the recognition of being false gods: the implication is that 
they are no gods at all. By focussing so exclusively on the image at the expense of the god 
that it represents,
39
 Meliton denies these ‘false gods’ any meaningful existence whatsoever. 
As a result, he is almost unique amongst Christian authors in this respect. To return to the 
passage in 1 Corinthians 8-10 to which I have already referred, the ambiguity in Paul, 
whereby the existence and power of   δ λ  is unclear at best, is dealt with entirely by 
Meliton’s firm rejection of all spirits. Indeed, only twice are other spirits mentioned at all: 
Meliton describes the freeing of a well at Hierapolis by the (soon-to-be) god Hadad from a 
rwḥ’ ṭnpt’, an ‘unclean spirit’,40 and also describes the worship of š’d’, ‘demons’.41 Why 
these two uses, when elsewhere the existence of spiritual beings is so firmly denied? 
Frequently, the New Testament authors describe demons and evil spirits as              
                                                 
38
 In The Martyrdom of Shamuna and Guria, the Christians are similarly encouraged to ṣlm’ (27), but the author 
regularly uses other synonyms: he shows none of the focus on this term that we find in Meliton. 
39
 As, for example, at 5.8: for Meliton, worshipping the image of a winged beast is entirely separate to worship 
of the beast itself. 
40
 Meliton 4.6. rwḥ’ is used throughout the Old Testament, most commonly as the Spirit of God (as at Gen. 1:2, 
during the Creation) but does appear as evil spirits in opposition to YHWH (Judges 9:23). 
41
 Ibid. 6.8: qdm šʼdʼ wṭlnytʼ: ʽl ʼrʽʼ mtʽrgl wšʼl ʼnt šʼltʼ sryqtʼ. mn mn dlyt lh lmtl (‘you roll on the ground before 
evil spirits and shadows and you ask empty petitions from that which has nothing to give’). 
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         : rwḥ’ ṭnpt’ is an exact translation of this phrase,42 which makes it extremely likely 
that Meliton is not suggesting that this spirit is the object of worship, but is rather drawing on 
Christian exorcism tradition as part of his narrative. This interpretation is reinforced by the 
fact that the objects of worship at Hierapolis, Nebo and Hadran, are described explictly as the 
ṣlm’ of humans (Orpheus and Zaradusht respectively), which emphasises worship of the 
image, not any spiritual power. 
In the second instance, Meliton describes the demon as š’d’: here, Meliton is not 
relying on exorcism tradition, and, at first sight, it might appear that he is acknowledging the 
existence, and worship, of other gods. However, this is immediately followed by the 
commandment to qwm lk mn lwt hnwn drmyn ʽl ʼrʽʼ: wmnšqyn lkʼpʼ: wyhbyn sybrthwn 
mkwltʼ lnwrʼ: wmqrbyn lbwšyhwn lṣlmʼ,43 which clearly associates the š’d’ with the physical 
image. 
To reinforce his point, Meliton focusses heavily on the connection between ṣlm’ and 
material. The contrast between certain materials, particularly gold, and the true God, is one 
made by many Christian authors (it will appear again in both Aristides and Tatian): the New 
Testament is full of such contrasts. In 1 Peter, gold and God are contrasted first on the basis 
of their value and perishability (  λ                          λλ       δ         
δ            );44 the author then reinforces his points by highlighting that the Christians 
enslaved to sin have been redeemed by the immortal (and infinitely more valuable) blood of 
                                                 
42
 The Peshitta uses it to translate                        in Mk. 1:23-6. They are also described, much less 
frequently, as                      (Acts 19:15). 
43
 Meliton 7.1: ‘raise yourself from those who lie upon the ground and kiss stones, giving their provisions as 
food for the fire, and offering their clothes to images’. 
44
 1 Pet. 1:7: ‘more valuable than gold which perishes when tested in the fire’. 
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Christ, rather than gold.
45
 Other uses of this theme appear in 1 Cor. 3:12-14, which again 
contrasts the respective values of Christ and of gold, inevitably dismissing the former:    δ  
          δ                 λ                 ,        , λ             ,   λ ,       , 
  λ    ,                  φ                              δ λ                  
     λ                                                  δ        .                         
ὃ      δ     ,        λ      .46 
For Meliton, however, the contrast between God and gold is not one based on its 
value: he is happy to compare God with gold alongside other, less valuable materials, such as 
stone and wood.
47
 The inclusion of stone in this list might suggest that perishability is not the 
issue at stake here:
48
 rather, the problem is the potential for confusion between object and 
deity. Meliton does dismiss the value of gold, later in his work: mkyl rḥm dhbʼ ʼnt wlʼ rḥm 
ʼlhʼ.49 However, his purpose at that point is to emphasise the potential of wealth to obstruct 
wise and godly living, and contrasts it with God on those grounds, rather than on grounds of 
idolatry. 
The implications of Meliton’s association of statue and divine are many: perishability, 
vulnerability, dependence and powerlessness are all amongst the features he attacks. These 
will be explored in the following chapter, but here it is essential to recognise that the basis of 
                                                 
45 Ibid. 1:18-19:   δ            φ       ,                 ,  λ        …  λλ              …         (‘for 
you know that you were ransomed not by perishable things, silver or gold… but by the precious blood… of 
Christ’). 
46
 1 Cor. 3:12-14: ‘if anyone builds on the foundation with gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay or straw, 
each man’s work will become apparent. The Day will show it, because it will be revealed by fire, and fire 
will test what sort of work each man has done. If anyone’s work remains which is built upon the foundation, 
he will receive a reward’. 
47
 Meliton 2.3-2.4: w’n ldhb’ ʼw ls’m’ ʼnš nqr’ ʼlh’: l’ hw’ hlyn ʼnwn : dmtḥšḥynn bhwn ʼyk ṣbynn. w’n lqys’ 
hlyn dmwqdynn. w’n lk’p’ hlyn dmtbryn ḥnn. ʼykn’ hkyl hlyn ʼlh’ ʼnwn (‘and if a man should call gold or 
silver ‘gods’, they are not, for we use them as we wish. And if [we call gods] these pieces of wood which we 
burn, and these stones which we shatter, how are these things gods?’). 
48 Imagery of Christ as the λ     of God (such as 1 Pet. 2:6, quoting Isa. 28:16) might suggest that rock and 
stone had positive connotations in this respect. 
49
 Meliton 8.8: ‘for you are a lover of gold, and not a lover of God’. 
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his argument, and therefore the means by which he attacks these characteristics of gentile 
gods, rests upon the understanding that god and image are one and the same, 
indistinguishable to Christian philosopher and gentile alike. 
Meliton’s attitude to iconolatry also informs his Euhemeristic account of the origins 
of local cults. I shall return to this section in a later chapter, but it is essential to note that, in 
his view, the fashioning of an image is explicitly connected to the process of deification: ʼnʼ 
dyn ʼyk mʼ dḥkm ʼnʼ. ʼktwb wʼḥwʼ ʼyknʼ wbʼylyn ʽlln ʼtʽbdw  ṣlmʼ  lmlkʼ  wlṭrwnʼ : whww ʼyk 
ʼlhyn.50 Note that the use of ʼyk (‘like’) strongly suggests that these beings are not actually 
gods:
51
 they are not gods: but they are treated as if they were gods. This happens, it seems, 
because good deeds allow one to be recognised with an image, and the fashioning of an 
image allows one to be treated as a god. Thus, even in the Euhemeristic historiolae, which 
discuss the origin of cult, it is the worship of images, and not of the gods at large, which 
concerns Meliton.  
 
2.3.2  The Syriac translator of Aristides 
However, when we compare Meliton’s attitude with other sources, we quickly see that 
it is not characteristic of Near Eastern Christianity. To begin with, the presentation in the 
Syriac translation of Aristides’ Apology is dramatically different. Although he, too, uses the 
word ṣlm’ of the images of the gods, it is not the ṣlm’ that is the focus of his work. The most 
evident difference between Meliton and Aristides is that Aristides frequently uses ʾlhyn of 
beings other than YHWH: in particular, it is applied to many of the familiar, Classical deities 
                                                 
50
 Ibid. 3.5: ‘I will write and show according to what I know how and for what reasons images are made for 
kings and tyrants, and they became like gods’. 
51
 Indeed, this is one of the few occasions in which the plural ʼlhyn is used to refer to gentile deities. Meliton is 
clearly happy to do so only because he makes it clear that they are not in fact ʼlhyn. 
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such as Zeus.
52
 This is far more in keeping with the Biblical attitude, which consistently uses 
the Hebrew ʾlhym to describe ‘other’ deities, such as Ba’al or Asherah. Whereas Meliton 
presented the ṣlm’ as the sole recipient of worship, Aristides recognises that they are merely 
likenesses created by humans to represent deities that already existed: brbry’ hkyl mṭl dl’ 
ʼdrkwhy l’lh’. ṭʽw b’sṭwks’. wšryw dnplḥwn lbryt’ ḥlp brwyhyn wmṭlth dhd’ ʽbdw dmwt’ 
wḥbšw bhykl’.53 It is important to note here that Aristides is no more lenient than Meliton: the 
worship of other beings than the true Creator remains an error (or sin).
54
 The key, however, is 
that the images worshipped by these sinners are representations of other deities, rather than 
being the deities themselves, as they are in Meliton’s Oration. These images are explicitly set 
alongside the elements (‘sṭwks’) as the recipients of worship: šrʽw mn šrr’. w’zlw btr rgt’ 
dtrʽythwn kd plḥyn l’sṭwks’ mštryn’ wlṣlm’ myt’.55 It is apparent that Aristides, far more 
clearly than Meliton, has reflected the ambiguity in the identity of gentile gods found 
throughout the Biblical record. 
The task of understanding the attitude of the Syriac translator of Aristides is further 
complicated by the fact that he uses a less specific vocabulary than Meliton. Where the latter 
                                                 
52
 He also labels them ‘sṭwks’, which, although I have rendered it ‘elements’, is a transliteration of the Greek    
        , and could easily be understood as ‘First Principles’, and Plato uses it in this sense:              
                  ,                                 λλ  (Theaet. 201e: ‘those First Principles from which 
we and everything else are made’; see also Tim. 48b). See also Aristole Metap. 1.983b:                     
             φ                     (‘this, they say, is an element and an origin of existing things’). 
Aristides is keen to attack the apparent rationality of Greek philosophers above all, and choosing ‘sṭwks’ as a 
synonym for ʼlhyn would enable him to highlight this. Although Pouderon and Pierre argued strongly that 
‘sṭwks’ carried connotations of             (2003:193), ‘sṭwks’ is never associated explicitly with Greek 
philosophers: it is associated rather with the philosophers of the Barbarians (or the Chaldaeans in the Greek 
of Barlaam and Josaphat). As a result, ‘sṭwks’ is more likely to refer to celestial elements, and the practice 
of astronomy, than to the Platonic First Principle. On the difference between ‘elements’ and ‘mortal’ gods, 
see Baumgarten 1996; see also below, 3.9. However, Aristides makes no such distinction here. 
53
 Aristides 4.6: ‘the Barbarians, then, because they did not understand God, erred with the elements and began 
to serve created things in place of their Creator, and because of this they made likenesses and shut them up 
in temples’. 
54
 For Meliton’s use of these terms, which appear to be interchangeable, see below, 4.5.3. 
55
 Ibid. 9.3: ‘they fell from the truth and pursued the desires of their own minds when they worshipped 
perishable elements and dead images’. This association of element and images refutes the suggestion of 
Pouderon and Pierre that the Greeks alone worship the image, while the Barbarians worship the stars and the 
Egyptians the animals (2003:364): it is clear that all people are guilty of iconolatry. 
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uses ṣlmʼ on twenty occasions, it appears only four times in Aristides’ text (5.2, 9.3, 20.2, 
23.4). In the last of these instances, the word is once again explicitly associated with images 
of men, lending further credence to the suggestion that the word relates specifically to 
anthropomorphic forms. In two of the other three instances, the ṣlmʼ is described as ‘dead’ 
(myṭʼ), and in the final one as dlʼ npš’ (‘not living’, used purely as a circumlocution to avoid 
repetition of myṭʼ which appears two words previously). Aristides, like Meliton, is clearly 
keen to emphasise that the ṣlmʼ are inanimate and powerless, an argument which is vital for 
some of his later diatribe. However, where Meliton almost exclusively uses the word ṣlmʼ, 
Aristides, on five occasions (2.4, 4.6, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5), uses the word dmwtʼ, ‘form’ or 
‘likeness’.56 Is this simply a synonym or do the words have two different purposes? The 
context of the two words is certainly slightly different; dmwtʼ appears four times in the space 
of five verses, an on each occasion describes a ‘likeness’ which was carved to honour the 
elements (‘sṭwks’), and, crucially, placed within a temple.57 This might suggest that dmwtʼ is 
used of cult statues, whilst ṣlm’ is used of human images, and in particular anthropomorphic 
ones: perhaps even honorific images. This distinction soon appears false, however: if ṣlm’ 
were used purely of an honorific image, there would be no need to describe it as ‘dead’ (myt). 
From their context, the ṣlmʼ must also be objects of worship. 
The answer to this problem may lie in the fact that the Syriac text of Aristides is the 
translation of a Greek apology. As noted in the introduction, the translator appears to have 
expanded to a significant extent; it seems plausible to suggest, however, that Aristides used 
dmwtʼ and ṣlmʼ because the Greek source used two different words. I noted above that 
                                                 
56
 The author of Mar Mari uses dmwtʼ as ‘likeness’ to describe the imitation of Christ which his apostles ‘put 
on’ (1). 
57
 As Weddle argued, the location of a statue went a long way towards identifying its purpose (2010:9); see also 
Burkert, who argued that the temple and cult image invariably went hand-in-hand (1985:89). 
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Meliton did not appear to recognise a terminological distinction but it is plausible that the 
translator of Aristides might have done so. The Greek terms most commonly used to refer to 
images are        and    λ    the former is often understood as a cult image, and the latter 
as an honorific statue (specifically of a human). It is apparent, however, that the distinction 
between        and    λ   is not nearly as firm as this definition would require. Weddle 
argued that, although the Latin terms simulacra and statua have clearly defined semantic 
ranges which authors almost universally adhered to, the same is not true of Greek terms.
58 
Cassius  io in particular uses    λ   to denote cult images.59 The difficulty in defining 
terminology is particularly apparent in epigraphic evidence, which, as Weddle demonstrated, 
shows no observable pattern to the use of       and    λ  .60 If we accept Weddle’s 
assessment of the semantic fluidity of these terms, then the apparent overlap between the two 
Syriac words ceases to be a problem. It therefore does not seem a stretch too far to suggest, 
tentatively, that the Syriac translator used dmwtʼ to translate        and ṣlmʼ for    λ   
(since both are closely associated with the human image).  
However, a brief glance at the Greek text of Barlaam and Josaphat 27, in which 
Aristides’ apology is quoted, suggests that the matter is not so straightforward (although ṣlmʼ 
does appear consistently as    λ  ).61 For example, dmwtʼ appears in the first instance as 
neither       nor    λ  : instead, it appears as    φ     ,62 which, whilst it does mean 
‘image’ or ‘form’, does not have the same cultic connotation. If we assume that the Greek 
                                                 
58
 Ibid.14; see also Estienne 2010:258. 
59
 Weddle suggests that  io “almost always uses the term agalma to describe an image of the gods, often when 
they were clearly the object of cult”: she quotes as evidence 59.28.3, where the statue of  eus Olympios is 
described as an    λ  . See also 41.61.4; 37.9.1-2; 39.15; 45.17.3; 47.40.4.Weddle also highlights a similar 
tendency in Julian (Or. 159c, Ep. 89b 203b-c) (2010:13). 
60
 Platt argued that the difference was one of appearance or form:        is derived from    , ‘to polish or 
smooth by scraping’, and therefore refers to “the object’s substance rather than its ritual function” (2011:93). 
61
 Barlaam and Josaphat 27.241, 244. The section in which the other two uses of ṣlm’ appear (20.2, 23.4) is not 
quoted by the author of Barlaam. 
62
 Ibid. 27.241. 
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text of Barlaam is accurate, it is clear that dmwtʼ does not consistently translate any one 
Greek word; furthermore, neither dmwtʼ nor ṣlmʼ can be exclusively associated with any 
particular ‘form’ of image. 
Regardless of the terminology used (and their context is not so different that they 
could not be simple synonyms), it is clear that Aristides’ view on iconolatry differs greatly 
from Meliton’s, insofar as Aristides recognises that the images (originally, at least) 
represented the gods whom the gentiles worshipped.
63
 Where Aristides does agree with 
Meliton, however, is in his claim that, by fashioning images of the gods, the likenesses 
themselves are treated as gods: w’ty’ ly d’tdmr ʼw mlk’ ʽl plswpyhwn d’ykn’ ʼp hnwn ṭʽw. 
wšmhw ʼlh’ ldmwt’ d’tʽbd l’yqr’ d’sṭwks’. wl’ ʼstklw ḥkym’ d’p hnwn ʼsṭwks’ mtḥbln’ ʼytyhwn 
wmštryn’.64 However, on the whole, Aristides does not focus on these images to nearly the 
same extent. He does refer elsewhere to the practice of fashioning images, and that a 
craftsman might ‘create’ a god: ddwmr’ dyn ʼytyh ʼw mlk’. ʽl ywny’: dkd mytryn mn šrk’ 
dklhwn ʽmm’: bhwpkyhwn wbmlylwthwn ʼykn’ ṭʽw btr ptkr’ myt’ wṣlm’ dl’ npš’. kd ḥzyn 
l’lhyhwn dmn ʽbwdyhwn mtnsryn wmštpyn: wmtkr’n wmtqṭʽyn: wmttwqdyn wmtṣyryn: wlkl 
dmw lhwn mštḥlpyn.65 Like many of the similar observations found in Meliton, this passage 
must take as its foundation the commandment in Exod. 20:4 which explicitly prohibits the 
carving or fashioning (ʽśh) of images in (seemingly) any form. We may assume, then, that the 
association of likeness of the gods and their ‘carved’ or ‘fashioned’ nature is a stock feature 
of Christian polemic depending on Exod. 20:4.  
                                                 
63
 Aristides 4.6; see above, n. 53. 
64
 Ibid. 5:3: ‘it comes to me that I might wonder, o King, regarding their philosophers, how they have also erred 
and named ‘gods’ those images (dmwtʾ) which are made for the honour of the elements, and the wise men do 
not understand that these elements are corruptible and perishable’. 
65
 Ibid. 20:2: ‘it is a wondrous thing, o King, concerning the Greeks, that although they are greater than all the 
rest of the nations in their reasoning and their rhetoric, that they should err with dead statues  (ptkrʾ) and 
images which do not live, while they see their gods, which are sawn and polished by their makers, and 
shortened and cut and burned and shaped and transformed into every shape by them’. 
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2.3.2.1 Aristides, Xenophanes and iconoclasm 
It is perhaps telling that this section is an attack in particular on Greek rationality. It is 
highly likely that Aristides is appropriating Greek philosophical ideals that appear to reject 
the fashioning of images in any form, but particularly iconic forms. Arguably the most 
famous proponent of this position was Xenophanes, the sixth-century BC philosopher.
66
 In a 
famous passage, quoted by Clement of Alexandria in his Miscellanies, Xenophanes writes:  
    δ                          β       λ       
                             λ           δ   , 
                    , β    δ     β             
             δ        φ                      
         ἷ             δ           ἕ      .67  
 
Immediately preceding this, Clement quotes a fragment with an apparently similar meaning:  
 λλ     β      δ                         
     φ                         φ        δ       .68  
Again,  
Α                   φ                  λ        
  ῇ        λ                   φ      λ     .69  
                                                 
66
 Precise dates are uncertain, although most scholars put his date of birth c. 570-560 BC. See further Lesher 
1992:3. 
67
 Xen. Fr. 15, quoted by Clem. Al. Strom. 5.110:  ‘but if horses or oxen or lions had hands or could draw with 
their hands and accomplish such works as men, horses would draw the figures of the gods as  similar to 
horses, and the oxen as similar to oxen, and they would make the bodies of the sort which each of them had’ 
(tr. Lesher). See also Versnel 2000:92-6. 
68
 Xen. Fr. 14, quoted by Clem. Al. Strom. 5.109:  ‘but mortals suppose that gods are born, wear their own 
clothes and have a voice and body’ (tr. Lesher). Lesher suggested that δ       , ‘suppose’, implies an 
element of choice, which is a plausible assessment (1992:85): it would imply that an alternative perception 
of the gods is possible. 
69
 Xen. Fr. 16, quoted by Clem. Al. Strom. 7.22: ‘Ethiopians say that their gods are snub-nosed and black; 
Thracians say that theirs are blue-eyes and red-haired’ (tr. Lesher). Lesher’s assessment of why we should 
perceive the gods as ‘like us’ is convincing, but not relevant here: see further 1992:94. 
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These passages are often used to highlight a long-standing tradition in Hellenistic 
philosophy of the criticism of image worship.
70
 According to Lesher, however, this is a 
slightly simplistic interpretation:
71
 it is Clement, not Xenophanes, who interprets the passage 
as a critique of image worship.
72
 Lesher argued that “at least superficially, these are 
comments on the diversity of belief and on a certain propensity of believers to attribute to 
gods qualities which the believers themselves possess. We are not told whether these 
considerations should serve to undermine these beliefs, either by having proved them false or 
having subjected to ridicule, although they are commonly read in this way”.73 Similarly, 
Ando observed that Xenophanes’ approach was more to do with strategies of representation 
than representation itself.
74
 It is, however, vital to observe that whatever the original 
intention, Christians interpreted them in order to support their own iconoclastic agenda. It is 
this ‘tradition’ that Aristides is clearly engaging with here.75  
Aside from these passages, however, the use of any word that could be interpreted as 
‘image’ is far more limited in Aristides than in Meliton. This is unlikely to be simple 
linguistic preference on the part of the authors. Such is the disparity in the frequency of such 
                                                 
70
 This tradition also influenced Roman authors: Varro claimed that the gods would be worshipped more 
reverently if images of them were excluded altogether (quoted in August. De civ. D. 4.31), which suggests, 
in keeping with Xenophanes, that the worship of images led people away from a true understanding of the 
divine. However, Varro did not entirely reject images: he regarded the association of image and divine as an 
important part of Roman religious tradition (Barclay 2007:84). See also Pellizer, who argued that both 
anthropomorphism and zoomorphism were essential parts of the negotiation with the divine (2009:268). On 
Varro’s apparent iconoclasm, see Estienne 2006:147-9: “Varro donne aux images des dieux une fonction 
clairement allégorique… la représentation des dieux permet en effet de rendre le monde divin intelligible 
aux hommes”. 
71
 Lesher 1992:90. 
72
 Clem. Al. Strom 7.22:  λλ     δ                  φ                                       
           ,                    φ                        ἕ       δ       φ      (‘The Greeks suppose 
that the gods have human shapes and feelings, and each paints their forms exactly like their own’; tr. 
Lesher). 
73
 Lesher 1992:91. 
74
 Ando 2008:28. 
75
 Another famous passage interpreted in this manner is a fragment of Heraclitus:             λ     δ  
                                  δ       λ            (                       δ                    ) (Fr. 
5; ‘furthermore, they pray to these statues! = <which is> as though one were to <try to> carry on a 
conversation with houses, without any recognition of who gods or heroes <really> are’; tr. Robinson). 
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words that I suggest that this is actually a symptom of their respective approaches. Since 
Meliton argues that the gods do not exist outside of their representations (dismissing outright 
the existence of demons and other powers), it is images that receive the brunt of his polemic: 
if he can destroy the rationality behind image-worship, gentile religious life would lose its 
entire basis, in theory and in practice. It will be demonstrated in the following chapter that 
this is exactly what Meliton hopes to achieve. For Aristides, however, the boundary is far 
more fluid. There are hints that he understands the images to ‘be’ the divine as well as 
representing them, but it is absolutely clear that he does not imagine them as being limited to 
this form. As such, for Aristides, the identification of the divine with man-made images, and 
the worship of them, is a fundamental error that creates its own misunderstandings of the 
relationship with the divine, but it is only a feature of gentile religious life. In fact, as I shall 
show, his problems with the ‘symptoms’ of this religious life are much the same as Meliton’s, 
but based in a more general and fluid understanding of the divine. 
 
2.3.3 Tatian 
For Tatian, as for the Syriac translator of Aristides, the practice of iconolatry is not 
the focus of his attack: it is the implications of this error, to which I shall turn in the following 
chapter. As such, there is less direct discussion of the concept of the image. That is not to say, 
however, that it is entirely lacking: indeed, some details are particularly instructive. 
From the very beginning of his argument, Tatian is clearly using a very different 
approach to either Meliton or Aristides. In the opening lines, Tatian describes how many of 
the religious traditions present in the Graeco-Roman world are inherited from foreign 
cultures: the reading of bird-flight from the Phrygians, for example, or sacrifice from the 
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Cyprians. Amongst these, he mentions that the art of sculpture was inherited from the 
Etruscans.
76
 Whilst one might be tempted to read ‘sculpture’ ( λ      ) as a reference to the 
fashioning and worship of these statues, the context makes that unlikely: it comes between a 
reference to Orpheus as the founder of poetry, and the Egyptians as the founders of history. It 
seems that ‘sculpture’ here is understood in a purely artistic sense – there is no reference to 
the use of these statues in cult. The artistic, rather than ‘religious’, value of statues is 
emphasised elsewhere by Tatian: in the only other part of the text in which statues are 
discussed at any length, the statues mentioned belong to figures from human (particularly 
cultural) history such as Sappho,
77
 amongst others. Tatian’s problem is not that these statues 
are worshipped: in fact, nowhere in this passage does he make this accusation. Instead, he 
argues that the problem is that these statues commemorate characters who are not worthy of 
being examplars, particularly because of their moral conduct:              φ          
                   ,                   λ       δ  .78 
I can find only one explicit reference to the worship of images of any form in Tatian’s 
text: δ                                                                λ .          λ    
      λ    δ                                                      δ    λ      λ      
                 .79 The worship of ‘sticks and stones’, however, does not immediately 
suggest statues.
80
 The focus is not the worship of man-made objects (as is the case in 
Meliton). Rather, because this also criticises the worship of the sun and moon, it dismisses 
more broadly the worship of anything that is not God (that is, that was created and is 
therefore subject to Him), and particularly the worship of the natural world. There is possibly 
                                                 
76
 Tatian Or. 1.1. 
77
 Ibid. 33.1. 
78
 Ibid. 33.2: ‘but Sappho was a wanton woman, driven mad by lust, and sang of her own lack of restraint’. 
79
 Ibid. 4.2: ‘I do not wish to worship His creation, which came into existence for our sake. The sun and moon 
[were created] for us: how can I worship my servants? How can I say that sticks and stones are gods?’ 
80
 Or at least, not anthropomorphic statuary: it may refer to aniconic worship. See below, 2.5.5. 
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a passing reference to the crafting of gods:   δ                    δ              
              δ                     λ               δ       ,                       
 λ       λλ                   .81 However, the key word,       ό , is translated by 
Whittaker as ‘fashioning’: whilst it may certainly carry that meaning, it is also defined by 
Liddel and Scott as ‘imagination’, so even this is not certain. Tatian could simply be 
suggesting that the gentiles conceived
82
 of a wide variety of gods. The context of the passage, 
which focusses on the inability of the soul to comprehend the light, would suggest that 
Tatian’s concern is with the ‘imagination’ of a multitude of gods, rather than necessarily the 
physical creation of them. 
Beyond these two instances, terminology referring to ‘images’ of any form is 
extremely scarce in the text; the word       is used occasionally to refer to a ‘likeness’, but 
this always refers to man’s ‘likeness’ to God.83 It is only man who bears this likeness: the 
demons do not bear this likeness because they are creatures of spirit, not of flesh (δ        δ  
                              ,            δ                         ).84 In fact, the lack 
of reference to iconolatry in Tatian is just as crucial, for different reasons, as the heavy focus 
evident in Meliton. It rapidly becomes clear that Tatian has adopted a position almost entirely 
contradictory to Meliton and Aristides. Where Meliton argued that it was the images that 
were the objects of worship, and that no supernatural force existed outside these that could be 
                                                 
81
 Tatian Or. 13.2-3: ‘the soul retained some sort of spark of its power, but because of its separation it could no 
longer see those perfect things; in seeking for God, it strayed and formed numerous gods, following the 
demons and their tricks’. 
82
 Whittaker 1982:27. 
83
 Based on the fact that, as noted above, it translates ṣlm’ in the LXX of Gen. 1:26. However, Tatian has not 
given to       the broader meaning of any human likeness that Meliton and Aristides have given to ṣlm’: it 
refers specifically to the relationship between man and God. 
84
 Tatian Or. 15.3: ‘no demon has any flesh, but their constitution is spiritual’. 
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the object of worship, Tatian is a relative monotheist:
85
 his approach is to distinguish between 
the ‘material spirit’ and ‘divine spirit’:               δ        λ   δ     .  λ              
                       ,       δ   ῇ  λ               ,                           λ    
   .86 Only God possesses this divine spirit; however, this material spirit is present in all 
objects – from living things, including trees, to rivers, and (presumably) inanimate objects. 
All objects and beings that are not God therefore belong in the material world. Tatian later 
makes a further distinction: some beings that lack flesh are superior to the ‘purely’ material, 
even though they too belong in the material world. It is these ‘spiritual’ beings that are the 
recipients of worship, as Tatian himself explicitly states:      δ             δ       ,     
           φ   ,              λ   λ β                                                   
λ               ,                                                ,    δ       λ   
   λ             λ                            ῇ   λ          .         δ ,   δ    
 λλ    ,                               λ  ,        δ                         .87 
This distinction makes it clear that, since these demons are not associated with the 
purely material, they are therefore not to be associated with images: it is the spiritual beings 
themselves that receive worship, and not the image. This would explain why his discussion of 
images in the text is, seemingly, exclusively limited to honorific or artistic depictions, and 
does not include ‘cult’ images. This position is entirely in opposition to that of Meliton, for 
whom the statue is the sole object of worship. Why should the two authors differ so much? 
Does Tatian, as a self-confessed convert under Justin, possess a more ‘accurate’ insight into 
                                                 
85
 Elze argued that Tatian was a strict monotheist and did not even allow for the soteriology of Christ 
(1960:105); Grant, however, demonstrated that this was not the case (1960:355-6). 
86
 Ibid. 4.2: ‘for the spirit that pervades matter is inferior to the more divine spirit: since it is almost like matter, 
it is not worthy of being equal to the perfect God’. 
87
 Ibid. 12.3-4: ‘however, the demons, as you call them, who were formed from matter, and possessing a spirit 
made from it, became profligate and greedy. Some of them turned to purer things, others to that which is 
inferior to matter and behaving in the same way. These, men of Greece, are the ones you worship, even 
though they were made from matter, and far from orderly in their behaviour’. 
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religious life? Is his account more reliable? This question will be addressed in more detail by 
examining some of the gentile sources which discuss image worship, but it is certainly 
surprising that, given the proliferation of cult images in the ancient world, such images are 
almost entirely ignored by Tatian.  
This difference is largely due to Tatian’s philosophical approach. Meliton appears to 
be concerned in a large part with the functional mechanics of gentile religious life, whilst 
Tatian addresses a variety of philosophical concepts, and in particular the division between 
flesh and spirit. It will be seen in the following chapter that even sacrifice, one of the most 
fundamental building blocks of gentile religious life, is of little concern to Tatian. The 
prominence of certain key philosophical terms, and in particular        and          , may 
suggest that in fact the focus of his attack is not the religious world but the philosophical – 
and in particular the school of Stoicism.
88
 It is important to note that the difference between 
Meliton and Tatian may be attributed to a considerable difference in approach, and does not 
necessarily suggest that one is more accurate than the other – as I shall demonstrate. What is 
clear, however, is that it is impossible to define a ‘Near Eastern Christian attitude’ to 
iconolatry: the sources vary too much to do so with any consistency. 
It is clear, then, that for these Christian sources,
89
 and for Meliton in particular, the 
practice of forming an image and worshipping it is particularly repellent.
90
 This is entirely to 
                                                 
88
 On the relationship between Tatian and Stoicism, see below, 4.9.3. 
89
 Of other Christian authors, Clement of Alexandria deals most explicitly with iconolatry, in his Exhortation to 
the Greeks. He displays more ambiguity towards cults statues than Meliton: at times he appears to suggest 
that the image is the recipient of cult (Protr. 4.41), but elsewhere he argues that mankind has been deceived 
into worshipping statues because of the skill of artists (ibid. 4.45). This is not an argument that appears in 
any of our Near Eastern sources, although Aristides perhaps comes closest when he suggests that the 
Barbarians erred by fashioning likenesses of the gods and ended up worshipping them (Aristides 4.6). 
90
 Ando argued that “Christians almost universally regarded idols and cult statues as the proper and exclusive 
recipients of pagan worship, and their understanding of the mechanics of conversion developed from this 
simple fact” (2008:161). However, as I have shown, Christian attitudes are more ambiguous than Ando 
suggested, although the practice itself is always regarded as a feature of idolatry. 
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be expected: the prohibition of exactly this practice in Exod. 20:4, which is then followed by 
the negative exemplum of the golden calf,
 91
 demonstrates that the rejection of iconolatry lies 
at the heart of Jewish interaction with the world around them, and this was a stance adopted 
extremely keenly by Christian authors. What is perhaps more surprising is the explicit 
identification of the statue with the divine, a common theme throughout these sources, but 
especially in Meliton. In some cases, it is easy to understand it as rhetorical technique; Tatian 
and the Syriac translation of Aristides are inconsistent in their identification of the god 
explicitly with its statue, for example, and appear to acknowledge that more than one deity 
exists, however lacking in power this may be: they are, in that sense, relative monotheists, a 
distinction highlighted in the introduction. In Meliton’s case, the association of god and 
statue is far stronger. He understands that in worshipping a statue, one worships the divine 
itself – partly because he firmly rejects any other form of the supernatural. Unlike Aristides 
and Tatian, Meliton is an absolute monotheist: that is, only one deity exists at all.
92
 
Allegations of substitutive error (that is, the explicit identification of god and statue) are 
extremely troublesome. Our non-Christian sources, when talking about the relationship 
between statue and divine, are extremely vague on the whole. Let us examine some of these 
sources and attempt to identify any features of their attitude that could prompt this stance 
amongst our Near Eastern writers.  
                                                 
91
 MacDonald argued that the episode of the golden calf highlighted a number of different ways in which 
idolatry could be understood: as well as illegitimate representation, this could include political rebellion, 
parody, immorality, greed and folly (2007:23): he interpreted the formation of the calf primarily as rebellion, 
in the context of the formation of the covenant. Similarly, Winiarski identified adultery as the primary 
metaphor for idolatry, representing the betrayal of the covenant, beginning with the golden calf (2006:41ff). 
See also Greenspahn 2010:487. Halbertal and Margalit argued that the rejection of the calf is ambiguous 
because it is not clear whether the error was the formation of an image of the wrong god, or worship of God 
in the wrong form (1992a:3). They also questioned why pictoral representation of God was forbidden, but 
linguistic depiction was permitted, and concluded that it was due to a fear of substitutive error (that is, 
worship of that which represents, rather than that which is represented): linguistic depiction allows no such 
error (1992b:25).  
92
 For further discussion, see above, 1.7.4. 
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2.4  Non-Christian sources 
2.4.1  Lucian 
An obvious place to begin with is Lucian’s On the Syrian Goddess. The discussion of 
images is very prominent in this text, largely because it is the author’s apparent intention to 
describe the cult practices at Hierapolis as well as the temple itself. A wide variety of 
vocabulary is seemingly used to define the ‘image’:        and    λ   are particularly 
prominent in their usage, as well as other terms like   δ  . The context in which these terms 
appear might suggest the possibility of categorisation:       , for example, is used of the 
image of the divine figures,
93 whilst    λ   is used of images of mortals (specifically 
characters from the Iliad).
94 The use of   δ   is less clear: it is used of mythic figures such as 
Procne, Philomela and Tereus, and is perhaps intended as a synonym for    λ  , given that 
the two terms appear almost adjacent. It is worth noting that   δ   is not exclusively reserved 
for the human image: the   δ   of Tereus, for example, is carved in bird form.95 
Further categorisation of these terms is difficult; Lucian’s text demonstrates much of 
the semantic fluidity of the terms       and    λ   noted by Weddle and discussed above. 
For example, the image of the goddess  erceto, one of the candidates for rulership of the 
temple, is defined as an   δ  .96 The text does, however, suggest that there is a distinction 
between purely decorative reliefs and statuary and the ‘cult image’, even if there is no 
linguistic category by which to define this. In particular, the cult image is described as a 
unique object that has powers of its own, with the potential to be understood as divine in its 
own right. For example, whilst other oracles require humans to make their pronouncements, 
                                                 
93
 Luc. Syr. D. 38:        is used to describe the images of Atlas and Hermes, among others. 
94
 Ibid. 40. On the role of these characters, see Lightfoot 474. 
95
 Luc. Syr. D. 38. 
96
 Ibid.14.  
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the oracle of Hierapolis is capable of doing so of its own accord: δ                            
               λ             .        δ             δ .            λ               ,     ῇ 
ἕδ                 ,    δ                                 δ             ,   δ   δ            
                  .         δ     δ      φ      ,       φ              δ              λλ   
                δ   .   λ                                                              
  δ              λ           ,                ,    δ            ,                       
   φ                        .97 Ignoring for the moment the involvement of human 
agency and machinery (to which I shall return in the following chapter), this appears to 
identify the deity with the statue: at the very least, the statue is more than a carved chunk of 
stone. A similar impression is given in his description of the riverside festivals: the     
(translated by Lightfoot as ‘cult images’) appear to make their own way down to the river.98 
Some quality of the image, then, gives it independent powers, particularly self-locomotion.  
Elsewhere, however, Lucian suggests that images are carved purely to represent the 
divine, because otherwise their worshippers would have no means to understand the deity 
involved: λ                  λλ                                          ,         φ    
  φ                   δ  .99 There is no mention here of the image being associated with 
the god; instead, the image is used in a purely representational manner. This apparent 
confusion or contradiction is highlighted most clearly in discussing the statue of Apollo, a 
unique depiction of the god with a beard:             λλ             λλ                    
                                                 
97
 Ibid. 36 (‘this one moves of its own volition and itself brings its soothsaying to fruition. It works like this. 
When it wants to prophesy, it first moves on its base, and the priests lift it up; if they do not lift it up it 
sweats and moves even more. When they lift it onto their backs and carry it, it drives them twisting and 
turning this way and that, leaping from one to another. Finally the chief priest approaches it and inquires 
about all manner of things: if it does not want something to be done, it retreats; if it approves it, it drives its 
bearers forwards like a charioteer’, tr. Lightfoot). For more on the self-locomotion of images, see below, 
3.2.1.1. 
98
 Ibid. 47. 
99
 Ibid. 34: ‘they consider it right to make images of the other gods, because their forms are not visible to all’ (tr. 
Lightfoot). See also Estienne 2006:149. 
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         β             100 this implies an association between god and image. Immediately 
after this, however, Lucian adds: δ                   φ       λ             λ             
                  δ  .101 These two observations appear to be in contrast. In the first instance, 
the god himself is made  in the second, it is his image. The key word which links both 
comments is            Lightfoot has attempted to reconcile the two observations by 
translating this as ‘represent’ in the first instance and ‘make’ in the second, thus leading to 
the conclusion that there is no association between god and statue. Lightfoot’s inconsistency 
in translating           entirely misses the point. Lucian’s repetition of the word is unlikely 
to be accident or coincidence, and so we ought to understand that the two verses are linked, 
and that therefore Lucian understood that there was a conflict between the two, or at the very 
least that he did not have a problem putting the two apparently contradictory uses side by 
side. Removing this conflict by inconsistency in translation is not only artificial, but it misses 
the implications of Lucian’s statement. 
Assuming the attribution of On the Syrian Goddess to Lucian of Samosata is correct, 
then other works present us with examples of his attitude to images: a particularly prominent 
one is found in The Tragic Actor, in which the gods are arranged by hierarchy according to 
their material:          λ  β                                  ἕ      , ὡ      λ     
          ,        δ                    ,                               ,                  
 λ φ       ,             λ       λ       .102 Lucian is clearly satirising the association of 
god and image; in his view, it is ridiculous that the gods are more or less prominent because 
of the material from which their statue is made. The same is true of the craftsmanship applied 
                                                 
100
 Luc. Syr. D. 35: ‘everyone else thinks of Apollo as young and represent him in early manhood’ (tr. 
Lightfoot). 
101
 Ibid. 35: ‘they think it great unwisdom to make images of the gods imperfect’ (tr. Lightfoot). 
102
 Luc. Iupp. trag. 7: ‘seat each of them in his proper place according to his material and workmanship, those of 
gold in the front row, then next to them those of silver, then all those of ivory, then those of bronze or stone’ 
(tr. Loeb). 
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to that statue, for Hermes asks:  λλ᾽                    δ    ,                          ᾖ     
  λ   λ           λ   ,         β   δ              ,  λλ      δῇ  δ            
          ,           λ        Μ             λ  λ              Φ  δ        
 λ         λ           δ                                                  ,103 to which 
question Zeus responds that ideally, craftsmanship should be valued, but that gold should 
come first in any case. As a result, the front benches are occupied by foreign deities, since the 
Greeks tend to make theirs of marble or bronze (perhaps with the slightest smidgen of ivory 
or gold). Needless to say, the Colossus of Rhodes takes offence at his relegation, and 
complains that the Rhodians could have made sixteen statues of gold, had they not insisted on 
making him so unnecessarily large. 
Lucian’s scene is, of course, ridiculous, but it does serve to highlight the ambiguity 
with which he treats the images of the gods, and the ambiguity of those whom he satirises. Is 
the image the god, or does it represent the god? Lucian appears determined to have his cake 
and eat it: the attitude he appears to display in On the Syrian Goddess is the same that he 
satirises in Tragic Actor. One possible solution might be to conclude that Lucian is simply 
imitating the style of Herodotus (since, as observed above, On the Syrian Goddess is a highly 
skilled imitation), who uses ‘god’ as a synonym for ‘image’ on an extremely frequent basis; 
indeed, this technique is so staggeringly common in Classical literature that perhaps we 
should not read anything into such a technique here: it is “found with great frequency in 
almost all ancient authors, regardless of their overall religious temperament”.104 However, 
this is too simplistic an approach, and does not help explain the interaction of the statues: 
                                                 
103
 Ibid:7: ‘I had better find out about this; if one of them is of gold and very heavy, yet not precise in 
workmanship but quite ordinary and misshapen, is he to sit in front of the bronzes of Myron and Polyclitus 
and the marbles of Phidias and Alcamenes, or is precedence to be given to the art?’ (tr. Loeb). 
104
 Weddle 2010:15. The technique is one which Plutarch deplores (Mor. 379c-d), which highlights its 
popularity amongst ancient authors. Cf. Burkert 1970:360, Ando 2008:23, Platt 2011:78. On Plutarch’s 
complaints, see ibid:19-20. 
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literary technique is almost certainly at work, but the repetition of          , twice in as 
many lines, implies that there are other factors to consider (never mind the fact that the statue 
in the temple has powers of self-locomotion and is capable of giving oracles of its own 
accord). The first question is whether the repetition was a deliberate play on the relationship 
between image and god, or whether Lucian simply used           again because he saw 
nothing contradictory.  
 
2.4.2  Philo of Byblos 
Philo of Byblos’ Phoenician History has less to offer in helping to explain Near 
Eastern Christian attitudes to iconolatry. He is primarily concerned with the origin of cults, 
rather than their practice necessarily. Nevertheless, a few details here prove instructive. In 
particular, he refers on two occasions to the ‘setting up’ of objects, but on only one occasion 
does he explicitly imply that these objects were the recipients of worship. Ousōos, the first 
man to sail on the sea sets up two stelae to Fire and Water, and after his death receives a 
  βδ   (‘branch’), together with his brother Hypsouranios:           δ  δ      λ        
                              ἷ          δ                              .        δ  
  λ                   λ  φ       φ      βδ            φ                   λ   
                                             .105  nfortunately, this passage is infuriatingly 
vague. It is not clear what the   βδ   represent; as a result, it is not clear whether the stelae 
that are worshipped are those established to Fire and Wind, or synonymous with the   βδ   
established for the two brothers. If we assume that Philo is at least vaguely consistent in his 
                                                 
105
 Quoted in Euseb. Praep. evang. 1.10.10-11: ‘he (Ousōos) dedicated two stelae to Fire and Wind, and 
worshipped them and made libations of blood to them from beasts he hunted. And when these two died,’ he 
says, ‘their descendants dedicated staves to them, and worshipped these staves, and held annual festivals in 
their honor’ (tr. Kaldellis, López). Baumgarten argued that the   βδ   were wooden staves known to be used 
in the worship of certain Semitic deities;  see also Reed 1949:99-101. 
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use of terminology, then it is extremely likely that the stelae honoured with festivals are those 
of Fire and Water. This might suggest that the   βδ   erected after the death of Ousōos and 
Hypsouranios are purely honorific, in recognition of their services. 
Another instance, however, suggests that the concept of the purely honorific image is 
vague at best. Two other characters, ‘Field’ and ‘Hero of the Field’, receive ‘august images’ 
amongst the Phoenicians:                     ἕ     ,                   λ    ,   δ        
              ,                       λ    β                    φ             
Φ      .106 The interpretation of this observation is very troublesome. In the first place, are 
we to assume that   β       implies that the images themselves were the recipients of 
worship? The cultic connections of the word would suggest so. Secondly, should        be 
interpreted as cultic, honorific or purely decorative depictions? The use of   β       surely 
rules out the latter interpretation: there is no reason why purely decorative images should be 
described in this way. Beyond this, it is unclear: the        is clearly established in honour 
of the heroes, and yet is described in terms befitting a cult object itself. 
Finally, there is a reference in passing to the relics of Pontus that are established in 
Beirut:                      λ                        φ       .107 There is nothing 
explicit here about the worship of physical objects, let alone images, but  φ       , or a 
similar derivative, was used in both previous instances of the establishment of an object of 
worship: it is at least plausible, if by no means proven, that the same is intended here. In any 
case, I cannot think of another purpose for referring to the ‘relics of Pontus’ at this point. 
Unfortunately, it is completely unclear what these ‘relics’ (λ      ) refer to: Baumgarten, 
                                                 
106
 Quoted in Euseb. Praep. evang. 1.10.12: ‘from them sprung others, of whom one was called Field, the other 
Field Hero or just Hunter, of whom there is in Phoenicia an arcane and highly revered statue as well as a 
temple drawn by a pair of oxen ‘ (tr. Kaldellis, López). 
107
 Ibid. 1.10.35:’[the Fishers] also consecrated the relics of Pontus in Beirut’ (tr. Kaldellis, López). See also 
Baumgarten 1981:208-9. 
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Attridge and Oden, Kaldellis and López offer no suggestions, and nothing in the context 
clarifies whether physical relics are meant, or the children of Pontus, namely Sidon and 
Poseidon:
108
 the latter is the most likely option, since only a few lines before, we are told that 
Muth, the child of Kronos and Rhea, is also made an object of worship.
109
 Overall, Philo’s 
account does not provide enough evidence to wholly address this issue, and is particularly 
ambiguous on whether the few images he does mention are necessarily objects of worship, or 
simply honorific.  
 
2.4.3  The Julius Terentius fresco 
As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, literary sources dealing with the 
religious life of the Near East are extremely scarce. Therefore some documentary, epigraphic 
and visual evidence must be used to fully compare Near Eastern Christian attitudes. A 
striking example of the relationship between statue and divine can be found in the ‘Fresco of 
Julius Terentius’ (see below, Fig. 2.1).110 Excavated in the so-called ‘temple of the Palmyrene 
gods’ in Dura-Europos, the fresco shows a crowded sacrificial scene; the eponymous tribune, 
Julius Terentius, is identified as the central figure by a Latin inscription. 
As well as the standard, it is clear that the three figures to the left, dressed in military 
attire, are standing on bases, which would imply that they are specifically understood as 
statues, rather than (as one might expect) depicting the god directly in the painting.
111
 
However, although Downey suggests that these three are the recipients of worship directly (of 
                                                 
108
 Quoted in Euseb. Praep. evang. 1.10.26. 
109
 Ibid. 1.10.34. On Muth, see Baumgarten 1981:112-120. 
110
 For the context of the piece, see Heyn, who argued that focussing exclusively on the fresco led to a 
misleading understanding of the piece, and that the apparent lack of coherence in a decorative plan for the 
temple was a crucial element in its understanding (2011:228). 
111
 As Dirven argued, these should be interpreted as gods rather than as statues of Roman emperors (2007:116). 
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the soldiers of the XX Palmyrene Cohort under Julius Terentius, depicted to the right),
112
 I do 
not think the matter is as clear as that. 
 
The two figures beneath the statues are identified as the        λ      and      
       (left and right respectively), but Downey admits that she is uncertain as to whether 
they themselves are the recipients of cult;
113
 given this uncertainty, I suggest that there is little 
here to suggest that the statues themselves are explicitly the objects of worship in the form of 
sacrifice (rather than, or possibly in addition to, the two figures below), as Downey and 
suggested. On the other hand, the ambiguity may well reflect the apparent uncertainty 
detected in our sources. 
                                                 
112
 Downey 2008:429. She argued that the cult relief was very often the chief object of cult in Dura-Europos 
(ibid:415), largely because such reliefs were more common than statues in Dura (ibid:430).  
113
 Downey 2008:430.   
Fig. 2.1. The fresco of Julius Terentius, from the ‘Temple of the Palmyrene gods’ at Dura-Europos. 
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In the absence of discussion from Near Eastern sources, can we compare Near Eastern 
Christian attitudes to more familiar Latin and Greek sources? Although they do not (or not 
very often or in any great detail) refer specifically to the Near East, or to the ‘theology’ of 
statuary, there are informative instances. By and large they appear to reflect the same 
apparent confusion displayed in Lucian and in some of the imagery. This is most apparent in 
Livy’s account of the arrival of the Magna Mater from Pessinus in 205 BC, in which the 
historian initially appears to distance himself from claims that the black stone was the 
goddess (‘sacrumque iis lapidem quam matrem deum esse incolae dicebant tradidit’).114 
However, by the time the stone arrives in Italy, he begins to treat it as the goddess: ‘P. 
Cornelius cum omnibus matronis Ostiam obviam ire deae iussus, isque eam de nave accipere 
et in terram elatam tradere ferendam matronis’.115 Presumably no dramatic change has taken 
place between the docking and transfer of the statue; either, therefore Livy is not certain as to 
how to refer to the statue, or else it is entirely appropriate to refer to the statue both as being 
and as representing the goddess simultaneously, a similar conflict to the one seen in Lucian’s 
text.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
114
 Livy 29.11.7: ‘he handed over to them the sacred stone which the natives said was the Mother of the gods’. 
115
 Ibid. 29.14.10: ‘P. Cornelius (Scipio) was ordered to go to Ostia with all the matrons to meet the goddess; he 
was to receive her from the ship and hand her over on to the ground, where she was to be carried by the 
matrons’. On Livy’s account, see Bremmer and Horsfall 1987:105-11, Gruen 1990:5-33 and Burton 1996. 
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2.5  Both ‘being’ and ‘representing’: having one’s cake and eating it 
We might here consider the approach of Ando in dealing with Classical attitudes 
towards statues and the divine. Rejecting earlier approaches of scholars such as MacMullen 
(who argued that “it is not reasonable to consider idols as gods”, 116 instead interpreting them 
as an aide-memoire), Ando suggested that this approach was misguided, and that it was in 
fact unnecessary to distinguish between statue as god and statue representing god.
117
 
Similarly, Versnel argued that the idea of mutually exclusive categories (that the god ‘is’ and 
‘is represented by’ the statue) is largely a modern creation: we must accept that gentiles “had 
to live with two (or more) indeed mutually exclusive realities and yet coped with the inherent 
paradoxes and inconsistencies”.118  This position was reinforced by Platt, who observed that 
“although the relationship between gods and material bodies was continually explored (and 
self-consciously problematised) in antiquity, it was not vigorously contested in theological 
debates that formed the basis of religious identity” 119 it seems there was little pressure to 
form a concrete position on the subject. Given that religion in the Roman world was not 
based around fixed ‘truths’ and doctrines, 120 there is no reason why Lucian should 
demonstrate the same attitude as Livy, or even to maintain the same position consistently in 
his own writings.
121
 
                                                 
116
 MacMullen 1981:78, my italics. Similarly, Clark understood statues as the focus of divine presence 
(2004:36); Versnel, although he argued that the statue could be understood as the god, agreed that the 
presence of the image “fostered the intimate, emotional atmosphere of personal communication” (2011:136). 
This does not, however, imply that all worship required such an image (Burkert 1985:42): I shall deal below 
with instances in which this is clearly not the case. 
117
 Ando 2008:42.  
118
 Versnel 2011:85, his italics. In the same way, he argued, the gods could simultaneously live on Mt. Olympus, 
in their temple, and yet be omnipresent. On the ‘doubling-up’ of gods, see Platt 2011:83-5. 
119
 Platt 2011:22. 
120
 As Rives pointed out, religion in the Roman world worked as a conception of the divine expressed through 
action rather than theology and codified beliefs (2007:27). See also Platt 2011:22, who suggested that the 
lack of formalised credo was a major factor in the variety of perspectives. 
121
 “Individuals understood the way that they and others interacted with their images on a hazy, yet fundamental, 
level; rituals and interactions could be transferred from cult to cult, location to location, and through time 
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Dick compared the relationship between divine and statue to the rite of the Christian 
Eucharist: one can talk about the statue as ‘god’ in the same way that one can talk about 
bread and wine as ‘the body and blood of Christ’,122 arguing that the cult statue is best seen as 
“the main conduit of divine self-disclosure”.123 Dick’s model is suggestive, but not in the 
sense that he intended it. The Eucharist is interpreted in a wide number of ways, ranging from 
the allegorical to full transubstantiation; it is likely that the role of statues was subject to an 
equally broad range of interpretations: some, undoubtedly, worshipped statues as gods, while 
others were more ambiguous, or rejected statues outright. Lucian’s attitude cannot therefore 
speak for the ‘beliefs’ of ‘the gentiles’ as a whole, but his text does serve to show that there 
is, in his eyes, considerable overlap between the categories of god and statue. Certainly it is 
impossible, in this text at least, to say that the image clearly was the god, as Meliton (and to 
some extent Aristides and Tatian) understand it. The matter is clearly more complicated than 
that. 
The brief survey of some of the literary evidence provided above appears to support 
the arguments of Ando and Versnel.
124
 Another option here might be to consider that 
although the statue represented the god, the divine had so much interest in the statue (as its 
representative) that the association of the two would be almost inevitable. Classical authors 
certainly understood that the gods took the treatment of their statues extremely seriously;
125 
offence to the statue could therefore easily be seen as tantamount to offence to the divine. 
                                                                                                                                                        
with relative ease. Certainly, changes in the religious, intellectual and social climate, the politics of the 
empire, and so on, had an impact upon religious practices, including interactions with cult images” (Weddle 
2010:21). See also Platt 2011:122, who observed that “the bond between gods and their cult statues is, like 
epiphany itself, continually shifting and elusive”. 
122
 Dick 2005:49. 
123
 Ibid:45. 
124
Ando’s use of Platonic metaphysics to explore the apparent contradiction between both ‘being’ and 
‘representing’ the statue is neither fully convincing nor necessary, a fact he himself admits (2008:42): I do 
not thing we must explain this feature necessarily, but rather to establish how it fits into the literary and 
social framework, as Versnel suggested and was highlighted above.  
125
 Weddle 2010:65. For more on this, see below, 3.7.1.1 
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One could argue that the treatment of images was symptomatic of the treatment of the divine 
themselves,
126
 but this may be an unnecessary complication. If the gods acted to punish those 
who violated their images, it is not hard to believe that they could quickly become identified 
with those images. The common trend of communication with statues can seemingly be 
understood in a similar way: as the most visible (and tangible) form of the god, they might 
well be expected to be ‘active’ participants in communication.127 It would therefore be 
misleading to distinguish between communication with and communication through the 
image. That is not to say that worshippers ‘mistook’ the statue for the god; as Weddle argued, 
such arguments do not fit at all well with our understanding of the rest of the Roman world, 
and is extremely condescending to those worshippers.
128
 
In light of this debate, it is not necessary to imagine that treatment of statues as 
‘divine’ meant that worshippers explicitly envisaged them in this manner. It simply created 
room for those who did.
129
 The ambiguity reflected in our sources, then, is entirely to be 
expected in that context. Insofar as we can talk of a Near Eastern Christian attitude to 
iconolatry, we may say that this attitude is correct in identifying the worship of statues as a 
key component of Near Eastern religious life, as throughout the Graeco-Roman world, but is 
wrong to suggest that statues were explicitly identified with the gods,
130
 or were the only 
recipients of cult, as Meliton suggests. Beyond this, however, we cannot talk about Near 
Eastern Christian attitudes with any greater specificity. 
 
                                                 
126
 Ibid.65. 
127
 Ibid.74. The following chapter will examine more closely the forms which this interaction may take. 
128
 Ibid.69. 
129
 Ibid.70. 
130
 As Andrade pointed out, some Jews appeared to recognise a distinction: the erection of statues of Gaius in 
the temple of Jerusalem was offensive because the statue, as representative of the emperor, emphasised 
control rather than demanded worship (2010:365). 
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2.6 Aniconism 
One aspect of religious life that appears particularly prominent in the Near East is so-
called ‘aniconic’ worship; as I highlighted in the introduction, Cumont, amongst others, 
considered it characteristic of oriental religious practice. The worship either of object with no 
obvious image, or of an apparent lack of image, appears consistently, especially in areas such 
as the former Nabataean kingdoms, and is often treated as being the “other side of the coin” 
from iconic depictions.
131
 Furthermore, evidence of these so-called ‘baetyls’ is found at Petra 
and other Nabataean cities. Stewart discussed the role of these baetyls in religious life, both 
East and West; he concluded, by examining a wide variety of literary sources, that aniconic 
baetyl-worship is regarded as extremely distinctive, and as a “phenomenon of the Roman 
East in particular”.132 Gaifman, however, recognised the attitude of the sources, which appear 
to regard aniconic worship as antiquarian or quaint, but suggests that this is merely part of the 
dialogue:
133
 in contrast to Stewart, she argued that such images were not a distinctive 
category in their own right, and that this is best demonstrated by the huge variety of images 
categorised by the term ‘baetyl’ – including images which appear at least partly iconic.134 
This debate is far too great in scope to fully reopen here; however, I suggest that a brief look 
at some of the Christian (and indeed Jewish) sources may provide insight into whether we 
can in any way define aniconism as characteristic of religious life in the Near East.  
                                                 
131
 As e.g. Cornelius 1997:21. This is not universally true; coins from Asia Minor depict an aniconic form of the 
goddess of Sardis alongside the statue of Ephesian Artemis (BMC Ionia, 110-15, pl. 38, esp. 1-2). 
132
 Stewart 2008:298. Sartre agreed, and suggested that it was an indigenous phenomenon that gradually became 
more Hellenised, leading to stelae with eyes, as a position somewhere between aniconism and 
anthropomorphism (2008:43). Similarly, Butcher observed a “Near Eastern propensity for avoiding 
anthropomorphic representations of the divine”, although he simultaneously suggested that one should 
“avoid seeing these as evidence for any general Near Eastern religion, which might imply greater spiritual 
coherence than is actually apparent” (2003:338), since the Near East did not have the monopoly on such 
images.  
133
 Gaifman 2008:39. 
134
 Ibid:61. 
 89 
 
One key element to recognise in this regard is that aniconic worship is not limited to 
litholatry;
135
 the result of this association is usually to regard aniconism as a form of 
primitivism.
136
 Gaifman determined two different forms of aniconism: one without images at 
all, and one without human images; if aniconism is defined by the lack of image, then 
worship of empty space is also a key factor.
137
 
 
2.6.1  Defining a baetyl 
Some discussion of the term ‘baetyl’ itself is needed. This is assumed to be derived 
from the Semitic byt ʾl (‘house of God’). One of the most famous occurrences of this term, 
and indeed an episode which may cast considerable light, is the story of Jacob’s Ladder, 
which is recounted in Gen. 28. After falling asleep and dreaming of angels ascending and 
descending a great ladder to heaven, Jacob declares: mh nwr’ hmqwm hzh ʼyn zh ky ʼm byt 
ʼlhym wzh šʽr hšmym.138 He then takes the stone on which he slept, and establishes it as a 
pillar. Significantly, although Jacob describes the place as ‘the house of God’, and the site 
later becomes known as Bethel (although originally known as Luz), neither the stone (‘bn) 
nor the pillar (mzbḥ) is described in terms of a byt ʾl.139 It is possible the author had in mind 
considerations of baetyl-worship and chose to avoid the term, but if this were the case, 
                                                 
135
 Gaifman argued that the creation of the category ‘aniconic’ “assumes a priori the ‘iconic’ as a default” 
(2012:2). Because it is very difficult to determine the ‘iconic’, the ‘aniconic’ therefore becomes far broader 
in scope than is usually accepted.  
136
 Gaifman 2010:67. 
137
 Gaifman 2012:28-9. See also Cornelius 1997:35. There has been considerable scholarship on the temple in 
Jerusalem as a prominent example of empty space worship: see in particular Weeks 2007:12-14. Niehr, on 
the other hand, suggested that this was a post-exilic development, and that Jewish theologians were forced to 
respond to Nebuchadnezzar’s removal of the statue (1997:75ff). However, aniconism in Jewish cult receives 
no coverage whatsoever in our sources, and so I do not intend to address that question here: for more, see 
also Mettinger 1997 and Uehlinger 1996.  
138
 Gen. 28:17: ‘this is nothing other than the house of God, and this is the gate of heaven’. 
139
 mṣbh appears throughout the Old Testament to describe standing stones. YHWH’s attitude towards them, 
however, is ambiguous; Gen. 28 and Isa. 19:19 make it clear that a mṣbh is pleasing to God, whilst Deut. 
16:22 implies quite the opposite (wl’ tqym lk mzbh ʼšr śn’ yhwh ʼlhyk: ‘do not set up for yourselves a pillar, 
which the LORD your God hates’). This ambiguity can only be explained by supposing that the mṣbh is in 
itself not offensive, but only when dedicated to the wrong object. 
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repeating the phrase ‘house of God’ would be non-sensical. It seems more likely that the 
author did not recognise byt ʾl as a technical term for such a statue. This is in keeping with 
the observation of Gaifman that byt ʾl is in fact better used either of places or of gods 
themselves, rather than the object of worship, whether it was strictly aniconic or not.
140
  
Either way, Genesis 28 “is neither an illustration of an overall Near Eastern propensity 
towards stone worship nor a concrete testimony of the existence of worship of baetyls in the 
biblical town of Bethel. At most, it is an aetiological story, which tells the history of a 
sanctuary in the town of Bethel, where there may have been a famous sacred stele that 
marked Jacob’s vision of God”.141 
What of the Greek term β    λ  ? Interpretations appear to vary, but none of the uses 
of β    λ  , at least as we find them in early sources, appear to match the meaning of the 
Semitic byt ʾl. Pliny the Elder, for example, describes them as a form of ceraunia, black and 
round in shape, which possessed magical powers.
142
 Philo of Byblos gives      λ   as one of 
the four sons of Ouranos and Ge, which is probably a Greek transliterated form of the Semitic 
deity Bethel.
143
 This is the closest we come in any of our sources to a direct etymological link 
between byt ʾl and β    λ  : other Greek sources, namely Philo of Alexandria and Josephus, 
tend to transliterate the former as β    λ,144 which would suggest that they do not recognise a 
connection. Nor is there a clear connection in meaning: in the LXX Gen. 28, the only word 
that could possibly have the meaning of ‘baetyl’, mzbḥ, is instead rendered    λ . Gaifman 
                                                 
140
 Gaifman argued that consistent modern usage of the term ‘baetyl’ to define these objects has been largely 
responsible for creating the perception of the ‘aniconic’ as a coherent concept, and that it obstructs our view 
of cultic reality (2008:38-9). I would agree with her insofar as using the word ‘baetyl’, with its connotations 
of the residence of the divine, does perhaps imply certain key characteristics, including the divine nature of 
the object, but nevertheless these themes are still identified by our ancient sources. Modern usage has 
probably contributed to the suggestion of a coherent concept, but it cannot be wholly, or even largely, 
responsible. 
141
 Gaifman 2008:51. 
142
 Plin. HN 37.51. 
143
 Quoted in Euseb. Praerp. Evang 1.10.17. See also Baumgarten 1981:190 and 202-3. 
144
 As e.g. Philo Confus. 74.4; Joseph. AJ 1.342.2. 
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goes into considerably more detail in attempting to identify the source of our understanding 
of the word ‘baetyl’,145 but it is important here to realise that there appears to be no fixed, 
defined category identified by our ancient sources, at least under the term β    λ  . 
 
2.6.2  Jewish and Christian attitudes 
Looking at certain Christian (and Jewish) sources may in fact help enlighten this 
position. In many cases, as has already become apparent in the study of iconolatry as a whole, 
they tend to portray a wildly inaccurate depiction of religious life. Here, however, I suggest 
we may be justified in using them to identify a tendency towards aniconism, if one should 
exist. A brief look at the Biblical attitude in general may help elucidate this. Firstly, it could 
be argued that the prohibition towards image-making found in Exod. 20:4 refers to objects 
with an image: l’ tʽśh lk psl wkl tmwnh ʼšr bšmym mmʽl w’šr b’rṣ mtḥt w’šr bmym mtḥt 
l’rṣ.146 This prohibition is apparently not limited to anthropomorphic images: psl (‘carved 
image’) is used rather than ṣlm, which, as demonstrated above, appears to be used exclusively 
of the image of man. It is not clear what these images are ‘of’, if anything: the commandment 
merely states that it may not be fashioned in the form (tmwnh) of anything under the heavens, 
on land or in the sea. The fact that it is carved images fashioned into the form of something 
suggests a particular opposition to iconism. This may in turn suggest that aniconism would be 
more tolerable to Jewish and Christian thinkers, because it seemingly does not violate this 
prohibition. This suggestion may be reinforced by a further prohibition, immediately 
following the more familiar ones: wʼm mzbḥ ʼbnym tʽsh ly lʼ tbnh ʼthn gzyt.147 The emphasis 
                                                 
145
 Gaifman 2008; she was critical of the scholarly tendency to use the term ‘baetyl’ in a broader sense than that 
found in Pliny (2012:15). 
146
 Exod. 20:4: ‘do not make for yourself a carved image, or any likeness of anything which is in the heavens 
above, or on the earth below, or in the waters below the earth’. 
147
 Ibid. 20:25: ‘if you build me an altar of stone, do not build it of hewn stone’. 
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on the carved nature of the stone in both prohibitions suggests something wholly 
inappropriate about a (specifically) man-made object taking the place of YHWH as the object 
of worship. It would be taking me far outside the objectives of this thesis to explore fully why 
this might be – but it is vital to at least acknowledge the existence of this apparent distinction. 
Is it a distinction acknowledged by Christian sources? Clement of Alexandria, in his 
Exhortation, does appear to recognise a tendency towards worshipping aniconic imagery: 
significantly, he treats it as characteristic of the East.
148
 Gaifman has suggested that, in 
Clement’s analysis, aniconic worship is worse than iconic, because one cannot blame the 
deceptive skill of the artist: one can only blame the magnitude of one’s own sin.149 This 
argument entirely ignores Clement’s own point of view, however:     δ  δ                 , 
           λ   .150 The distinction is not substantial, but it is present. Like our Classical 
sources, he too understands it as something primitive, which is crucial. If aniconic worship 
was regarded as a ‘backwoods’ survival of primitive cult, practised only in the most rural and 
uncivilised of areas, and simultaneously as a distinctive feature characteristic of the Near 
East, then (quite apart from the internal contradiction of these two statements) one could 
reasonably expect the ‘primitive’ nature of aniconic worship to draw the fire of Near Eastern 
Christian authors.  
 
 
 
2.6.3  Meliton 
                                                 
148
 Clem. Al. Protr. 4.40:   λ                                 ,       β       λ    ,                       
           (‘in antiquity, the Scythians worshipped the dagger, the Arabians the stone, and the Persians the 
river’). 
149
 Gaifman 2010:84. 
150
 Clem. Al. Protr. 4.40: ‘when art arrived, error increased’. 
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With this in mind, it is rather startling that even Meliton, who describes in some detail 
the origin and behaviour of local cults such as that at Hierapolis, does not explicitly mention 
aniconic worship. The closest is a brief allusion to the worship of ‘material’, but, given that 
this forms a key part of Meliton’s polemic on image-worship as a whole, it cannot be used as 
evidence for aniconism in its own right. The same goes for the use of the term glypʼ 
(‘carving’). If I am correct in hypothesizing that ṣlm’ is used purely of anthropomorphic 
images, then glyp’ must, if it is even recognized as a category in its own right, stand for all 
other images, which may well include aniconic ones, but must also include zoomorphic and 
so on: aniconic images do not appear in the text as an independent category. 
 
2.6.3.1 Meliton, Lucian and the         
Perhaps the most telling instance is a reference to the goddess Simi, daughter of 
Hadad, deity of Hierapolis. It is very likely that this is Meliton’s misinterpretation of the 
Greek        , the military standard which we know was honoured there, where it appears 
between the figures of Hadad and Atargatis (see below, fig. 2.2).
151 Whether or not worship 
of a         was considered strictly ‘aniconic’ is a slightly moot point (it would have been 
covered in imperial iconography for a start),
152
 but it is clear that Meliton has either 
                                                 
151
 Details of the         are given by Lucian (Syr. D. 33). Lightfoot’s 2003 translation and commentary offers 
excellent discussion on the relationship between Simi and the         (5 0-547); see also Lightfoot 
2007:93-7. Butcher questioned whether or not this might be an example of Roman ‘colonization’ of 
indigenous cult, but noted the popularity of such standards in the second- and third- century religious art of 
Hatra (2003:344). Dirven suggested that the standards at Hierapolis “are not Roman military objects, but cult 
objects that derive from a long indigenous tradition” (2005:119), but that the degree of Roman influence in 
the depiction of the standards varied from place to place: for the differences between the standards of 
Hierapolis and Hatra, see ibid:122-3. The         likely became incorporated into local myths, and thence 
appears as Simi in Meliton’s text (Butcher 2003:345). 
152
 Although one might consider the incident at Jerusalem under Pontius Pilate in which the Jews objected to the 
standards displayed around the city: it is not clear whether it was the function or the appearance of the 
standards that caused offence (Bond 2007:93). 
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concealed, or, more likely, simply not recognised, any distinction between anthropomorphic 
deities and more ‘aniconic’ ones.153  
 
 
2.6.4 Aristides 
Like Meliton, the Syriac translation of Aristides explicitly rejects the worship of the 
elements in particular as a form of the divine.
154
 However, he goes further than Meliton in 
claiming that, in fact, images are fashioned in the likeness of these elements. It is significant 
that Aristides’ criticism of the carving or fashioning of images of the form of man is levelled 
at the Greeks: could Aristides be making a distinction between the Greek world, which 
                                                 
153
 Despite this, Sartre argued that Syr. D. 33 demonstrated that “two clearly antagonistic iconographic traditions 
coexisted, as if in an attempt to satisfy the tastes and needs of all the faithful” (2008:  )  however, it is 
unclear how far these traditions were entirely independent, let alone antagonistic. 
154
 Aristides 6.2 (earth), 6.5 (water), 7.2 (fire), 7.3 (wind), 8.3 (sun). 
Fig. 2.2 Cult relief from Hierapolis/Mabog, showing (l-r)Hadad, the         and Atargatis, flanked 
by twin lions 
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worships the familiar ṣlm’, and the ‘barbarians’, who do not? Unfortunately, tempting though 
this hypothesis is, it cannot be maintained. Firstly, this theory requires us to assume that the 
‘barbarians’ should be associated with the indigenous inhabitants of the Near East. There is 
little evidence in the text itself which suggests that the barbarians can be associated with any 
specific racial group,
155
 despite the fact that the Greek text of Barlaam and Josaphat gives 
them as      λδ    , the Chaldaeans.156 Secondly, and more conclusively, the barbarians are 
in fact equally culpable of fashioning ṣlm’: Aristides says, in fact, that it was they who first 
carved likenesses of the gods, placed them in temples, and worshipped them (implying that 
the Greeks adopted their practice from them).
157
 If this is the case, which it seemingly must 
be, why accuse only the Greeks of actually fashioning their images (and specifically accusing 
them of violating the commandment of Exod. 20:4)? As noted above, this section is closely 
connected with the idea of Greek rationality (and therefore philosophy) and is therefore 
adopting Greek philosophical ideals about the irrationality of forming images of the divine. It 
in no way suggests that carving recognisable images is a feature of the Greek world in 
contrast to the ‘barbarian’ world, even if that could be comfortably identified as the 
indigenous inhabitants of the Near East, whose religious life was ‘imposed upon’ by the 
introduction of Greek forms.
158
 Furthermore, I can find no further reference which could in 
any way endorse this theory; in part, I am sure, this is because Aristides is less concerned 
with image-worship itself than Meliton, but the same argument that applies to the latter may 
also apply to the former: that ‘aniconic cult’ was not a characteristic feature of the Near East 
and so the Syriac translator does not identify it as such. 
                                                 
155
 See also the discussion on Tatian and Lucian as ‘Assyrians’ for the misleading concept of ‘indigenous’ 
Semitic social strata in contrast to, or conflict with, ‘imported’ Greek culture: above, 1.4.3 and 1.5.1. 
156
 On this association, see Pouderon and Pierre 2003:49-53. 
157
 Aristides 4.5. 
158
 Gaifman 2008:67. For more on this discussion, see above, 1.4.3. 
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2.6.5 Tatian 
Because Tatian’s concern is largely with the worship of immaterial spirits or demons, 
his account does not offer much either to support or undermine Stewart’s position on the 
prominence of aniconism. He does at one point question the sense of worshipping sticks and 
stones (    δ    λ      λ                        ),159 which, as noted above, may suggest 
aniconic forms of image. However, the context makes this extremely unlikely: in the 
preceding passage he also denies that we should worship the sun or moon, which suggests 
that here ‘sticks and stones’ are symbols of the natural world, and the worship of God’s 
creation, rather than referring to any form of image. Beyond this, Tatian has very little to 
offer in any way on the discussion. 
 
2.7 Concluding remarks 
Much more could be said on aniconic cult: however, the brief survey here suggests 
that it did not feature in any significant way in Christian attitudes towards religious life in the 
Near East. Whether or not this can be used to entirely deny Stewart’s position is a 
troublesome question: I am inclined to suggest that, although worship of aniconic object was 
prominent, it was far too varied to categorize in any meaningful way, and that little 
distinction is drawn between aniconic and iconic, as Gaifman argued. I acknowledge the 
limitation of my sources in this respect, for it is not in their best interest to portray an accurate 
perception of religious life, but one would suspect that it would feature heavily in the 
rhetorical armoury of Meliton in particular if it were in any way characteristic of the region. 
                                                 
159
 Tatian Or. 4.2: ‘how am I to declare that sticks and stones are gods?’. 
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It has become clear during this chapter that Near Eastern Christian attitudes to 
iconolatry vary considerably. Meliton, Tatian and the Syriac translator of Aristides are 
consistent in the sense that they identify iconolatry as a key component of gentile religious 
life, and treat it with great hostility due to the violation of the prohibition of Exod. 20:4. 
Beyond this, however, there is too much variation to be specific. As a result, the authors vary 
when compared with the evidence of non-Christian texts: Meliton appears to be the least 
accurate, in that he explicitly identifies statue with god, and is therefore an absolute 
monotheist: there is no evidence in other sources to support this concrete identification. Both 
Tatian and Aristides, on the other hand, appear to better capture the sense of ambiguity with 
which the gentile world approaches cult images. An understanding of this ambiguity is found 
at the very heart of Judaeo-Christian iconoclasm: the incident of the golden calf fails to 
clarify whether the statue is, or represents, a god.
160
 It is therefore unsurprising that Aristides 
and Tatian recognise this ambiguity. 
However, all three authors use the attacks on iconolatry not as an objective in itself, 
but as a means to an end. They aim to show the folly of sacrificial cult by highlighting the 
weakness of the gods to whom these sacrifices are offered: iconolatry represents the first 
logical step in this process. My next chapter will examine Near Eastern Christian attitudes to 
this weakness. 
                                                 
160
 Greenspahn 2010:487. Margalit and Halbertal, however, argued that the commandments ‘to have no other 
god’ and ‘not to make a graven image’ are to be treated entirely separately: we cannot therefore treat Exod. 
20:3-4 as the root of this ambiguity (1992b:19). 
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Chapter Three: ‘an idol has no real existence, and there is no God but one’ (1 Cor 8:4): 
Near Eastern Christianity and the powerlessness of idols 
3.1 Introduction 
In the passage from 1 Corinthians quoted in the previous chapter, Paul discusses the 
nature of ‘idols’, saying          β                 δ λ      ,   δ           δ     δ λ   
        ,           δ         ἕ             ἷ .1 This can be interpreted in one of two ways: 
either that other gods do not exist (absolute monotheism), or that they are so lacking in 
substance and power that, in comparison with the true God, they are virtually nothing 
(relative monotheism).
2
 The concept that the ‘idol’ is ‘nothing’ is widely adopted by 
Christian writers, and Meliton, Tatian and the Syriac translator of Aristides are no different in 
this respect. This powerlessness is expressed in three main areas: firstly, the inability of the 
divine to respond to sacrifice; secondly, the dependence of the divine and its need for 
sacrifice; thirdly, the vulnerability of the divine. It could be, perhaps, misleading to 
distinguish these three issues as clearly as this: as I shall demonstrate, our authors do not 
make such clear distinctions, and these areas often overlap. Nevertheless, they are the three 
key areas in which Tatian, Aristides and Meliton attack the powerless of the gods of the 
gentiles. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 1 Cor. 8:4: ‘now, as regards food which has been offered to idols, we know that an idol is nothing in the world, 
and that there is no God but one’. 
2
 For more on this distinction, see above, 1.7.4. For the application to Meliton, Tatian and the Syriac translator 
of Aristides, see above, 2.3.3. 
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3.2 Near Eastern Christian attitudes to the powerlessness of idols 
3.2.1 Meliton 
Let us turn first to Meliton. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, he argued 
strongly that gentile gods had no existence at all (in keeping with the quotation from Paul, 
without demonstrating any of Paul’s ambiguity on the subject). This has profound 
implications on his attitude towards their powers, which, as I shall show, differs considerably 
from those of Tatian and the Syriac translation of Aristides. We must begin by recognising 
that Meliton’s argument is based on a clear statement of purpose. In the central section, he 
provides a Euhemeristic analysis of the origin of gods: ʼnʼ dyn ʼyk mʼ dḥkm ʼnʼ. ʼktwb wʼḥwʼ: 
ʼyknʼ wbʼylyn ʽlln ʼtʽbdw ṣlmʼ lmlkʼ wlṭrwnʼ: whww ʾyk ʼlhyn. ʽbdw bny ʼrgws ṣlmʼ lhrqls. mṭl 
dbr mdynthwn hwʼ wḥyltn hwʼ. wqṭl bḥlyṣwth ḥywt’ byštʼ. wytyrʼyt mṭl ddḥlyn hww mnh.3  
When I referred to this passage in the previous chapter, I observed that ʾyk (‘like’) implies 
that the ‘kings and tyrants’ are not gods, but are merely associated with them, reinforcing 
Meliton’s argument that other gods simply do not exist; and that, secondly, all gods were 
made so by human reverence and by the fashioning of an image:
4
 there is no distinction 
between, for example, Herakles and Dionysus on the one hand, figures whom the Classical 
world accepted as mortals-turned-divine, and Zeus or Poseidon on the other. To these two 
observations we may add a third: that this reverence was caused by the benevolence of these 
great men towards mankind: that is to say, worship (and divinity) is given in response to 
power, and particularly benevolence and blessing. This is an aspect of Graeco-Roman 
religion which is widely accepted: the position was best stated by Gradel, who claimed that 
                                                 
3
 Meliton 3.5: ‘I will write and show according to what I know how and for what reasons images are made for 
kings and tyrants, and they became like gods. The sons of Argos made an image for Herakles, because he 
was an inhabitant of their city and he was strong, and in his strength he killed evil beasts, and especially 
because they feared him’. 
4
 See above, 2.3.1. 
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power was the only true ‘measuring-stick’ of divinity in the ancient world.5 That is, worship 
is relative to power, and one becomes worthy of worship through the display of this power, 
particularly when this display is used for the benefit of mankind.
6
 This is the approach 
adopted by Euhemeristic authors like Philo of Byblos, and Meliton here uses it for his own 
ends.  
A brief word on the Euhemeristic section itself. Lightfoot observed that the polemic in 
Meliton’s Euhemeristic historiolae is curiously “flaccid”7 compared with the rest of the text, 
and suggested that it might be an interpolation, especially since the purely local Syrian 
historiolae appear to differ from some of the more familiar ones, such as the section dealing 
with Athens. It is certainly true that, when taken as a whole, most of the stories are written in 
a matter-of-fact style, reporting detail with none of the editorial attack that we might expect. 
However, where Lightfoot deals almost exclusively with the historiolae as the “real 
curiosity”,8 I suggest that it is possible to explain the lack of polemic by treating this section 
as part of the overall text, and by recognising that Meliton’s focus is almost exclusively on 
the ṣlm’ or image. Given this focus, it would not only be unnecessary, but counterproductive, 
for Meliton to discuss the powers or conduct of the gods in any great detail: to do so would 
involve admitting that they exist at all, and this is something Meliton is determined to avoid. 
This, of course, raises the question as to why the historiolae should be included at all: at first 
glance they add nothing to Meliton’s argument. I suggest that the answer should be sought 
                                                 
5
 Gradel 2002:3 . Similarly, Rives argued that “the gods were what the gods did” (2007:92), and were thus 
defined by their activitiy rather than by their attributes. On apotheosis through acts of both conquest and 
benefaction, see Bosworth 1999:4-7. 
6
 Versnel highlighted the paradox inherent in this mentality: “the exalted or omnipotent god owed much of his 
inaccessible majesty to the fact that he lent an ear to lowly mortals” (1981:35). The humbling of the divine 
majesty is a particularly prominent theme in Christianity: see esp. Phil. 2:6-7. Similarly, Ando argued that 
pietas was due to the gods only insofar as they care for man (2008:5). 
7
 Lightfoot 2007:72. 
8
 Ibid:59.  
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not in the argument itself, but in the supposed addressee, ʼnṭwnynws qsr. On at least one other 
occasion, Meliton attempts to make the Oration directly relevant to a royal (or imperial) 
reader by discussing the conduct of kings.
9
 It is entirely possible that the Euhemeristic section 
was intended to serve a similar purpose, especially since this section immediately follows an 
observation that the Caesars are worshipped more than other, more traditional gods: ʼnʼ dyn 
ʼmr ʼnʼ. dʼp swlʼ ʼmrt ʽlyhwn dlṣlmʼ hw dmlkʼ dmytw sgdyn. whdʼ pšyqʼ lmdʽh. hʼ gyr ʼp hšʼ. 
lṣlmʼ hw dqsrynʼ sgdyn wmyqryn: ytyr mn dlhnwn qdmyʼ.10 Given this context, it is possible 
that the Euhemeristic account is an attempt either to make the section more relevant to an 
imperial readership, in the unlikely event that the text ever reached ʼnṭwnynws qsr, or, more 
likely, as a further reminder of the supposed addressee to the wider readership. I shall deal 
with the moral aspects of the historiolae in the following chapter, but it is certainly worth 
observing that, while Meliton is less aggressive in his use of Euhemeristic approach than we 
might expect, it is not necessary to attribute the section to a different author. 
By recognising the connection between divinity and power, or more accurately 
efficacy, Meliton implicitly provides a second string to his polemic: if he can demonstrate 
that the gods are incapable of responding benevolently and benefiting mankind, the entire 
justification of gentile sacrifice and religious life is lost. He attempts to do just this: hydyn 
yhb lk dṣbynwhy tdʽ. kl mn drḥyq gyr mn ʼydʽtʼ dʼlhʼ ḥyʼ. mytʼ hw wqbyr bpgrh. mṭl hnʼ qdm 
šʼdʼ wṭlnytʼ: ʽl ʼrʽʼ mtʽrgl wšʼl ʼnt šʼltʼ sryqtʼ. mn mn dlyt lh lmtl. ʼnt dyn qwm lk mn lwt hnwn 
drmyn ʽl ʼrʽʼ: wmnšqyn lkʼpʼ: wyhbyn sybrthwn mkwltʼ lnwrʼ: wmqrbyn lbwšyhwn lṣlmʼ: 
wṣbyn kd mrgšyn dnplḥwn lmdm dlʼ mrgš. wšʼl ʼnt šʼltʼ dlʼ blyn lʼlhʼ dlʼ blʼ: lnpšk  dlʼ mtḥblʼ. 
                                                 
9
 Meliton 7.7-8.4. 
10
 Meliton 3.2: ‘but I say also that the Sybil said about them that they worship the images of dead kings. It is 
easy to understand, for even now they worship the images of the Caesars even more than their former gods’. 
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wttḥzʼ ḥʼrwtk mn kdw wdylh ʼyṣp.11 Meliton begins this passage by reinforcing the idea that 
false gods are ‘dead’. He develops on this position by showing that dead objects have nothing 
to offer to their worshippers: how could they? The petitions that are asked of them are 
therefore empty. Instead, these petitions should be asked of the immortal God, because He is 
capable of responding to these petitions. Is there a difference between the petitions asked of 
gentile gods and those asked of the Christian God? The former are sryqtʼ (‘empty’), and the 
latter lʼ blyn (‘do not waste away’); however, it is likely that these descriptions depend on the 
object from whom they are asked, rather than the nature of the petition itself. In fact, there is 
surprisingly little exploration as to what form these ‘petitions’ of gentiles might take. Only 
once does Meliton offer anything with which to interpret this: only the Christian God is able 
dntl lk ḥyʼ dlʽlm. dlʼ mytyn,12 and, by implication, this is something which the gentile gods 
lack the power to do. No other evidence is available within the text to suggest how Meliton 
intends this concept of eternal life to be interpreted within a gentile religious context; I shall 
deal with the problem more fully once the evidence from Tatian and the Syriac translation of 
Aristides has been assessed, since both offer a little more in this respect. 
Meliton also attacks the apparent irony of his opponents’ position: wʼn lqysʼ hlyn 
dmwqdynn. wʼn lkʼpʼ hlyn dmtbryn ḥnn. ʼyknʼ hkyl hlyn ʼlhʼ ʼnwn: dhʼ ḥwšḥʼ ʼnwn dbny ʼnš.13 
Whilst the gods themselves (that is, the images) are incapable of offering benefit or 
assistance, the materials themselves, in their natural form, are far more useful than the gods 
                                                 
11
 Meliton 6.8-7.2: ‘then He permits you to know His will. For everything which is far from the living God is 
dead and buried in the body. Because of this you roll on the ground before evil spirits and shadows and you 
ask empty petitions from that which has nothing to give. But you, raise yourself from those who lie upon the 
ground and kiss stones, giving their provisions as food for the fire, and offering their clothes to images. 
Although they are sentient they wish to serve whatever is not sentient. Ask petitions which do not waste 
away to God, who does not waste away, for your soul which is imperishable, and your freedom will be seen 
sufficiently: be careful of it’. 
12
 Meliton 4.8: ‘to give to you life for eternity, which does not die’. 
13
 Meliton 2.4: ‘and if these pieces of wood which we burn, and these stones which we shatter, how are these 
things gods? For they are useful to men’. 
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into which they are fashioned! This is consistent with Meliton’s claims that the god is strictly 
limited to the statue, and one can therefore expect no more help from the god than one would 
from any other material. 
Other than this, however, Meliton does not deal very much with the efficacy of the 
divine. God’s omnipotence and benevolence is discussed at great length; from this we may 
deduce that, by way of contrast, the gentile gods lack these powers, but nothing explicit is 
stated. In view of his broader attitude, however, this absence is perhaps not as surprising as it 
would first appear. Meliton consistently and firmly denies the existence of ‘alternative’ 
supernatural powers, and claims that gentile gods are exclusively limited to the physical 
image or ṣlm’, and as such is an absolute monotheist. Beginning from this position, the fact 
that the gods are incapable of rendering assistance is therefore self-evident, and requires no 
further explanation: how could a being that does not exist, or exists only as an inanimate 
statue, bless their worshippers in response to sacrifice? Discussing the powerlessness of 
gentile gods at any great length would in fact undermine his own argument: by discussing 
their efficacy he must admit their existence. It ought to be noted that this does not stop him 
emphasising the fact that gentile gods are senseless, a characteristic he emphasises on 
numerous occasions; however, it seems that his focus was on the non-existence, rather than 
the powerlessness, of false gods. 
 
3.2.1.1 The self-locomotion and independence of images 
However, Meliton’s position (that images lack any sort of independent power) is not 
self-evident, as it might initially appear to be; there is evidence in the ancient sources for 
reports of statues seemingly acting independently, responding to prayers and moving of their 
own accord. One such account is found in Lucian’s On the Syrian Goddess, and was 
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mentioned in the previous chapter.
14
 Lucian’s account highlights considerable overlap 
between the powers of self-locomotion of the statue itself and the involvement of human 
agency: despite the fact that it requires priests to carry it around, Lucian claims that the 
impetus is given by the image itself. A very similar account is found in Diodorus Siculus, 
talking about the oracular statue of  eus Ammon at Siwah:    δ                     
      δ              λλ     λ   λ   λ                                  δ         
     λ           .                  φ                           δ       ·       δ      
         φ                                                                         
           .15 Both here and in the account of Lucian, the statue is able to move by directing 
the steps of those who carry it: it therefore appears to function through an expression of its 
divine will rather than through active self-locomotion. A similar phenomenon appears 
elsewhere in Lucian’s text:           δ                                   ,   λ       δ     
    λ          β     ,           ῇ           λ                             .16 Lightfoot 
demonstrated that this was almost certainly a ceremonial procession as a precursor to ritual 
washing.
17 However, the term used to describe the images is        rather than       , which 
Lucian uses elsewhere of images of the gods, or    λ  , which is commonly used by other 
authors for statues of mortals.
18
 The use of        may imply that it is not the cult image itself 
                                                 
14
 See above, 2.4.1. Luc. Syr. D. 36: ‘this one moves of its own volition and itself brings its soothsaying to 
fruition. It works like this. When it wants to prophesy, it first moves on its base, and the priests lift it up; if 
they do not lift it up it sweats and moves even more. When they lift it onto their backs and carry it, it drives 
them twisting and turning this way and that, leaping from one to another. Finally the chief priest approaches 
it an inquires about all manner of things: if it does not want something to be done, it retreats; if it approves it, 
it drives its bearers forwards like a charioteer’, tr. Lightfoot. 
15
 Diod. Sic. 17.50.6: ‘the image of the god is ringed with emeralds and many other precious stones, and it has 
an absolutely unique power of prophecy. It is carried about on a golden boat by eighty priests; carrying the 
god on their shoulders, they go about without their own will wherever the sign of the god leads their steps’. 
16
 Luc. Syr. D. 47: ‘very great festivals take place there, which are called ‘descents to the lake’ because in them 
all the cult images go down to the lakeside’ (tr. Lightfoot). 
17
 Lightfoot 2003:492. 
18
 See above, 2.3.2. 
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that is involved in the ritual descent; alternatively, and more likely, it simply demonstrates 
once again the semantic fluidity in talking about cult statues, particularly in Greek.  
Although it is by no means clear that either Lucian or Diodorus Siculus entirely 
believed either instance quoted here, it is evident that many other people did believe in the 
independent powers of the image,
19
 even when the author may suspect fraud. For example, in 
another of his works, Lucian tells of Alexander, the false prophet of the serpent god Glycon, 
who forged prophecies for a sum. Lucian comments that initially, he had a huge following, 
and only later did people with any common sense (  λλ                   ), largely 
consisting of followers of Epicurus, begin to suspect fraud;
20
 Lucian vehemently criticises the 
gullibility of those who were taken in by Alexander.
21
 Although human agency may be 
suspected in many cases, Weddle argued that it did not follow that this would be the 
immediate response of the worshipper: if you pray before a statue expecting to encounter the 
god, why would you immediately suspect human invovlement?
22
 Nor, Weddle argued, was 
there evidence to support the suggestion that it was only the credulous, uneducated plebs who 
were taken in by the powers of speech and self-locomotion of the statues.
23
 Some Christian 
authors were clearly aware of this phenomenon: Eusebius attacks the deception of priests in 
moving the statues in religious fraud,
24
 but Meliton does not appear to acknowledge it, 
despite the explicit association of image and god.  
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 Weddle 2010:94. 
20
 Luc. Alex. 25. 
21
 Ibid:20. 
22
 Weddle 2010:103. 
23
 Ibid. 96. This is seen in Lucian’s account of the variety of classes taken in by Alexander’s fraud. 
24
 Euseb. Hist. eccl. 9.3. 
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3.2.2 Tatian 
Tatian, rather surprisingly, does not discuss the benefits that gentile gods offer in any 
great detail.  On the single occasion that he does deal with these benefits, he is rather vague 
as to their efficacy: δ                 φ                            λ                      
      β  λ                         λ  β        β      .25 The demons help those who 
offer them sacrifices in a variety of different ways, and a number of these, namely the one 
who is in love (  λ         ) and the one who hates (       ), show a considerable overlap 
with the field of magic.
26
 Significantly, Tatian does not suggest that the demons are incapable 
of performing healings and so forth. Quite the reverse: he argues that the demons use such 
benefits to trick mankind into evil and make them their slaves.
27
 The problem for Tatian is 
not that the gods are powerless, and therefore incapable of offering assistance, but that the 
assistance the gods offer marks them out as morally corrupt, and therefore not worth 
worshipping.
28
 Tatian adopts a similar approach to the assistance of gods in the form of 
omens and prodigies, which is an area that Meliton and Aristides ignore. Rather than arguing 
that the gods are incapable of offering such aid, and therefore that sacrificial cult is worthless, 
he emphasises the folly of mankind making themselves subject to, for example, the flight of 
birds; this, he argues, would make mankind inferior to birds.
29
 Tatian therefore adopts a 
                                                 
25
 Tatian Or. 17.2: ‘there are appearances of demons, and the sick, and the one who says that he is in love, and 
the one who hates, and the one who wants vengeance: all of these take the demons as their assistants’. The 
description of the one who ‘hates’ is consistent with New Testament characterisation of the gentile, and 
particularly of their reaction to Christianity: see e.g. John 7:7, Lk. 1:71. 
26
 Despite the ambiguity demonstrated here by Tatian, I do not intend to engage with the relationship between 
religion and magic, except to note that in both areas some return was seemingly expected from the deity. For 
more on this, see Versnel 1991, Beard, North and Price 1998a:154-5 and 219-20, Janowitz 2001 and Rives 
2007, esp. 158-180. 
27
 Tatian Or. 18.3. The evil here is presumably, although not explicitly, the offering of sacrifices. Grant argued 
that this passage showed considerable similarities with the Valentinian Theodotus (Clem. Al. Exc. 72.2), and 
thus endorses Irenaeus’ rejection of Tatian as a heretic (1954:63. See above, 1.4.3). 
28
 Tatian Or. 17.3:     δ                                     δ          δ                                    
β        (‘how is it good to aid in adultery? How is it of good character to help peoples’ hatred?’). 
29
 Ibid. 19.4. 
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completely different attitude to Meliton, in that he appears to acknowledge the efficacy of 
sacrifice, but chooses instead to attack its moral aspects. 
Furthermore, Tatian appears to attack a second aspect of gentile sacrifice that Meliton 
largely ignores: the power of the gods to punish. Tatian writes:          β          
δ   λ                             λ β    .30 This must be a reference to the demand of 
the gods for sacrifices and the repercussions if those demands are not met. However, it is 
clear that, in Tatian’s view, this anger is largely impotent. He suggests that demons merely 
‘take credit’ for inflicting sickness on man:                                                 
 λ    δ        δ                         ,     δ      β       ,                φ     , 
                    λ  β           .31 This statement appears to imply that the demons 
are not responsible for these illnesses, and that they merely claim that they are (presumably to 
inspire fear and motivate sacrifice). Immediately after this, however, he appears to claim the 
opposite:      δ                             φ    β λ          δ             ἕ        
       ·    λ         δ         λ          δ δ             ,              
           ,32 which does imply the involvement of the gods. However, these sicknesses are 
caused not by the power of the divine, but by their madness. It is impossible, therefore, that 
these illnesses should in any way be considered a punishment for the failure to sacrifice. 
Tatian elsewhere makes it explicit that the demons cannot actively harm mankind:        
δ             ,                                   ῇ λ   ῇ              λ           δ  
                       δ       δ            .33 This, therefore, represents a second 
                                                 
30
 Ibid. 10.1: ‘why should I worship gods who take bribes and are angry if they do not get them?’ 
31
 Ibid. 16.3: ‘there are diseases and disturbances of our material, but, whenever these occur, the demons claim 
that they are the causes, and they follow distress wherever it takes hold’. 
32
 Ibid. 16.3: ‘sometimes too they shake the body’s system with a fit of their own madness, and then smitten by 
a word of God’s power they go away in fear, and the sick man is healed’. See also Hawthorne 1964:175. 
33
 Tatian Or. 16.2: ‘if they had the power, they would have dragged down the whole heaven, together with the 
rest of Creation. However, they do no such thing, for they are powerless’. 
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reason why the demons cannot bless mankind: they are both unwilling to do so, in their 
malevolence, and incapable of doing so, in their powerlessness. The central argument of 
Tatian’s polemic in this area becomes most explicit when he says:     “  λ          ” 
  λλ                                                                    δ       
      λ      .34 The key word here,         (‘as if’) strongly implies that the gods are not, 
in fact, powerful beings. Whilst for Meliton, the non-existence of gods is best exemplified by 
their failure to provide blessings in exchange for sacrifice, for Tatian (although this idea may 
be implicit), the argument is almost the opposite: we must not fear the demons’ wrath (which, 
although Tatian does not give an equivalent, we may understand as the ira deum) because 
they are powerless; we therefore do not need to offer sacrifices to appease them.  
 
3.2.2.1 Excursus: The ira deum 
The ira deum was a prominent factor in motivating sacrifice, as we can see from both 
literary and epigraphic sources. At the very beginning of the Iliad, for example, extensive 
sacrifices are made to appease Apollo and divert the plague that he unleashed on the Greeks. 
This is not guaranteed to succeed, however: Athena subsequently observes that no amount of 
sacrifice would have appeased her fury at the Greeks for their behaviour after the fall of 
Troy.
35
 We see this phenomenon at work in Lucian’s On the Syrian Goddess, in the account 
of the building of the temple at Hierapolis:  δ  δ                                   δ   
                      δ          ,                λ                        ῇ   ῇ   λ   
    ,    δ          ,   λλ                  λ   .   δ                 δ           
               δ             λ          λ β  ,         δ                              
                                                 
34
 Ibid. 14.1: ‘you follow the ‘rule of many’ rather than sole rule, and obey the demons as if they were 
powerful’. 
35
 Hom. Od. 3.145-6. 
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      λ                               δ     .36 Stratonice’s dedication of the temple is 
motivated by the desire to appease the deity and alleviate the illness which the goddess 
inflicted upon her. The ira deum phenomenon is also a key element of the writings of Roman 
historians, particularly Livy and Tacitus; Davies argued that both authors structured their 
narratives around a system of prodigies, which were reported, discussed and finally 
expiated.
37
 This system relied upon the assumption that sacrifice would appease the ira deum 
and restore the state to pax deorum. It would be a considerable leap to suggest that Tatian is 
thinking of the system of prodigies, but it is clear that it was a common assumption that the 
anger of the gods was to be averted through sacrifice; Lucretius’ On the Nature of the 
Universe, as an elaboration of Epicurean philosophical ideals, attempts to demonstrate that 
the fear of the gods is irrational, for they are uninterested and powerless either to harm or to 
bless: 
‘apparet divum numen sedesque quietae, 
quas neque concutiunt venti nec nubile nimbis 
aspergunt neque nix acri concreta pruina  
cana cadens violat semperque innubilus aether 
integit et large diffuso lumine ridet’.38 
                                                 
36
 Luc. Syr. D. 19: ‘now while this Stratonice was still married to her first husband she had the following dream: 
Hera was ordering her to build her the temple in the Holy City, and threatening her with a great many woes 
if she disobeyed. At first she took no notice; but afterwards, when she fell very ill, she told her husband 
about her vision, conciliated Hera, and undertook to build the temple’ (tr. Lightfoot). 
37
 Davies 2004.  Tacitus and Livy are commonly treated as sceptical (Davies 2004:18; on Livy’s scepticism: 
Levene 1993, although he admits that there is insufficient evidence to provide a concrete answer (1993:30); 
on Tacitus’ scepticism, see Syme, who argued that the question was irrelevant to Tatitus’ narrative 
(1958a:397)). However, Davies demonstrated that their assessment of events relied on the understanding that 
the gods were heavily involved in the life of the state, and that Rome’s survival and glory depended upon her 
piety and the continuation of the pax deorum; indeed, scepticism as a widespread phenomenon appears to 
have been an illusion (ibid: 6). However, whilst widely accepted, prodigies “were not to be taken to indicate 
fated or irreversible processes; nor were they taken as the opportunity for formal divination of the gods’ will, 
since traditionally all prodigies were implicitly bad signs” (Beard, North and Price 1998a:37). 
38
 Lucr. 3.18-22: ‘the power of the gods appears, and their restful homes, which the winds cannot shake, nor the 
rain-clouds spray, nor a white snow-fall harm with its firm frost. An ever-cloudless sky covers it, and it 
laughts with a light diffused far and wide’. This passage plays with the Homeric depiction of the laughter of 
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If the gods exists, they have no interest in the affairs of men, for better or worse. 
Lucretius is particularly concerned to show that death is nothing: the gods lack the power to 
punish us in the afterlife, and so we may live our lives free from such fear. From this, 
Lucretius argues, we need not fear their punishment in this life either. Such arguments would 
be unnecessary without a widespread belief in the ira deum.
39
  
It is worth observing that prodigies decrease in prominence in the imperial period; 
Beard, North and Price attributed this to the rise in importance of the emperor as the focus of 
divine (dis)pleasure.
40
 This might imply that the ira deum is inapplicable to our region or 
period. However, this is clearly not simply a feature of Roman state cult. A huge number of 
so-called ‘confession’ inscriptions from Phrygia and Lydia in the second and third centuries 
AD
41
 demonstrate clearly that the fear of the divine anger could often be a motivating factor 
to establish stelae recording dedications. For example:  
         ,   (   )               .  - 
      φ          δ       - 
     δ    λ                
                            
β  λ                   λ- 
                                                                                                                                                        
the gods in their blessed existence: Il. 1.599 or Od. 8.326. On Lucretius and the fear of the gods, see Gale 
1991, Segal 1990 and Wallach 1976; on Lucretius and Epicurus, see Warren 2010, Clay 1983, Sedley 1998. 
39
 The unpopularity of the Epicureans is apparent in Livy, who is very dismissive of them: he “simply notes that 
some, extremely ill-defined, people did not adhere to traditional interpretations. He does not dignify them 
with a title” ( avies 200 :23). Similarly, MacMullen argued that to absolutely deny the existence of the 
gods, or their involvement in the lives of men, would be “absolutely unacceptable” (1981:62). 
40
 Beard, North and Price 1998a:252. Davies agreed that this was the reason that prodigies are given less 
prominence in Tacitus than in Livy: although there is still a great interest in prodigies, “no one in their right 
mind would report one to an imperial senate”, since these would often imply a threat to the emperor. 
(2004:160-2).  
41
 Schnabel (2003:182-7) argued, in part based on the dates, that the prominence of these inscriptions was a 
response to the success of Christian missionary work in the region, which led to “increased exploitation of 
traditional mentalities and practices with the goal of solidifying the control of the “gods of the fathers” over 
the village people” (ibid:187). These arguments highlight the uncertainty raised at the beginning of this 
thesis as to the degree of influence which Christianity had in the early period.  
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    ,    λ                  - 
              ·             Μ - 
                     λλ        - 
       Μ          δ        - 
                        ,  
       λ         λλ    φ - 
                         - 
                          
          .42 
 
In this case, the cause of the god’s anger is clearly attributed to Trophime’s failure to obey an 
initial command. This anger is demonstrated through inflicting insanity on the girl, and is 
appeased only by her committing herself to temple service. The anger of the gods might also 
be averted by making known their greatness and their power, as this inscription demonstrates:  
- - - - - - - - - 
                ]     λλ  ]- 
   ]       δ     ]- 
                - 
λ               - 
  ,        δ      
    δ         - 
   .              ]- 
λ                 ]  
        λλ    φ - 
           δ      
    λ   δ        
                                                 
42
 BIWK 57: ‘because Trophime, daughter of Artemidoros Kikinnas, had been asked by the god to fulfill her 
service and was unwilling to come forward quickly, the god punished her and made her insane. She asked 
Meter Tarsene and Apollo Tarsios and Mes Artemidorou Axiottenos, ruler of Koresa. The god ordered me to 
register myself for service to the gods’ (dated to 118/9 AD). Petzl and Malay defined         as “the report 
of sin, divine punishment and relief from it” (1987: 71). 
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     ,              
  λ          Μ     
   ]     .43 
Unlike the first example, here it is unclear as to what form the punishment takes.
44
 Neither is 
the cause of their anger identified, or at least, not explicitly.
45
 However, the means of 
appeasement is clear: Apollonius’ daughter is to glorify the gods (beginning with the 
establishment of this stele), and to make known the manifestations of their power (which 
were expressed through her punishment).
46
 We may, therefore, suspect that the punishment 
was inflicted for the culprit’s expressing some negative views about the gods. In any case, the 
                                                 
43
 BIWK 33: ‘[the daughter] of Apollonius, who recorded [these words] in the temple, was punished by the gods, 
in order that she would make known their powers. She paid the money, and appeased the gods, and she set 
up this stele and made known their great powers, and from now on she praises them. Under the priest 
Metras’. Petzl (1994:39) restored ‘daughter’ (       ) in the first line.  
44
 This is not uncommon: see also BIWK 20, 21, 35,  7, 60, 63, 66, 67, 71, 73, 7 , 76. “The fact that the 
punishment is sometimes not specified indicates that the nature of the calamity is less significant than the 
fact of punishment which is clearly seen as an expression of the power of the god or the gods mentioned in 
the inscription” (Schabel 2003:163).  
45 “Mit     δ        wird möglicherweise die Ursache für die Bestrafung der Tochter (?) des Apollonios 
angegeben” (Petzl 199 :39). Schnabel admitted that there was insufficient evidence to explain the few 
instances where the offence is not stated: it may be that the offence was considered either too trivial or too 
complicated, or even that influential village elders ‘hushed it up’ (2003:172-3). Rostad argued that the 
absence of details as to the punishment is an indication that confession or admittance of guilt is not as 
important in the inscriptions as is generally supposed (2002:1 7). Words like    λ     and      λ        
are surprisingly infrequent in the texts: of the one hundred and twenty-four inscriptions recorded by Petzl, 
   λ     appears just three times and      λ        six. As a result, Rostad argued, confession vocabulary 
should not be considered as central to these texts, and we should instead focus on them as records of 
reconciliation, which had already been achieved prior to the establishing of the stele (ibid:150): the account 
of the transgression itself, when included, should be considered “narrative elements introduced as the 
reasons why the reconciliation of the deity and the dedication of the inscriptions were necessary, and not as 
the transgressor’s admittance of his or her own guilt” (ibid. 158). While this argument overlooks the fact that 
in many cases establishing the stele is part of the reconciliation ritual, it certainly explains the often startling 
lack of detail as to the crime that is supposedly being confessed, or the punishment that was inflicted. By 
making sacrifice, ritual cleansing and the dedication of a stele, rather than the confession of guilt, the 
essential components of this process (ibid:162), it is clear that these inscriptions closely matches the public 
practice of expiation seen above. See also MacMullen, who argued that the confession inscriptions were too 
varied to belong to a single tradition (1981:32). Rostad did not, however, attempt to explain why such 
inscriptions should appear exclusively in Lydia and Phrygia: he criticised Pleket for attributing them to 
Oriental influence in the region (2002:149; see Pleket 1981:156), but offered no alternative explanations. 
Similarly, he could not offer an explanation for why ideas of divine vengeance did not feature in votive 
stelae, epitaphs and even healing inscriptions from the same region (2002:163; see e.g. TAM 5.1.323, 325, 
331-2).  
46
 Schnabel argued that this was the primary motivation behind the erection of these stelae: by emphasising the 
humiliation of the offender, the stelae publically reinforced the supremacy of the god and his absolute 
control over the people of his or her region (2003:178). This is in keeping with his argument that these stelae 
were a response to the success of Christian missionary work. 
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pattern is clear: the gods direct their anger against the culprit for some misdemeanour; this 
anger is expressed through a negative occurrence, and can only be appeased by making 
propitiatory sacrifices in a form commanded by the gods. This pattern is followed both in 
Roman state cult (as seen in Livy and Tactitus) and in private life in Asia Minor.
47
  
However, it may be a false dichotomy to suggest that Tatian’s argument, which 
focussed on the inability of the gods to punish, is entirely different from Meliton’s, which 
focussed on their inability to reward.
48
 In the above-cited episode at the beginning of the 
Iliad, prayers that Apollo might avert his wrath would be identical to prayers for healing, as 
we shall see below. Thus, prayers for gifts or blessings, which Meliton mentions, and prayers 
that the gods might be appeased, which we see in Tatian, should not be entirely distinguished: 
as will be seen below, votive offerings in particular allow for considerable overlap in 
interpretation. 
 
3.2.3 The Syriac translation of Aristides 
The Syriac translator of Aristides begins from an entirely different position than either 
Meliton or Tatian. As discussed in the previous chapter, for Aristides the gentile gods do 
exist, in some form or another, and it is therefore unsurprising that he spends a considerable 
amount of time attempting to demonstrate the folly of their worship. He has also adopted a 
different methodology to that of Meliton; Meliton’s sole attack on the powerlessness of gods 
is found in the context of ritual practice, of sacrifice and prayer. Aristides, however, focusses 
on the mythological stories found throughout the Near East and the Graeco-Roman world. 
The logic of his approach is clearly stated: in many of these stories, the gods suffer and are 
                                                 
47
 For more on these inscriptions and their interpretation, see below, 4.7.1. On the pattern of offence-
punishment-confession-healing, see van Straten 1981:101 and Schnabel 2003:161. 
48
 As Rives pointed out, it is impossible to precisely identify the emotions which motivated any given sacrifice 
(2007:98).See also Davies 2004:10 and Versnel 1981:3. 
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incapable of helping themselves; how, then, are they to help their worshippers? twb ʼmryn ʽl  
ʼprwdyṭʼ dʼlhtʼ lm ʼytyh. wbzbn lm mdyrʼ. ʽm ʼlhyhwn. wbzbn dyn mgyrʼ bbny ʼnšʼ. wbzbn dyn 
hwʼn  lh rḥmʼ ʼrys.  bzbn dyn ʼdwns dʼytwhy tmwzʼ. wbzbn lm. hy ʼprwdyṭʼ ʼlyʼ hwt wbkyʼ 
lmwth dylh dtmwzʼ. wʼmryn dnḥtt lšywl ʼyk dtzbnywhy lʼdnws mn pryspwnws dʼytyh brt šywl. 
ʼn hkyl ʼprwdyṭʼ ʼlhtʼ ʼytyh. wlʼ ʼškḥt dtʽdrywhy lrḥmh bmwth. ʼyknʼ mṣyʼ dlʼḥrnʼ tʼdr.49 This 
formula (‘if the god is unable to do X, how are they able to help?’) is immediately repeated 
with a second example: wtwb ʼmryn ʽl  tmwzʼ dʼytwhy  ʼlhʼ. wʼytwhy lm ṣydʼ wgyrʼ. wʼmryn 
dhw hnʼ ʼtqṭl mn mḥwtʼ dḥzyr brʼ. wlʼ ʼškḥ dnʽdr lnpšh. wʼn lnpšh lʼ ʼškh dnʽdr. ʼyknʼ lgnsʼ 
ʼnšyʼ mškḥ dnprns.50 If the gods lack the power to help themselves (or, in Aphrodite’s case, 
those dear to her), they are in no better position than their worshippers, and are thus unable to 
offer anything. As a result, the gentiles whom the Syriac translator of Aristides attacks are 
foolish to offer them sacrifices that can have no hope of reward. 
 
3.2.3.1 Excursus: The tripartite theology: religion and myth 
However, this focus on mythical stories of the gods raises an apparent problem. In 
order for the arguments made by the Syriac translator of Aristides to be convincing, it is 
necessary to accept that the stories which he quotes formed an important part of a gentile 
worshipper’s interaction with the gods about whom the stories were told. It is not at all clear 
how far this is the case. Scholars often quote fragments of Varro’s tripartite theology to help 
                                                 
49
 Aristides 16.4-6: ‘again, they say of Aphrodite that she is indeed a goddess. Sometimes, indeed, she dwells 
with the gods; but sometimes she commits adultery with sons of men. Sometimes she has Ares as a lover, 
but sometimes Adonis, who is Tammuz. Sometimes, indeed, Aphrodite grieves and mourns for the death of 
Tammuz. They say that she descended to Sheol in order to ransom Adonis from Persephone, who was the 
daughter of Sheol. If, then, Aphrodite is a goddess but was not able to help her lover in his death, how can 
she help others?’  
50
 Ibid. 16.7-17.1: ‘again, they say of Tammuz that he is a god and is indeed a hunter and an adulterer.  They say 
that he himself was killed by a blow from a wild boar, and was not able to help himself. If he is not able to 
help himself, how is he able to oversee the human race?’ 
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resolve this issue: mythicon appellant, quo maxime utuntur poetae; physicon, quo philosophi, 
ciuile, quo populi.
51
 This is often used to demonstrate that myth and ritual (particularly public 
ritual) had little interaction;
52
 the Jupiter about whom stories of philandering were common 
was not identical with Jupiter Optimus Maximus to whom sacrifices were offered on behalf 
of the state.
53
 This was, in part, to create “different contextual registers” through which 
gentiles could interpret seemingly contradictory conceptions of the gods.
54
 On the basis of 
this interpretation, Aristides’ arguments are misleading, since the mythic stories which he 
relates have no bearing on the practice of sacrifice which he is attempting to undermine. 
Aristides appears to explicitly reveal this fundamental misunderstanding when he says: 
sywmyhwn dyn wpylswpyhwn mʽlyn wʼmryn. dkynʼ dklhwn ʼlhyhwn ʼytwhy ḥd.55 If we take 
this at face value, Aristides’ observation is entirely opposite to that of Varro, by associating 
the gods of philosophical reflection and of mythic storytelling (although he says nothing 
about the ‘civic gods’ of state ritual practice). However, elsewhere, it is clear that Aristides 
                                                 
51
 The fragment is quoted in August. De civ. D. 6.5: ‘they call it mythical, which the poets primarily use; the 
natural, which the philosophers use; and the civic, which the people use’. As Rives noted, Varro did not 
invent this tripartite theology, but derived it from earlier Greek philosophers (2007:22); see also Momigliano 
2003:150. It was evidently widespread, although not all authors used precisely the same classifications: Dio 
Chrysostom argued that a fourth branch of theology, that of the artists, should be added to the existing three 
(Orations 12.39-47). Rives uses this four-fold division as the basis for his assessment (2007:23). I will use 
the more traditional three branches advocated by Varro, because, as will be seen, Aristides explicitly 
engages with these three branches. For fuller discussion of the Tripartite Theology, see Lieberg 1973 and 
particularly Pepin 1956. 
52
 Rives noted that each of these areas should be considered spheres of activity, within which each theology was 
appropriate, but outside which they were problematic. However, although Varro appears to have favoured 
the philosophical branch and was critical of traditional myth, he also acknowledged its importance as a form 
of entertainment and source of literature, and upheld civic religion within the civic sphere (where 
philosophical reflection would not function properly): “although mythic and civic religious institutions 
might be “wrong” from a philosophical point of view, they were not to be rejected for that reason, but 
remained appropriate enough within their own spheres” (ibid. 22). Thus, Varro’s tripartite theology should 
not be used for the basis of rejection of other ‘forms’ of religiosity, such as we see in Lucretius and other 
philosophical works.  
53
 Beard, North and Price suggested that “differentiation of religion” was as a consequence of the increasing 
familiarity of the Roman world with Greek philosophy (1998a:151). For the relationship between religion 
and philosophy, see below, 4.8.  
54
 Versnel 2011:7. 
55
 Aristides 20.6-21.1: ‘but their authors and philosophers introduce and say that the nature of all of their gods is 
one’. 
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has indentified elements of Varro’s tripartite division: tšʽytʼ gyr dʼlhyhwn. mnhyn mtlʼ. 
wmnhyn kynytʼ. wmnhyn zmyrtʼ wqyntʼ ʼytyhyn.56 It would appear that Varro’s physical 
theology corresponds to kynytʼ, mythical to mtlʼ and civic to zmyrtʼ wqyntʼ (‘hymns and 
songs’ being understood as ritual forms of expression). If this is the case, then Aristides has 
not simply misunderstood, he has deliberately misrepresented the interaction of the poets and 
philosophers: it may well be that he is aware of the tension between the two and is attempting 
to play on that.
57
 It is clear that although Aristides recognised an apparent distinction in the 
writings about the gods, he ignored it for his own rhetorical purposes.
58
 
However, there may be a closer link between the myth and ritual than Varro’s 
tripartite theology might suggest, and it would be misleading to simply dismiss Aristides’ 
arguments as inaccurate and inappropriate. Firstly, we need to be careful when we discuss the 
‘civic gods’. This category covers public, state cult (such as the cult of Jupiter Optimus 
Maximus). Does this mean that private cult is a different entity? It is possible. Although it is 
difficult to draw clear distinctions between public and private cult,
59
 we should recognise that 
                                                 
56
 Aristides 22.3: ‘as for the stories of the gods, some of them are parables, some of them are physical, some of 
them hymns and songs’. In the Greek of Barlaam and Josaphat, these elements appear as               , 
        φ      and          λλ        (15.6). See Pouderon and Pierre 2003:369-72. 
57
 Ibid:365.  
58
 This is not surprising: Christian authors regularly described a relationship between mythology and religious 
practice that was too close to be an accurate reflection (Garrison 1997:10). Momigliano argued that we must 
try and forget the tripartite theology in dealing with Christian polemic and apologetic (2003:151): however, 
as Barclay demonstrated, Jewish authors, and Josephus in particular recognised these tensions and engaged 
with them (2007:76). We may assume, therefore, that Christian authors did so too. 
59
 Klauck argued that private cult paralleled state cult but was essentially distinct from it, and that unregulated 
practice could cause antagonism (2000:62). Similarly, Woolf highlighted the role of state cult or polis-
religion at the very heart of religious life (2003:41); by extension, private religion existed on the fringes 
(Beard and Crawford 1985:25); Scheid, similarly, considered both private religion and philosophical 
reflection as largely unimportant for his treatment of mythic religion (2003:118). However, Woolf admitted 
that a model focussed exclusively on state cult gives only a partial account of the religious life of the Greek 
east under Roman rule even during the early imperial period (2003: 6). Weddle disagreed: “the 
differentiation between state- and private- cult can be seen to be blurry at best, and the evidence does not 
always allow us to determine how we might categorise certain religious practices at all” (2010:39). 
Similarly, Holm argued that distinguishing between ‘public’ and ‘private’ religiosity is “a perpetual habit 
associated with our preference for individual over group identity” (1996:131). Rives preferred to talk about 
cult practice in general, rather than civic cult necessarily (2007:23); he also acknowledged that we should 
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there is much more scope for the involvement of myth in a private individual’s religious life, 
since there is no possible form of orthodoxy even in public cult.
60
 That is not to suggest that, 
for example, the Homeric epics were in any way regarded as ‘sacred texts’,61 particularly 
since there is no one standardised set of myths, but simply that it is very possible that an 
individual making a private offering may still have recalled some of these stories, and that the 
possibility for overlap is considerable. Secondly, Scheid questioned the absolute distinction 
between myth and cult: “there is no question that the majority of rites did not accord the least 
place to myth, mythical recitation and mythical characters, and that myth as such was an 
artistic genre that functioned according to its own rules. Yet many cults also displayed direct 
and intimate connections with myth. The extended descriptions of rites and festivals that have 
come down to us reveal precisely the respective places of the two types of discourse”.62 
Scheid gives as an example the ludi saeculares; although myth was very much on the fringes 
of this religious celebration, the carmen saeculare, which formed an integral part of the rite, 
                                                                                                                                                        
talk about domestic cult as neither an extension of, nor entirely distinct from, public cult (ibid. 121); given 
that Aristides talks of zmyrtʼ wqyntʼ (‘hymns and songs’), which may be either public or private, it would be 
misleading to entirely distinguish between the two. Dandamayev observed that the primary difference in 
public and private cult in the Near East was to be found in the media through which it was transmitted: 
evidence for private cult is almost always found in literary sources, since one would not broadcast it in 
public media (1996:45). However, this argument entirely ignores the evidence of what are clearly private 
religious inscriptions, which I shall highlight throughout this thesis.  
60
 Roman religion functioned through orthopraxy rather than orthodoxy: see Rives 2007:27, 48. On the 
difference between myth in private and public cult, see Woolf 2003:45. Similarly, Beard, North and Price 
argued that “it is possible that for some Romans these private cults would have afforded a separate religious 
world within which they might have found the personal experience of superhuman beings, the sense of 
community and their place in it, which the remoteness of the official cult denied them” (1998a: 9). 
61
 Klauck suggested that the Homeric poems were “justifiably called the ‘Bible of the Greeks’” (2000:13  cf. 
MacMullen 1981:68), but this is clearly not the case. They are not sacred texts except insofar as they provide 
the model for many types of ritual and sacrifice, as Burkert demonstrates: his Greek Religion relies heavily 
on the Homeric poems for detail. Furthermore, the lack of ‘sacred texts’ did not mean that texts were 
unimportant in religious life: hymns and aretalogy formed an important part of some cults (Rives 2007:7), 
although these were more prominent in the cults of Isis and Demeter in particular than in traditional cult:  see 
below, 3.3.4. See also Clark 2004:90. 
62
 Scheid 2003:120. He highlighted the fact that “almost all ancient public cults were linked to myth, if only 
through the decoration of cult sites” (ibid:119). Burkert agreed in refusing to draw such a firm distinction: 
“piety was indeed in the Greek view a matter of ritual, but myth was nonetheless ubiquitous. The two were 
transmitted together because they explained and strengthened each other” (1983:33). 
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featured myth prominently.
63
 The majority of mythic content in the poem revolves around 
Aeneas and the stories of Julian ancestry; a number of gods, Apollo in particular, feature 
prominently, but the Carmen tends to refer to their mythic attributes rather than conduct 
(such as Apollo, ‘augur et fulgente decorus arcu’).64 This sort of iconography was an 
essential part of cult, but has less to do with mythic conduct than Scheid suggested: it is this 
conduct which the Christian polemicists attack. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that Varro’s tripartite theology is useful, but must be treated 
with caution. On the one hand, it is essential to distinguish between philosophical reflection, 
mythic narrative and cultic ritual: the Syriac translator of Aristides has not done this in his 
approach, and one must therefore question how relevant his mythic arguments are to the 
practice of religious life. On the other hand, it is surely impossible to believe that these stories 
were completely irrelevant to gentile worshippers, or that Aristides’ polemic would not cause 
anger or distress; if mythic stories were entirely distinct from religious thought, it is surely 
unlikely that even a Christian apologist would undermine his own argument by discussing the 
association unless there were something in it.
65
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
63
 Ibid.122. Scheid suggested that the gods were supposed to take pleasure in the mythological allusions in the 
Carmen, albeit an aesthetic pleasure, different to the pleasure gained from sacrifice or offerings (ibid:123). 
As will be seen below, however, the idea that myths were pleasing to the gods is far from universal. In 
agreement with Scheid, Rives demonstrated that myth could “intersect” with cult, even if it were not 
properly part of it (2007:29). 
64
 Hor. Carm. Saec. 61: ‘[Phoebus] the augur, dressed with his gleaming bow’. 
65
 Rives 2007:30. 
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3.3 The blessings of the gods:         and salvation 
Regardless of its accuracy as regards the relationship between myth and cult, 
Aristides’ arguments are in keeping with those of both Meliton and Tatian in attempting to 
undermine the idea that the gentile gods were able to bestow blessings upon their 
worshippers. To what extent does this reflect reality in religious life in the ancient world? 
Sacrifices are usually expressed in terms of a reciprocal relationship (often labelled do ut 
des). Burkert demonstrated that “the bond between man and the sacred is consummated in the 
continuous exchange of gift for gift.”66 Given the prominence of this mutual gift-giving in 
sacrifice, it is hardly surprising that Christian authors have targeted it with their polemic. This 
raises a further question, however: what is the ‘help’ that the Syriac translator of Aristides 
imagines that Aphrodite or Adonis-Tammuz would be able to offer? As noted, Meliton does 
not discuss at any great length the nature of the help that gentile gods are able to offer, but is 
at least specific, stating that God and God alone is able dntl lk ḥyʼ dlʽlm. dlʼ mytyn:67 this is 
the ultimate reward of the Christian life, and is therefore inaccessible to gentiles. Aristides 
has a little more to say in this respect, but he is simultaneously more vague than Meliton. He 
questions how Tammuz would be able to prns (‘oversee’) the human race. This may refer to a 
wide variety of things, from healing to prosperity or protection.
68
 Elsewhere, he is more 
explicit as to the ‘help’ which the gods offer (or not): whʼ sgdyn lhwn kd nṭryn lhwn bzhyrwtʼ 
rbtʼ. dʼlhyhwn mn lsṭyʼ lʼ ntgnbwn. wlʼ ʼstklw brbryʼ. dkl  ʼynʼ dnṭr rb hw mn hw dmtnṭr. wkl 
mn dbrʼ rb hw mn hw mdm dmtbrʼ. ʼn hw hkyl dʼlhyhwn mḥylyn lpwrqnʼ dnpšhwn ʼyknʼ 
                                                 
66
 Burkert 1985:35; this allowed an expression of superiority between dedicator and recipient (ibid:66). It is 
tempting to regard these exchanges with the divine as mere bargains with little genuine devotion, but “since 
the formal exchange of benefits was something that characterized a wide range of social relationships in the 
Graeco-Roman world, it is not surprising that it also helped structure relationships between mortals and 
immortals” (Rives 2007:2 )  these interactions tell us nothing in themselves of the worshipper’s state of 
mind. See also Ando 2008:6. 
67
 Meliton 4.8: ‘to give to you life for eternity and which does not die’. 
68
 Payne Smith (1903) also gives as potential definitions ‘manage’ or ‘administer’ (particularly with respect to 
property) or simply ‘to care for’. ‘To oversee’ captures the range of these possibilities. 
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nprnswn lbnynšʼ pwrqnʼ.69 He attacks the Egyptian gods, and their efficacy, in extremely 
similar terms: wlʼ ʼstklw hkyl mṣryʼ: dhlyn dʼyk hknʼ: lʼ ʼytyhwn ʼlhʼ: hlyn dlyt bʼydyhwn 
pwrqnhwn wʼn ky ʽl pwrqnʼ dnpšhwn mḥylyn. ʽl pwrqnʼ dsgwdyhwn ky. mn ʼykʼ ʼyt bhwn ḥylʾ 
dnʿdrwn.70 In both these instances, the weakness of the gods makes it impossible that they 
should offer their worshippers pwrqnʼ (‘salvation’). 
 
3.3.1 Excursus:         in cult practice 
However, it is not fully clear what the Syriac translator of Aristides means by pwrqnʼ. 
Payne Smith defines it as ‘redemption’, ‘ransom’ or ‘salvation’. The Greek equivalent, 
       , is used throughout the New Testament, always with the meaning of deliverance 
from death and eternal life in the kingdom of God, and the Peshitta often uses pwrqnʼ to 
translate        :71 although the word is not used by Meliton, he similarly understands that 
God is able to deliver eternal life.
72
 However, it is possible that by pwrqnʼ Aristides means no 
more than the saving of one’s (earthly) life, perhaps from illness or starvation, as opposed to 
deliverance from death (and the provision of eternal life).  The distinction between the two 
may seem slight, but, as will be demonstrated below, is crucial to an understanding of both 
Christian and gentile concepts of soteriology.         is far from unusual in gentile texts and 
inscriptions, but it often has a far different meaning to that found in a Christian context. By 
                                                 
69
 Aristides 4.7-5.2: ‘and behold! they worship them when they guard them with great care, that their gods may 
not be stolen by looters.  And the Barbarians did not understand that everything that watches is greater than 
that which is watched, and anything which creates is greater than that which is created. If it is the case, 
therefore, that their gods are too weak to deliver their own salvation how is it that they might deliver 
salvation to mankind?’ 
70
 Ibid. 19.5: ‘therefore the Egyptians do not understand that things like these are not gods, for their salvation is 
not within their own power.  If they are weak for the salvation of themselves, then concerning the salvation 
of their worshippers, how will they have the strength to help them?’ 
71
 See, for example, Acts 4:12, which emphasises Christ’s unique power in delivering        . Both pwrqnʼ and 
        in the New Testament belong exclusively to God, and are often contrasted with the fiery judgement 
to which non-believers are condemned. 
72
 See above, 3.3; Meliton 4.8. 
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studying these texts, it may be possible to identify which form of salvation Aristides is 
talking about: saving one’s life, or deliverance from death.  
Both Meliton and Aristides appear to reveal a Near Eastern Christian understanding 
that gentile cults claim to offer their worshippers ‘salvation’ in some form or another. How 
far does this attitude match what we see in our non-Christian sources, in the Near East and 
elsewhere? One author for whom         is particularly prominent is Aelius Aristides;73 as a 
second-century author, born near Peramum, his writings will provide useful comparative 
material.
74
 His Sacred Tales consistently refer to Asklepios as his       in his ‘deliverance’ 
from illness.
75
 This divine assistance, it seems, manifests itself in the form of advice given 
through dreams. When followed precisely, it leads to        , whilst other, contrary advice 
may lead to a worsening of the symptoms: Aelius Aristides’ foster-father, Zosimus, dies after 
failing to comply with his dream instructions.
76
 Although his focus is largely on         in 
the form of healing, this is not exclusive, which argues against MacMullen’s claim that we 
might consider healing to be “the chief business of religion”.77 Aelius Aristides also thanks 
his god for his delivery from shipwreck. On one occasion, Aelius Aristides’ companions hail 
him as      , since it is his prayers that delivered them from shipwreck.78 These episodes 
highlight several important features. Firstly, Asklepios is hailed as       because of his 
immediate, practical aid: although he delivers Aelius Aristides from death, this is by no 
                                                 
73
 In order to distinguish him from Aristides the apologist, I shall refer to him as Aelius Aristides in full. All 
references are to Behr’s 1973 edition. Although Aelius Aristides has little apparent relevance to the study of 
the Near East, his writings nevertheless provide important comparative material, for reasons given in the 
introduction (1.5.3). 
74
 On his life and career, see Swain 1996:256-60. 
75
 Although this is not exclusively true: Apollo and Athena are both referred to as       on occasion within the 
text. 
76
 Aelius Aristides Hier. log. 1.76-7. Aelius Aristides later says that this is the greatest sign of the god’s power 
(2.73). See also Rives 2007:99. 
77
 MacMullen 1981:49. As Johnson observed, however, even when         does not refer to healing in the text, 
it is always of a practical and earthly nature (2009:57). He highlighted Hier. log. 1.330-44 to suggest the 
existence of an afterlife, but this is far from clear. 
78
 Aelius Aristides Hier. log. 4.36. 
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means to be understood as a permanent salvation, rather a postponement of his end. Aelius 
Aristides himself makes this point explicitly:                     φ        δ         , 
  λλ   δ                             .79 Secondly, it is clear that Asklepios’ aid is not 
guaranteed: when Aelius Aristides prays for the deliverance of Zosimus, Asklepios first 
refuses, and only yields to persistent entreaty:
80
 although there is an expectation that the god 
will respond to sacrifice with blessing, this is not entirely secure.
81
 Thirdly, the shipwreck 
episode makes it clear that Aelius Aristides’ trust in Asklepios’ salvation makes him unique 
in some respect, for it is clear that this faith is not shared by his shipmates. This is clear from 
other episodes in the sacred tales: during one of his apparently frequent illnesses, Aelius 
Aristides follows the dream-instructions of Asklepios, despite the ridicule of some of his 
companions, who thought he was being irrational.
82
 This shows that Aelius Aristides’ belief 
is not shared by everyone (in his own perception, at least):    δ                     φ λ   
         ,          ,     δ    ,        .83 Diagoras the Atheist observed that if travellers 
who died at sea could set up inscriptions, these would vastly outnumber the votive 
inscriptions that already existed.
84
  
 
 
                                                 
79
 Ibid. 2.37: ‘my saviour gave me one day after another; or, rather, even now he is still my saviour’. 
80
 Ibid. 1.71. 
81
 “There is no sense in which the gods should be seen as all-powerful or irresponsible, with humans as their 
helpless slaves. But nor could they be reliably controlled or predicted” (Beard, North and Price 1998a:3 ): 
they could, however, be negotiated with. See also Burkert 1985:189. Bremer highlighted four elements of 
prayer by which the god could be persuaded to act: da quia dedi (‘give, for I have given’), da ut dem (‘give, 
for I shall give to you’), da quia dedisti (‘give, for you have previously given’), and da quia hoc dare tuum 
est (‘give, for it is in your character to give’) (1981:196). It is not clear, however, that these should be 
identified as four separate claims: they are rather elements of the reciprocal relationship between man and 
god which reinforce man’s inferiority. 
82
 Aelius Aristides Hier. log. 1.63. 
83
 Ibid. 3.40: ‘the one that wants to believe after this, let him believe; the one who does not, well, so long!’ 
84
 The attribution to this remark to Diagoras is disputed by ancient authors: Cicero (De Nat. Deor. 3.89) 
attributes it to Diogoras, but Diogenes Laertius attributes it to the fourth-century BC philosopher Diogenes, 
although he admits that there is some debate as to the true source (Diog. Laert. 6.59). On the abundance of 
such inscriptions at shrines, see van Straten 1981:78-9. 
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3.3.2 Excursus: Votive offerings 
However, these objections notwithstanding, belief in the material provision of the 
gods appears to be widespread. We find throughout the empire thousands of votive 
inscriptions, established either in thanksgiving for a blessing received (often healing), or 
promising an offering in the event that this blessing will be received. Burkert addressed the 
widespread nature of these inscriptions, suggesting that “in distress and danger man seeks to 
find deliverance through a voluntary act of renunciation, one determined and circumscribed 
by himself. He seeks to master the uncertainties of the future by means of a self-imposed ‘if – 
then’. Any situation of anxiety may present the occasion for a vow: for the individual, 
sickness or the perils of a sea voyage  for the community, famine, plague, or war.”85 
However, as Dijkstra observed, epigraphic evidence may take one of two forms: they may 
beseech the god for help in exchange for some offering or dedication (do ut des), or they may 
fulfil a vow already made to the god in thanksgiving for help already made (da ut dem).
86
 
This latter category of ex vota offerings includes many of the tales of Aelius Aristides, as 
well as Diagoras’s cynical observation noted above. It is clear that in the case of an ex vota 
offering, some specific blessing has been granted, and the dedicator makes his offering to 
complete his end of the bargain.
87
 There is also abundant evidence, both epigraphic and 
otherwise, of do ut des offerings made with no specific blessing in mind. A farmer’s prayer to 
                                                 
85
 Burkert 1985:69. See also MacMullen 1981:51. Versnel observed that the expression of these needs in prayer 
did not necessarily represent selfishness or egoism: it was simply an acknowledgement of one’s dependence 
upon the god (1981:18). 
86
 These form two of the five categories of religious observance which Valerius Maximus describes: man may 
approach the gods with prayer, when something must be entrusted; a vow, when something is demanded; 
thanksgiving, when a vow is fulfilled; entreaty, when a sign is begged from the gods (through a variety of 
means); and sacrifice, when something is accomplished through ritual (Val. Max. 1.1.1a-b). It should be 
pointed out that the fifth, sacrifice, forms an integral part of the other four, and so highlighting it as a 
category in its own right may be misleading. For more discussion of this passage, see Ando 2003:1 and 
2008:1-2. 
87
 However, there is little apparent difference between thanking the gods for a blessing with a fulfilled vow on 
the one hand, and asking for future blessing on the other: “when ancient man ‘thanked’ his human or divine 
benefactor in word or deed he was most reluctant to do so without also ensuring his future” (Versnel 
1981:63). 
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Mars, recorded in Cato’s On Agriculture, clearly shows this expectation of practical, albeit 
vague, blessing in response to the sacrifice that was offered.
88
 Firstly, the suovetaurilia, the 
most traditional of Roman sacrifices, is offered. The dedicant then prays: ‘Mars pater, te 
precor quaesoque uti sies volens propitius mihi domo familiaeque nostrae, quoius re ergo 
agrum terram fundumque meum suovitaurilia circumagi iussi, uti tu morbos visos invisosque, 
viduertatem vastitudinemque, calamitates intemperiasque prohibessis defendas 
averruncesque; utique tu fruges, frumenta, vineta virgultaque grandire beneque evenire siris, 
pastores pecuaque salva servassis duisque bonam salutem valetudinemque mihi domo 
familiaeque nostrae; harumce rerum ergo, fundi terrae agrique mei lustrandi lustrique 
faciendi ergo, sicuti dixi, macte hisce suovitaurilibus lactentibus inmolandis esto; Mars 
pater, eiusdem rei ergo macte hisce suovitaurilibus lactentibus esto’.89 Two features of this 
prayer are to be noted. Firstly, unlike Aelius Aristides and the votive inscriptions, there is no 
evidence that the farmer is concerned about one particular incident of illness: rather, he is 
praying, it seems, for the general benevolence of Mars, both to protect and prosper his farm. 
Ando argued that such sacrifices were a matter of trial and error, whereby one measures the 
success according to the results:
90
 it is easier to measure the success of one’s sacrifice when 
one only prays for limited and specific results. Aelius Aristides is able to pronounce his 
prayers a success because he is released from a specific illness: how is the farmer to measure 
the more general protection of Mars? Secondly, and an extension of this point, there is no 
                                                 
88
 Examples such as this one reinforce the point raised in the introduction, that certain features of religious life 
were universal, and not restricted to ‘east’ or ‘west’. 
89
 Cato Agr. 141: ‘Mars Pater, I pray and beseech you to be favorable and kind to me, my house and our 
household; for this reason I have ordered a suovetaurilia to be driven around my land, ground and farm, that 
you may prevent, ward off and avert diseases, visible and invisible, dearth and destruction, ruin and storm, 
and that you permit the crops, corn, vineyards and plantations to grow and flourish, and that you keep safe 
the shepherds and their sheep, and grant good health and strength to me, my house and our household. In 
respect of these things, in respect of purifying my farm, ground and land, and performing the purification, as 
I have said, be honoured by the sacrifice of the suckling victims of this suovetaurilia’ (tr. Beard, North and 
Price). 
90
 Ando 2008:21. 
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guarantee that Mars will act: the dedicator ‘beseeches’ the god and hopes that he will be 
‘honoured’91 by the sacrifice, but no more. However, the suovetaurilia would not be a cheap 
offering for an individual, however wealthy the farmer. As a private offering, we cannot 
imagine that he is under social pressure to make such an impressive oblation: we must, 
therefore, assume that the farmer has a reasonable expectation that Mars will respond to such 
a sacrifice in the manner which the farmer has asked.
92
 
 
3.3.3 ʽl ḥyy (‘for the life of’) in Near Eastern inscriptions 
Dijkstra, however, argued that it would be misleading to create a rigid distinction 
between these models of sacrifice (that is, between votive offerings and dedications which 
anticipated future blessing), and criticised Burkert for focussing exclusively on votive (that is, 
da ut dem) religion.
93
 His extensive study of epigraphic material from Nabataea, Palmyra, 
Hatra and Dura-Europos clearly shows a far more complicated set of negotiations in practice. 
These inscriptions ask for        , which is often given in bilingual inscriptions as ʽl ḥyy94 
rather than pwrqnʼ, which the Syriac translator of Aristides and the translators of the Peshitta 
                                                 
91
 As Beard, North and Price note, macte, which is common in prayers, is uncertain in its translation, although it 
is related to magnus,’great’ (1998:153). 
92
 This point is made extremely convincingly by King (2003:281-282). 
93
 Dijkstra 1995:16. 
94
 Moralee distinguished between inscriptions asking for         and those asking for ʽl ḥyy, on the grounds 
that “votive offerings to gods for salvation’s sake must have developed independently in the Near East and 
the Greek world” (200 :3): his study of inscriptions from the region is therefore limited to those made      
       . However, the frequency of bilingual inscriptions suggests that we are not dealing with two 
independent traditions in this period, but that, as noted in the introduction, individuals could express their 
identity through Semitic or Greek linguistic use (or sometimes both): they are not mutually exclusive. 
Moralee’s study, while useful, is therefore somewhat limited in scope, particularly for the purposes of this 
study. Although Kaizer agreed with Moralee’s approach, in not seeking Semitic influence on the 
inscriptions, he also acknowledged the limitations, and suggested that a fuller study must pay attention to 
both         and ʽl ḥyy (2005:631). 
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use for the Greek term;
95
 whilst the two may appear synonymous, pwrqnʼ does not appear in 
these inscriptions.  
These inscriptions, in Greek, Semitic or bilingual, take a number of forms: both those 
established ex vota and those hoping for some future blessing, specified or otherwise. 
Dijkstra observed that ex voto, votum solvit libens or            appear consistently in votive 
inscriptions, but equivalents are rarely found in inscriptions asking for ʽl ḥyy:96 these are 
probably, therefore, to be interpreted as do ut des offerings rather than votive in the sense that 
we have seen above (insofar as the dedicator is asking for future blessing, rather than 
thanking the gods for blessings already received). It is clear, however, that ʽl ḥyy does not 
correspond to the Christian concept of salvation: like        , it has a broad semantic range, 
which can include life, well-being, safety, health, soundness (of body and mind), welfare, 
happiness, prosperity, preservation or deliverance. Given the enormous number of 
inscriptions found throughout the Near East, it is more than likely that the dedicators 
requested one or more of each of these definitions.
97
 However, given that we occasionally 
find ʽl šlm used apparently synonymously, as in the below inscription, it is likely that ʽl ḥyy 
broadly means simply prosperity, wellness or blessedness (‘well-being’, as Dijkstra translates 
it): 
                                                 
95
 Klijn performed a study of these words in the New Testament, and concluded that ḥyyn was particularly 
prominent in Old Syriac, whilst derivatives of prq featured more regularly in the Peshitta (1952:391). 
However, in instances where the OT Peshitta uses prq, quotations of that passage in the NT tend to use ḥyyn 
(as at Rom. 9:27, quoting Isa. 10:22).  
96
 “This particular Palmyrene class of inscriptions states that this altar was made in expressing gratitude, or that 
this altar was made as an expression of gratitude. Although this Aramaic phrase bears resemblance to the 
Latin and Greek formulae, it should not be conceived as an Aramaic equivalent. In contrast with these, it 
does not necessarily entail that the dedications in question accomplish so many vows. A sense of gratitude 
may originate in many different religious experiences and is not restricted to the fulfilment of vows” 
(Dijkstra 1995:17). See also Kaizer 2002 and Drijvers 1976. 
97
 Although Gasparro highlighted the risk in approaching individual cases with too broad a definition of 
‘salvation’, arguing that the dedicator or celebrant would likely be concerned with one specific aspect 
(1985:xvii). 
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[dnh] msgdʼ dy qrb 
[y]mlk br mškw ldwš 
rʼ ʼʽrʼ ʽl šlmh 
wšlm bnwhy wdʼ 
bywm ḥd bnysn 
šnt [42] lh 
[prkyh].
98
 
Inscriptions such as this one could be interpreted as a public proclamation made as part of 
social conformity and in keeping with tradition,
99
 and the same could be said of ex vota 
inscriptions. Dijkstra clearly demonstrated that a key part of inscriptions featuring the 
formula ʽl ḥyy is the building and maintaining of social relationships, because very often the 
dedicator and the beneficiary are not identical.
100
 In the vast majority of these inscriptions, 
there are three parties involved: the dedicator, the divine recipient, and the beneficiary 
(usually more than one), of whom the dedicator may be named, but is rarely the sole 
beneficiary.  
Inscriptions at Hatra appear to be far vaguer than those at Nabataea in naming the 
beneficiary, who is at times not identified at all: we find examples of an enigmatic prayer for 
                                                 
98
 Cantineau 1978b:24: ‘[this] is the sanctuary (or stele) that Yamlik son of Mashku has offered to Dusares Aara 
for the well-being of himself and the well-being of his sons. And this on the first day of Nissan of the 42
nd
 
year of the Eparchy’ (tr. Dijkstra). 
99
 Burkert 1985:93: “the pious act of dedication is thereby transformed into an act of public ostentation. One 
creates one’s memorial, mnema.” See also  ijkstra 1995:19:  “rather the stereotyped wording suggests that, 
whatever the personal religious intentions of the dedicator, the dedication of an object to a particular deity is 
a matter of custom, implying good manners and culturally prescribed conduct as well as the application of 
certain standard formulae”. 
100
 Dijkstra observed that since one’s ḥyy was the highest blessing one could ask for, it would inevitably 
advertise the dedicator’s affection and loyalty to the benefactor (ibid:30). In a number of cases, this is 
expressed through requests for the salvation the emperor. Moralee argued those who made such dedications 
“were tapping the deeply rooted tradition of making dedications for personal salvation, a tradition that in this 
region stretches back hundreds of years” (200 :19), and that the two types (personal salvation, and the 
salvation of the emperor) should be treated as part of the same phenomenon.   
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the life of ‘all those who are dear’ (sc. to the dedicator), as in this inscription on the northern 
gate of courtyard of main sanctuary at Hatra:  
[byr]ḥ ʼyr šnt 449 šwrʼ wʼbwlʼ dy bnʼ byt ʼlhʼ nṣr[w] mryʼ [ʽl 
ḥyyhy wʽl ḥyʼ] bnyhy wʼḥyhy 
wʽl ḥyʼ mn dy lmryʼ  rḥym bnʼ byt šmš ʼlhʼ rbʼ [    ] byt š[mš] 
ʼlhʼ tqwm ʼnʼ ʽbdʼlhʼ br ṭpsrʼ br nṣrw bnyt ʽl ḥyʼ nšryhb m[ry] ʼ 
wʽl ḥyʼ b[nyhy].101 
In this case, Dijkstra argued, ‘whoever is dear’ should be identified as Nasru’s clients. These 
inscriptions therefore serve to build kinship ties between the beneficiary and dedicator, and 
could be interpreted as a response to social pressure rather than religious conviction.
102
 
There are also examples of ʽl ḥyy inscriptions used by the dedicator as an act of self-
advertisement or euergetism,
103
 which again suggests the construction of self-identity, rather 
than the hope of eternal life in any sense. Kaizer questioned whether, in the case of these 
dedicators, and particularly those who left posthumous legacies, the possibility of an afterlife, 
“as inspired by real religious feelings”, should be eliminated, but admitted that it would be 
dangerous “to argue from our lack of knowledge about the beliefs of the Palmyrenes”.104 
Notwithstanding difficulties in talking about ‘real’ religious feelings or ‘belief’, as 
highlighted above, it is clear that, if the dedicator did anticipate an afterlife, they left little 
evidence of it in the inscriptions. Instead, they focus on the link between ʽl ḥyy and 
                                                 
101
 H272: ‘In the month Iyyar of the year 449 (=138 AD). The wall and the gate which lord Nasru has built in 
the house of the gods for the life of himself and the life of his sons and brothers and for the life of whoever is 
dear to the lord. The builder of the house of Shamash, the great god [       ] am I, Abdullah son of Tapsarra 
son of Nasru. I have built it for the life of lord Neshryahb and for the life of his sons’ (tr. Dijkstra). 
102
 See also Moralee 2004:76. 
103
 Euergetism was defined by Kaizer in this context as “the contributions which the rich members of cities or 
other communities not only were expected to make but did make to the public expenses, above all to 
voluptates and opera publica” (2002:2 3  see also Veyne 1976:20, who provided the foundation for Kaizer’s 
definition). 
104
 Kaizer 2002:244. For fuller discussion of the relationship between these inscriptions and funerary 
inscriptions, see ibid:242-256 and Kaizer 2010. 
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benefactions, as this inscription found on the lintel of the main entrance of the temple of 
Nabu in Hatra clearly shows: 
[lṭ]b dkyr šmšʽqb br ḥnynʼ ʼrdklʼ dbnʼ 
[ʼr]zʼ hdyn lnbw ʼlhʼ ʽl ḥyʼ bn[yhy   ]klhn.105 
In Hatra, at least, the semantic range of ʽl ḥyy appears to have broadened and may even 
include ‘for the honour of’: we find it inscribed on a number of statues with no cult 
connection or iconography apparent.
106
 
However, it is clear, as in the prayer to Mars quoted above, that social pressure and 
conformity is an inadequate explanation. In order to justify a sacrifice of any form, 
particularly an expensive one, there must be a certain expectation that the god will respond to 
the dedicator’s prayer. A bilingual inscription from Diocletian’s Camp at Palmyra 
demonstrates this: 
      ]                 Μ                
      δδ]  δ         Φ                  
                  ]                       
[        ] 
lbʽlšmn rbʼ w[r]ḥmnʼ ʽl[t]ʼ dh wsmkʼ ʽbd 
[mʽny br] ʽmt br ḥdw[dn pr]mw[n] ʽl ḥywhy wḥyy 
bnwhy byrḥ šbṭ šnt 4[   ].107 
                                                 
105
 H403: ‘May Shamashaqab son of Hanina, the architect, be remembered for good, for he has built this temple 
for the god Nabu for the life of his sons [         ] all of them’ (tr. Dijkstra). 
106
 “Indeed, the religious dimension appears to have been dispensed with completely. As a result the formula 
should not be explained as the evocation of a divine recipient for the bestowal of ‘life’ on one or more 
beneficiaries. The idea may waver at the back of the dedicator’s mind, but it is not explicitly expressed. 
Instead, dedicators and beneficiaries are simply presented in their social relationship, creating serious 
problems about the exact nature of the dedication” ( ijkstra 1995:219). 
107
 Cantineau 1930:11:              
Gk: ‘To the highest and answering Zeus. Mannaios Ammathos son of Haddudan son of Firmon for the well-
being of himself and of his children. In the month Pereitios [     ]’.                            
Palm: ‘For Baalshamin, the Great and Merciful, Maanai son of Amat son of Haddudan Firmon has made this 
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‘Highest and answering Zeus’ is here identified with ‘Baalshamin the great and merciful’. In 
both cases the epithet implies an expectation on the part of the dedicator that their prayer will 
be answered, but also a recognition that the power to answer, or not, lies in the hands of the 
god. Similarly, inscriptions are often dedicated to the ‘good and rewarding’ god: 
Baalshamin
108
 and Nabu
109
 are both given this epithet (ʼlhʼ tbʼ wskrʼ). These epithets do not 
help to build social ties, but must reflect on the expectation that the god will live up to the 
name given to him by the dedicator, namely by delivering ḥyyn to the dedicator and the 
beneficiaries. 
Dijkstra argued that epithets like ‘the Merciful’ are reserved for specifying the 
Anonymous God.
110
 This deity, under the alias bryk šmh lʽlmʼ (‘he whose name is blessed 
forever’)111 appears in a number of Palmyrene inscriptions, such as this one from Diocletian’s 
Camp: 
bryk šmh lʽlmʼ ṭbʼ 
wrḥmnʼ ʽbd wmwdʼ 
lʽlmʼ whblt br tymr 
ṣw br mlkw ʽl ḥywhy wḥ 
yʼ bnwhy byrḥ nysn ywm 20 
šnt 547.112 
                                                                                                                                                        
altar and the hall of banquets, for the life of himself and the life of his sons. In the month Shebeth of the year 
4[   ] (February ? AD)’ (tr. Dijkstra). 
108
 Cantineau 1930:21. 
109
 Bounni and Saliby 1965:127. 
110 Although he also noted that Baalshamin is occasionally described in this way. So too is  eus Tourmasgada in 
 ura-Europos:     λ   Μ                                 δ  (‘Zeus Helios Mithras, (the) Holy, (the) 
Highest, (the) Answering Tourmasgada’, TEAD 9.3, no. 974, with an abbreviated form of the title appearing 
in TEAD 9, 3, no. 973). (Dijkstra 1995:139, esp. no. 66). 
111
 Teixidor suggested that this formula was most probably cultic and as such could be applied to this or that 
deity even thought that the inscriptions seem to refer to one particular god” (1979:116). 
112
 RSP 135: ‘He whose name is blessed forever, the Great and the Merciful. Wahballat son of Taimarsu son of 
Malku has made in order to do honour in eternity for the life of himself and the life of his sons. In the month 
Nissan, the 20
th
 day, of the year 547 (=20
th
 April 236 AD), tr. Dijkstra. 
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Although the divine recipient is left unnamed, the identification of them as ṭbʼ wrḥmnʼ 
(‘Great (in the sense of Good) and Merciful’) surely requires an understanding of the 
beneficience of the divine, as the epithets cannot simply be part of a cultic forumula which is 
repeated for form’s sake.113 It is therefore likely that inscriptions which identify the 
Anonymous God in such terms were set up with reasonable expectation of the giving of ḥyyn, 
or, possibly, in response to a blessing already received. However, as Dijkstra noted, of the 
multitude of Anonymous God inscriptions, only three have any explicit motive,
114
 and only 
one of these definitely employs ʽl ḥyy,115 giving further support to Dijkstra’s argument that “a 
sharp distinction should be made between texts with the formula ʽl ḥyy and those without”.116 
Dedications asking the Anonymous God for ʽl ḥyy must therefore be seen as a request for a 
fairly non-specific future blessing (‘well-being’ is enormously vague), and yet one which the 
dedicator assumed had a reasonable chance of being bestowed in response to the dedication. 
However, although the term         appears frequently in epigraphic evidence, it can 
also be applied to humans:
117
 for instance, Augustus is referred to as       in a calendar 
from Priene (dated to 9 BC).
118
 In what way was Augustus viewed as a ‘saviour’? It may be 
in the sense that he brings peace and security to his people, or it may be related to their 
prosperity. It is unlikely to have any more specific field of reference than this, and certainly 
does not imply that he is able to deliver the dedicator from death: as I shall discuss later, it is 
                                                 
113
 Teixidor argued that this formula was by no means an indication of monotheistic preference on the part of the 
worshipper, but was possibly a “spiritualized” used to designate Baalshamin (1979:115). Invocations to 
‘unknown’ or ‘nameless’ gods were discussed above: 1.7.4. In cases like these it is clear that people knew 
more or less what sort of deity they needed, but they left it up to him to decide whether the chosen name (or 
which of the chosen names) was best” (Versnel 1981:1   see also 2011: 3-58). Ogilvie argued that the gods, 
“like dogs, will only answer to their names” (1969:2   see also Ando 2008:130)  the invocation to the 
Anonymous God is therefore probably, in part, an attempt to get around this.  
114
 Despite the enormous popularity of the Anonymous God at Palmyra: see Teixidor 1979:115-9. 
115
 CIS 2:4058. 
116
 Dijkstra 1995:141. 
117
 Notwithstanding the above-cited instance in which Aelius Aristides is referred to as such by his ship-mates 
(above, 3.3.1). For more on the relationship between the emperor and the divine, see below, 5.2.3. 
118
 OGIS 458. 
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not clear whether people would pray directly to an emperor in the hope of receiving some 
benefit (such as healing), and assuming that they did, such prayers would belong in private 
contexts, not on civic calendars. It is probable that Augustus is described as       
retrospectively: he is being thanked for the blessings that he has brought to the empire, rather 
than beseeched for future blessings (although there is no doubt the hope that he will continue 
to provide peace, security and prosperity). For more specific blessings, the traditional gods 
perhaps proved more efficacious. Nevertheless, there are suggestions of a broader range of 
powers available to the honoured benefactor, as this fragmentary inscription from el-Hubta 
demonstrates: 
[        ]ʼ dy ʼ [                                                  ] 
[w]brh [d]y [mn] qbytʼ hw w[         ] ʽ[b]dʼlgʼ 
br ʽbdʼlgʼ dy [m]n swdy w[           ] wbnwhy 
[w]whbʼlhy wrbʼl  w[                     ] wwhbʼlhy 
[w]bn[w]h[y l]ʼlh ṣʽbw ʼlhʼ dy [b]ʼṣl ḥbtʼ ʽl ḥy[y] 
[r]bʼl [m]lkʼ mlk nbṭw dy ʼḥyy wš[y]zb ʽ[m]h [wʽ]l ḥyy gmlt whgrw 
ʼḥwt[h m]lkt nbṭw bny mlkw 
[mlk]ʼ mlk nbṭw br ḥrtt mlk nbṭw rḥm ʽmh 
[wʽl ḥy]y qšmʼl wšʽ[w]dt ʼḥwth mlkt nbṭw wʽ[l] 
[ḥyy               m]lk[w] bn[y] rbʽl wgmlt whgrw [    ] 
[                              m]lkt nb[ṭw wʽl ḥ]yy qšmʼ[l] 
[                      rbʼl mlk n]bṭw dy ʼ[ḥ]yy wšyzb 
[ʽmh].119 
                                                 
119
 Cantineau 1978b:9: ‘[      ] that [       ] and his son who originate from Qabita, he and [       ] Abdalga son of 
Abdalga who originate from Soueida (?) and [     ] and his sons, and Wehbellahai and Rabbel and [       ] and 
Wahbellahai and his sons for the god Saabu, the god who resides in [         ] of Hubta for the life of king 
Rabbel, king of the Nabataeans, who brings life and deliverance to his people, and for the life of Gamilate 
and Hagiru, his sisters, princesses of the Nabataeans, the children of king Malichos, the king of the 
Nabataeans, son of Aretas, king of the Nabataeans, who loves his people, and for the life of Qoshmail and 
Shaudat, his sisters, princesses of the Nabataeans, and for the life of [      ] Malichos, the children of Rabbel 
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Rabbel, the king, is not specifically referred to in any term that is directly equivalent to 
     , but he is able to bring ‘life and deliverance’ (ʼḥyy wšyzb) to his people. We might 
well read into this the same ideas expressed in the above-cited reference to Augustus, that he 
is able to provide peace and prosperity to those under his rule. A second, very similar, 
inscription from Iram employs the same formula, again of Rabbel: 
 
[                  ] dy bʼrm ʽ[l ḥyy rbʼl mlk ʼ mkl nbṭw] 
[dy ʼḥyy w]šyzb ʽmh wʽl ḥyy gmlt wh[gyrw] w[    ]š[          ʼḥwth] 
mlkwt nbṭw wʽl ḥyy ḥrtt wš[      ] bnwhy wʽl ḥyy ḥldw [        ] 
[        ]rw wʽl ḥyy qšmʼl wšʽwdt ʼḥwth byrḥ ʼyr šnt [17] 
lrbʼl mlkʼ mlk nbṭw dy ʼḥyy wšyzb ʽmh.120 
 
Despite the huge variety in the uses of         or ʽl ḥyy seen above, in only a few do 
we find any reference to an afterlife, with the sense found throughout the New Testament and 
used of Jesus Christ. It may feature in this inscription from Taima in the Hejaz:  
ḥgrʼ dy qrb ʼḥbwl whw pny ḥṭm 
h lmnwh ʼlht ʼlhtʼ lḥyy npšh wnp 
š ʼḥrth lʽlm.121 
Associating this inscription with an afterlife depends on Dijkstra’s translation of npš as 
‘soul’.122 Whilst it can stand for the soul, and is roughly synonymous with the Greek     , it 
can also range from a breathing being to the seat of one’s emotions. Like     , it can simply 
                                                                                                                                                        
and Gamilat and Hagiru [      ] princesses of the Nabataeans, and for the life of Qoshmail [    ] king Rabbel, 
king of the Nabataeans, who brings life and deliverance to his people’ (tr. Dijkstra). 
120
 Savignac 1933:408; Starcky 1966:979: ‘[        ] that is in Iram for [the life of king Rabbel, the king of the 
Nabataeans, who brings life and] deliverance to his people and for the life of Gamilat and Ha[giru] and [   
his sisters], princesses of the Nabataeans, and for the life of Aretas and [    ] his children and for the life of 
Huldu [    ] and for the life of Qoshmael and Shaudat, his sisters. In the month Ayyir of the [17
th
] year of 
king Rabbel, the king of the Nabataeans, who brings life and deliverance to his people’ (tr. Dijkstra). 
121
 Beyer and Livingstone 1987:291: ‘the dedication that Ahibol has offered, who is a protege of Hatamah, to 
the highest goddess Manawah for the life of his soul and the soul of his offspring in eternity’ (tr. Dijkstra). 
122
 Moralee heavily criticized Séjourné’s 1892 translations, which, for example, asked for the soul of one 
Sophronia: in Moralee’s view, Séjourné’ “introduced a blatantly Christian reading of the text that invoked 
the future salvation brought through Christ’s forgiveness of sin” (200 :20). 
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stand as a synonym for ‘person’, ‘individual’ or simply ‘self’.123 This makes it impossible to 
give a concrete definition. However, the same phrase appears in the Syriac translation of 
Aristides and is used of the ability (or, rather, the lack thereof) of the gods to save 
themselves: ʼn hw hkyl dʼlhyhwn mḥylyn lpwrqnʼ dnpšhwn ʼyknʼ nprnswn lbnynšʼ pwrqnʼ.124 
In this instance, Aristides clearly does not intend npš in any way to refer to the ‘soul’ of the 
god, and it could either be translated ‘to save one’s life’, or, as I have done, ‘to save 
oneself’.125 However, it is unlikely that ḥyy npš here means simply ‘to save himself’ (i.e. the 
dedicator), where npš is used instead of repeating his own name, since there would be no 
need to repeat the phrase for his children. It is possible that it carries the same meaning as at, 
for example, Matthew 10:28 (       φ β                                  ,     δ  
         δ                     φ β      δ    λλ       δ                            
   λ              ),126 and lʽlm (‘for eternity’) certainly makes it plausible that more than 
simply ‘personality’ or ‘breath’ is involved here, but the inscription offers little further 
evidence with which to interpret this peculiar usage. 
Another possible reference to ‘eternal’ salvation may be found at Jebel Muntar 
(South-West of Palmyra):  
lblḥmwn ʽbdw mn kyshwn mqymw br mqymw br zbdbwl ʽrym 
wyrḥbwlʼ br mlkw br lšmš br ḥnbl ʼʽby hyklʼ dnh wʼsṭwʼ 
  dy šyšʼ dy qdmwhy wʼsṭwʼ dy lʽlmnh wtṭlylʼ klh wtrʽwhy wšrgbʼ 
                                                 
123
 Dijkstra defines it as “a creature’s essence, a person’s individuality or personality” (1995:74). Kaizer, 
however, preferred to use lnpš as a reflexive pronoun, the equivalent of the Greek       (2010:25) 
124
 Aristides 5.2: ‘if it is the case, therefore, that their gods are too weak to (deliver) their own salvation how is it 
that they might (deliver) salvation to mankind?’ 
125
 This is also Rendel Harris’ translation, and is probably correct given that Aristides’ point is to draw out the 
contrast between the god saving himself and saving the worshipper. The same phrase appears also in his 
attack on iconolatry (20.2-3). Since these statues can have no souls which they might save, npš must be 
reflexive and refer to the self. 
126
 Mt. 10:28: ‘have no fear of those who can destroy the body but cannot destroy the soul. Rather, fear the one 
who has the power to destroy both body and soul in Hell’. 
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dy nḥšʼ wʼp qrbw hyklʼ dy mnwt wʼsṭwwhy wtṣbyth 
klh ʽl ḥyyhwn wḥyy bnyhwn wʼḥyhw[n] lʽlmʼ byrhḥ ʼyr šnt 400.127 
Although this may appear explicit, we have no evidence to tell us exactly what the dedicator 
hoped for in praying ʽl ḥyyhwn wḥyy bnyhwn wʼḥyhw[n] lʽlmʼ (‘for the  life of themselves 
and the life of their sons and their brothers for ever’). There is certainly nothing suggesting 
that ‘forever’ must imply an afterlife. Funerary inscriptions at Palmyra similarly attest to a 
‘house of eternity’ (byt ʽlmʼ), but Kaizer doubted that this referred to the continued existence 
of the soul: instead, he suggested, this should be interpreted as eternal remembrance.
128 Either 
way, such inscriptions may hint at the concept of eternal deliverance, but they are extremely 
scarce and can in no way be used to argue for a widespread belief in         in this sense, 
but must be regarded as the (potentially unusual) views of the occasional individual 
expressed in a far more familiar form and context.
129
 
  
3.3.4 Excursus:         in  mystery cults. 
However, the distinction between material salvation and the blessings of eternal life is 
far less clear in some of the ‘mystery cults’ which we find throughout the empire, and which 
were particularly prominent in this period. I acknowledge that this is a dangerous and 
controversial area: numerous scholars have argued that seeking a precursor or parallel to 
Christianity in any of the cults of the Roman Empire has hugely misleading consequences.
130
 
                                                 
127
 Gawlikowski 1973:16f: ‘for Belhammon Moqaimu son of Moqaimu son of Zabdibol Arima and Yarhibola 
son of Malku son of Lishamsh son of Hannibel Aabai have made from their own pockets this temple as well 
as the marble portico in front of it and the portico on top of it and the entire roof and its gate and the bronze 
šrgb. And also they have offered the temple of Manawat and its porticoes and all its ornamentations for the 
life of themselves and the life of their sons and their brothers for ever. In the month Iyyar of the year 400 
(=May 89 AD)’ (tr. Dijkstra). 
128 Kaizer 2010:25: the phrase appearse in bilingual inscriptions as          (   )        . 
129
 There is “no good evidence to support the notion of a deeply rooted belief in an afterlife at Palmyra” (Kaizer 
2010:28). 
130
 “The constant use of Christianity as a reference system when dealing with the so-called mystery religions 
leads to distortions as well as partial clarification, obscuring the often radical differences between the two” 
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However, I am interested only in the concept of salvation and its significance within these 
cults, and on these grounds a comparison is justified; I do not intend to look at how salvation 
is delivered, or the role of faith within these cults. I will briefly examine the role of         
and the aims, or aspirations, of participants in some of these cults: specifically, the Eleusinian 
mysteries of Demeter, and the cults of Isis, Mithras and Dionysus. Could the polemic of 
Meliton and the Syriac translation of Aristides against the ‘salvation’ delivered (or not) by 
gentile gods be directed against these cults? These cults are, according to Burkert, 
stereotyped in three ways: that they are late; that they are ‘oriental’; and that they are spiritual 
in nature and goal.
131
 He convincingly dismissed each of these stereotypes, and demonstrated 
that these mystery cults are not to be treated as religions in the way that we might understand 
them.
132
 Instead, they should be understood as strictly optional practice within polytheistic 
religion as a whole,
133
 rather than as a closed or exclusive system in their own right.
134
 
Burkert further argued that the third of these stereotypes, the spiritual goal of these cults, 
obscures the most obvious aim of these cults: that of votive religion, which, as he noted, is 
“elementary, widespread, and quite down-to-earth”.135  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Burkert 1987:3). See also Ando 2008:3. Similarly, Smith observed that a comparison is often drawn 
between early, ‘pure’ Christianity, and later forms which were ‘polluted’ by mystery cults (2003:30). See 
also Gasparro 1985:xiii. 
131
 Burkert 1987:2-3. 
132
 Ibid:3- : “initiations at Eleusis or worship of Isis or Mithras does not constitute adherence to a religion in the 
sense we are familiar with, being confronted with mutually exclusive religions such as Judaism, Christianity, 
and Islam”. However, just because they were options outside the construct of traditional religious practice 
does now mean that these cults were at odds with it (Rives 2007:180). 
133
 It is in a large part the characterisation of the mystery cults as ‘alternatives’ to traditional cult practice that 
has led scholars to group them together, and in turn led to the approach of Cumont in comparing them to 
Christianity (Ando 2008:102; Beard, North and Price 1998a:212). See e.g. Woolf: “as the autonomy and 
integrity of poleis were weakened by those same imperialisms there was a marked growth in alternative 
forms of religion – Bacchic cult, Judaism, Mithraism, Christianity among others – which paid less respect to 
polis boundaries and the social order” (2003: 1). On the problems with discussing ‘alternative’ (as opposed 
to ‘official’) cults, see Beard, North and Price 1998a:261. 
134
 Similarly, mystery cults should be treated on an individual basis, rather than as a unified group (Gasparro 
1985:xiv). 
135
 Burkert 1987:12. Similarly, Rives argued that mystery cults could provide a “more intense religious 
experience” than could be found in traditional cult (2007:172). 
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3.3.4.1 Eleusis 
That salvation even in these mystery cults can have a more ‘down-to-earth’ meaning 
is seen in the dual blessings promised to the initiates at Eleusis: Demeter would bestow upon 
them “the mysteries that held the promise of “better hopes” for a happy afterlife” (which are, 
it would seem, exclusive to Eleusis),
136
 but also the promise of abundant grain, thus meeting 
peoples’ everyday needs. 
What of the ‘blessings’ of a happy afterlife? We must be careful in writing about the 
promises made by the cult: the diversity of sources is too great, and too many are written by 
outsiders, to be definitive.
137
 However, we do find a number of consistent themes in these 
sources, and in these cases we may comfortably assume that these claims were commonly 
understood. The Homeric hymn to Demeter
138
 offers tantalising hints: it tells of Demeter’s 
promises, whilst disguised as a nursemaid in Eleusis, to make Metaneira’s son ‘deathless and 
unaging’: 
                                          
   δ  φ λ               φ                 .139 
 
In a second passage we read:  
 λβ   , ὃ    δ                            :  
ὃ  δ     λ                      ,                
                                                 
136
 Burkert 1987:5. 
137
 Burkert 1983:294. Furthermore, much of the written evidence which attests to the cult is considerably older 
than the sources used up to this point: It was noted in the introduction that it is legitimate to use much older 
sources in this context, albeit with due caution: as will be seen, the attitudes we find in these older sources 
are consistent with those in later texts, which strongly implies that such attitudes have not changed over 
time. The same observation applies to the use of Aristophanes below, and of the Homeric texts and Plato 
elsewhere in this thesis. 
138
 It was noted in the introduction that it is legitimate to use much older sources in this context, albeit with due 
caution: as will be seen, the attitudes we find in these older sources are consistent with those in later texts, 
which strongly implies that such attitudes have not changed over time. The same observation applies to the 
use of Aristophanes below, and of the Homeric texts and Plato elsewhere in this thesis. 
139
 Hymn. Hom. Dem. 260-1: ‘I would have made your son deathless and unaging for all his days, and given him 
eternal honour’.  
 138 
 
           φ                  φ          .140 
There are hints that this aspect of the Eleusinian cult was a popular understanding,
141
 
as this excerpt from Aristophanes’ Frogs demonstrates. Herakles is describing the journey 
through the underworld: 
    λ                   
          λ                        ,                             
        φ     λλ                δ ,       
                             δ                     
  δ                                 λ  .  
                             
      δ  δ                
    λ              
              .142 
The happy fate of the celebrants is thus contrasted with that of wrongdoers, who are 
tormented by snakes and wild beasts. 
A fragmentary Pindaric work suggests a similar distinction between the fate of the 
followers of Eleusis and those who scorn her rites:  
 λβ           δ          
   λ                  · 
 ἷδ       β        λ      
                                                 
140
 Ibid. 480-2: ‘blessed is he among men on earth who has seen these mysteries; but he who is not intitiated and 
who has no part in them, he never has the same kind of good fortune when he has died and is down in the 
murky gloom’. 
141
 See Rives 2007:174. 
142
 Ar. Ran. 154-158:                        
Herakles: ‘next, the blowing of pipes will surround you, and you will see happy thiasoi of men and women 
together clapping their hands’.              
Dionysus: ‘who are these?’ 
 Herakles: ‘these are the Mystic celebrants’. 
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 ἷδ   δ  δ  δ          .143 
 
Later material displays a remarkably similar interpretation. We find in Cicero’s On the Laws, 
for example, a discussion of the mysteries: nam mihi cum multa eximia divinaque videantur 
Athenae tuae peperisse atque in vitam hominum attulisse, tum nihil melius illis mysteriis, 
quibus ex agresti immanique vita exculti ad humanitatem et mitigati sumus, initiaque, ut 
appellantur, ita re vera principia vitae cognovimus, neque solum cum laetitia vivendi 
rationem accepimus, sed etiam cum spe meliore moriendi.
144
 
These texts all appear to indicate that, for the initiate, Demeter was able to provide a 
blessed existence after death, and that this was true at numerous points in time; at the same 
time, the fate of the uninitiate is one of suffering and darkness.
145
 We should not, however, 
read resurrection symbolism into these blessings: the evidence for such symbolism is, as 
Burkert demonstrated, extremely scarce.
146
 Instead, since initiation marks a change of status, 
this may be reflected in a change of status after death rather than anything else – it certainly 
does not appear to offer eternal life in any respect, and immortality is rarely mentioned in the 
context of the Eleusinian rites.
147
 It is true that in the Homeric hymn, Demeter tells Metaneira 
                                                 
143
 Fr. 137: ‘blessed is the one who has seen these things [sc. the mysteries] before he goes beneath the earth, for 
he knows the end of life, and the beginning of [life] given by the gods’. 
144
 Cic. Leg. 2.36: ‘for of those many extraordinary (or even divine) things which your Athens has produced and 
contributed to human existence, it seems to me that none is better than those mysteries, by which we have, 
from our backwards and barbarous lifestyle, been refined and civilised to a state of humanity; just as the rites 
are named initiations, so in truth we have learned the origins of life; not only have we received the ability to 
live in joy, but even to die with better hope’. 
145
 Odysseus’ encounter with Achilles’ ghost in the underworld, in which Achilles claims that he would rather 
be a slave on earth than a king amongst the dead, demonstrates the perception of suffering after death (Hom. 
Od. 11.488-491). Plato also hints at the possibility of suffering in the afterlife as punishment for one’s deeds 
in this world (Leg. 870d-e). 
146
 Burkert 1987:23. MacMullen argued that even in cases where the god was understood to rise from the dead it 
should not be taken for granted that the worshippers envisaged such a reward for themselves (1981:55). 
Similarly, Gasparro argued that true eschatological significance can only be understood through analogy, if 
at all (1985:104). 
147
 Burkert 1985:289. See also Rives: “to a large extent, such promises seem simply to have been an extension 
of the more important promise of heightened divine favour during life” (2007:17 ). However, we should be 
careful in assuming that Christian ideas of salvation were necessarily ‘better’ than those offered by such 
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that, because of her intervention, her son will no longer be able to escape death and the 
Fates,
148
 which might suggest promises of immortality to the obedient, but it is clear that, 
whether or not this was Demeter’s intention towards the boy, such promises are not offered to 
the initiates of the cult which she establishes at Eleusis. As Gasparro argued, we cannot deny 
a certain soteriological aspect to these rites, “and yet the rites of Eleusis do not imply an 
“escape” from the normal conditions of existence”.149 
 
3.3.4.2 Isis 
The same, it seems, is true of the cult of Isis. Apuleius’ Metamorphoses tells the tale 
of the inquisitive Lucius, who pays for his curiosity by being transformed into an ass. After a 
series of adventures stretching from murder, looting, witchcraft and bestiality, the ass-Lucius 
encounters a statue of an unknown deity and addresses it in desperation.
150
 He is greeted by 
the apparition of Isis, who addresses herself as rerum naturae parens, elementorum omnium 
domina, saeculorum progenies initialis, summa numinum, regina manium, prima caelitum, 
deorum dearumque facies uniformis
151
 and says that she has been moved to action by Lucius’ 
prayers (commota...precibus).
152
 Isis offers to restore Lucius to his former anthropomorphic 
state: the word salus is repeatedly used by both Isis and the author to describe this 
                                                                                                                                                        
cults: “only a Christian perspective finds bodily resurrection self-evidently superior to the different versions 
of after-life (or not) within traditional Roman thought, or to the Isiac model of immortality, or to the gradual 
ascension of the soul of the Mithraic initiate” (Beard, North and Price 1998a:291). The fact that death 
remained inevitable did not make the promises of Eleusis any less appealing to the initiate.  
148
 Hymn. Hom. Dem. 262:      δ                                     λ     (‘now he will no longer be able to 
avoid death and the Fates’). 
149
 Gasparro 1985:xxi. 
150
 Apul. Met. 11.2:  quoquo nomine, quoquo ritu, quaqua facie te fas est invocare (‘by whatever name, 
whatever rite, and whatever appearance it is right to call upon you’). 
151
 Ibid. 11.5: ‘mother of the natural world, mistress of all the elements, and firstborn of the ages; greatest of the 
divine powers, queen of the dead, and foremost of heavenly beings; my one person manifests the aspect of 
all gods and goddesses’. Compare the Isis aretalogy found at Kyme, which is the longest and best-known 
form:                        (3a) (‘the mistress of every land’). The text can be found in Grandjean 
1975:25-27. See also Versnel 2011:283. 
152
 Apul. Met. 11.5. 
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restoration,
153
 which is the Latin equivalent of the Greek        , as bilingual inscriptions 
testify.
154
 In this context, then, salus clearly refers to a literal rescue. This rescue depends 
upon Lucius’ immediate initiation into the rites of Isis and his wholehearted obedience to her 
commands (the command to celibacy in particular causing the philandering Lucius some 
distress). It is clear that Isis’ power allows a postponement of death and the extension of life: 
quippe cum transactis vitae temporibus iam in ipso finitae lucis limine constitutos, quis 
tamen tuto possint magna religionis committi silentia, numen deae soleat elicere et sua 
providentia quodam modo renatos ad novae reponere rursus salutis curricula.
155
 The Isis 
aretalogy found at Kyme suggests something similar: 
                     . 
                         .156 
As Versnel noted, “the two lines can be understood as comprehensive formulas in which Isis’ 
supremacy over life and death, including sickness, perils and disaster, is proclaimed”.157 Only 
rarely, however, do either Isis or Lucius suggest that this initiation will have an effect beyond 
death: vives autem beatus, vives in mea tutela gloriosus, et cum spatium saeculi tui 
permensus ad inferos demearis, ibi quoque in ipso subterraneo semirotundo me, quam vides, 
Acherontis tenebris interlucentem Stygiisque penetralibus regnantem, campos Elysios 
incolens ipse, tibi propitiam frequens adorabis. quod si sedulis obsequiis et religiosis 
                                                 
153
 Ibid. 11.5: iam tibi providential mea illucescit dies salutaris (‘now, by my grace, the day of your salvation is 
dawning’). The word salus also appears in 11.12 and 11.22. Apuleius twice uses the word renatus (‘reborn’), 
at 11.16 and 11.21: on the basis of this, Gwyn Griffiths suggested that the Isaic worshipper “identified his 
death and rebirth with those of Osiris” (1975:52).  
154
 On the identification of salus and        , see Moralee 2004:2. 
155
 Apul. Met. 11.21: ‘indeed, those for whom the span of life was done, and even now stand on the threshold at 
the edge of the light itself, if they were able to be entrusted safely with the great secrets of the cult, the 
power of the goddess often drew them through, and by her grace were reborn after a fashion, and placed on 
the track of a new deliverance’. See Versnel 2000:135. 
156
 ‘I conquer Fate; Fate hearkens to me’ (55-56). See also Gwyn Griffiths 1975:166. 
157
 Versnel 2011:285. Versnel also noted whilst this is “certainly not an assurance of blissful immortality in the 
netherworld, it definitely exalts Isis above the ranks of other, and in particular the Greek gods”, (ibid:286) 
since challenging Fate is normally beyond even a god. 
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ministeriis et tenacibus castimoniis numeri nostrum promerueris, scies ultra statuta fato tum 
spatia vitam quoque tibi prorogare mihi tantum licere.
158
  In a similar manner to the 
Eleusinian mysteries, what is promised here is not ‘salvation’ in the sense of deliverance 
from death, but in a more blessed existence after death, or a temporary extension of the 
present life: death itself remains inevitable.
159
 We find a similar thought expressed in a more 
ambiguous statement: nam et inferum claustra et salutis tutelam in deae manu posita, 
ipsamque traditionem ad instar voluntariae mortis et precariae salutis celebrari.
160
 This is 
the only occasion in the text in which salus is used with a sense which may stretch beyond 
the strictly material; however, this passage is immediately followed by the one quoted above 
in which Isis promises an extension of life even at death’s door. inferum claustra must 
therefore be understood to have this sense, and not in any way suggest that Isis is able to 
prevent death in the sense of Christian soteriology; despite Gwyn Griffiths’ claims that 
Apuleius’ use of salus “approaches the sense familiar in the usage of the Church, as in O 
salutaris hostia”,161 it is clear that this has not addressed the difference between a blessed 
existence after death and the removal of death. As such this comparison is inappropriate and 
misleading. 
 
                                                 
158
 Apul. Met. 11.6: ‘you will lead a blessed life, you will live gloriously under my protection. When the cycle of 
your life is spent and you travel down to the dead, there too you will find me, whom you see now, in the 
subterranean hemisphere, shining amongst the shades of Acheron, and reigning in the innermost parts of the 
Styx: whilst you dwell in the Elysian fields, you will constantly worship me as I favour you. If, by 
wholehearted obedience, dedicated service and persevering celibacy you earn our divine blessing, you will 
know that I alone am able to prolong the span of your life beyond that determined by Fate’. Gwyn Griffiths 
argued that the second adjective (‘gloriosus’) implies that we cannot read ‘beatus’ with a more general sense 
of happiness, but must interpret religious significance (1975:164). 
159
 Beard, North and Price argued that Isis offers Lucius a ‘solution’ to death, which is not strictly true: she 
offers him an alternative (and better) existence, but this is no solution to death itself. Beard, North and Price 
did, however, recognise that the primary focus of Isis’ blessings is an extension of this life (1998a:289-90). 
Cf. Burkert 1983:295. 
160
 Apul. Met. 11.21: ‘the gates of death and the protection of salvation were placed in the hands of the goddess, 
and the tradition itself was celebrated in the manner of voluntary death and salvation through prayer’. Gwyn 
Griffiths argued that salus here has a spiritual as well as physical sense (175:280). 
161
 Ibid:157. 
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3.3.4.3 Dionysus 
A similar development may be seen in the Bacchic mysteries.
162 
There are numerous 
hints in literary works about the potential benefits of the rites in the afterlife, and the 
sufferings to which the uninitiate would be exposed, beginning with Plato.
163
 Another 
fragment of Pindar highlights the blessings available to one of the teletai:   
... λβ   δ              λ           λ     
                    ἕ                       , 
     δ      λ                 δ λ                 
       
       ·164  
This is clearly true of the later rites, too, for similar suggestion is made by Plutarch:         ἃ 
     λλ          ,               λλ    λ        ὡ    δ     δ  ῇ    δ  λ             
  δ  λ            ,   δ        λ                           λ                       β λ  
                               , ἃ         ,  λλ λ                   . ὡ       φ       
                δ                   λ                         .165 Given the sorrowful 
context of this passage, written to his wife after the death of their daughter, it is likely that 
this is something Plutarch took extremely seriously. 
                                                 
162
 Burkert observed that “scholars have been reluctant to acknowledge this dimension of  ionysiac worship, on 
the assumption that concern about the afterlife should be seen to have developed in later epochs” (1987:21). 
163
 Pl. Resp. 364e-365a. It should be noted that Plato wrote as an outsider to the rites: as with the discussion of 
the Eleusinian mysteries, this raises further issues, in addition to the chronological difference. 
164
 Fr. 131: ‘... having, by a happy fate, grasped the initiation which puts an end to suffering. For everyone’s 
body is subject to overpowering death; a likeness of life remains alive, for it alone comes from the gods’. 
165
 Plut. Mor. 611d-e: ‘as for what you hear from others, those who persuade the crowds by saying that in no 
way, and in no place, is there evil or suffering for that which is torn away [sc. the soul], I know that you 
believe the words of our ancestors and the gatherings that celebrate the mysteries, which are familiar to those 
of us who have a part [in the mysteries]. Keep in mind that the soul is immortal, and endures as birds that are 
captured’. 
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In one inscription, there is a possible reference to a Bacchic ‘paradise’ where 
Bacchants invite the child to their dances as a Satyr.
166
 However, it would be “an 
inadmissible generalisation to claim that all bacchic teletai were concerned exclusively or 
even primarily with the afterlife”.167 As with both Eleusis and Isis, the salvation offered here 
serves a practical role, even in the hopes of the afterlife.
168
 Even in the case of Plutarch, who 
suggests that the soul is immortal, the fact remains that his daughter has died; the concept of 
resurrection or immortality in a Christian sense is entirely absent. 
 
3.3.4.4 Mithras 
It is extremely difficult to talk with any certainty about the hopes of Mithraic initiates, 
because source material is particularly scarce. There are certainly no parallels to the texts of 
Apuleius or the Homeric Hymns, and as such I do not intend to deal with the cult in as much 
detail. However, it does not appear that Mithraic cult offered anything different in respect of 
        to the other three mystery cults discussed above. The Mithraic steps or grades might 
suggest some form of progression towards an ascendancy, and iconographical parallels with 
Iranian Zoroastrianism, for which the immortality of the soul was a key concept, could 
encourage us to think in these terms, but Burkert strongly argued that this was not the case: 
“it has generally been assumed, as a result of our ideas of what a “mystery religion” should 
be like, that Mithras should guarantee his followers some kind of transcendent salvation – 
immortality, ascend to heaven from the “cave” which is the cosmos. Clear evidence, 
however, is lacking. This is all the more surprising because spiritual life, the immortality of 
                                                 
166
 CIL 3:686. Burkert argued that “this is just an imaginative possibility” (1987:23). 
167
 Burkert 1985:295. 
168
 Burkert 1987:23. 
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the soul, and the ascent of the righteous to heaven are such well-established ideas in Iranian, 
 oroastrian tradition. But this is not so with Mithras”.169 
 
 
3.3.4 Salvation and deliverance in the Syriac translation of Aristides 
It does not appear, then, that any cult promises to provide its followers with         
in the sense of deliverance from death. Although the cult of Demeter at Eleusis promised a 
blessed afterlife, death was nevertheless an accepted reality. This is clearly not the same as 
the ḥyʼ dlʽlm dlʼ mytyn170 or pwrqnʼ. Christianity, by contrast, must have appeared a morbid 
religion, with an obsession with death and the tomb.
171
 Does this help us to understand 
Aristides’ use of the word pwrqnʼ? If we understand pwrqnʼ in the sense of ‘to save one’s 
life’, this is reasonably common in gentile religious epigraphy and literature (as Aelius 
clearly shows); it could therefore be treated as a realistic attack on gentile cult. If pwrqnʼ is 
understood to be equivalent to the New Testament usage of        , in the sense of 
deliverance from death and life everlasting, then this deviates wildly from the expectation and 
understanding of gentiles, even those involved in mystery cults. Either would be an 
acceptable conclusion; it was noted in the previous chapter that Aristides and Tatian are both 
more accurate than Meliton in their presentation of gentile iconolatry, and it may be that the 
same is true of Aristides’ understanding of pwrqnʼ.  
With one exception, however, pwrqnʼ appears only in Aristides’ attacks against the 
barbarians
172
 and against the Egyptians,
173
 and not at all in Meliton’s text. The sole exception 
                                                 
169
 Ibid:27. 
170
 Meliton 4.8: ‘life for eternity and which does not die’. 
171
 Burkert 1987:28. 
172
 Aristides 4.7-5.2. 
173
 Ibid, 19.5. 
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comes in Aristides’ attack on Greek iconolatry: wkd ʽtqyn wmn ngyrwtʼ dzbnʼ mwpyn. wkd 
mtnskyn wkd mtdqqyn. ʼyknʼ ky lʼ ʼstklw ʽlyhwn dlʼ ʼytyhwn ʼlhʼ: whlyn dpwrqnʼ dnpšhwn lʼ 
ʼtmṣyw. ʼyknʼ yṣypwtʼ dbny ʼnšʼ mškḥyn dnʽbdwn.174 I do not think that Aristides is 
suggesting that the statues are in any way associated with the ability to provide pwrqnʼ: the 
passage in question follows immediately on from the attack on Egyptian pwrqnʼ, and it is 
probable that he intended it to form an explicit contrast with Egyptian cult. Other than these 
instances, the word is barely used. More frequently, however, Aristides criticises the failure 
of the gods to ‘help’ mankind (usually because the god in question is dead, tied up, or has 
suffered some similar misfortune), which is expressed not by pwrqnʼ but as ʽdr.175 Here, 
Aristides may be attacking the gentile concept of        , but this is most likely         in 
the sense of ‘saving one’s earthly life’, and therefore must refer to promises of healing, 
prosperity or protection; it certainly does not imply deliverance from death in any but the 
most basic sense. Given the context with which Aristides uses the terms pwrqnʼ and ʽdr, and 
given that pwrqnʼ is used exclusively of barbarians and Egyptians, then it is likely that 
pwrqnʼ refers specifically to mystery cults (which, as Burkert observed, were usually 
stereotyped as foreign, despite the fact that in a number of instances this is clearly not the 
case).
176
 If this is true, then pwrqnʼ may well carry New Testament soteriological 
connotations and refer to ‘deliverance from death’ (even though this is not quite accurate to 
the promises made by such cults, as far as we are aware). This would also explain why the 
Syriac translator of Aristides has used pwrqnʼ as an equivalent for        , rather than ʽl 
                                                 
174
 Ibid. 20.3: ‘and when they age and comes to an end by the passing of time, and when they are melted down 
and broken into pieces, how do they not understand regarding them that they are not gods? And those which 
are not capable of the salvation of their own lives, how are they able to guard men?’ 
175
 Ibid.16.6: ʼn hkyl ʼprwdyṭʼ ʼlhtʼ ʼytyh. wlʼ ʼškḥt dtʽdrywhy lrḥmh bmwth. ʼyknʼ mṣyʼ dlʼḥrnʼ tʼdr (‘if, then, 
Aphrodite is a goddess but was not able to help her lover in his death, how can she help others?’). 
176
 Burkert 1987:2-3. 
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ḥyy, which, as demonstrated above, lacks such connotations; where ʽl ḥyy appears in votive 
inscriptions, it lacks any of the sense with which Aristides uses pwrqnʼ.177 
Augustine attacks the association between the Galli and the afterlife, and specifically 
their failure to fulfil these promises,
178
 which may suggest that, at least by this late stage, 
Christians identified such promises of immortality with mystery cults, but that does not 
necessarily mean that the same is true of the late second century. It is worth noting that not all 
Christian evidence explicitly maintains the focus on         as deliverance from death. 
Some Christian epigraphy uses         of worldly peace and prosperity, as an inscription 
from Hama shows:                                  (  )          Μ          
   φ λ  .179 Dijkstra argued that, such was the similarity with the non-Christian epigraphic 
format,         should be interpreted in a much more limited, earthly sense.180 The Syriac 
translator of Aristides has not done so, and this may explain his choice of terminology. 
 
3.4 Near Eastern Christian attitudes to the dependence of the divine 
Regardless of the precise relationship involved and the benefits gained, all our 
authors, both gentile and Christian, clearly understand the reciprocal nature of sacrifice, 
whether this is expressed as do ut des or da ut dem. Since this is a two-way issue, we must 
now consider the second aspect of this relationship: what exactly do the gods benefit from the 
sacrifices and offerings made to them by their worshippers?  
 
                                                 
177
 This is perhaps not surprising. Klijn argued that while Syriac terms for ‘life’ were originally far broader than 
the Greek        , and would appear in inscriptions with the semantic range demonstrated above, prq in 
particular was increasingly assimilated to the Greek term as found in the NT (1952:396-397). Therefore, by 
the time Aristides’ Apology was translated into Syriac, it is likely that pwrqnʼ had been given a firmer 
definition in Syriac theology (that is, life for eternity and which is preceded by death (ibid. 395). 
178
 August. De civ. D. 7.24-26. 
179
 IGLS 2027: ‘by way of a vow and for the well-being of John and Thomas and Mannos, (sons) of Theophilus’ 
(tr. Dijkstra). See also IGLS 252. 
180
 Dijkstra 1995:286. 
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3.4.1 The Syriac translation of Aristides 
The Syriac translator of Aristides clearly interprets sacrifices in terms of the needs of 
the gentile gods: ʼmr ʼnʼ dyn dʼlhʼ ʼytwhy lʼ ylydʼ. lʼ ʽbydʼ. kynʼ ʼmynʼ dlʼ šwry wdlʼ šwlm. lʼ 
mywtʼ. mšmlyʼ wlʼ mtdrknʼ. mšmlyʼ dyn dʼmrt hdʼ hy. dlyt bh bṣyrwtʼ. wlʼ snyq ʽl mdm. 
klmdm dyn ʽlwhy snyq.181 The same point is repeated shortly afterwards: lʼ šʼl dbḥtʼ wnwqyʼ. 
ʼp lʼ ḥdʼ mn ʼylyn dmtḥzyn. mn ʼnš mdm lʼ šʼl. kl npšn dyn mnh šʼln.182 Admittedly, neither of 
these points explicitly states that the gentile gods are in need. Instead, they highlight the fact 
that God is not in need; the gods are implicitly contrasted to God’s self-sufficiency, and 
Aristides highlights the fact that gentilic sacrifices expresses entirely the wrong position, 
since we need the divine, and not vice versa.
183
 We do find more explicit discussion of the 
neediness of gods in Aristides’ discussion of the mythological stories of the gods, beginning 
with Hephaistos: wtwb mʽlyn ʼlhʼ ʼḥrnʼ ʼpsṭws. wʼmryn ʽlwhy dʼytwhy ḥgyrʼ wsym qwbʽʼ 
bryšh. wlbyk bʼydh klbtʼ wqwrnsʼ: wplḥ qynywtʼ: ʼyk dmnh nškḥ ḥšḥtʼ dsybrth. ʼrʼ ky klh hnʼ: 
snyq ʼlhʼ hnʼ: hdʼ dlʼ mškḥʼ dʼlhʼ nhwʼ snyqʼ ʼw ḥgyrʼ. wʼn dyn lʼ sgy mḥylʼ.184 It is not clear 
what ‘nourishment’ is here: however, his role as a blacksmith appears to imply that Aristides 
considers this to be Hephaistos’ means of earning a living, and therefore stands for 
sustenance. Similar treatment is given to Asklepios: wmn btr hnʼ mʽlyn ʼlhʼ ʼhrnʼ: lʼsqlyps 
wʼmryn dʼytwhy ʼsyʼ. wmtqn smmnʼ wʼsplynwtʼ mṭl dnmlʼ ḥšḥtʼ dsybrth. ʼrʼ ky snyqʼ ʼytwhy 
                                                 
181
 Aristides 2.2-2.3: ‘but I say that God was not born and not made, a nature that is permanent, which has no 
beginning and no conclusion; undying, perfect and incomprehensible. But by ‘perfect’ I say this: that He has 
no deficiency, that He does not need anything; but everything needs Him’. 
182
 Ibid. 2.7: ‘He does not ask for sacrifice or libation; none at all from those things which are visible. He does 
not ask anything from men; but all (living things?) ask from Him’. 
183
 As Palmer observed, ‘negative theology’ (‘the gods are not X’) is used frequently by the early apologists, but 
for different purposes; Aristides uses it to distinguish true and false god, whilst Justin uses it only as part of a 
defence against atheism (1983:240-1). 
184
 Aristides 13.5-6: ‘again, they introduce another god, Hephaistos. And they say of him that he is lame and 
wears a cap on his head, and holds in his hand tongs and a hammer; he works as a blacksmith, so that from 
this he may find his necessary nourishment. Now then, is this god so needy? It is not possible that a god 
should be needy or lame, for otherwise he is very weak’. 
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ʼlhʼ hnʼ.185 Both Hephaistos and Asklepios are in need of nourishment, and in both instances, 
they appear to derive this nourishment from their respective ‘jobs’. However, according to 
Aristides, Asklepios’ neediness is also associated with the fact that he was struck by 
lightning.
186
 snyqʼ (‘needy’) must therefore be connected with both the dependence and the 
vulnerability of the gods. The vulnerability of the divine is a broad theme which is very 
apparent in Aristides, and to which I shall return shortly; here, however, it is important to 
note the connection between weakness, dependence and the folly of worship which Aristides 
emphasises: just as it is folly to worship a god who cannot hope to deliver his worshippers, it 
would be foolish, as those in need, to ask from a being which is itself in need, because they 
are in no better position than their worshippers. 
Apart from the dependence of gods on sacrifice, the reciprocal nature of gentile ritual 
is interpreted by the Syriac translator of Aristides in a second polemical way: the greed (or 
mercenary nature) of the gods. This is usually presented in terms of bribes: wmn btr hnʼ 
mʽlyn ʼlhʼ ʼḥrnʼ. wqryn lh ʼplwn. wʼmryn ʽlwhy dʼytwhy ṭnnʼ wmštḥlpnʼ wbzbn lbyk qštʼ 
wqṭʼrqʼ. bzbn dyn qytrʼ. wnqwšʼ. wqṣm qṣmʼ lbny ʼnšʼ: ʼyk dnsb mnhwn ʼgrʼ. ʼrʼ ky: ʽl ʼgrʼ 
snyq hnʼ ʼlhʼ.187 This serves three polemical purposes simultaneously. Firstly, it allows 
Aristides to attack the idea of the gentile gods and their blessings, as discussed above: these 
blessings are not a gift but a purchase. Secondly, it allows him to portray the gods in morally 
compromising terms.
188
 Finally, and crucially, it emphasises their need: a god who is wholly 
self-sufficient and self-sustaining, as the Christian God is, has no need for bribes, as Apollo 
                                                 
185
 Ibid. 14.3: ‘after him they introduce another god, Asklepios. They say that he is a physician, and he prepares 
medicines and bandages so that he may satisfy his need of nourishment. Is this god needy, then?’ See 
Pouderon and Pierre 2003:351-2. 
186
 Aristides 14.4-5. 
187
 Ibid. 15.6: ‘after him they introduce another god, and call him Apollo. They say of him that he is jealous and 
changeable; at times he holds a bow and quiver, but at times a lyre and plectrum. He prophesies oracles to 
the sons of men, so that he may receive from them a reward. Does this god, then, need a reward?’ 
188
 For more on this see below, 4.2.1. 
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does in this instance. The association between bribery or reward and the neediness of Apollo 
is emphasised by the repetition of snq (‘to need’). The very fact that the gods accept bribes 
emphasises that they are not entirely self-sufficient, and they thus depend on these bribes to 
sustain them. 
 
3.4.2 Meliton 
Meliton appears to be explicit in expressing a similar attitude: dʽ dyn dryš ʽbdyk ṭbʼ 
hnw. dlʼlhʼ tdʽ. wlh tplwḥ. wdʽ dmdm lʼ šʼl lk. ʽl mdm lʼ snyq.189 At first glance, this is an 
attack on the needs of gentile gods (albeit one made by means of a contrast with the true 
God). However, in this section Meliton is discussing the importance of understanding God’s 
true place, and the place of the images and carvings simply as images and carvings. In this 
context, it is likely that the statement that ‘God does not need us’ is intended to highlight 
man’s position in respect to God; this is emphasised by the command to serve him. Meliton’s 
point emphasises our subservience to God, rather than attacking the needs of the gods, 
although this may fulfil a secondary, polemical purpose of the passage implicitly. The claim 
that God ‘needs’ nothing is repeated again: ʼyt ʼlhʼ dsnyq.190  Here, however, the contrast with 
gentile gods is quite clear: Meliton simultaneously denies that God can be bought (or, rather, 
His blessings and goodwill). This, presumably, is a repetition of Aristides’ point that the gods 
are vulnerable to bribes), or that He could be stolen or destroyed by vandals. In this context, 
God’s needing nothing is equated with his invulnerability; the gods, by contrast, are 
dependent for their survival on gentile offerings, which strongly suggests that, in Meliton’s 
                                                 
189
 Meliton 5.4: ‘but know that the chief of your good works is this: that you know God and serve Him. And 
know that He does not ask anything of you: He needs nothing’. 
190
 Ibid. 7.6: ‘is God that which is in need?’ 
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perception, gentiles imagine their offerings as sustenance for the gods. The dependence of the 
gods, however, greatly limits their ability to benefit the worshipper, and makes sacrifice an 
essentially contradictory excercise: ʼyknʼ šʼl ʼnt lh dntl lk ʼyk dlʽtyrʼ: wyhb ʼnt lh ʼyk 
dlmsknʼ.191 Only here is this contradiction made explicit, but the idea behind it, that the gods 
are in fact in no better position than us, lies at the foundation of all three authors and their 
respective interpretations of gentile gods and their needs. 
 
3.4.3 Tatian 
Tatian, too, emphasises both of these aspects of reciprocal sacrifice:  λλ    δ      
                 δ   δ                          δ       δ  βλ       φ       ὡ  
  δ   . φ           δ                      .192 Like Aristides, he draws an implicit 
contrast between God, who is entirely self-sufficient and self-sustaining, and the gentile gods, 
who are needy and dependent. The greed of these gods, and their vulnerability to bribes, is a 
theme which I have already highlighted, and it finds further emphasis in Tatian’s Address:    
      β           δ   λ                             λ β    .193 This is the most explicit 
attack on the greed of the gods found in our three authors. However, Tatian does not go 
further in exploring the need of the gods: the emphasis is clearly on their greed. The fact that 
the gods are in need is therefore less abhorrent than the immorality which the gods 
demonstrate. Again, as with the blessings of the gods, it is their moral attributes, and not their 
powerlessness, which is the focus of Tatian’s attack: this approach greatly differs from those 
of both Meliton and Aristides. 
                                                 
191
 Ibid. 7.6: ‘how do you ask him to give to you, as one who is rich, and give to him as one who is poor?’ 
192
 Tatian Or. 4.3: ‘nor is the ineffable God to be bribed, for he is entirely free of needs and must not be 
represented by us as in need of anything’. This is one of the most common aspects of negative theology, 
even when the apologists do not spell out the implications that god is invisible, intangible and all-powerful 
(Palmer 1983:238). 
193
 Tatian Or. 10.1: ‘why should I reverence gods who take bribes and are angry if they do not get them?’ 
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3.4.4 Other Christian texts 
Christian literature commonly emphasises the          δ    – the God who is not in 
need.
194
  Although Tatian does not use this phrase exactly, the underlying idea is evident, as 
demonstrated above. Athenagoras, also writing in the late second century, uses the idea more 
fully than Tatian:      δ             δ                       δ                δ         
  δ                                      δ   ,              λ       δ  ,     δ        
     δ   .195 Nor is this polemic directed solely at gentile religious life: Justin Martyr 
argues that God demanded sacrifice in the Levitical code not because of His desire for 
sacrifice, but because such sacrifice was needed for the sins of the Jews.
196
 Jesus’ sacrifice 
removed the need for such sacrifices, because (as the Son of God) only he was able to 
perfectly satisfy this wrath.
197
 The Epistle to Diognetus similarly compares Judaism with 
gentile rituals based on the supposed idolatry of sacrifice in itself:    δ                 δ   
                        λ                 λ                                           
  δ           φ λ                    δ                        λ  β     ,     δ  
δ                       δ         δ      .198 This implies that there is something 
inherently wrong with the concept of sacrifice as a whole, and not just with sacrifices to the 
                                                 
194
 Petropolou argued that this position “constitutes the kernel of the Christian perception of the divine” 
(2008:250). 
195
 Athenagoras Leg. 13.1-2: ‘the Designer and Father of all things does not need blood or fat, or the fragrance 
of flowers and incense. He himself is the perfect fragrance and has absolutely no want of anything’. The 
notion also appears in the writings of Tatian’s mentor, Justin (1 Apol. 10.1). 
196
 Justin Dial. Tryph. 22.1:         δ                    λ             δ         δ λ λ      ,  λλ     δ      
  δ                           φ    ,       λ                         ,                          λ     
δ        (‘so that you may know that it was because of the sins of your people and because of their 
idolatries, and not because there was a need of such offerings, that they were commanded thus, listen to how 
He spoke of these things through Amos’). See also Tertullian Against Marcion 2.18. Petropolou argued that, 
according to Justin, the introduction of Jewish sacrifice was intended to keep the people of God away from 
gentile gods (2008:249-50): however, this interpretation ignores the essential cleansing role of the sacrifice. 
197
 As expressed e.g. Hebrews 10:11-14. See Petropolou 2008:271-274 for the emergence of the idea that Jesus’ 
sacrifice made animal sacrifice redundant. 
198
 Ep. Diog. 3: ‘for those who think that they are offering sacrifices to him by blood and burnt fat, and whole 
burnt offerings, and that they are reverencing him by these honours, seem to me to be in no way better than 
those who show the same respect to deaf images. For it seems that the one offer to those who cannot partake 
of the honour, and the other to him who is does not need anything’. See Palmer 1983:238. 
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gods; this attitude appears to be reflected in our Near Eastern Christian sources in their 
repeated emphasis that God needs nothing. 
 
3.5 Non-Christian sources 
We can therefore identify the need of the gods as an important aspect of Near Eastern 
Christian attitudes. How does this compare with the approach of non-Christian sources? We 
find a considerable amount of discussion dedicated to this very theme. Plato characterises 
sacrifice as a gift, δ    .199 However, this characterisation raises problems with the fact that 
the gods receive only the ‘unwanted’ parts of the offering. Hesiod provides the most familiar 
explanation of the tradition: Prometheus deceives Zeus by offering him a choice of the 
sacrificial meat.
200
 Burkert claimed that the Greeks marvelled at the Semitic idea of the 
holocaust, the whole burnt offering, because this total surrender of the animal to the god 
contrasted with their own model.
201
 However, problems with this characterisation only occur 
in the case of meat offerings; in the case of libation or incense burning, which would have 
been the most basic and fundamental form,
202
 there is not a problem, which suggests that the 
Promethean model of sacrifice was, as Petropolou pointed out, a way of combining the 
vertical and horizontal axes (that is, between man and god, and between fellow men) 
simultaneously.
203
 
 
                                                 
199
 Euthryphr. 14c; the same terminology is found in Mt. 5.23. 
200
 Hes. Theo. 545-558. Burkert questioned whether the god represented more than simply an excuse for the 
sacrificial feast (1983:7). Klauck suggested that this represented a ‘guilt culture’, which may be true, but 
does not explain the practice itself (2000:18). For the interpretation of this myth, see Vernant 1977, in which 
he highlights the story as part of a wider narrative which reinforces the distinction between men and gods, 
rather than explaining this odd feature of sacrifice; because man must eat flesh to sustain himself 
(temporarily), it emphasises his mortality (Vernant 1980:53-5). See also Beard, North and Price 1998a:37. 
201
 Burkert 1985:63, although he does point out instances of Greek holocaust, notably in the cult of the dead. 
202
 Kaizer 2008b:189; invocation and prayer, however, remained inseperable from these cultic forms (Burkert 
1985:71). 
203
 Petropolou 2008:28. See also Vernant 1980:53 and van Straten 1981:67. 
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3.5.1 Lucian 
Although, then, this aspect of sacrificial practice may have been commonly accepted 
by ancient sources, their reaction to it was not always positive. Lucian’s On Sacrifices 
brutally satirises those who offer such sacrifices on the understanding that the gods ‘require’ 
something:                                              λ φ                         
  δ          λ            δ                        λ       .204 He also attacks the greed 
of the gods in accepting bribes, and that one is therefore able to buy blessings from them, in 
very similar terms to those seen in Aristides and Tatian:                                   
         ,         , β  δ   ,    δ   λ       β            ,    δ  β   λ            β  ,    
δ            λ         λ          λ               ,               Α λ δ        λ    
δ   λ               β   λ    .205 On one level, this reflects the do ut des and da ut dem 
mechanisms through which sacrifice functioned (see above). Lucian’s characterisation, 
however, presents the gods as greedy and mercenary, in need of the offerings which are 
presented. This might suggest that the attitude of Aristides and Tatian accurately reflects the 
reality of religious practice. However, we must be extremely cautious in our handling of 
Lucian’s text; we cannot necessarily suppose that Lucian wholeheartedly endorsed the 
attitudes found in his satirical works. However, as satire, they are effective only if the 
attitudes they criticise are common, and we must therefore assume that these ideas (namely, 
that the gods could benefit from sacrifice and that they responded by bestowing blessings) 
were otherwise widespread. Secondly, the majority of his satire is directed at epic tropes, 
such as the story of Apollo and Poseidon building the walls of Troy, which Lucian uses to 
                                                 
204
 Luc. De sacr. 1: ‘they assume that the gods are so lowly and mean that they are in need of men, and that they 
enjoy being flattered and are angry when they are neglected’. 
205
 Ibid. 2: ‘one can buy from them health, it may be, for a calf, riches for four oxen, a kingship for a hecatomb, 
a safe return from Troy to Pylos for nine bulls, and passage from Aulis to Troy for a king’s daughter’. 
Macleod (1991:277) discussed the sacrifice, and observed that Lucian misquoted Od. 3.8, in which nine 
times nine bulls, rather than nine, are offered to Poseidon.  
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highlight their poverty.
206
 As noted previously, we must be careful in negotiating the 
relationship between mythic stories and ritual practice: we have no idea how far such stories 
would have influenced a worshipper’s mind as he or she went about their sacrifice. In this 
light, it is difficult to use On Sacrifices to highlight the reality of religious life, either in the 
Near East or elsewhere. At most, we may conclude that Aristides and Tatian have identified a 
common topic of discussion and have applied it to their arguments, but this does not mean 
that this discussion was understood to reflect actual practice. 
 
3.5.2 Other sources 
The comic playwright Aristophanes also mocks the suggestion that the gods may be 
in need: 
           δ      δ                                                                                               
       ,   δ                                 
   λ    ὡ                             ,                         
 λλ  ὡ            φ                                         
        λ  :    δ  β  β                               
                 λλ                       
               φ                 ,                       
                                ,                                 
                λ                   . 207 
                                                 
206
 Luc. De sacr. 4. 
207
 Ar. Av. 1516-24: ‘there is no man who still sacrifices to the gods; the smoke from the thigh-bones has not 
reached us since that time. We fast as though it were the Thesmophoria, without any sacrifices. The 
barbarian gods, who are starving, holler as if they were Illyrians, and are threatening to charge on Zeus if he 
does not open up the markets where parts of the sacrificial victims are sold’. 
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This displays a very similar attitude to the writings of Lucian, which suggests a comic 
tradition of mocking these epic tropes. Whilst we should treat neither the Birds nor Lucian’s 
On Sacrifices as characteristic of gentile religious life, the comedy would be ineffective if it 
mocked assumptions that were not commonly held. It is also possible that such texts strongly 
influenced Christian polemicists in their approach: the overlap between Lucian and Tatian, 
and in particular in their attacks on the venial nature of the gods, may suggest that the 
apologist was at least aware of the work of his contemporary and adopted elements of it in his 
own. 
 
3.6 Feeding the gods
208
 
It is not entirely clear, however, in what way the gods do benefit from these sacrifices. 
Lucian is more explicit than most textual sources: namely that they offer a welcome 
alternative to nectar and ambrosia:                ,                                   
              ἷ                 β                                      δ             , 
             β         δ      .209 The Homeric epics210 are particularly inconsistent on this 
subject: the gods are repeatedly described as feasting, particularly with the Ethiopians.
211
 
Elsewhere, however, it is made explicit that the gods do not consume food or wine:  this is 
                                                 
208
 For fuller discussion of this topic, see Weddle 2010. 
209
 Luc. De sacr. 9: ‘if anybody sacrifices, they all feast, hungering for the smoke and drinking the blood that is 
spilt at the altars, just like flies; but if they eat at home, their meal is nectar and ambrosia.’ 
210
 Many of the accounts of wounded gods come from myth, and, as we have already noted, there appears to be 
a distinction between myth and cult. Are we justified in relying on the Homeric epics for information? Like 
other texts used in this chapter, they are far older, but given that they remained in continuous use, their age 
does not represent a barrier. Their genre may also provide an issue; Kearns was correct to observe that the 
difference between, for example, Herodotus’ depiction of the divine and that of the epics could hardly be 
greater (Kearns 2004:60; see also Buffière 1956). It is worth noting, however, that many of the stories found 
in Aristides in particular, as well as Lucian’s satire, are drawn from epic. As a result, as long as the 
distinction between myth and cult (or indeed myth and history, as Kearns showed) is maintained, it would be 
problematic to avoid them on the grounds of difficulty. 
211
 Zeus and the other Olympians feast with the Ethiopians in Il. 1.423-5, and Poseidon in Od. 5.282. See below 
for fuller discussion of the use of the Homeric epics in this context. 
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given as the reason for the fact that the gods produce ichor rather than blood in Iliad 5:340, 
and in Odyssey 5.195 Odysseus and Calypso share a meal, with the mortal consuming food 
and wine and the goddess nectar and ambrosia. Zeus suggests that the sacrifices offered to the 
gods (in this case, by the Trojans) are pleasing because they are a due honour, expressed both 
as a royal gift (     ) and an allotted portion (λ      ):  
                β      δ      δ                          
λ  β                :        λ                  .212  
There is no evidence here that the gods consume the offerings in any sense. This 
inconsistency is apparent, too, in far later authors, which suggests that this attitude did not 
change over time: Julian, for example, suggests on one occasion that the fumes nourished the 
gods directly, but elsewhere that, although the fumes were pleasing to the gods, they did not 
need them for sustenance.
213
 
The most explicit ritual demonstration of the ambiguity of understanding is found in 
the practice of         , or its Latin counterpart, lectisternia.214 It is not certain that images 
of the gods were necessarily involved,
215
 but it is at least certain that the rituals involved 
inviting the gods to dine. This is familiar from myth: as noted above, Zeus and the other 
                                                 
212
 Il. 24.69-70: ‘my altar never lacked in an equal feast, the libation or the burnt offerings, the honour which is 
our portion’. In the case of the prayer to Mars found in Cato and quoted above, this is the most likely 
interpretation of macte. If this is the case, Mars’ advantage from the sacrifice would be in the honour he 
receives, and not in eating it. 
213
 Julian Caes. 333d/ Letters 293c-d. 
214
 There are differences between the two: “whilst theoxenia could describe a number of different large scale 
rituals in the Greek world, Roman lectisternia were mainly a specific city-wide celebration, dedicated to a 
collection of Olympian deities, which took place in individual homes as well as part of a large-scale public 
ritual” (Weddle 2010:232). 
215
 Livy 40.59.7-8  is the only explicit evidence we have in this respect; Weddle argued that the presence of the 
gods at these banquets was felt but not seen, and that images were specifically absent, thus affirming at least 
some of the distinction between man and god (2010:235). Other than this, the fellowship between god and 
man was at most implicit (Klauck 2000:21), although Ando argued that the sellisternia, which were parades 
of explicitly empty seats, stood in direct contrast to the lectisternia (2008:23). 
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Olympians are noted as guests of the Ethiopians and sharing in their feast.
216
 If, as Petropolou 
demonstrated, sacrificial banquets were a form of expression for the horizontal axis of 
sacrifice (that is, forming bonds between human participants), then the          and 
lectisternia provided a means of simultaneously emphasising the vertical axis (between god 
and worshipper).
217
 Inviting a deity to a meal was also an evident feature of religious life in 
the Roman Near East, as the large number of dining rooms in temple enclosures testifies,
218
 
although it is less clear than in the Greek world whether or not the worshippers shared in 
these banquets with the deity.
219
 Religious banquets were ubiquitous in the region, at least in 
Palmyra, and, as in the Greek world, served a social function, whilst religious elements 
(particularly incense burning and libation) allowed worshippers to “express a sense of 
subordination to the divine world”,220 thus functioning on both the horizontal and vertical 
axes, in Petropolou’s formulation. With this in mind, it is hard to see what function would be 
served by inviting a god to dine without worshippers playing at least some part in the meal. 
Again, it is not clear in what way the god benefitted from the meal; the apocryphal story of 
Bel and the dragon suggests that the deity is understood to consume the meal in some way, 
until the prophet Daniel reveals to the king of Babylon that the priests and their families have 
been secretly consuming the food.
221
 If worshippers were not present at the meal, then this 
                                                 
216
 Lucian’s On Sacrifices also satirises this understanding by quoting the incident in which Artemis was not 
invited to the feast on Oenus, and sat at home sulking (Luc. De sacr. 1). 
217
 Petropolou 2008:28. 
218
 For a fuller discussion of this feature of religious life in Palmyra, see Kaizer 2008b. 
219
 Ibid. 187. 
220
 Ibid. 189. 
221
 The story is part of the apocryphal Daniel 1 , found only in the LXX. “No matter how we approach this 
evocative apocryphal story, it is clear that Bel of Babylon was believed by many to have enjoyed his meals 
in seclusion” (Kaizer 2008b:187). 
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would agree with Weddle’s suggestion that food may have been left at the feet of statues in 
order to avoid asking difficult question such as ‘how does it eat?’222 
Although this suggestion of Weddle’s is plausible, these questions may not actually 
have caused the worshippers discomfort. Returning to the passage in 1 Corinthians in which 
Paul discusses ‘idol offerings’, he forbids Christians to eat the meat which was offered:        
φ           δ λ                    δ λ                 λλ      ἃ             , δ               
                 λ  δ                     δ                 .223 The key word is 
  δ λ      ; this clearly does not involve participation in a communal sacrificial meal 
(which Paul forbids in the following verse), for only part of the animal was offered to the 
god; the rest was not offered, and thus consumed by the worshippers. It would appear that he 
envisions the consumption of the food which had been placed in front of the image: 
inevitably, the statue has failed to eat its portion, and it must be disposed of. One cannot 
imagine that the Christians were sneaking into a temple after the rite in search of a snack, and 
that the fact that the god failed to eat its portion was commonly accepted and caused no great 
theological distress amongst its worshippers. 
Part of the problem in our understanding, as Weddle highlighted, lies in the fact that 
Greek and Roman ritual is not directly comparable, although there is overlap: it is therefore 
difficult to use Hesiodic theory to account for Roman religious practice, for example.
224 
There might be similarities between          and lectisternia in terms of practice, but we 
should be cautious in assuming that they explicitly served the same purpose. Nevertheless, it 
                                                 
222
 Weddle 2010:226. Although people knew that the priest really ate the food, “they had no difficulty in 
imagining that the gods themselves partook of the gifts” (van Straten 1981:86). 
223
 1 Cor. 10:19-20: ‘what, then, should I say? That an idol is anything, or that idol food is anything? Those 
things which the gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to demons and not to God. I do not wish you to become 
partners with demons’. As Horrell observed, Paul does not make it clear at what point eating idol food 
becomes identified with idolatry (2007:124). 
224
 Weddle 2010:207. 
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appears in some way that the gods were understood to benefit from the offerings made to 
them, in these offerings and in sacrificial practice in general: whether this brought them 
sustenance or honour appears to be unclear, and since there is no universal theory of sacrifice 
in the ancient world,
225
 it would be misleading to look for a conclusive answer. The idea that 
the gods could benefit from sacrifice does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that they 
depend upon it; this conclusion is drawn, as shown, by satire and is then elaborated upon by 
Christian polemic, and thus comes to form an important, though not entirely accurate, part of 
Near Eastern Christian attitudes to religious life. 
 
3.7 Near Eastern Christian attitudes to the vulnerability of the divine 
For Christian authors, the natural extension of the dependence of the divine is the 
vulnerability of the gods, particularly to death and damage. This point was made explicitly 
above in the discussion of Meliton, who associated God’s lack of need with his 
invulnerability. For Aristides and Tatian, it is an almost inevitable conclusion: if the gods are 
in need of sacrifice (whether for sustenance or anything else), it follows that, in its absence, 
they suffer. From this, it naturally follows that the gods are vulnerable. This line of thought is 
not found explicitly in any of our three authors, but we find numerous different aspects of the 
argument emphasised repeatedly, as we shall see. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
225
 Ibid. 211.  
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3.7.1 Meliton 
Meliton, for example, questions: wʼn lqysʼ hlyn dmwqdynn. wʼn lkʼpʼ hlyn dmtbryn 
ḥnn. ʼyknʼ hkyl hlyn ʼlhʼ ʼnwn,226 making it clear that a ‘god’ cannot be broken, and that 
anything which is broken is, therefore, not a god by definition. The same idea is repeatedly 
emphasised elsewhere: whknʼ ʽtyd bzbnʼ ʼḥryʼ: dnhwʼ mmwlʼ dnwrʼ: wtʼqd ʼrʽʼ ʽm ṭwryh. 
wnʼqdwn bnynšʼ ʽm ṣlmʼ dʽbdw: wʽm glypʼ dsgdw lhwn.227 The victims of God’s judgement 
here are the wicked and the images they worship. Since the ṣlm’ is to be explicitly associated 
with the gentile gods (see above), it is clear that these gods are also vulnerable to the 
judgement of God, and are therefore not immortal. They are vulnerable, too, to human 
agency: ʼyknʼ sbr ʼnt ʽlwhy dnzkyk bqrbʼ. dhʼ mʼ dzkʼwk bʽldbbyk ʼp lh qlpyn lh.228 The 
vulnerability of the divine here is closely associated with the inability of the gods to benefit 
their worshippers, since the inability to protect themselves makes them unable to protect 
those who trust in them. In fact, the reverse is also true: the survival of the gods depends on 
the success of their followers in war. Meliton’s ironic statement emphasises what is, for him, 
the sheer irrationality and self-contradiction of the gentiles’ position. 
 
 
                                                 
226
 Meliton 2.4: ‘and if these pieces of wood which we burn, and these stones which we shatter, how are these 
things gods?’ 
227
 Ibid. 9.8: ‘so will it be in the last times: there will be a flood of fire, and the earth will be burnt up, together 
with its mountains and the people will be burnt up together with the images which they made, and the 
carvings which they worshipped’. 
228
 Ibid. 7.6: ‘how do you suppose about him that he will give you victory in war? When your enemies conquer 
you, they strip him too’. Ando argued that the defeat of gods in war would be particularly troubling to 
gentile worshippers: “when Rome itself was sacked, it must have been hard to deny that “the gods in Rome” 
– the numina victa – had failed once again to protect not only their city, but even themselves” (2008:138). 
Because the gods had such an impact in the running of the state, their defeat in battle would be of huge 
significance (Beard, North and Price 1998a:41-3). It is therefore suprising that this is the only reference to 
such a phenomenon in Meliton, Tatian or the Syriac translator of Aristides; although Aristides mocks the 
fighting of the gods amongst one another, he does not dwell on their defeat and what significance this might 
have (Aristides 21.3). 
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3.7.1.1 Excursus: the destruction of images 
Beyond this, however, there is little explicit discussion of the vulnerability of the 
divine. This almost certainly stems from the association of ṣlm and god, as seen in the 
passage just quoted. If the gods are no more than physical images, then it is self-evident that 
they are vulnerable to theft and destruction.
229
 Such practices were far from unheard of in the 
ancient world, although never approved of.
230
 Occasionally, we find instances where 
desecration is simply not explained.
231
 In other instances, we are given the reasons behind the 
destruction: occasionally the desecration is motivated by simple greed,
232
 whilst elsewhere it 
is attributed to the failure of the gods to answer prayers and offerings.
233
 The logic behind 
such desecration is easy to follow: through their deafness or refusal to help, the deity has 
revealed themselves either to be not a deity, or powerless, or unfriendly.
234
 Destroying their 
statues would, in the first two cases, have no repercussions, and in the third case, it is possible 
that the culprit imagined he might be harming the god through harming their image.
235
 It is 
certainly true that the gods were understood to take such acts of vandalism as tantamount to 
an assault on themselves, particularly since the way that one treats a cult statue could be seen 
as symptomatic of one’s attitude towards the gods:236 “damaging a cult statue does literally 
damage a god. In one sense, the destruction of an image could be taken to suggest a lack of 
power in the divine, or a lack of interest on the part of gods in how their images were 
                                                 
229
 Discussion of the practice is also found in Justin Apol. 1.9 and Ep. Diog. 2. 
230
 “That mortals could harm the images of the gods was a grave cause of concern in the Roman world, and 
retribution for these acts was generally assumed to be forthcoming” (Weddle 2010:182). See Weddle 2010: 
188-194 for detailed discussion of the practice. 
231
 Suet. Nero 56, in which the emperor urinates on a statue of Atargatis. See also SHA Caracalla 5.7 for similar 
practice. 
232
 According to Cicero, this is clearly the case in Verres’ ransacking of the temples on Sicily. See e.g. In Ver. 
1.1.11, 12, 14, 2.4.95. 
233
 As e.g. in Artemidorus 2.33, 4.78. 
234
 Weddle 2010:189. See also Versnel 1981:37-42. 
235
 Weddle 2010:192. 
236
 Ibid. 65. 
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treated”.237 In Dio, for example, we find the observation that Zeus destroyed with lightning 
the ship transporting his stolen image away from Olympia.
238
 Christian authors occasionally 
advocated destruction of such images to show that gods were nothing but wood and stone,
239
 
but there is no evidence that gentile authors saw such destruction in these terms: Julian 
argued that the destruction of images was, conversely, an argument for the existence and 
power of the gods, since the culprit was usually caught and punished.
240
  
 
3.7.2  The Syriac translation of Aristides 
            Aristides’ position, as with the neediness of the gods, largely depends on the 
interpretation of myth, which is used to emphasise mortality of the gods and their 
vulnerability to harm: wmnhwn mmt mytw. wmnhwn byd brqʼ ʼtmḥyw. wmnhwn ʼp lbny ʼnšʼ 
ʼštʽbdw. wmnhwn bʽrwqyʼ šnyw. wmnhwn byd bny ʼnšʼ ʼtgnbw.241 Beginning with the 
castration of Kronos, Aristides explores a number of stories in which the gods suffer, drawing 
the inevitable conclusion: rbʼ hkyl ṭʽywtʼ wbzḥʼ dʼʽlw ywnyʼ ʽl ryšʼ dʼlhyhwn. bhy dklhyn hlyn 
ʼmrw ʽlwhy. ʼw mlkʼ. lʼ mškḥʼ dʼlhʼ ntpkr ʼw ntpsq. wʼn dyn lʼ sgy dwʼ.242 These stories 
include: Asklepios,
243
 Dionysus,
244
 Adonis-Tammuz,
245
 Kore,
246
 and Osiris.
247
 Finally, 
                                                 
237
 Ibid. 203, notwithstanding instances when no culprit is evident, and the destruction is therefore understood in 
terms of an ill omen, of which occurrence we find numerous examples: see e.g. Dio 37.9.1-2, 19.2 and Livy 
40.1-2. See also Weddle 2010:194-5. Furstenberg argued that, in Rabbinic and Christian thought, the 
destruction of images was intended not only to highlight the powerless of the god but actively to harm the 
gods themselves (2010:340-1). He compared this process of nullification to the damnatio memoriae of 
certain emperors (ibid:345). 
238
 Dio 59.28.4 
239
 Euseb. Vit. Const. 2.45, 4.23, 4.25.  
240
 Jul. Ep. 295. The same sentiment is attributed by Origen to Celsus (C. Cels. 8.41). 
241
 Aristides 10.2-10.3: ‘some of them were slain outright, some of them struck by lightning. Some of them were 
even made subject to the sons of men. Some of them departed in flight, and some of them were stolen by the 
hands of men’. See Pouderon and Pierre 2003:345-7. 
242
 Aristides 12.1: ‘great, therefore, is the error and the mockery which the Greeks introduce regarding the head 
of their gods, in that they have said all of these things about him, o King. It is not possible for a god to be 
bound or amputated, or else it is a great sorrow’. 
243
 Ibid. 14.5. 
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Aristides concludes this section by observing: wlʼ mrgšyn dwyʼ: bklhyn hlyn dlw mdm ʼnwn. 
kd klywm ḥyryn bʼlhyhwn dmtʼklyn wʼbdyn mn bny ʼnšʼ. ʼp mn knwthwn wmnhwn kd yqdyn. 
wmnhwn kd mytyn wmtmsyn whwyn zblʼ. wlʼ mstklyn dʼbdyn bznyʼ sgyʼʼ.248 It is worth noting 
that in not all these instances are the gods explicitly described as being killed: Kore, for 
example, is simply snatched off by Pluto: this may be a metaphor for death, but Aristides 
does not actually emphasise this, saying only ʼlhʼ gyr dmtḥṭp sgy mḥyl.249 In a number of 
other instances, too, the weakness of the gods is emphasised by being captured or bound 
rather than being slain: only Asklepios, Dionysus, Osiris and Tammuz are explicitly killed. 
For Meliton, the vulnerability of the divine was demonstrated through their susceptibility to 
death (or, rather, demolition, since Meliton does not admit that they ever existed in the first 
place). For Aristides, death is a feature of the vulnerability of the divine, but the true 
weakness is expressed in their inability to help themselves, whether that is to save themselves 
from death or free themselves from capture. This emphasises again the close connection 
between the vulnerability and the dependence of the gods as perceived by Aristides.  
Although the Syriac translator of Aristides differs greatly from Meliton in his 
association of god and image, he too, like Meliton, observes that the images of the gods are 
vulnerable to damage: wkd ʽtqyn wmn ngyrwtʼ dzbnʼ mwpyn. wkd mtnskyn wkd mtdqqyn. 
ʼyknʼ ky lʼ ʼstklw ʽlyhwn dlʼ ʼytyhwn ʼlhʼ: whlyn dpwrqnʼ dnpšhwn lʼ ʼtmṣyw. ʼyknʼ yṣypwtʼ 
                                                                                                                                                        
244
 Ibid. 15.3. Selene is given as Dionysus’ mother rather than Semele, which Pouderon and Pierre attributed to 
scribal error, rather than misunderstanding by the author (2003:211). 
245
 Aristides 16.7. 
246
 Ibid. 17.4. 
247
 Ibid. 18.6. 
248
 Ibid. 19.4: ‘the wretches do not perceive that in all of these things they are nothing, while every day they 
look upon their gods, which are eaten and are destroyed by man, or even by their own kind, and (look upon) 
some of them being burned and some of them while they die and decay and become manure, and they do not 
understand that they perish in many different ways’. 
249
 Ibid. 17.4: ‘for a god who is snatched off is very weak’. 
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dbny ʼnšʼ mškḥyn dnʽbdwn.250 This passage forms part of an attack on philosophers, and is 
therefore to be understood as an attempt to harness Greek philosophical iconoclastic ideas, 
particularly those found in Xenophanes.
251
 Unlike Meliton, however, Aristides does not 
emphasise human agency in the destruction of these images. For Meliton, the destruction of 
images (by human agency) emphasises their place in relation to mankind and the true God 
(since both man and God can destroy these images). Aristides does not discuss the 
relationship between man and image (largely because gentile gods are not limited to their 
images, as they are for Meliton). His point is simply that all forms of such gods are 
vulnerable to decay and destruction. 
 
3.7.2.1 The death of Adonis-Tammuz 
At this juncture it is worth focussing on the myth of Adonis-Tammuz, given that it is 
discussed by both Meliton and Aristides. The myth is also found in Lucian, which allows us 
to examine its significance in both gentile and Christian contexts. Meliton gives a brief 
account in discussing the origin of the worship of Balthi in Phoenicia: sgdw bny pwnyqʼ lblty 
mlktʼ dqwprws. mṭwl drḥmt ltmwzʼ br kwtr mlkʼ dpwnyqyʼ: wšbqt  mlkwth wʼtt  ʽmrt bgbl krkʼ 
dpwnyqyʼ. wbh bzbnʼ šʽbdt lklhwn kprwnʼ lkwtr  mlkʼ. mṭl dmn qdm tmwzʼ: rḥmt hwt lʼrws. 
wgrt bh. wʼḥdh hwpsṭs bʽlh wṭn bh. wʼtʼ qṭl ltmwzʼ blbnn ṭwrʼ:  kd ʽbd ḥzyrʼ bwrzʼ. wmnh mn 
zbnʼ qwyt blty bgbl. wmytt bʼpqʼ mdyntʼ. ʼtr dqbyr tmwzʼ.252 The account found in the Syriac 
                                                 
250
 Ibid. 20.3: ‘and when they age and come to an end by the length of time, and when they are melted down and 
broken into pieces, how do they not understand regarding them that they are not gods? And those which are 
not capable of the salvation of their own lives, how are they able to guard men?’ Cf. 4.7, for the theft of 
these images by looters. See also Rendel Harris 1893:56. 
251
 See above, 2.3.2.1. 
252
 Meliton 4.1-4.2:  ‘the sons of Phoenicia worshipped Balthi, the queen of Cyprus, because she loved Tamuz, 
the son of Cuthar, king of the Phoenicians. She left her kingdom and she went and dwelt in Gebel, a walled 
city fortress of the Phoenicians, and at that time she made all the Cyprians subject to Cuthar the King; 
because before Tamuz she loved Ares, and committed adultery with him, and Hephaistos, her husband, 
caught her, and was jealous of her. He came and killed Tamuz in Mount Lebanon, while he was hunting 
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translation of Aristides is somewhat less detailed: wtwb ʼmryn ʽl tmwzʼ dʼytwhy ʼlhʼ. wʼytwhy 
lm ṣydʼ wgyrʼ. wʼmryn dhw hnʼ ʼtqṭl mn mḥwtʼ dḥzyr brʼ. wlʼ ʼškḥ dnʽdr lnpšh. wʼn lnpšh lʼ 
ʼškḥ dnʽdr: ʼyknʼ lgnsʼ ʼnšyʼ mškḥ dnprns. whdʼ: lʼ mškḥʼ dʼlhʼ gyrʼ ʼw ṣydʼ ʼw mʼt bʽšwmyʼ 
nhwʼ.253 Elsewhere, he is mentioned as the occasional lover of Aphrodite,254 but this short 
account represents the only details we are given as to the death itself. Aristides’ account lacks 
much of the detail found in Meliton’s: all Aristides tells us is that he was a hunter who was 
killed by a boar, and from it draws the conclusion that he can offer no help to his 
worshippers.
255
 Meliton’s account differs in one respect: namely, that Tammuz was killed not 
by a boar but by a jealous Hephaistos.
256
 Regardless, however, both accounts are explicit: 
Tammuz was killed, and, despite the efforts of Aphrodite (in the Aristides version) to free 
him from Hades, he remained that way. Meliton does not mention this, but simply observes 
that Tammuz is buried in Aphiki.  
Lucian’s account, although it contains many of the same details as those found in 
Meliton, is dramatically different in emphasis. For a start, it is very clear that Adonis is not 
dead, at least in the understanding of the worshippers at Byblos:       δ                     
    λ        ,                           δ   δ                  ,      δ   ῇ       
                 λ                                .257 Even if we understand that 
                                                                                                                                                        
boars. And from then on Balthi remained in Gebel, and she died in the city of Aphiki, where Tamuz was 
buried’. 
253
 Aristides 16.7-17.1: ‘again, they say of Tammuz that he is a god and is indeed a hunter and an adulterer.  
They say that he himself was killed by a blow from a wild boar, and was not able to help himself. If he is not 
able to help himself, how is he able to oversee the human race? It is not possible that a god should be an 
adulterer or hunter or that he should die of violence’. 
254
 Ibid. 16.4. 
255
 Pouderon and Pierre give little coverage to the myth except to note the importance of the rites (2003:356). 
256
 Given that Aristides elsewhere ridicules the idea of fighting between the gods, it is perhaps surprising that he 
has not used the same version of the myth as Meliton. 
257
 Luc. Syr. D. 6: ‘after they have finished beating their breasts and lamenting, they first make offerings to 
Adonis as to the dead (my italics) and afterwards, on the next day, they claim that he lives and send him into 
the air’ (tr. Lightfoot). For more on this passage, see Lightfoot 2003:305-328; for a fuller discussion of the 
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    λ        (‘they claim’) implies a certain dubiousness on Lucian’s part, the claim that he 
might be dead in any sense is reported with equal caution: sacrifices are offered            
      (‘as if he were dead’). A few lines later, Lucian reports the unusual phenomenon of the 
river Adonis, running from Mt. Lebanon into the sea. Once a year, the river turns red: 
          δ               ῇ               δ               β                ,         ἷ   
       δ              λλ                                           δ δ  .258 Although 
Lucian clearly expresses doubts about this particular story, it is clear that it is accepted by 
most of those involved. What is crucial here is that according to this account, Adonis is not 
dead as Meliton or Aristides claim: the present             suggests that he remains alive 
and is wounded again and again on an annual basis. Lucian’s account suggests that, in the 
view of both himself and many of the worshippers of Adonis, the god is not dead; however, it 
is equally clear that he can be wounded, perhaps seriously. 
 
3.7.3 Tatian 
In dealing with the vulnerability of the gods, Tatian adopts an almost identical 
approach to that of the Syriac translator of Aristides, using myth as the basis of his attacks. 
As well as the Cretan tomb of Zeus,
259 he discusses the rule of Kronos:            δ      
               β   λ       βλ                                                           
β   λ              β   λ     δ δ     260 Unlike Aristides, however, Tatian does not 
explicitly associate Kronos’ captivity with weakness, and therefore with his being unworthy 
of worship. The focus here is on his inability to provide laws, since he has no kingdom 
                                                                                                                                                        
relationship between this passage and the one found in Meliton and the significance in understanding local 
cult practice, see Lightfoot 2007:86-91. 
258
 Ibid. 8: ‘the story is that on these days Adonis is wounded on Lebanon, and the blood that reaches the water 
changes the colour of the river and gives the stream its name’ (tr. Lightfoot). 
259
 Tatian Or. 27.1-2; for more on the tomb of Zeus, see below. 
260
 Ibid. 9.3: ‘how did Kronos, bound in fetters and driven out of his kingdom, become established as the one 
who allots command of the home? How can one who has no kingdom himself give out kingdoms?’ 
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himself. The focus, once again, is moral, rather than religious. There are instances in which 
Tatian does attack the mortality of the gods, but he rather surprisingly admits that they do not 
die easily:                       δ   ,                     ·        δ          
                δ                                              ἃ                        
                  δ       .261 Notice, again, the explicit association between the character 
of the gods and their moral impact on the worshipper; it is what they teach that is so harmful, 
and not necessarily the worship which they receive. Although the above statement by Tatian 
allows that the gods can die, it is nevertheless completely at odds with the attitude of both 
Meliton and Aristides, who focus on the link between vulnerability and powerlessness, and 
therefore emphasise the extent to which the gods can suffer and die. Why does Tatian, then, 
claim that the gods do not die easily? The answer must lie in the distinction between flesh 
and the spirit. Here, Tatian tells us that the demons are not made of flesh (           
         )  elsewhere, he tells us that they are spiritual (δ        δ                        
        ,            δ                         ).262 Despite this, the spirit from which the 
demons are made is different, and inferior, to the spirit from which the true God is made, 
which is itself the constructor of material spirits.
263
 We have here a suggestion of a hierarchy 
of beings, with man at the bottom, the demons (or false gods) above them, and God above 
them. Tatian’s admission that the demons do not die easily is therefore not a grudging 
admission that they have at least some strength, but rather an attempt to highlight their 
position with respect to both man and God: this would also explain his constant use of 
δ       , rather than        , to describe the gods: they are as different from God as they are 
from men. 
                                                 
261
 Ibid. 14.1: ‘they do not die easily, for they have no part in the flesh. While they are alive, they follow the 
practices of death, and die themselves as often as they teach sins to their followers’. 
262
 Ibid. 15.3: ‘none of the demons are at all composed of flesh, but their construction is spiritual’. 
263
 Ibid. 4.2. 
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3.8 Non-Christian sources 
3.8.1 The Homeric poems 
It appears, then, that a consistent feature of Near Eastern Christian attitudes to 
religious life is that the gods of the gentiles are vulnerable in some form or another. What do 
non-Christian sources make of the ‘vulnerability’ of their gods? We find numerous pointers 
in the Homeric poems. On numerous occasions in the Iliad, a god is wounded: most 
famously, Aphrodite by Diomedes (with the help of Athena): the poem emphasises her pain 
and distress, so it is clear that she has been greatly affected.
264
 Nor should we understand that 
she is wounded only by Athena’s help; in comforting Aphrodite, Dione narrates the other 
instances in which gods have been wounded or caused suffering at the hands of mortals:  
  λλ       δ   λ     λ      δ               
     δ      λ     λ         λλ λ             .  
 λ                                      λ     
   δ    λ    , δ                 δ    : 
    λ    δ            δ δ           δ         :  
                   λ                λ     ,  
                    λλ      β    
               λ  .265  
 
This last passage is particularly extreme as it gives the impression that the gods could, given 
a particularly unusual set of circumstances, even die. Elsewhere, however, this is clearly not 
                                                 
264
 Il. 5.335-40. 
265
 Ibid. 5.383-90: ‘many of us who live on Olympus have suffered at the hand of men, who bring grievous pains 
one upon another. Ares suffered when Otus and mighty Ephialtes, the sons of Aleous, bound him in stout 
chains. He was bound in a bronze jar for 13 months, and there Ares the war-glutton would have perished, if 
the stepmother [of Otus and Ephialtes], the most beautiful Eeriboea, had not informed Hermes’. 
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the case, as we see when Athena strikes Ares with a stone and ‘slackened his limbs’ (λ    δ  
    ). 266  This circumlocution, used here and again a few lines later when Athena deals the 
same treatment to Aphrodite, is used throughout the Iliad, and usually to describe the death of 
a mortal. That Ares and Aphrodite leave the field, wounded but alive, demonstrates that it 
does not always have this sense, but perhaps that is the point: even these blows from Athena, 
powerful enough to kill any mortal, could not kill a god. This may reflect the same sense seen 
in Lucian’s account of the myth of Adonis: the god may be wounded, but not killed. 
Seemingly the most explicit statement is given by Apollo to Achilles, whilst the latter is 
pursuing the god: Apollo tells Achilles that it is impossible for the mortal to kill him,
267
 to 
which Achilles responds by saying that he would punish Apollo if he were able.
268
 However, 
this statement does not necessarily claim that Apollo cannot be killed. It may simply suggest 
that he is not fated to die by Achilles’ hand, in which case Achilles’ reply would suggest that 
he lacks the power to change his fate: a tempting conclusion, given the role of Achilles’ fate 
in the Iliad as a whole. Either way, it highlights a slightly ambiguous attitude throughout the 
epic towards the vulnerability of the gods.  
 
3.8.2 Lucian and the tomb of Zeus 
Problems with using the Homeric epics in this context were raised above; however, it 
is clear that Lucian (as well as Tatian and the Syriac translator of Aristides) rely on myth, and 
Homer in particular, for some of their critiques, as I shall show. One of the more famous 
demonstrations of the ambiguous nature of divine vulnerability, and one which Lucian 
                                                 
266
 Ibid. 21.400-407. 
267
 Ibid. 22.13:                   ,                           (‘you will never kill me – I am not subject to 
Fate’). 
268
 Ibid. 22.20:                 ,        δ                 (‘I would have vengeance upon you, if only I had the 
power’). 
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focusses upon, is found in the attitude towards the so-called ‘tomb of Zeus.’ Euhemerus 
suggested that Zeus had once been a mortal and was now buried on Crete.
269
 The suggestion 
found extremely vocal opponents: Callimachus famously wrote: 
‘                  :’           φ  ,      ,       
                  :    δ          ,              .270  
Lucian sarcastically thanks the Cretans for the revelation: the Greeks were mistaken 
to attribute thunder and rain to Zeus, because (if they had only known it!) he had actually 
been buried in Crete the whole time!
271
 The widespread ridicule towards the tomb of Zeus 
would suggest that the death of the gods was in fact considered impossible, even for Lucian.  
Nor is Lucian’s ridicule simply limited to the death of gods. In particular, he attacks 
the myths surrounding Hephaistos as a cripple: he must have seemed a natural target (and, as 
Aristides demonstrated, this was certainly the case with Christian polemic). The very fact that 
he is a cripple highlights Lucian’s satire, for if the gods were invulnerable, he would not have 
hurt himself in his fall from heaven.
272
 Even though he mocks the Cretans for supposing that 
 eus could die, he suggests that this could have been true for Hephaistos:                 
          λ                 φ                  δ      ,                      φ       
                                         .273 However, the satire is not directed at 
Hephaistos himself; the strongly sarcastic tone suggests that such a death may not have been 
a possibility. His attack is reserved for the myths which surround the gods, and which appear 
to emphasise their vulnerability. Unlike Aristides, however, this does not undermine the 
                                                 
269
 FGrH 63. See also Spyridakis 1968. 
270
 Callim. Hymn 1 9-10: ‘Cretans always lie; for they built a tomb for you, o Lord; but you are not dead, and 
you exist forever.’ The suggestion that Cretans were liars became commonplace: it is even found in the New 
Testament (Tit. 1:12). 
271
 Luc. De sac. 10. 
272
 Ibid. 6. 
273
 Ibid. 6: ‘if the Lemnians had not kindly caught him while he was falling, then our Hephaistos would have 
been killed just like Astyanax when he fell from the walls’. 
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practice of sacrifice, but rather encourages the reader to examine their perspective on the 
gods to whom those sacrifices are offered. Here we see more clearly the relationship between 
Homeric myth and religious discussion: Lucian acknowledges, and ridicules, the limitations 
of the former, whilst simultaneously relying on it for source material. We are therefore 
justified in adopting a similar approach: the epics must be treated with considerable caution, 
but, since our sources engage in detail with them, it would be a mistake to ignore them. 
 
3.8.3 Philo of Byblos 
Philo of Byblos relies on the approach of Euhemerus for his interpretation of the gods: 
that is, they were once mortals who were posthumously treated as gods in recognition of their 
services to mankind. As such, with this approach, it is not only possible for gods to die, but 
essential that they do so. Aeon and Protogonos, and the children of Genos, their son, are all 
identified explicitly as        , ‘mortal’, and several of the stories state quite clearly that the 
characters (or ‘gods’) in question died, such as Fire and Wind,274 Kronos,275 and Ouranos.276 
However, he appears to identify two different categories of gods: one set are immortal (the 
sun, the moon, the planets and the elements), and others are mortal (which he goes on to 
elaborate by giving Euhemeristic accounts of their lives.
277
 Is there a distinction between 
gods who can die and gods who cannot? If so, it is certainly not one that the three Christian 
authors recognise; although Aristides does not explicitly state that all the gods of whom the 
stories are told die, he does not suggest that the ones who do perish are in anyway different to 
the others.  
 
                                                 
274
 Quoted in Euseb. Praep. evang. 1.10.10. 
275
 Ibid. 1.10.15. 
276
 Ibid. 1.10.29. 
277
 Ibid. 1.9.28. 
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3.9 Olympic or Chthonic? 
This interpretation of Philo of Byblos raises an interesting question: is it possible that 
a distinction is to be drawn between Olympian and Chthonic deities, the former being 
immortal and invulnerable and the later not so?
278
 Baumgarten asserted that Melqart 
“emerges as a god who controls properity through his role as a chthonic deity”,279 and that he 
was thus different from the gods of the heavens. Melqart, or his Greek equivalent Herakles, is 
the archetypal Euhemeristic god: and yet, he remains distinct from the gods of Olympus. This 
also appears to be true of other mortals who ‘become’ gods: Asklepios, for instance, initially 
appears to be worshipped as a     , not as a     .280 The Greeks invariably regarded dead 
gods, such as Adonis, as foreign,
281
 which may have helped to identify strict categories, and it 
is certainly true that the Olympians appear to show a marked aversion to the dead,
282
 with the 
exception of Hermes, who guides the souls to their rest. In Il. 20:61-5, Poseidon’s rage 
                                                 
278
 Diodorus Siculus attributed just such a suggestion to Euhemerus (6.1.2): as Baumgarten observed, it was the 
category of mortal gods, rather than the immortal, ‘natural’ gods, which attracted the most attention in 
antiquity (1996:92). Burkert noted that the cult of the gods was usually regarded as being in direct 
opposition to the cult of the dead and of Chthonic beings (1985:199-203): he highlighted a series of direct 
contrasts in the manner of cult practice between the two, but this does not necessarily mean that the Chthonic 
beings are identified as being more vulnerable than the Olympians. As Burkert admitted, certain figures, 
such as Herakles, appear to cross the divide (ibid:208). Petropolou has highlighted a tendency to distinguish 
sacrificial terminology involving the two groups:          , rather than      , being used of heroic or 
Chthonic sacrifice (as in Herodotus 2.44; Petropolou 2008:35). Although she demonstrated that there are 
insufficient differences in sacrificial practice to maintain this distinction fully, Petropolou highlighted some 
characteristics of the victim in a classic ‘Chthonic’ sacrifice: the victim was black, slaughtered at night with 
its head facing down; the blood was poured on the ground, and the libation was not of wine (2008:35-36). As 
Petropolou argued, then, we may accept the classification of ‘Chthonic’ with reservations, but must not push 
the distinction too far. It is certainly insufficient to suggest that the recipient of such a sacrifice was 
explicitly mortal. 
279
 Baumgarten 1981:210. 
280
 Pindar describes him with this term (Pyth. 3.7). However, grave markers played no role in his cult, and he 
was ultimately worshipped as a      (Burkert 1985:214). 
281
 Ibid. 201. 
282
 Harrington (2001:174) attributes this to matters of cultic purity, and highlights Artemis’ aversion to the dead 
in Hippolytus 1437ff as an example. She compared this practice to the Levitical commands regarding the 
purification of corpses (which is impossible) and of those who encounter them (as e.g. Nb. 6:6). Similarly, 
Burkert argued that the indestructability of the gods marked their true separation from men (1985:188): their 
actions lack the significance of those who are can perish. 
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threatens to crack open the earth and reveal the dead to the Olympians, to whom Hades’ 
dwelling is repulsive in the extreme.
283
 
However, the two categories, if they may be so called, are not entirely independent: 
“the opposition between Olympian and Chthonic constitutes a polarity in which one pole 
cannot exist without the other and in which each pole only receives its full meaning from the 
other”.284 Although Hades and Persephone, as well as other, lesser beings such as the Erinyes, 
are regarded as Chthonic, they nevertheless form a key part of the mythical interpretation of 
the divine structuring of the universe. Philo of Byblos’ observation that some gods are mortal 
and others immortal cannot be used to create separate categories of gods. Instead, it must be 
regarded as an attempt to explain the continued existence, and worship, of certain celestial 
entities like the sun within a Euhemeristic narrative in which the gods are only worshipped 
after death and in return for their services to mankind. In any case, Christian sources do not 
engage with this debate on any level: as we have seen, they group all gods together with no 
distinction, and all gods are vulnerable 
 
3.10 Concluding remarks 
As observed at the start of this chapter, the themes of powerlessness, dependence and 
vulnerability are very closely interconnected. Meliton, Tatian and the Syriac translator of 
Aristides all emphasise each of these ideas, often in conjunction with each other. Aristides in 
particular connects the three strands very closely through his interpretation of myth: the gods 
depend on men for their food, which means that they are vulnerable; since they are vulnerable 
and needy, they can offer nothing to mankind. Ultimately, the three arguments depend upon 
                                                 
283
 Il. 20:61-5. 
284
 Burkert 1985:202. 
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the identification of the gods as ‘dead’ or ‘senseless’, and the main purpose is to ridicule 
gentile notions of sacrifice. Many of these arguments are made by comparison rather than 
explicitly: this is particularly seen in the emphasis on          δ   , but it is clear that in a 
comparison with the true God, gentile gods come off second best. It is therefore possible to 
highlight these three areas as key features of Near Eastern Christian attitudes (as far as our 
evidence goes). Beyond this, however, further clarification is impossible: the manner in 
which Meliton, Tatian and the Syriac translator of Aristides express their disgust at these 
features varies to such an extent that we cannot highlight a single Near Eastern Christian 
approach to the subject. Tatian, in particular, focusses primarily on the moral implications of 
divine weakness, rather than its cultic significance. The next chapter will examine these 
moral issues in further detail. 
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Chapter Four: ‘The desires of the flesh are against the Spirit, and the desires of the 
Spirit are against the flesh’ (Gal. 5:17): Near Eastern Christianity, ethics and moral 
religion. 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter it was seen that, for all three authors, there was a considerable 
overlap between the powerless worship of powerless gods and the immoral worship of 
immoral gods.
1
 Tatian’s polemic in particular clearly associates the two; we saw how the 
weakness of the gods is expressed through both their immorality and the immorality to which 
they lead their worshippers. For the Syriac translator of Aristides, too, mythic stories place 
the immorality, the vulnerability and the weakness of the divine alongside one another. This 
chapter will explore the idea of ‘immoral gods’ and their relationship to cult. It will then 
examine the effect that this has on the worshippers’ own lives, and the relationship of 
religion, philosophy and ethics both at a public and private level.  
The immorality of the gentiles is a key element of New Testament theology; 
immorality, and particularly sexual immorality, is a key element of the discussion which 
defines Christian and Jewish identity, and marks the gentiles as ‘other’.2  In the majority of 
cases it is contrasted explicitly with the lifestyle of Christians, in order to establish these 
boundaries: ὡ                                   ,                     ,                
   λ      ,       δ        λ .3 Paul’s use of          4 has been widely discussed;5 on 
                                                 
1
 Nor is this solely true of Christian thought. For Rabbinic Judaism, idolatry was held as the opposite to 
holiness, because it held back the working of holiness, as the extension of God’s will, in the world: it was 
thus considered the ultimate act of holiness to give up one’s life rather than commit idolatry (in the form 
either of false worship or of immoral practice) (Harrington 2001:16-28).  
2
 Lieu 2004:133. The other marker is given as idolatry, which, in Lieu’s understanding, is primarily the worship 
of images (ibid:118), but must also include the discussion of powerless gods in the previous chapter.  
3
 Rom. 13:13: ‘let us walk decently, as if in the daytime, not in feasting and drinking-parties, not in fornication 
and sensuality, not in arguing and jealousy’. See also 1 Cor. 5:1, 11; Gal. 5.19-21, 1 Th. 4:5, 1 Pet. 4:3. 
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numerous occasions it is used explicitly in connection with ‘the flesh’, usually sexual 
immorality.
6
 This identification is closely connected with Paul’s wider understanding of 
idolatry as a whole, of which           are merely a feature.7 
With this in mind, it is important to look again at Varro’s tripartite theology. We have 
briefly looked at the connection between civic and mythic gods, and although the connection 
cannot be entirely dismissed, it is not nearly as strong as the Christian authors emphasise. 
This chapter will require us to look at the third of the categories, the natural or physical gods 
of the philosophers. It will conclude by examining in more detail the relationship between 
Meliton, Aristides and Tatian and particular philosophical groups, particularly the writers of 
the Stoa.
8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
4
 This word is notoriously difficult to translate; see Fitzgerald 2008:1-4 for some of the common options. Here I 
prefer to translate it as ‘emotions’, as this captures some of the sense of the irrational associated with the 
word. 
5
 I do not intent to discuss Pauline approaches to Christian sanctification, as this tells us nothing about the 
religious context. For discussion of moral progress in Paul, see e.g. Harrington 2001, Aune 2008, Engberg-
Pederson 2008, Ware 2008.  
6
 As at Rom. 1:26, 7:5, 1 Thess. 4:5, Gal.  5:24. Vöglte argued that this association specifically with sexual sin 
was derived from Jewish theology rather than Hellenistic philosophy (1939:206). Similarly, Bonhöffer 
(1911:125) argued the same point of Paul’s association of        with the broader notion of ‘sin’. On Paul’s 
approach to sexual immorality, and particularly his treatment of Aphrodite, see Garrison 1997:30-9. 
7
 “Paul’s negative characterization of these passions fits within a larger complex of issues, including idolatry, 
impurity, and various sexual practices” (Aune 2008:226). See also Barton 2007b. 
8
 As I shall explain below, the availability of our sources makes it extremely difficult to concentrate on Near 
Eastern philosophical life; furthermore, these authors appear to engage primarily with western philosophical 
schools. 
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4.2 Near Eastern Christian attitudes to the morality of the divine 
4.2.1 The Syriac translation of Aristides  
The first aspect to be considered is the moral conduct of the gods. The most explicit 
of the three Christian authors in this respect is the Syriac translator of Aristides: wmnhwn 
smw dkrʾ wlmnhwn nqbtʾ: wdʾyk dmnhwn mn ʾlhyhwn ʾštkḥw dgyryn wqṭlyn wṭʽyn wḥsmyn 
wrgzyn wmtḥmtyn. wqṭlyn lʾbhyhwn. wgnbyn wḥṭpyn.9 The mythic stories which he explored 
to emphasise their weakness, need and vulnerability are simultaneously used to emphasise 
less-than-appealing aspects of their characters. Many of these are familiar, with Zeus’ many 
adulteries a particular target: wʾmryn ʽlwhy dʾštḥlp lbʽyrʾ wlmdm ʾḥryn: ʾyknʾ dngyr lnšʾ 
mywttʾ wnqym lh mnhyn bnyʾ. kd bzbn ʾmryn dʾštḥlp lʾzbrkʾ. mṭl rḥmth d’wrpʾ wdpsypʾ. wtwb 
ʾštḥlp ldmwtʾ ddhbʾ mṭl rḥmth ddnʾʾ. wlqwqnws mṭl rḥmth dlʾdʾ. wlgbrʾ mṭl rḥmth dʾnṭywpʾ. 
wlbrqʾ mṭl rḥmtʾ dshrʾ. ʾyknʾ dmn ʾylyn ʾwld bnyʾ sgyʾʾ mn ʾnṭywpʾ gyr ʾmryn dʾwld ztws 
wʾmpywnʾ. wmn shrʾ ldynwsws. mn ʾlqmyʾ lhrqlws. wmn lṭw: lʾplwn wlʾrṭmys. wmn dnʾʾ 
prsʾʾ. wmn ldʾ qsṭwr wpldwqyws. wʾlʽʾ wplwdws. wmn pnmsws ʾwld tšʽ bntʾ: hlyn dmwss šmh 
ʾnyn. wmn ʾwrwpʾ: mynwʾʾ wqrdmwnʾ wsrpdwnʾ. lḥrtʾ dyn ʾštḥlp ldmwtʾ dnšrʾ: mṭl rḥmth 
dgnwdmws rʽyʾ.10 The conclusion which Aristides draws is inevitable: lʾ gyr mškḥʾ dʾlhʾ ngyr 
                                                 
9
 Aristides 9.4-10.1: ‘some of these they portray as male and some female, and so some of their gods were found 
to be adulterers and murderers, mistaken, jealous, wrathful, furious, patricides, thieves and plunderers’. It is 
unsurprising that moral attacks on the gods form such an important part of his polemic: Pouderon and Pierre 
argued that moral theology is at the very heart of his entire work (2003:69). However, I shall show that, 
although immorality is indeed vital to Aristides’ argument, it is not necessarily his main focus. 
10
 Aristides 12.2-13.1: ‘they say about him that he was transformed into cattle and into anything else in order 
that he might commit adultery with mortal women, and that he might raise for himself sons from them. Since 
at one time they say that he was transformed into a bull on account of his passion for Europa and Pasiphae; 
and again he was transformed into the form of gold on account of his passion for Danae; and into a swan on 
account of his passion for Leda; and into a man on account of his passion for Antiope; and into lightning on 
account of his passion for the Moon: so that from these he fathered many children. For from Antiope, they 
say, he fathered Zethus and Amphion; from the Moon, Dionysus; from Alcmene, Herakles; from Leto, 
Apollo and Artemis; from Danae, Perseus; from Leda, Castor, Polydeuces and Helen; from Mnemosyne he 
fathered nine daughters, those who are called Muses; from Europa, Minos, Rhadamanthus and Sarpedon. 
But finally he was transformed into the form of an eagle on account of his passion for Ganymede the 
shepherd’. For fuller discussion of this passage, see Pouderon and Pierre 2003:345-7. Rendel Harris 
compared this section to Justin’s polemic on adultery in 1 Apol. 21, but the two passages do not make the 
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ʾw nznʾ: ʾw ntqrb lmdmkʾ dʽm dkrʾ. ʾw dnqṭwl lʾbhwhy. wʾn dyn lʾ sgy byš mnh ddywʾ 
mḥblnʾ.11 In addition to Zeus’ adultery, his incest and homosexual practices are also attacked, 
but it is clear that adultery is one of the key issues in Aristides’ polemic: the same charge is 
brought against Ares
12
 and Aphrodite.
13
 In both these cases, their immoral conduct 
invalidates their claim to be considered as gods. 
It is not just the sexual ethics of the gods which he brings into question. The 
drunkenness of Herakles
14
 and Dionysus
15
 is attacked, as are the greed and trickery of 
Hermes: wtwb mʽlyn ʾlhʾ ʾḥrnʾ: wqryn lh hrmys. wʾmryn dʾytwhy gbrʾ rḥm yʽnwtʾ wrʾg 
ywtrnʾ. wmgwšʾ wpšyg’ wdrrʾ. wmpšqnʾ dmlʾ. hdʾ dlʾ mškḥʾ dʾlhʾ nhwʾ mgwšʾ ʾw yʽnʾ ʾw 
pšygʾ: ʾw rʾg mdm dlʾ dylh. ʾw dʾrrʾ. wʾn dyn lʾ mštkḥ ʾytwhy dlʾ ḥšḥw.16 Nor is explicitly 
immoral conduct the sole focus. Aristides also attacks Artemis, not because she is immoral as 
such, but because her conduct is ‘unbecoming’: wbtrh mʽlyn ʾrṭmys ʾlhtʾ ḥtʾ dʾplw. wʾmryn 
dʾytyh hwt ṣydtʾ. why hdʾ: ṭʽynʾ hwt qštʾ wgʾrʾ. wmtkrkʾ hwt bṭwrʾ. kd dbyrʾ klbʾ. ʾw dtṣwd 
ʾylʾ ʾw ḥzyry brʾ. hy dmškrʾ dṭlytʾ btwltʾ blḥwdyh ttkrk bṭwrʾ. wtṣwd ṣydʾ dḥywtʾ. wmṭl hdʾ lʾ 
mškḥʾ dʾrṭmys ʾlhtʾ thwʾ.17 In none of these cases is the polemic as vitriolic as we might 
                                                                                                                                                        
same point: whilst Aristides is critical of the moral aspects of the gods, for Justin, the fornication of the gods 
is placed in contrast to Christ, who was produced without sexual union (Rendel Harris 1893:58-9). 
11
 Aristides 13.4: ‘for it is not possible that a god should commit adultery or fornication or to draw near to sleep 
with males, or to kill his father. Otherwise he is more wicked than a destructive demon’. 
12
 Ibid. 14.7. 
13
 Ibid. 16.4-6. 
14
 Ibid. 15.5. 
15
 Ibid. 15.2. “Il est bien plus probable que, lorsqu’il parle d’enlèvement, Aristide fasse allusion au délire qui 
s’emparait des femmes dans le rituel du dieu” (Pouderon and Pierre 2003:353). 
16
 Aristides 13.6-14.2: ‘again they introduce another god, and they call him Hermes. They say that he is a man 
loving avarice and lusting after profit, a magus and maimed and a wrestler and one who interprets. But it is 
not possible that a god should be a magus, or avaricious, or maimed, or coveting whatever is not his, or an 
athlete. For if it is found otherwise then he is no benefit’. See Pouderon and Pierre 2003:351. On the more 
human aspects of Hermes, see Versnel 1990:213-251, esp. 223, and 2011:40-42. 
17
 Aristides 16.2-3: ‘after him they introduce Artemis as a goddess, the sister of Apollo. They say that she is a 
huntress and she carries a bow and arrows, and wanders around on mountains while leading dogs, either to 
hunt deer or wild boar. But it is disgraceful that a virgin should wander about on mountains by herself, and 
hunt the trail of beasts. Because of this it is not possible that Artemis should be a goddess’. Rutherford 
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expect, despite the extent to which Aristides focusses upon these aspects, but it is perfectly 
possible to establish a reason for this. It is significant that the number of gods whose moral 
conduct is attacked is surprisingly limited: those quoted above represent the only ones 
attacked in these terms, namely Zeus, Ares, Hermes, Dionysus, Aphrodite, Herakles and 
Artemis (if one considers the attack on her impropriety comparable to the attacks on greed, 
adultery and so on). When one considers the number of gods whom Aristides attacks in 
general (the total is sixteen), it becomes clear that the moral conduct is not actually the focus 
of Aristides’ polemic. This is especially clear when one considers that a far greater number of 
gods are attacked for their powerlessness, dependence or vulnerability. Immortality, rather 
than immorality, is the focus of his polemic. 
Although it is repeatedly emphasised that these types of conduct (particularly adultery 
and greed) make it impossible for the character in question to be a god, the logic underlying 
this argument is not entirely clear. For the powerlessness, vulnerability and dependence of the 
gods, the argument was explicit: how could they be expected to assist their worshippers when 
they cannot defend themselves? In the attack on Hermes, we find a similar statement: the 
immoral conduct of the gods means that they are unable to help their worshippers (wʾn dyn lʾ 
mštkḥ ʾytwhy dlʾ ḥšḥw).18 Firstly, this emphasises the close connection already observed 
between the moral conduct of the gods and their powerlessness; it also recognises once again 
the importance of the efficacy of the divine in worship. However, Aristides does not explain 
why Hermes’ greed means that he is incapable of helping mankind. The logic of this 
argument must be drawn from elsewhere. As with the polemic on powerlessness, Aristides 
relies on implicit attacks on the gods by emphasising the positive qualities of the true God: 
                                                                                                                                                        
argued that ‘proper’ social behaviour, such as tact and etiquette, was a key part of moral theology (1989:97): 
Aristides’ attacks on Artemis show this to be the case. 
18
 Aristides 14.2: ‘for if it is found to be otherwise, then he is no benefit’. 
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wmṭl hdʾ. lʾ mškḥʾ dbr ʾnšʾ mn kynʾ nsymywhy dʾlhʾ. lhnʾ dbzbn kd mskʾ lḥdwtʾ gdšʾ lh ʽqtʾ. 
wlgwḥkʾ wgdš lh bkyʾ. hnʾ dʾytwhy ḥmtnʾ wṭnnʾ. wḥswmtnʾ wmttwynʾ. ʽm šrkʾ dbwṣrʾ ʾḥrnʾ. 
wbznyʾ sgyʾʾ mtḥbl mnhwn dʾsṭwksʾ. wʾp mn ḥywtʾ.19 We might therefore conclude that the 
immorality of the deities listed means that they are not gods because their conduct marks 
them out as dramatically different to the true God: God is defined as God on the basis of his 
character, and because the gentile gods do not match this character, they cannot be defined as 
god.  
            When he explores the consequences of the gods’ immorality, however, Aristides does 
offer some more explicit interpretation in this respect, namely that the gods do not offer good 
role models to their worshippers: wmkʾ nsbw bny ʾnšʾ ʽlltʾ ʾyk dngwrwn. wnznwn. wnḥṭpwn. 
wdnsʽrwn kl dbyš wsnʾ wndyd. ʾn gyr hlyn dmtqryn ʾlhyhwn: klhyn hlyn dktybn mn lʽl sʽrw: 
kmʾ ytyrʾyt nsʽrwn ʾnyn bny ʾnšʾ: ʾylyn dbhwn bhlyn mhymnyn dsʽrw hlyn.20 It now becomes 
further apparent that the immorality of the gods is not Aristides’ chief focus: he is primarily 
interested in their conduct not because of its connection to their divinity, but because belief in 
the stories about the gods leads their human worshippers to act in similar ways. The point is 
emphasised slightly differently again, to demonstrate its importance to Aristides’ argument: 
hʾ gyr kd smw ywnyʾ nmwsʾ: lʾ ʾstklw dbnmwsyhwn lʾlhyhwn mḥybyn. ʾn gyr kʾnyn 
nmwsyhwn ʽwlyn ʾlhyhwn. dʽbdw ʽbr nmwsʾ: kd mqṭlyn lḥddʾ wsʽryn ḥršwtʾ: wgyryn wḥṭpyn 
                                                 
19
 Ibid. 9.2: ‘because of this, it is not possible that we should depict as God him who is by his nature man, to 
whom at times, when he searches for happiness, grief arises; he searches for laughter, and mourning befalls 
him; one who is wrathful and jealous, envious and regretful, together with the rest of the other faults, and in 
many ways corrupted more than the elements and the beasts’. 
20
 Ibid. 11.1: ‘from this men took the opportunity to commit adultery and fornication, and to plunder and to do 
everything evil, hateful and abominable. For if those who are called their gods have done all these things 
which I have written above, how much more will men do them, those who believe that they [sc. the gods] 
have done these things!’ 
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wgnbyn: wdmkyn ʽm dkrʾ: ʽm šrkʾ dswʽrnyhwn ʾḥrnʾ.21 This emphasises the inconsistency, in 
his view, of Greek theology: if the Greeks disown the gods’ conduct, then they worship 
dishonourable beings, but if they do not, then they (and their laws) are equally morally 
corrupt. The idea that the divine should provide a moral exemplar is no doubt rooted in one of 
the most important verses in scripture: ky ʾnʾ yhwh ʾlhykm whtqdštm whyytm qdšym ky qdwš 
ʾny.22 For Aristides, therefore, although the conduct of the gods may disqualify them from 
being gods (because they fail to match the moral excellence which defines God), its true 
significance is in the negative impact it has on the lives of worshippers. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 Ibid. 21.6-22.2: ‘for see! While the Greeks establish laws, they do not understand that by their laws they are 
condemning their own gods. For if their laws are just, their gods are unrighteous, for they committed a 
transgression of the law, since they kill one another and performed enchantments and committed adultery, 
plundered, stole, slept with males, together with the rest of their other deeds. But if their gods are 
beautiful/fine and, like they say, did all these things, the laws of the Greeks are unrighteous, and are not 
established according to the will of their gods, and in this the entire world has erred’.  
22
 Lev. 11:44: ‘I am the Lord your God. Consecrate yourselves; be holy because I am holy’; see also ibid. 19:2 
and 20:26. Scholarship tends to focus on qdš (‘holy’) as a term of separation: the term literally means ‘to 
separate’ or ‘to set aside’ (see Milgrom 1991, 2004). However, Harrington demonstrated that Rabbinic 
holiness also contained elements of moral goodness: as the Holy One, God is not only separated from all 
imperfection and weakness, but he is also “Other” because he embodies within Himself all goodness, 
including justice, mercy and life itself” (2001:12). She also argued that this understanding of holiness was in 
contrast to the Greek concept of      , which appears only rarely in the Septuagint: it is used of ram’s horn 
trumpets which are blown before the Ark, and therefore in themselves have only minor cultic significance 
(Jos. 6:8). In preferring to use       to translate qdš, the writers of the Septuagint “made an implicit 
distinction between the nature of the Jewish God and the gods of the pagan world” (Harrington 2001:15)  
Rives, in contrast, argued that       and       were by and large synonymous (2007:13), while Burkert 
argued that       “lacks the juridical factor  it does not point to objective demarcation but to an attitude or 
feeling of looking upward in awe and fascination” (1985:270). The command highlighted above separates 
Israel from the nations not only in matters of diet and ritual practice, but in ethical living: in Lev. 19:2, the 
command is followed by a number of largely ethical concerns, such as the command to honour one’s 
parents. Thus, holiness “signals utter withdrawal from what is morally evil. As one separates from impurity 
and immorality, one emulates God himself, who by nature is distinguished from all other entities, and who is 
especially separated from evil” (Harrington 2001:16). Nor is the association of holiness and morality limited 
to Rabbinic thought: Mt. 5:48 repeats the command of Leviticus but replaces       with   λ     (‘perfect’), 
which shows the close association of morality and holiness in Christian thought. Paul is explicit on the 
subject in 2 Cor. 7:1 and Eph. 5:27: in both these instances, to be       means to remove every blemish or 
spot of improper conduct from one’s life. See also Mt. 19:21, Col. 1:28, Phil. 3:12. 
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4.2.2 Tatian 
Tatian is less explicit in his attacks on the moral conduct of gods, particularly 
individual gods: as noted in the previous chapter, individual, named gods do not feature very 
frequently in the text. The polemic is largely targeted at the gods in general, rather than 
specific, named ones:                           βλ                               δ     
                   δ φ                     λ                     .23 Tatian has drawn an 
identical conclusion to the Syriac translator of Aristides: the behaviour of the gods somehow 
disqualifies them from being gods. It is not clear how this should be, but the gods are 
portrayed in such frivolous fashion in this passage that we may assume that it places them in 
stark contrast to the majesty of God. The target of this polemic is    δ       , and is not 
narrowed down any further. There are a few instances in which the conduct of individual 
gods is discussed, such as Zeus’ seduction of Kore,24 or the Dioskouri’s rape of the daughters 
of Leukippus
25
; Kronos is criticised for consuming his sons, and Zeus for eating Metis.
26
 
However, in the only section in which individual gods are discussed extensively, it is the 
contradictory nature of their roles, rather than the immorality of their conduct, which is the 
focus of Tatian’s attack: Cybele promotes castration, while Aphrodite encourages love-
making and childbirth; Asklepios and Apollo heal, while Athena and Artemis destroy.
27
 Like 
Aristides, Tatian emphasises the connection between the moral conduct of the gods and their 
                                                 
23
 Tatian Or. 8.1-2: ‘those who watch single combat, and cheer on one or the other; who marry, seduce boys, or 
commit adultery; who laugh, or are angry; who flee and are wounded: how are we not to think of all these as 
being mortal?’. Grant (1954:64) offered this passage as justification for Irenaeus’ condemnation of Tatian as 
a heretic for his rejection of marriage (see above, 1.4.3); however, Hawthorne (1964:166) pointed out that 
marriage is not identified with pederasty or adultery, but rather placed alongside them as an example of the 
kind of practices which must be regarded as mortal. 
24
 Tatian Or. 8.4. 
25
 Ibid. 10.2. 
26
 Ibid. 25.3. This passage is in fact intended to act as apologetic in its true sense; for more on this, see below, 
5.3.1. 
27
 Tatian Or. 8.2. However, Burkert argued that a polytheistic system required opposition on some level in 
giving order to the world: the chaste Artemis requires Aphrodite as her counterpart (1985:248). 
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powerlessness (here expressed through their materiality and vulnerability):         δ , 
  δ    λλ    ,                               λ  ,        δ                         .28 
The immorality of the gods is clearly secondary to the fact that, for a variety of reasons, 
worshipping them is irrational: the gods, like everyone else, will be judged for their conduct.  
             Like the Syriac translator of Aristides, Tatian emphasises the negative impact of 
mythic tales of the gods: δ                                 φ                     
  φ         , δ                                                  .29 This is found 
immediately after the attack discussed above on the frivolous conduct of the Homeric gods in 
general; Tatian makes it explicit that it is Homer’s depiction which is under attack.30 He 
claims that it was for this reason alone that poetry was created:           δ ,           
                                     δ  φ     .31 The gods are not the sole target of 
Tatian’s polemic, either: he attacks Zeno’s tales for glorifying the morally corrupt. Although 
he acknowledges that there are a few good men in these tales (such as Herakles and 
Socrates), the wicked vastly outnumber them.
32
 As well as poetry, drama is attacked for the 
negative exemplars that it portrays; Tatian says of an actor he watched: ἕ             
               , δ    δ                 , δ  β λ                  , φ              , 
                       ,                ,      δ      δ     ,     δ           
                                                 
28
 Ibid. 12.4: ‘these, men of Greece, are the ones you worship, even though they were made from matter, and far 
from orderly in their behaviour’. Hunt argued that both inappropriate conduct and weakness described in the 
myths served to emphasise the powerlessness of the gods (2003:59). 
29
 Ibid. 8.2: ‘by the way in which they revealed their nature to men, they urged their audience to do the same 
things’. This is unsurprising: “l’idée que les mythes servent de prétexte aux hommes pour justifier leurs 
méfaits est fréquente dans l’apologétique” (Pouderon and Pierre 2003:347). Similarly, Hunt argued that 
Tatian’s approach to the mythological conduct of the gods is nothing more than “the standard approach used 
in this kind of apologetic material” (2003:6 ). 
30
 Tatian Or. 8.1:       ἷ ,    φ           , “  β      δ               λ                    ” (‘as Homer 
says, ‘unquenchable laughter arose among the blessed gods’’: this is a quotation from either Il. 1.599 or Od. 
8.326). 
31
 Tatian Or. 1.3: ‘you concocted poetry in order to tell of the battles and the affairs of the gods, and the 
corruption of the soul’. 
32
 Ibid. 3.2.  
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 φ                                              .33 Like Aristides, Tatian does not spend 
much time attacking the moral conduct of the gods; at best, it would serve to emphasise that 
worship of the gods is irrational, which he has already demonstrated. Instead, he uses it to 
emphasise the danger in their worship by highlighting the negative effect it has on mankind. 
 
4.2.3 Meliton  
            Meliton, in contrast, adopts a completely different approach from either Aristides or 
Tatian towards the conduct of the gods. In the central Euhemeristic section, he describes the 
origin of local cults by discussing the lives of numerous men who were later treated as gods: 
these accounts range from Athena and Zeus in the Greek world to Nebo in Hierapolis-Mabog. 
It is largely on the basis of this section, and the lack of polemical tone, that Lightfoot 
suggested that the historiolae might have been a later interpolation.
34
 It is certainly true that 
not many of the historiolae include moral polemic, and what polemic there is revolves 
entirely around sexual ethics: Herakles is accused of multiple rape and excessive lust, as is 
zwrdy prsyʾ rḥmh (‘Zurdi the Persian, his companion’);35 Athena is attacked for adultery with 
Hephaistos to produce Ericthippus;
36
 Zeus is accused of adultery with Alcmene to produce 
Herakles;
37
 and Balthi (Aphrodite) of adultery with Tammuz.
38
 Other common charges are 
ignored: although Dionysus is credited with introducing wine, the natural extension of this, 
drunkenness,
39
 is completely ignored. However, I argued above that discussing the conduct of 
                                                 
33
 Ibid. 22.1: ‘single accuser of all the gods, an epitome of superstition, one who slanders heroic deeds, who acts 
out murders, who explains adulteries, a store-house of madness, a teacher of lechers, a starting-point for the 
condemned. Such a man was praised by all’. 
34
 Lightfoot 2007:73. This claim is discussed in much more detail above: 3.2.1. 
35
 Meliton 3.5. Zurdi is probably to be identified with Theseus (Lightfoot 2007:76), although Cureton preferred 
 aradas, “the author of the abominable law of the Persians” (1855:88). 
36
 Meliton 3.8. 
37
 Ibid. 4.1. 
38
 Ibid. 4.1. 
39
 As seen in Aristides 15.2. 
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the gods would mean admitting their existence in a form other than that of the image: Meliton 
absolutely refuses to do so, and as such, the Euhemeristic historiolae are entirely in keeping 
with the approach of the rest of the Oration. However, this does mean that Meliton offers 
very little discussion on the moral conduct of the gods, particularly when compared to Tatian 
or the Syriac translator of Aristides; in Meliton’s eyes, the gods cannot misbehave because 
they do not exist. 
 
4.3 Non-Christian sources on the morality of gods 
            We have seen, then, that the morality of the gods plays an important, if relatively 
minor, part in the polemic of all three authors. In part, the polemic of Tatian, Aristides and 
Meliton depends upon the association of the mythic and the religious. It was observed in the 
previous chapter that Varro’s tripartite theology distinguishes between poetic and civic 
religion; Most argued that this division served to protect the poets and their depictions of the 
gods from precisely the sort of discussion which Aristides and Tatian rely on.
40
 However, I 
observed that it was unlikely that people could offer sacrifices to a god without being at least 
mindful of the stories told of them, and I suggest that this will be equally true of the moral 
conduct. It is surely impossible that these stories would not occur to the worshipper, 
particularly if they offered sacrifices in a temple surrounded by familiar imagery and 
iconography of the god, even if the sacrifice is not consciously made to, for example, Zeus as 
adulterer and the stories do not play an active part in their understanding of Zeus the god. In 
                                                 
40
 Most 2003:308: “in practice it served to establish a clear division of labour between three separate forms of 
religiosity, thereby immunizing not only the great poets of the past, Homer and Hesiod above all, but also 
the institutions of the city, in their political and religious complicity, against any corrosive impact which 
might otherwise have derived from philosophical speculation about the true nature of divinity”. It was also 
seen that Aristides appeared to recognise a clear distinction between the mtlʾ (‘parables’), kynytʾ (‘the 
physical’) and zmyrtʾ wqyntʾ (‘hymns and songs’), which must parallel the mythical, physical and civic 
branches of Varro’s theology. For fuller discussion on the origins and use of the tripartite theology in this 
context, see above, 3.2.3). 
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any case, the accusations made by the Christian authors, and by the Syriac translator of 
Aristides in particular, again appear lacking in foundation: they intend these arguments to 
invalidate sacrificial practice, but the connection between the conduct of the gods and the 
sacrifices they receive is tenuous at best. 
 
4.3.1 Philo of Byblos 
           We have also seen the notion that the divine should act as moral exemplars to 
mankind, largely founded on the Levitical code.
41
 Let us now examine how far the attitude of 
these Near Eastern Christian authors matches the perception of non-Christian sources. Firstly, 
how strong is the connection between the morality (or otherwise) of the gods, and their 
worship? Philo of Byblos’ euhemeristic account, although it deals at great length with the 
stories of the gods, rarely mentions anything untoward in their conduct: he tells of Ouranos’ 
rape of Ge, and his subsequent attempts to murder his children;
42
 similarly, Kronos murders 
his own son, Sadidos.
43
 However, in neither of these cases is there any evident criticism of 
either Ouranos or Kronos. The absence of moral criticism is perhaps not surprising in this 
account; Philo’s euhemeristic approach is based on the understanding that the ‘gods’ became 
so because of their services to man; their immoralities have little place for discussion in this 
context. 
 
 
                                                 
41
 Fitzgerald (2008:12-14) argued that aetiological myth often had a strong moral centre (as with the declining 
morals of the five races of men in Hes. Op. (106-201), and that such myths were intended to encourage 
moral contemplation and the development of a good way of life (2008:15). However, his analysis is based on 
the cultural and moral development of mankind: this may reinforce the association between myth and moral 
exemplar, but says nothing about the role of the gods in this context. 
42
 Quoted in Euseb. Praep. evang. 1.10.17. Baumgarten suggested that, since the infanticide did not feature in 
Hesiod’s account of the Cosmogony, Philo’s was probably a rationalising account (1981:191), which might 
also help explain the lack of critical comment.  
43
 Quoted in Euseb. Praep. evang. 1.10.21. 
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4.3.2 Lucian 
           We find more discussion in the various works of Lucian. Whilst describing the 
construction of the temple at Hierapolis, he mentions the rape of Europa by Zeus (in the form 
of a bull).
44
 Again, however, the story is reported in a matter-of-fact way with no implied 
criticism of Zeus; it is simply one of the various accounts of the foundation of the temple 
given by the priests, and Lucian’s real concern is with finding the most accurate one. It is 
immediately apparent that this myth has nothing to do with religious life at Hierapolis. It is 
also worth remembering that much of this account depends on the use of Herodotus; 
Lightfoot suggested that Lucian had deliberately inverted the Herodotean model, by “placing 
the vulgate version of the myth, which Herodotus does not even mention, in the mouths of the 
very Phoenicians least likely to articulate it in this way”.45 As such, it is entirely to be 
expected that Lucian’s account reveals little of his attitude towards the immoral conduct of 
the gods. 
              In some of Lucian’s comic works, however, we do find more criticism of the gods’ 
activities: Prometheus bemoans the fact that there is just as much misbehaviour amongst the 
gods as amongst mortals,
46
 and Zeus attacks Dionysus for his drunkenness and womanly 
character.
47
 More frequently, Zeus appears to be criticised for his adultery.
48
 Nor is he alone 
in this rebuke: Rhea is criticised for her adulteries despite her age.
49
 Only occasionally,
50
 
                                                 
44
 Luc. Syr. D. 4.  
45
 Lightfoot 2003:299. On the passage, see ibid. 297-301. 
46
 Luc. Prom. 16. 
47
 Luc. Deor. conc. 4. For commentary on this passage, see Macleod 1991:255-7. 
48
 Such as Luc. De sacr. 5, which tells of his various transformations. For fuller discussion of the mythological 
allusions, see Macleod 1991:277-8. An identical sentiment is expressed by Momus in Deor. conc. 7, who 
goes on to say that Zeus’ example has inspired the other gods and, even worse, the goddesses to commit 
adultery (ibid. 8), although Oliver suggested that it was Dionysus’ attendants to whom Momus primarily 
took objection (1980:306). 
49
 Luc. De sacr. 7.  
50
 Despite this, Petropolou argued that On Sacrifices represents one of the most complete texts on the practice 
(2008:42); this is only true if we fail to observe that Lucian’s focus is myth, not ritual. 
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however, is there any suggestion that these stories are in any way linked to the worship of the 
gods through cult practice and sacrifice: Zeus, in rebuking Dionysus, questions      
                  φ                                         λ                
           51 Similarly, the priest of Kronos at the Saturnalia angers the god by repeating the 
stories of his binding (which, it seems, are mistaken) during a prayer.
52 Elsewhere, however, 
the stories are explicitly connected with mythic tales of the poets:                
     λ                                .53 Lucian frequently makes it clear that the stories 
the poets tell of the gods are not to be trusted; Tychiades, in The Lover of Lies, for example, 
says of the poets that they are    δ        δ   ,      φ                         , ὡ     
                                     φ  ,  λλ                  δ                 δ      
δ  δ          λλ                         φ λ         .54 Significantly, however, Philocles’ 
opponent Tychiades also suggests that these tales of the gods are so widespread that anyone 
who doubts them is considered a sacrilegious fool.
55
 Some defence is made of the poets; 
Hesiod is made to claim that he expressed poetic license,
56
 whilst Philocles suggests that the 
stories of the gods are designed to delight rather than to instruct.
57
 Whatever Lucian’s true 
thoughts on the value of the poetic stories of the gods, it is evident that they have nothing at 
all to do with religious life expressed through ritual and sacrifice. To this extent, we must 
                                                 
51
 Luc. Deor. conc. 5: ‘how are we to be surprised that men despise us when they see such laughable and bizarre 
gods?’ The criticism is made in the context of the half-human herd of satyrs and the like that accompany 
Dionysus. We may strongly suspect that     φ      has cultic connotations: if one despises the gods, one 
will not continue to make offerings. 
52
 Luc. Sat. 5. Kronos responds by saying that Homer and Hesiod could have had no definite knowledge of him 
(ibid. 6). 
53
 Luc. De sacr. 5: ‘do the poets not gravely tell these things about the gods?’’.  
54
 Luc. Philops. 2: ‘famous men who employed written lies, so that they not only deceived those who listen to 
them then, but transmitted the lie through succeeding generations right down to us, encased in the finest 
words and metre’. A similar sentiment is expressed in Ver. hist. 1.3 and Iupp. trag. 39. 
55
 Luc. Philops. 3:    β                                δ             δ λ         λ                
                                      δ   (‘they think him impious and senseless for not believing in such 
evident and genuine facts, to such an extent does the lie dominate’). 
56
 Luc. Hes. 5. 
57
 Luc. Philops. 4. 
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support the distinction made by Varro’s tripartite theology. Aristides and Tatian are clearly 
mistaken to associate the stories on which their arguments are based with the cult of the gods 
which they are attempting to undermine. Here we see a clear difference between Christian 
attitudes and those of non-Christians, both in the Near East and elsewhere in the Graeco-
Roman world. 
 
4.4 Excursus: the tripartite theology: philosophy, myth and the dangers of poetry 
This point is clearly demonstrated by the volume of material criticising the poets for 
their presentation of the gods, and accusing them of lying. This was noted above in the works 
of Lucian; the argument existed as early as Xenophanes.
58
 The most famous use of this 
argument is found in Plato’s Republic. Plato does not particularly have anything against 
poetry in itself;
59
 however, he clearly objects to the fact that the poets spoke at a third remove 
from their subjects.
60
 Whilst this undermines their authority on the subject matter, and 
therefore makes them unable to act as suitable teachers, it is not clear how Plato connects this 
                                                 
58
 KRS 166; Lesher argued that Xenophanes’ scepticism was primarily focussed on Homeric religious attitudes 
(1978:1). See also Most 2003:309. The widespread use of such objections shows that they may have been 
commonly accepted, but that does not mean that everybody did so without reservation: “it is hard to imagine 
many others beside Plato having a use for the idea of poetry as exclusively a tool for education and the 
formation of character” (Rowe 198 :1 6  see also Rives 2007:38). It was observed in the previous chapter 
that Aristides grouped authors and poets together, almost certainly to highlight tension between the two 
(Aristides 20.6-21.1; see above, 3.2.3), which would also suggest that such discussion was relatively 
commonplace. 
59
 Asmis defended Plato against accusations that he lacked an understanding of poetry as a form of emotional 
expression (1992:3 6). Similarly, Rowe argued: “that Plato adopts this narrow and restrictive attitude to the 
products of art is not because he is unaware of the pleasure it arouses; rather it is because of his awareness of 
it. Art sinks deep into the soul, and we inevitably carry away with us whatever character it presents to us” 
(1984:145; Pl. Resp. 595b). O’Connor has highlighted considerable poetic influence in the Republic, and 
argued that Socrates was simultaneously presented as both Odysseus and Teiresias in order to act as both 
adventurer and guide (2007:59-63). It is clear that Plato’s objections are not made on the grounds of taste, 
for Socrates comes to the decision to expel poets “with a sense of loss and an almost embarrassed 
reluctance” (ibid. 56). 
60
 Pl. Resp. 599d. The issue of poetic inspiration is also raised at length in Ion. See Asmis 1992, Nussbaum 
2003:226-228, Rowe 1984:149. 
 191 
 
with the issue of active ethical harm.
 61
 Instead, the speaker, Socrates, argues that poets 
should be excluded from the ideal state because of their corrupting influence on the young: 
the young, he says, are incapable of distinguishing between what is the underlying meaning 
(       ) and what is not.62 As a result, they do not understand that much of what the poets 
say is false.
63 However, it is not the fact that these tales are false that is the problem:   δ     
       λ         δ      δ          λ               φ                  .64 The fact that 
the depiction of the gods is false is secondary in importance, in Plato’s view, to the fact that 
these stories are held up in such a way that inevitably encourages imitation.
65
 In particular, 
the speaker observes that, if the gods fight among themselves, as in Iliad 20, how can we 
expect the guardians of the state to work together to the benefit of all?
66
 Similarly, if a man 
were to harm his father, he would simply be following the example of Zeus, who imprisoned 
                                                 
61
 “Plato certainly never spells out the connection between the metaphysics of imitation and the charge of ethical 
harm” (Moss 2007: 15). Moss argued that poetry corrupted simply because it was imitation (ibid. 429); the 
appearance is ontologically distinct from the object (not the Form), and that by copying the appearance (of a 
bed, in this instance), the object itself is not copied (ibid. 418ff). A realistic painting which captures the 
appearance rather than the reality has great power to deceive, and this is also true (to a far greater extent) of 
poetry (ibid. 422). However, it seems that Plato is “less concerned with the factual or literal veracity of myth 
than with its value as a means of conveying ethical or religious truths” (Murray 1996:135). I do not deal in 
any great length here with the issue of the Forms, and that of poetic inspiration, as it has no significant 
bearing on the issue of morality, either of the divine or of human worshippers. For discussion of Forms in 
this context, see Moss 2007, Rowe 1984 and 2003, Sedley 2003. 
62
 Pl. Resp. 378d:                 ἷ                                      (‘for the young are not able to judge 
what is the underlying meaning and what is not’  my thanks to Dr. Phil Horky for suggesting this 
translation). Elsewhere, Plato argues that λ β                                                  δ       , 
               φ             δ           ἷ                (“it is a corruption of the minds of all those 
who hear it, those who do not have as a remedy the knowledge of how these things really are”) (ibid. 595b). 
The effect of allegorical interpretation was that it “served to make other modes of thinking about the divine 
subordinate to philosophy; the underlying assumption was that only philosophy revealed the true 
significance of traditional myth, art, and cult” (Rives 2007:39). See also Murray 1996:140. See also Plut. 
Mor. 355c-d:      δ                            δ                                                 
φ λ   φ  ,     δ                 δ  φ λ                                ,     δ   λ    δ           
            δ             λλ                                                ,   δ    λ         φ     
                δ    δ         (‘if, then, you listen to the stories about the gods in this way, accepting 
them from those who interpret the story reverently and philosophically, and if you always perform and 
observe the established rites of worship, and believe that no sacrifice that you can offer, no deed that you 
may do will be more likely to find favour with the gods than your belief in their true nature, you may avoid 
superstition which is no less an evil than atheism’).  
63
 Pl. Resp. 377a. See also 377e, in which the speaker criticises fables for bearing no resemblance to their 
subjects (sc. the gods). 
64
 Ibid. 378a: ‘even if they were true, we should not be so quick to tell them to the young and the senseless’. 
65
 See also Pl. Prtg. 325e-326a. 
66
 Pl. Resp. 378c.  
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Kronos,
67
 and a god who changes his form will only encourage mankind to be deceitful.
68
 All 
three of these arguments are used by the Syriac translator of Aristides in his attack on the 
moral example of the gods; it is plausible that his argument is based on this section of the 
Republic, and that he is relying on Plato’s own arguments.  
However, Plato’s assessment that the gods are a poor moral example (which Meijer 
described as a “decency criterion”)69 is not actually the point that he is making. Far more 
damaging is the fact that it leads us to a misleading understanding of the divine, in particular 
in relation to the notion of justice.
70
 The poets
71
 present the relationship between mortals and 
their allotted fate in a manner of which Plato strongly disapproves. He rejects the suggestion 
that the divine gives both good and undeserved evil:
72
 god is entirely good and must always 
be spoken of as such.
73
 He cannot, therefore, be presented as dispensing arbitrary justice: the 
only evil to come from god is just punishment, and this cannot truly be called evil: λ       
                                                 
67
 Ibid. 378b. For detailed analysis of this passage, see Murray 1996:139. 
68
 Pl. Resp. 380d-382e. O’Connor, however, emphasises the fact that Socrates has inversed this idea: the gods 
have no need to lie, whilst mankind occasionally must (“humans may lie, or disguise themselves, for 
protection from enemies, or to help friends who cannot be reformed simply by unadorned arguments, say”, 
2007:81-2). Needless to say, when Aristides adopts the deceit of the gods for his polemic, he does not use 
this interpretation. 
69
 Meijer 1981:221. 
70
 This also appears to be true of the Homeric description of the underworld, which Plato attacks in 386a-d “not 
so much because it is false, but because it undermines the courage and patriotism of the city’s soldiers” 
(O’Connor 2007:58, 386a-d). Plato refers to Od. 11.489-91; he uses the same passage in Book 7 of the 
Republic (516d-e) to undermine the connection of a man to the city. See O’Connor 2007:58ff for fuller 
discussion of this passage. 
71
 Nussbaum (2003:216) argued that the tragedians and comic poets are the primary focus of this section, and 
that “Plato treats Homer as, basically, one among the tragic poets, though he is well aware of the distinction 
between direct representation and narration” (ibid. 215). 
72
 Pl. Resp 379d. See, for example, Il. 24.527-8, 24.530, 24.532. Murray discussed the differences between 
Plato’s quotation and the transmitted version of the Homeric text (1996:143). See also Versnel 2011:157-8. 
73
 Pl. Resp. 379b. This must be the difference between appearance and reality which the poets as imitators fail to 
observe and which causes such damage (Moss 2007:429). See also Murray 1996:142. 
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ὡ             δ                           ,    δ             λ        .74 Occasionally, the 
error of the poets is explicit, as in the Homeric Hymn to Apollo: 
Μ           ᾽               β             λῇ  
                 δ  ᾽   β      δ᾽            
 λ        ,   ᾽           ᾽                    
     ᾽  φ  δ                ,   δ  δ         
                    ᾽                  λ   : 75 
The Muses, and through them the poets, encourage mankind to regard their sufferings as the 
works of the gods, and this leads to despair. The wise man is self-sufficient: in aiming to 
become god-like, we aim to make ourselves stable, secure and immune to the slings and 
arrows of the world.
76
 The problem with the poets, seemingly, is that “the grandiose 
aspiration to self-sufficiency is repeatedly punctured”:77 if the gods dispense arbitrary justice, 
then no-one can be truly self-sufficient, because we are all subject to the whims of the divine. 
To this extent, Schopenhauer’s interpretation of tragedy, that the tragedians remind us of our 
vulnerability in an unpredictable world and encourage a life of pessimistic contemplation,
78
 is 
entirely at odds with Plato’s view that we should strive for self-sufficiency. Furthermore, the 
                                                 
74
 Pl. Resp. 380b: ‘they must say that God does only just and good works, and that they benefitted from the 
correction’. See also Prtg. 324b, Gorg. 476-7. Poets “should not say that god makes men miserable by 
punishing them; rather that the wicked are wretched because they need punishment, which god supplies in 
order to benefit them” (Murray 1996:1 5). See also Meijer 1981:261-2, Mackenzie 1981; MacMullen argued 
that this was the role of demons (1981:82). 
75
 Hymn. Hom. Ap. 189-93: ‘all the Muses together, answering voice with beautiful voice, sing of the immortal 
gifts of the gods, and of the despair of men, all that they receive from the undying gods; how they live 
senselessly and helplessly, and can find no defence against death or old age’. 
76
 Morgan argued that this position was a compromise between two existing positions: that man could become 
god, and that absolute limits existed to the life of man, held by ‘alternative cults’ and ‘traditional religion’ 
respectively (1992:231). It has already been argued that it is inappropriate to drawn such distinctions 
between alternative and traditional cult (above, 3.3.4), but Morgan is correct to highlight two opposing 
perspectives on man’s relationship with the gods. 
77
 Nussbaum 2003:224. See also Versnel 2011:152-70. 
78
 For a helpful summary of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Hegel on tragedy, see Nussbaum 2003:222.  
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heroes of poetry react in unseemly fashion: we are not to grieve over our fortune, because it is 
not allotted to us arbitrarily.
79
 Poetry is dangerous, then, not simply because it may encourage 
morally aberrant behaviour, but because it endorses an attitude towards the divine that will 
prevent us from becoming god-like.
80
 
Other authors are also critical of poetic notions of the gods: Plutarch, for example, 
accuses them of δ    δ       ,81 and accuses them of a contradictory attitude:        δ      
         λ           λ              φ λ         ,       δ           β  β        
  λ                 .82 Unlike Plato, however, Plutarch does not focus on the examples set 
by the gods: like Aristides,
83
 he appears to argue that the conduct attributed to the gods would 
(if it were true, and this is the fundamental distinction between Plutarch and Aristides) 
invalidate their status as gods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
79
 “The ethical objection raised against tragedy is that it shows good people encountering reversals in fortune 
and grieving as if these had great significance” (ibid:226). Cf. Asmis 1992:3 7. Moss (2007: 32) argued that 
the object of imitation “is human action, and in particular excellent human action”  it is true that this is a 
major problem for Plato, but does not account for the worries found in the stories about the gods. 
80
 “Socrates has shown that Homer and the others have nothing but a semblance of wisdom. Now he shows that 
this semblance is a corruption of the soul. By revealing the moral ugliness of traditional poetry and its power 
to corrupt even the best citizens, he reduces it to the lowest level of abomination, so that it must surely be 
purged” (Asmis 1992:357).  
81
 Plut. Mor. 1051e.  
82
 Ibid. 1049b: ‘consider how he always attributes to God good and benevolent names, but cruel, barbarous and 
Galatian deeds’. Russell argued that Plutarch’s    δ       , like Plato’s, were created to fill the gap between 
the divine and punishment (1968:135). 
83 Although Plutarch emphasises the importance of        : this is not indifference but imperturbability through 
the domestication of           (Krentz 2008:130; see also Wright 2008:140). 
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4.5 Near Eastern Christian attitudes to the morality of man 
4.5.1 The Syriac translator of Aristides 
This leads us to the second key aspect of morality that our Christian authors attack: 
that of the individual worshipper. The title of this chapter demonstrates the importance of an 
ethical way of life to Christianity: the point is emphasised repeatedly throughout the New 
Testament, encouraging Christians away from gentile lifestyles which are characterised 
particularly by drunkenness, greed and sexual immorality, as noted in the introduction to this 
chapter. For the Syriac translator of Aristides in particular, the importance of the mythic 
stories of the gods was that they led mankind astray, and he concludes his apology by 
discussing the moral practices of Jews, Christians and gentiles.
84
 His treatment of gentile 
morality is uncompromisingly brutal: ywnyʾ dyn ʾw mlkʾ. mṭl dsʽryn ṣbwtʾ mškrtʾ bmdmkʾ 
dʽm dkrʾ: wdʽm ʾmʾ wḥtʾ wbrtʾ: gwḥkʾ dṭnpwthwn ʽl krsṭynʾ mhpkyn lh. krsṭynʾ dyn. kʾnyn 
wḥsyn.85 The similarity with the moral tales of the gods once again emphasises his view that 
the gods acts as poor models for their worshippers. Surprisingly, however, this is the only 
real attack on gentile morality in the Apology. Its purpose, however, is abundantly clear: it is 
intended to act as a plea for conversion, away from ignorance: wytyrʾyt ḥysyn ʽlyhwn. ʾyk ʾnšʾ 
dḥsyryn mn ydʽtʾ. wḥlpyhwn mqrbyn ṣlwtʾ ʾyk dntwbwn mn ṭʽywthwn. m’ dyn dgdš wtb ḥd 
mnhwn.  mtkḥd mn krsṭynʾ: mn swʽrnʾ dsʽyryn lh. wmwdʾ lʾlhʾ kd ʾmr: ddlʾ bʾydʽtʾ hlyn sʽrt. 
wmdkʾ lbh wmštbqyn lh ḥṭhwhy. mṭl ddlʾ bʾydʽtʾ sʽr ʾnwn. bzbnʾ qdmyʾ: kd mgdp hwʾ wmṣḥʾ 
                                                 
84
 It is this section which O’Ceallaigh suggested was a later Christian interpolation into a Jewish text (1958:227-
30; see above, 1.4.2). However, similarities with the rest of the text make this unlikely. In particular, 
Aristides emphasises the divine as a moral exemplar: wmtdmyn bʾlhʾ: byd rḥmt ʾnšʾ dʾyt lhwn (‘they imitate 
God by the power of the love of man which they have’, 22.6). This is clearly consistent with the mythic 
stories which Aristides explores elsewhere. His discussion of pagan morality, and sexual ethics in particular, 
is also very consistent. Although I do not intend to deal with Jewish morality in any great length here, as it 
has no bearing on the question at hand, it is worth noting that Aristides’ attitude is markedly ambiguous: at 
times, he is very positive, whilst elsewhere he claims that their worship is directed towards angels rather than 
to God (23.1). 
85
 Ibid. 27.2: ‘but the Greeks, o King, because they practice obscene things in sleeping with males, and with 
mother and sister and daughter, turn the ridicule of their defilement upon the Christians; but the Christians 
are upright and holy’. 
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hwʾ lʾydʽthwn šryrtʾ dkrsṭynʾ.86 By confessing his sins, the gentile’s heart is able to be 
cleansed, and he is redeemed. Conversion appears to be a matter of changing one’s way of 
life; however, the logic of Aristides’ argument also makes the need for a change of God 
implicitly evident. Worship of gentile gods leads to an immoral lifestyle, whilst worship of 
the true God leads to a blessed one. Rejection of sins can therefore only be accomplished by 
ceasing to worship the false gods who lead one astray. This is rarely made explicit, which is 
somewhat surprising: Aristides has spent so long ridiculing the gods for their weaknesses that 
one would expect a more concrete command to reject them and to follow the true God.
87
 
The connection between one’s God and one’s ethical lifestyle to Aristides’ apologetic 
is made clear in the far more extensive section which is dedicated to the lives of Christians.
88
 
Their way of life is determined by the pwqdnʾ (‘commandments’)89 that are handed down by 
God: again, the divine acts as the moral exemplar. The results of these commandments are 
                                                 
86
 Ibid. 27.3-27.4: ‘all the more abundantly do they pity them as men who are lacking in knowledge, and on their 
behalf offer up prayers in order that they might turn from their error.  And when it happens that one of them 
turns they are ashamed before the Christians of the deeds that have been done by him. He confesses to God 
when he says ‘I did these things without knowledge’ [i.e. in ignorance], and he cleanses his heart and he is 
forgiven his sins, because he committed them without knowledge previously, when he was blaspheming and 
cursing the true knowledge of the Christians’. See also Pouderon and Pierre. 2003:69. So prominent is the 
connection between ethics and morality that Pouderon and Pierre suggested that Aristides himself had been 
converted by seeing the moral conduct of other Christians (2003:80); Aristides himself says nothing of his 
own conversion, however. 
87
 The suggestion appears only once in the discussion: pqḥʾ hy lhwn gyr dnsgdwn lʽlhʽ šryrʽ: ytyr mn dnsgdwn 
lzmm dlʾ pwršn (‘it is better for them to worship the true God than to worship a buzzing which is without 
intelligence’, 28.1). On the connection between the rejection of God and morality, cf. Pouderon and Pierre 
2003:70: “c’est pour ignorer le vrai  ieu que Grecs et barbares se livrent à mille turpitudes”. 
88
 Rendel Harris discussed the relationship between this section of the Apology and the Teaching of the Twelve 
Apostles; although there are similarities in the description of Christian ethics, he argued that Aristides’ 
presentation is “vastly superior”, and that his treatment “can only be paralleled for beauty and spirituality in 
the pages of Tertullian” (1893:63). 
89
 This word is repeatedly emphasised in this section: 23.3, 24.6, 25.4, 26.2. In 25.4, it is made clear that the 
commandments are received from mšyḥʾ (‘Christ’), which suggests that it is not the Levitical 
commandments which Aristides has in mind, but rather Jesus’ teachings: possibly, given the emphasis 
placed in the text on caring for one’s neighbours, he is thinking specifically of the command in John 13:3 : 
    λ          δ δ                      λλ λ   ,                                           λλ λ    
(‘I give you a new commandment, that you should love one another: just as I loved you, so should you love 
one another’). See also 1 John 2:7-8. Pouderon and Pierre discussed the distinction which Aristides makes 
between Jesus’ teachings and the Torah: “juifs et chrétiens n’en puisent pas l’inspiration aux mêmes 
sources” (2003:65). 
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clear: where the gentiles are incestuous and adulterous, the Christians lʾ gyryn wlʾ mznyn;90 in 
particular, their wives are dkyn ʾyk btwltʾ (‘pure like virgins’) and their daughters knykn 
(‘modest’),91 in distinct contrast to Aphrodite, for example. While the gentile gods (and, by 
extension, the gentiles themselves) are greedy and mercenary, the Christians lʾ kymyn ʽl 
gwʽlnʾ. wlʾ rgyn dlʾ dylhwn.92 While gentile gods fought amongst themselves and murdered 
other family members, the Christians lʾbʾ wlʾmʾ myqryn. wlʾylyn dqrybyn lhwn mṭʾbyn.93 
Aristides repeatedly emphasises their humility
94
 and charity;
95
 there is no explicit contrast 
drawn with gentile ethics by these virtues, but it is once again clear that they live in this way 
because pqd ʾnwn mryʾ ʾlhhwn.96 Aristides’ attempts at conversion, so clear in the attack on 
gentile morality, are evident here, too. The Christians live in this admirable manner not 
simply because they have been commanded, but because they will be rewarded: mlyhwn dyn 
wpwqdnyhwn ʾw mlkʾ. wšwbhrʾ dpwlḥnhwn. wswky ʾgrʾ dpwrʽnhwn: ʾyk swʽrnh dḥd ḥd 
mnhwn: dmskyn lh bʽlmʾ ʾḥrnʾ.97 Admittedly, Aristides does not talk explicitly about 
judgement which awaits the unrighteous, but here the reward of the Christians is surely 
intended to stand in contrast to the stumbling and ignorance of gentile life. 
                                                 
90
 Aristides 23.4: ‘do not commit adultery and do not fornicate’. 
91
 Ibid. 24.1. 
92
 Ibid. 23.4: ‘do not conceal a deposit (or something held in trust); they do not covet that which is not theirs’. 
93
 Ibid. 23.4: ‘honour their father and mother, and do good to those who are their neighbours’. 
94
 Ibid. 24.3. 
95
 Ibid. 24.3,4,5, 25.6. 
96
 Ibid. 25.1: ‘the Lord their God commanded them’. 
97
 Ibid. 26.2: ‘their words and commandments, o King, and the glory of their labours and the expectation of the 
reward of repayment, according to the deeds of each one of them, which they expect in another world’. See 
also 24.1. Pouderon and Pierre suggested that Aristides may have been converted because of the attraction of 
the Christian moral lifestyle, and that this would explain the prominence of morality in the text (2003:70). 
This is a particularly tempting suggestion, and would explain why there is less emphasis on the saving work 
of Christ. Cf. Justin 2 Apol. 12.1. However, Pouderon and Pierre also observed that a large part of the 
theological justification for conversion, which appears in the Greek of Barlaam and Josaphat (15.1-2), is 
absent from the Syriac (2003:382-5). If this passage was part of the original apology, then the Syriac 
translator has omitted it to emphasise his moral focus at the expense of faith and grace; for more on the 
relationship between the Syriac translation and the text of Barlaam and Josaphat, see above, 1.4.1.  
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Conversion is not the sole aim of this section, however. This becomes clear in the 
very final section, when Aristides writes: nšttqwn mkyl lšnywhn dmmllyn sryqwtʾ wʽšqy 
lkrsṭyn’. wnmllwn mkyl šrrʾ.98 This is apologetic in its true sense, intended to defend against 
accusations of immorality. In the concluding part of this thesis, I shall address the reasons for 
Christian persecution, but one possibility, raised by Sherwin-White, is that the Christians 
suffered because of their perceived immoralitites, or flagitia, most prominently incest and 
cannibalism (prompted by a misunderstanding of the Lord’s Supper and the Christian practice 
of calling one another brother and sister).
99
 This may provide evidence for Sherwin-White’s 
theory, insofar as the Syriac translator of Aristides felt it necessary to justify the moral 
standard of Christian practice. The length of the apologetic in this section might suggest that 
this is a key goal of Aristides; however, in the vast majority of cases, as demonstrated above, 
Christian conduct is explicitly contrasted with that of the gentiles, suggesting that true 
apologetic remains a less important aim than conversion.
100
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
98
 Aristides 27.6-28.1: ‘now let the tongues of those speaking emptiness who slander the Christians be silenced, 
and let them now speak the truth’. Pouderon and Pierre argued that, in fact, this entire section should not be 
considered “une exhortation à la conversion” but “un appel à la tolerance” (2003:39 -5).  
99
 Sherwin-White 1964:23-5; Beard, North and Price suggested alternative reasons for the charges: namely that 
heretical cults actually practiced incest and cannibalism, or that they were rhetorical exaggerations familiar 
to the presentation of any barbarian group (1998a:226). It is possible that the references to incest (27.2) are 
an attempt to divert just such accusations away from the Christians; see below (5.3.1) for further discussion. 
100
 As argued above, the two are clearly not mutually exclusive, however. Palmer highlighted the same approach 
in the second-century apologist Theophilius (1983:250). 
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4.5.2 Tatian 
Tatian, too, is far more concerned with the morality of man than of the gods. His 
Address is specifically written as an answer to Greek philosophy with its moral concerns. He 
describes how he sought out wisdom, and experimented with different cults, but was so 
appalled at the immorality he experienced in some of them that he immediately abandoned 
them in favour of Christianity.
101
 He immediately begins with a fierce attack on the moral 
corruption of famous Greek philosophers. Diogenes, he says, was greedy and died of over-
eating raw octopus;
102
 Aristippus       φ   δ                                  103 Plato 
was a glutton;
104 Aristotle              ῇ                        δ             ἷ           
          , λ        δ       λ    δ                            λ      .105 I shall deal 
with Tatian’s attacks on philosophy itself later in the chapter; however, it is very clear that 
these codes lead one away from, rather than towards, an upright life.
106
 Surprisingly, 
however, he does not attack individual areas of morality in any great length: only greed is 
particularly targeted.
107
 Tatian’s main argument in this respect is that the moral values of 
gentiles are revealed by those whom they honour: in honouring Polyneices and Eteocles, for 
example, they demonstrate their high regard for fratricide.
108
 Similarly, by honouring 
‘debauched’ poets like Sappho, they honour lust and sexual immorality.109 Unlike the Syriac 
translator of Aristides, however, who attacked gentile immorality (with no distinction 
between barbarian and Greek, such as we find elsewhere in the text), Tatian acknowledges 
                                                 
101
 Tatian Or. 29.1. He specifically identifies cults led by   δ                     (‘effeminate associates’), 
presumably the rites of Cybele, and those involving unnecessary ritual slaughter. 
102
 Ibid. 2.1. 
103
 Ibid. 2.1: ‘walking round in a purple cloak, debauched himself most respectably’. 
104
 Ibid. 2.1. 
105
 Ibid. 2.1-2: ‘having stupidly established a limit to foresight and defined happiness as those things which he 
enjoyed, used to flatter that wild lad Alexander in a most uneducated manner’. 
106
 There are exceptions: he acknowledges Socrates as one of the few good men (3.2). 
107
 He argues that greed is needless, since everyone is equal in death (11.1-2). Tatian was later accused of 
extreme asceticism, but such tendencies are scarcely noticeable in the Address (Hunt 2003:64).  
108
 Tatian Or. 34.1.  
109
 Ibid. 33.2. 
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that there are different values and practices amongst different peoples:                 
 λλ     φ                                 ,   λλ      δ                         δ     
                                δ                β  β     δ       ,           δ      
               ,    δ      λ               φ  β δ                     
          .110 It does not appear, however, that one group is any less prone to vice than any 
other: it is simply that they prefer different kinds of vice. 
Tatian does, however, agree with the Syriac translator of Aristides in emphasising the 
connection between morality and judgement. He argues that mankind was given free will so 
that their acts might be judged accordingly:            φ  λ   δ         λ       δ         
                ,   δ  δ                   δ                                    
                            β      β  λ   .111 Tatian elsewhere criticises gentile notions 
of judgement, by arguing that mankind are judged by God, and not by Minos and 
Rhadamanthus, the judges of souls in the Classical underworld.
112
 It is possible, he says, for 
the spirit to escape death, but this spirit belongs only to those who live uprightly.
113
 Although 
not stated explicitly, the consequences for the one who does not live uprightly are clear: such 
a life will lead to death. However, for Tatian, conversion is based on the recognition of the 
                                                 
110
 Ibid. 28.1: ‘for the Greeks think that intercourse with one’s mother is to be avoided, but such a practice is 
highly regarded among the Persian magi. Paedophilia is condemned by barbarians, but considered a 
privilege by the Romans, who try to gather herds of boys as if they were horses in pasture’. This is one of the 
only occasions in the text in which the Romans are identified as a distinct group from the Greeks, 
presumably to emphasise the sheer variety of immoral practice. Hawthorne has highlighted similarities 
between this passage and other gentile authors, such as Dio Chrysostom (Euboikos 133), and argued that 
Tatian is doing nothing more than “showing his sympathy for certain pagan writers” (196 :180  see also 
Puech 1903:42). 
111
 Tatian Or. 7.1-2: ‘this is so that the bad might be justly punished, since he has become wretched through his 
own fault, and the just man might be rightly praised for his good deeds, since in his free will he did not 
violate the will of God’. Unlike the apostle Paul, however, Tatian does not appear to embrace man’s total 
depravity: the soul retains             δ              (‘a spark of its own power, 13.2) which can be 
misdirected. See also Hawthorne 1964:173 and Hunt 2003:65. 
112
 Tatian Or. 6.1. Minos and Rhadamanthus also appear in Aristides’ work, but no mention is made of their 
judgements. 
113
 Ibid. 13.1,3. He also suggests that man’s failure to reach heaven is due, in part, to the malevolent rage of 
demons or gods (16.1): again, we see the prominence of the divine in their influence on mankind’s morality. 
Here, however, it is a little more direct than as a simple moral exemplar.  
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true God, rather than the changing of one’s lifestyle: whilst the two are connected, he 
emphasises the need for faith in God considerably more than Aristides.
114
 
Like the Syriac translator of Aristides, Tatian also focusses on the ethical practices of 
Christians in order to provide a defence against accusations of immorality. Here we see far 
more explicitly the charges of cannibalism and incest that were raised against Christians:    
βλ            ,     δ     λλ         δ       λ               λ                  
                                                   φ         δ             
     δ                            δ    λ   δ                                 δ     
        ,                          λ     ,                Μ              .115 Notice again 
the close correlation between true apologetic and hostile polemic in this passage. Tatian also 
seems to defend social practice, by affirming that they obey the laws, honour the emperor and 
serve (possibly in the army).
116
 The idea that the good conduct of the Christians will not only 
defend them against their accusers, but win converts in the process because of the attractive 
nature of their way of life is one which features in the New Testament;
117
 the way in which 
Tatian turns these accusations against the accusers suggests that he has a very similar aim in 
mind. 
 
 
 
                                                 
114
 “Tatian’s theory of salvation revolves entirely around the prophetic revelation of knowledge of God (or the 
truth) and the consequent bestowal of the divine spirit. His theory has nothing whatsoever to do with 
possession of a divine spark; without direct aid from the spirit, men incline down towards matter, 
presumably with the divine spark in tow” (Hunt 2003:71). 
115
 Ibid. 25.3: ‘what harm do we do to you, men of Greece? Why are you disgusted by those who follow the 
word of God as if they were the most defiled of all? There is no cannibalism amongst us - you educated folk 
created this false tale. According to you, however, Pelops became the gods’ meal, although he was loved by 
Poseidon; Kronos, too, consumed his sons and Zeus swallowed Metis’. 
116
 Ibid. 14.1. 
117
 1 Peter 2:12-15. See also Alexander 1999:39. 
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4.5.3 Meliton 
Let us now look at the third of our authors. On the surface, Meliton is extremely 
concerned with morality. At the very beginning of his text, he announces his intention: lʾ hwʾ 
bʽgl pšyq lmytyw lʾwrḥʾ tryṣtʾ lbr ʾnšʾ: ʾynʾ dnwgrʾ sgyʾʼ qdm ʾttḥd bṭwʽyy.118 ṭwʽyy (‘error’) 
and sklwtʾ (‘transgression’ or ‘foolishness’, and largely synonymous with ṭwʽyy), as well as 
ḥṭytʾ (‘sin’) and byštʼ (‘evil’), appear frequently in the text.119 This would appear to suggest 
that Meliton is advocating a change of lifestyle, rejecting the immoralities of the gentile 
world. However, it quickly becomes apparent that this is not the case, because Meliton gives 
clear definitions of what he means by ‘error’: mn twʽyy hw gyr hwyn hlyn klhyn byštʾ. ryšʾ 
dyn dṭwyy hdʾ hy. dkd lʾlhʾ ʾnš lʾ nhwʾ ydʽ: wḥlp ʾlhʾ lmdm dlʾ hwʾ ʾlhʾ nhwʾ sgd.120 The 
synonymous sklwtʾ is given a very similar definition: sklwtʾ dyn hdʾ hy dʾmr ʾnʾ. dʾn ʾnš 
nšbwq lmdm dšryrʾyt ʾytwhy: wnplwḥ lmdm dšryrʾyt lʾ ʾytwhy. ʾytwhy dyn mdm dšryrʾyt 
ʾytwhy wmtqrʾ ʾlhʾ. wšryrʾyt ʾytwhy. wkl mdm bḥylh qʾm.121 Both ṭwʽyy and sklwtʾ describe 
the worship of a false or non-existent god in place of the true God, rather than acting as terms 
of moral invective.
 
He also defines ḥṭytʾ (‘sin’): ʾyknʾ lʾ nštkḥwn bḥṭynʾ rbʾ: ʾylyn dmḥlpyn 
lʾlhʾ rbʾ bmlthwn: bhlyn ṣbwtʾ dbpwqdnʾ qymyn kmʾ dqymyn.122 Although he does not 
explicitly define byštʼ (‘evil’), Meliton gives us a clear indication as to what constitutes it: 
whdʾ hy byštʾ dʽlmʾ: dʾylyn dsgdyn wdḥlyn lmʾ dlʾ mrgš.123 The same idea is repeated again 
and again: rather that dealing with the way of life of the gentile, and criticising their greed, 
                                                 
118
 Meliton 1.2: ‘it is not easy to quickly bring a man to an upright way, the sort who was previously held for 
many years in error’. 
119
 Unsurprisingly so: as Halbertal and Margalit demonstrated, ‘error’ was understood to be the root of idolatry 
in philosophical approaches to the subject (1992a:2). 
120
 Meliton 8.4: ‘for from error arise all of those evils, but the chief of the errors is this, when a man does not 
know God, and instead of God worships that which is not God’ 
121
 Ibid. 1.6: ‘but the error which I speak of is this: when a man leaves whatever truly exists and worships 
whatever does not truly exist. But there is that which truly exists; it is called God, and he truly exists; 
everything exists in his strength’. 
122
 Ibid. 2.4: ‘how will they not be found in great sinfulness, those who exchange the great God in their words 
for those possessions which continue to exist according to the commandment as long as they exist?’. 
123
 Ibid. 3.4: ‘for such is the evil of the world of those who worship and fear that which does not feel’. 
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lust and so on, all of these concepts are essentially synonymous and attack the failure to 
recognise God, and to worship that which does not exist, namely the ṣlmʾ or image, in his 
place. For the Syriac translator of Aristides, in contrast, the sins of the gentiles by which they 
were condemned were immoral acts, particularly incest and adultery. For Meliton, these acts 
are not the issue: far more important is the rejection of the true God. Spiritual error, rather 
than a moral one, is the key element here. 
This is perhaps the strongest argument available for treating Meliton as a Christian 
author. It is clear that one’s deliverance depends not on one’s way of life but upon the 
recognition and worship of God: sm qdmyk kwlhyn ṣbwtʾ. wmḥwʾ lk. dʾn btr byštʾ tʾzl ttḥyb 
bʽbdʾ byšʾ. wʾn btr ṭybwtʾ. twbl mnh ṭbtʾ sgyʾtʾ. ʽm ḥyʾ dlʽlm dlʾ mytyn.124 Since ‘evil’ is the 
failure to recognise God, it is by this criterion that the gentile will be condemned, and not by 
their way of life (despite the emphasis on ‘evil deeds’). The use of ṭybwtʾ makes this even 
more explicit: althouth I have translated it ‘goodness’ because of the contrast with byštʼ 
(‘evil’), ṭybwtʾ is used in the Peshitta to render      , and could easily be translated as 
‘grace’.125 Although Jesus himself claims                  λ        λ                      
   φ           λ        λ    ,  λλ   λ      ,126 salvation in the New Testament is 
achieved by faith in God (and in his Son) and not by a morally upright life (represented by 
the Law). Paul makes this abundantly clear in the book of Romans: he begins by observing 
that          δ         δ   ἷ ,127 and that both Jew and Greek are condemned by the terms of 
the Law: δ                       δ                                      δ             
                                                 
124
 Ibid. 7.3: ‘He set before you all these possessions, and demonstrated to you that if you follow after evil, you 
will be condemned by your evil deeds, but if after good you will receive from Him many good things, with 
life for ever which does not fail’. 
125
 In keeping with Payne Smith (1903): she also suggests ‘kindness’, ‘benefit’ or ‘favour’. 
126
 Mt. 5:17: ‘do not think that I came to do away with the Law and the Prophets: I did not come to do away with 
them but to fulfil them’. 
127
 Rom. 3:10: ‘there is no-one upright, not one’, quoting from Ps. 14:3 and 53:3 (with some minor differences, 
Ps. 14:1-6 and 53:1-6 are identical). For the translation of δ       as ‘upright’, and particularly its use in the 
writings of Plato in this sense, see Annas 1981:11-13. 
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                  .128 In contrast, justification is given as a gift through faith in Christ,129 
which is set in contrast to the law: δ                               ,  λλ  δ         
       . λ                     δ                                     .130 Meliton, rather 
more than the Syriac translator of Aristides, emphasises the importance of faith as the basis of 
conversion: Aristides implies, rather than commands, the need for faith in God and not in 
false gods.
131
 Tatian, too, failed to emphasise grace: just as man chose wickedness of his own 
free will, so too is he able to reject it.
132
 For Meliton, one is judged on the basis of one’s faith 
in God (or lack thereof), and not one’s deeds: it is for this reason that morality is not 
emphasised in his work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
128
 Rom. 3:20: ‘for from the works of the law no human will be justified in His sight. For through the law comes 
knowledge of sin’. 
129
 Ibid. 3.24. 
130
 Ibid. 3.27-28: ‘through what law? That of works? No, but through a law of faith. For we consider that man is 
justified by faith, separately from a law of works’. Note, however, that Paul does not advocate ignoring the 
Law, but fulfilling it: it is simply that the means of doing so are based in faith and not in works (ibid. 3:28).  
131
 As Pouderon and Pierre observed, morality is the primary basis for avoiding the coming judgement 
(2003:71). However, it is clear that this morality is a consequence of conversion (see above: 5.3.1), and 
therefore conversion remains necessary. 
132
 Tatian Or. 7.1-2. As Hawthorne emphasised, this stance is almost the reverse of that seen in the Pauline 
epistles: for Paul, we are in need of Christ’s salvation because of our inability to choose good over evil (Eph. 
2:1-9). In Tatian, man is able to choose to reject wickedness and thus embrace God: the need for Jesus 
appears to become secondary to our need to choose God (1964:172-3). In contrast, Grant argued that 
Tatian’s doctrine relied most heavily on Paul (1954:64): elsewhere, this is certainly the case, but here 
Tatian’s emphasis on the need for man to choose God, and not vice versa, is at odds with the apostle. 
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4.6 Non-Christian sources on the morality of man 
 
We may take it for granted that our Christian sources exaggerate gentile immorality 
for rhetorical purposes, and that the practices of which they are accused are considerably less 
common than Tatian, Meliton and the Syriac translator of Aristides would have us believe. 
How does this Christian attitude compare with that of Near Eastern gentile authors?  
All three Christian authors, and Aristides in particular, emphasise the connection 
between salvation and morality.
133
 Is there any evidence in gentile sources for a connection 
between human immorality and divine retribution? We have already seen from Plato’s 
Republic a concern that the gods are represented as just, and particularly that the life of a just 
and virtuous man brings reward from the gods:        δ                      λ      ὃ     
                λ  δ                          δ                     δ               
              .134 It is not entirely clear what Plato means that men will not be neglected: 
however, given the discussion in Books 2 and 3 of the justice of the gods, it is very likely to 
imply that the gods do not allow undeserved suffering to occur to the righteous. This theme is 
repeated: Plato emphasises the blessings (again, however, unspecified, but probably referring 
to peace and self-sufficiency) which the gods bestow on the righteous.
135
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
133
 Salvation, or        , in a gentile context, was discussed in the last chapter; here I adopt those conclusions, 
and regard it as well-being in this life, with the possibility of well-being after death: in no way should it be 
regarded as deliverance or resurrection in the way that Aristides, Meliton and Tatian mean it. 
134
 Pl. Resp. 613a-b: ‘he will never be abandoned by the gods, the one who wishes and is eager to become 
upright, and to become like God by the pursuit of goodness (as far as it is in man’s power)’. For the power of 
philosophy to make one like the gods, see below, 5.5.3. 
135
 Ibid. 612c, 613b.  
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4.6.1 Lucian 
Lucian appears to display a particularly ambiguous attitude towards the relationship 
between morality and punishment. In discussing the origin of the temple at Hierapolis, he is 
told the story of  eucalion:         δ                      δ              β             
                             ,                 φ λ                    δ            
                 ,          φ           λ     φ                          λλ    δ   
  δ δ         β        λ                               β                     λ         
  λλ      β ,    ὃ        δ                        λ    ,      λ    δ         
          λ                δ          β  λ                   β          .136 The episode 
reveals an understanding that the gods punish the immoral and reward the good man. Again, 
however, we must remember that Lucian is here following a Herodotean model, by giving a 
‘Greek’ account followed by the local tradition. Despite this, however, Lightfoot notes that 
the whole passage is “very un-Greek”,137 and has more in common with the story in Genesis 
6, which might allow us to conclude that Lucian is here relying less on Herodotus for his 
interpretation; it is possible, therefore, that this passage reflects a little of Lucian’s own 
perspective. 
However, we are forced to question the role that this story, and its implications, has 
within religious life at the temple. The answer, it seems, is very little; Lucian does not rely on 
the story for anything but its aetiological significance. He is clearly treating it as a myth, even 
insofar as it deals primarily with man rather than the gods. Nevertheless, a second story with 
                                                 
136
 Luc. Syr. D. 12: ‘of those first men, it is said that they were great sinners and did wrongful deeds, for they 
did not abide by oaths, nor welcome foreigners, nor receive suppliants, and in requital for this the great 
calamity overtook them. The earth gave forth a great flood: there were torrents of rain, the rivers flowed 
down to the sea in spate and the sea rose up until everything became water and all people perished. 
Deucalion was the only human being to survive to the next generation because of his good counsel and 
piety’ (tr. Lightfoot). Lightfoot linked this passage to the story of Nebo and Simi in Meliton (4.6): for the 
relationship, see Lightfoot 2003:336-8. 
137
 Ibid:339. 
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a heavily moral leaning is told of the founding of the cult, of Combabos and Stratonice, wife 
of the king.
138
 Stratonice attempts to sleep with Combabos, who has been sent to escort her, 
and, upon being rejected, she reports to the king that Combabos attempted to rape her. 
Combabos is able to prove his innocence on the grounds that he had himself castrated before 
the journey began, and his genitals placed in storage. Here we see a clear overlap between a 
story with moral implications and cult practice (namely, the origin of the galli). However, 
while Lucian does not approve of the attempted adultery, that is clearly not the focus of the 
story. Rather, it serves to explain the origin of an unusual cult feature.
139
 In neither of these 
instances, then, can we say that immorality is explicitly connected with cult practice, or with 
the divine. 
Some of Lucian’s other works, however, reveal a greater concern with the relationship 
between immorality and divine punishment. This is particularly clear in his Saturnalia. In a 
conversation with Kronos¸ his priest Kronosolon convinces the god to act against the rich and 
greedy, who are abusing the poor.
140
 Kronos agrees, and writes to the rich, rebuking them for 
their treatment of the poor. The rich respond, claiming that Zeus takes no notice of the 
complaints of the poor (and therefore Kronos should leave them alone).
141
 A complaint 
frequently found in Lucian’s work is that the guilty do not suffer, and the good do not receive 
the blessings to which they should be entitled. For example, Lucian has Timon suggesting 
that the wicked do not need to fear Zeus’ thunderbolt, and accuses the god of being blind and 
deaf to wickedness.
142
 The same point is made by the philosopher Damis,
143
 to which his 
                                                 
138
 Luc. Syr. D.19-25. 
139
 For fuller discussion of this passage, and particularly its Herodotean parallels, see Lightfoot 2003:384-411. 
140
 The conversation, and the dialogue with the rich that results, is found in Sat. 26-36. 
141
 Luc. Sat. 36. 
142
 Luc. Tim. 2. Timon also suggests that the fact that Zeus fails to punish the guilty or reward the innocent is 
evidence that he is either sleeping or dead (ibid. 6). Chaniotis questioned how prevalent this attitude might 
be: “neither the disbelief nor the resignation of alert observers of human society uprooted the idea that the 
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opponent Timocles responds that         ,                          ,144 presumably 
referring to punishment in the afterlife. Equally, however, there are some suggestions that 
wickedness is punished, either in this life or the next. The tyrant Megapenthes descends to the 
underworld to be judged by Rhadamanthus, who explains that a man’s wickedness leaves 
scars which enable him to be judged:                                              β   , 
     ἕ              φ                               φ    .145 The philosopher Cyniscus 
has cleansed his scars, and is therefore permitted to travel to the Isle of the Blest. For those 
with considerable scarring, however, such as Megapenthes, torment awaits.
146
 During the 
author’s fictional journey to the Isle of the Blest in True Account, he encounters all the gods 
except for the lesser Ajax, who is being punished in the place of the wicked.
147
  
It also appears that the guilty can be punished in this life, in keeping with the more 
immediate definition of         discussed above:148 during the conversation with his priest 
in the Saturnalia, Kronos observes that the greedy and indulgent do suffer, in the form of 
hangovers, dropsy or early death.
149
 It is not at all clear how much credence Lucian gives 
these ideas; all of these observations come from texts written in satirical manner. However, 
                                                                                                                                                        
gods – as superior powers, and not as human constructs – did not neglect crime and wrongdoing” (200 :2). 
We shall see below, however, that the relationship between divine punishment and wrongdoing is far from 
clear. 
143
 Luc. Iupp. trag. 21.36.  
144
 Ibid. 36: ‘they hear (you), and one day they will unleash their vengeance’. Zeus himself makes the same 
point to the philosopher Cyniscus (Iupp. conf. 17). Chaniotis argued that this attitude was far from 
uncommon, and helped counter the accusations we see here and elsewhere in Lucian: “faith that divine 
punishment awaits him (sc. the evildoer) in a life after death reduced the frustration of the just” (200 :2). 
See also Sourvinou-Inwood: from the very earliest testimonies, the depiction of the fate of the wicked 
“furnished a paradigm on which was modelled the punishment in the afterlife of ordinary impious and unjust 
people” (1995:70). 
145
 Luc. Cat. 24: ‘as many wicked deeds as any one of you commits during his life, for each one he carries an 
invisible mark on his soul’.  
146
 Ibid. 28. 
147
 Luc. Ver. hist. 2.17. His crime varies, from dragging a suppliant from Athena’s temple to the rape of 
Cassandra. 
148
 Above, 3.3. 
149
 Luc. Sat. 28. 
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such satire would lose its force if it did not engage with ideas that were commonly accepted, 
or at least commonly known. 
 
4.6.2 Apuleius 
The relationship between an upright life and a blessed existence after death is also 
apparent in Apuleius’ Metamorphoses. In return for delivering Lucius’ salvation, Isis 
commands: plane memineris et penita mente conditum semper tenebis mihi reliqua vitae tuae 
curricula ad usque terminus ultimi spiritus vadata. nec iniurium, cuius beneficio redieris ad 
homines, ei totum debere quod vives.
150
 Quite what it means that Lucius’ life should be 
pledged to Isis is unclear: however, it appears to be closely connected with obedience to Isis 
and her commands,
151
 and almost certainly suggests that Lucius is to serve her as a priest. 
These commands vary in form; however, it is clear that Lucius’ salus in this life and his 
blessed existence in the next depend, at least in part, upon his moral uprightness, and in 
particular his celibacy: quodsi sedulis obsequiis et religiosis ministeriis et tenacibus 
castimoniis numeri nostrum promueris, scies ultra statuta fato tum spatia vitam quoque tibi 
prorogare mihi tantum licere;
152
 Lucius later reveals that he is hesitant to be initiated because 
of the strenuous rules of abstinence and celibacy.
153
 The consequences if Lucius fails to 
adhere to these rules of celibacy are not made clear, for this marks the end of Isis’ speech, but 
                                                 
150
 Apul. Met. 11.6: ‘you should clearly remember and always hold hidden deep in your mind that the remaining 
path of your life, up to the final passage of your breath, is mine. Nor is it unjust if you owe the entirely of 
your life to the one by whose kindness you return to the world of men’. See Gwyn Griffiths 1975:163-4. 
151
 Ibid.11.5: ergo igitur imperiis istis meis animum intende sollicitum (‘so, therefore, pay careful attention to 
these commands of mine’. 
152
 Ibid. 11.6: ‘if, by wholehearted obedience, dedicated service and persevering celibacy you earn our divine 
blessing, you will know that I alone am able to prolong the span of your life beyond that determined by 
Fate’. 
153
 Ibid. 11.19: at ego quamquam cupienti voluntate praeditus, tamen religiosa formidine retardabar, quod enim 
sedulo percontaveram difficile religionis obsequium et castimoniorum abstinentiam satis arduam, cautoque 
circumspectu vitam, quae multis casibus subiacet, esse muniendam (‘although I was eager and willing, I was 
hindered by a reverent fear, because I found through diligent enquiries that the observance of her cult was 
difficult, that chaste abstinence was extremely difficult, and that life, which was subject to so many 
misfortunes, needed to be fortified by careful circumspection’). 
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one may safely assume that the promised blessings – notably an extension of one’s life in this 
world, and a more blessed existence in the next – will be withheld if he does not keep to his 
end of the bargain. Later in the text, worshippers marvel at Lucius’ return to human form: 
felix hercule et ter beatus, qui vitae scilicet praecedentis innocentia fideque meruerit tam 
praeclarum de caelo patrocinium, ut renatus quodam modo statim sacrorum obsequio 
desponderetur.
154
 This indicates a clear expectation that an upright, innocent life will be 
rewarded. Again, however, these rewards appear in the form of         defined above: there 
is no eschatological significance to these blessings. 
 
4.6.4 Philo of Byblos 
Unfortunately, Philo of Byblos has little to offer to this debate, or, at least, as far as 
we know from the fragments preserved in Eusebius. In Philo’s account, man exists as the 
beneficiary of the gods’ good works, and as the one who bestows divinity upon the deity as a 
reward. The morality of man therefore plays no part in the text. 
 
4.7 Immorality or impiety? 
The situation is complicated, however, by the relationship between moral and 
religious purity. Polybius narrates the story of the Macedonian general Dikaiarchus, who was 
in the habit of establishing altars to    β    (‘ungodliness’) and           (‘lawlessness’). 
His punishment was swift, and the hand of the divine was clear to see, to the delight of all.
155 
However, it is not clear which of    β    and           led to Dikaiarchus’ downfall: was 
                                                 
154
 Ibid. 11.16: ‘by Hercules! He is fortunate and blessed three times over, who, by the preeminent innocence 
and trustworthiness of his life has deserved such a distinguished favour from heaven, that he is reborn after a 
fashion, and is immediately pledged to the obedience of the rights’. Gwyn Griffiths observed that applying 
the adjective innocentia to Lucius’ fides is rather striking, given his conduct throughout the book, beginning 
with the curiosity which caused his transformation; Gwyn Griffiths further suggested that this might either 
refer to his conduct before the transformation, or to the expectation of cleansing and forgiveness (1975:275). 
155
 Polybius 15.54. For a fuller discussion of the story, see Meijer 1981:216. 
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he punished because of his impiety, or because he was immoral?
156
 Such a question is not 
incompatible with Jewish thought, at least: a number of Old Testament episodes reveal the 
wrath of God against incorrectly conducted ritual practice, rather than against the immoral.
157
 
 
4.7.1 Confession inscriptions
158
 
In the previous chapter, it was seen that the ‘confession inscriptions’ from Phrygia 
and Lydia expressed a popular belief in a relationship between one’s conduct and divine 
wrath, which followed a set pattern: the conduct of the believer angered the god(s), who 
expressed this anger by punishing the culprit (although sometimes the nature of crime and 
punishment was left unclear). The culprit appeased the anger of the gods through some form 
of sacrifice, and established a stele as testimony to the power of the divine.
159
 At times, 
however, it is not clear whether the crime committed is moral or cultic one. For example:  
         ,   (   )         β  .      1 
         φ          
            ,          
            (Μ    )     λ         - 
δ         λ                        5 
   δ                     , ἃ   
                                                 
156 Not everyone recognised an abrupt distinction: Marcus Aurelius observed that    δ        β   (‘injustice is 
impiety’, Med. 9.1) on the grounds that ill-treating other human beings contradicted the supreme law of 
Nature, and was therefore impiety against this most venerable deity.  
157
 Such as the sons of Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, in Lev. 10:1-2; Nb. 20:8-12, in which Moses and Aaron are 
punished for striking the rock of Meribah with the staff rather than waving at it, shows the consequences of 
failure to obey God’s commands to the letter. Geller compared such instances to the ira deum, although he 
does not attribute it to malice on the part of YHWH (2000:279-80). 
158
 For more on the nature of these inscriptions, see above, 3.2.2.1. 
159
 For more on this pattern, and the terminology of the inscriptions, see Pleket 1981. Note that appeasing the 
gods did not necessarily equate to healing: in some instances, the offender was already dead. In addition, 
despite the fact that blindness was was often interpreted as a sign of divine vengeance (Versnel 1981:35; 
Schnabel 2003:163), “none of the confession inscriptions that refer to an eye ailment, presumably often 
blindness, mention healing after the forgiveness of sins” (ibid:176). Presumably the appeasement simply 
meant that no future repercussions were to be expected, even if the punishment already inflicted remained 
permanent. See also Rostad 2002:146. 
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       .              ῇ   - 
δ          λ     ,  ῇ    φ   ,  ῇ   - 
       ῇ       δ           λ   - 
                                   β -    10 
    ],    δ    ,   φ λ   .          
          λλ  δ  λ                    
                      ῇ          ῇ  
     λ               ,              .  ῇ  
                                      15 
     λ                   ,        ,      - 
    ,   (   )            ,    (  )          (    )        
                    ,    (   )   .          λ      
             δ  ,                          ,  
    δ    λ                                -  20 
λ    φ                              .  
                        λ        λ      - 
                         λλ      ,  
                           φ λ    ,    φ    
        δ     δ                            -  25 
         .160 
                                                 
160
 BIWK 5 (235/6 AD): 
In the year 320, in the month of Panemos. 
Sinner Because I have been enlightened by the gods, by Zeus and the great (Men) Artemidorus. 
God  I have punished Theodorus on his eyes because of the sins which he has committed. 
Sinner I committed intercourse with Trophime, the slave of Happlokomas, the wife of Eutyches, in 
the praetorium [for which see Petzl 1994:8-9]. 
God  He took away the first sin with a sheep, a partridge and a mole. 
Sinner The second sin: when I was a slave of the gods of Nonnos, I committed intercourse with the 
  flutegirl Ariagne. 
God  He took away the second sin with a piglet and a tuna. 
Sinner The third sin:  I committed intercourse with the flutegirl Aretousa. 
God He took away the third sin with a chicken, a sparrow and a pigeon, a kypros of grain, a 
prochus of wine, and a kypros of clean wheat for the priests. 
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This text clearly highlights the pattern discussed above: the crime, followed by the anger of 
the god
161
 (expressed through the blinding of the culprit) and then the necessary appeasement, 
are all emphasised. At first glance, the crimes might appear to be moral ones: the culprit, 
Theodorus, sleeps with three separate women.
162
 However, in the first instance, the issue 
appears to be that this took place in an area with sacred significance (    λ      ). In the 
second and third instances, the women involved are both flutegirls (       λ  ), and 
Theodorus a servant of the god himself (δ  λ              ).163 It is highly likely that these 
two women served a religious function, probably within the temple; it is even possible that 
the intercourse took place within the sacred place, as was the case with the first instance. The 
fact that at least two of the women had a religious function makes it clear that the god’s anger 
is not directed at Theodorus’ philandering, but at his pollution of laws of ritual purity. There 
are a few examples where the offence may be a moral one (for example, non-payment of 
debts,
164
 disrespecting one’s mother,165 cheating orphans,166 or theft167). However, the vast 
                                                                                                                                                        
Sinner I called upon Zeus as an advisor [possibly the priest of Men Artemidorus: see Schnabel 
2003:165]. 
God See! I blinded him on account of his sins. But he has appeased the gods: he established the 
stele and took away his sins. Asked by the council, I answer that I am merciful, if he 
establishes my stele on the day I commanded. Open the prison: I release the convict after one 
year and ten months. 
161
 Petzl argued that “es spricht nur ein Gott, m glicherwise  eus” (199 :9). Given that it is the help specifically 
of Zeus that is asked for, this is the most likely interpretation, although Schnabel suggested that it might be 
Men Artemidorus who is   λ    (‘merciful’) in line 22. 
162
 This inscription follows the same patterns as collections of ‘serial stelae’, which appear to demonstrate a 
continuing cycle of offence, punishment, appeasement and restoration: “Man erhält dadurch immerhin auch 
einen Eindruck von der Intensität und Beharrlichkeit, mit der diese einfache Landbevölkerung sich unter 
Umständed von ihren strengen Gottheiten verfolgt fühlte” (Hermann and Varinlioğlu 198 :9). Leaving aside 
the condescension of these ‘simple villagers’, we see a pattern which clearly expresses a firm belief in the 
continuing power, and therefore ability to punish, of the god in question. See also Schnabel 2003:165 and 
Petzl 1994:28. 
163
 See also Petzl 1994:10. Schnabel understood        λ   as ‘single’, and therefore ‘unmarried’ (2003:172), 
but there is no evidence to prefer this over the more usual translation. 
164
 BIWK 17-18; SEG 34.1212-1213. 
165
 BIWK 47. 
166
 BIWK 35; TAM 5.1.231. 
167
 Theft could include money (BIWK 46) or animals from the sanctuary (BIWK 68). Drew-Bear argued that in 
these cases, the punishment “was directed not against the actual offences, themselves relatively minor, but 
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majority of inscriptions (at least, where the offence is recorded) are in some way connected to 
cult practice: some, like Theodorus, sleep with temple attendants, while others fail to turn up 
to temple duty,
168
 or illegally graze their flocks on temple property.
169
 
In places, it is even more explicit that the punishment was directed at impiety and not 
immorality: 
                      ]    1 
                    
β             δ   ,  
   λ               - 
                        5   
 φ  λ    .          
  λ              - 
   .170 
There may be a question mark as to whether the failure to keep his word indicates a moral 
failing on Diogenes’ part; however, the major concern appears to be the failure to fulfil the 
vowed offering.
171
 The strictness of these purity rules is clearly demanding:  
                    λ-  1 
λ               δ       - 
  β β                   - 
                                                                                                                                                        
rather against the perjury in the name of the divinity which followed (sc. in denying responsibility)” 
(1976:265); cf. Cameron 1939:158. It is clear, then, that even in cases such as theft, which appear strictly 
‘moral’ issues, there may be an element of impiety involved to which the god primarily objected. Rives, in 
contrast, argued that these stelae strongly support a connection between morality and the gods (2007:62), 
but, as shown, the majority of them relate to cult practice in some manner: “it is offence against the deity 
that causes the punishment, not stealth, fraud or any other conflicts between humans in itself. The gods will 
not intervene in human conflicts unless they are urged to do so by a curse or perjury” (Rostad 2002:161). 
168
 BIWK 16; SEG 33.1210. 
169
 BIWK 7. 
170
 BIWK 45: ‘because Diogenes vowed a cow to Zeus Peizenos but did not give it, his daughter Tatiane was 
punished with blindness. But the god has been appeased, and this [stele] has been established’. Blindness, as 
in the case of Theodorus, quoted above, was often interpreted as a sign of divine vengeance (Versnel 
1981:35; Schnabel 2003:163). 
171
 The importance of votive offerings was discussed in the previous chapter: see above, 3.3.2. 
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                  δ   ,  
  λ       δ       λ -  5 
                     λ - 
    ,              λ   λ]- 
    .172 
In the previous two instances, there may be a question of a moral issue; here, however, there 
is no such question. Antonia’s only crime is wearing incorrect clothing into the cult site.173 
The anger of the gods is unambiguously prompted by her impiety. What is clear from all 
three of these inscriptions is that the relationship between impiety and divine anger was a 
crucial part of private religious life in Lydia and Phrygia; we cannot imagine, particularly in 
Antonia’s inscription, that they were simply established in response to social pressures.174 
Inscriptions from Hatra provide an additional perspective on these issues. Five 
separate inscriptions have been found referring to capital punishment for a variety of 
offences,
175
 such as theft (including the theft of building tools from a temple site), and temple 
musicians abandoning their position. At times, the offence is clearly an issue directly 
affecting the deity (such as the the theft of tools from Bar-Maren’s building site), but 
elsewhere it appears to have little to do with the god:  
 
 
                                                 
172
 BIWK 43: ‘I, Antonia, daughter of Antonius, [established this stele] to the god Apollo Bozenos, because I 
entered into his sanctuary wearing unclean clothing. I was punished, and then I confessed and lifted up 
praises, because I was made whole again’.  
173
 “Antonia hatte in unreinem Gewand die heilige Stätte betreten” (Petzl 1994:53).  
174
 Although Schnabel suggested that pressure from the community or priest may have played a part, and in 
particular may explain why the name of the offender often appears to have been added later (2003:165). 
Pleket discussed in detail the motivation of worshippers: “the subjection of the worshipper is suitably 
attended by the feeling that he is always running the risk of committing (material and/or spiritual) sins and 
that the almighty god and/or goddess of his village will then mete out suitable punishments (in the shape of 
illness or worse)” (1981:178). 
175
 The inscriptions in question are H281, H336, H342, H343, H344. 
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byrh knwn d4 x 100 + 20 + 20 + 20 +1 + 1+ 1 bmlkʼ dy 
ʼlhʼ ʼṣṭbw šmšbrk rbytʼ 
wḥṭryʼ qšyšʼ wdrdqʼ wʻrbyʼ 
klhwn wkwl dy ʻmr bḥṭrʼ whkyn psq<w> 
dy kwl dlgnwb lgw mn mlʼ hdyn 
wlgw mn šwrʼ bryʼ ʼyn gbrʼ 
hw gwyʼ lqṭyl bmwtʼ dy 
ʼhʼ wʼ gbrʼ hw bryʼ 
lrgym.
176
 
Despite the fact that the offence is apparently not a religious one, action is taken ‘on the 
advice of the gods’. Similarly, in the case of the disappearing musicians, Nergal is attributed 
a leading role in the institution of the inscription.
177
 In this latter instance, it would be 
plausible to suggest that Nergal is taking a proprietary interest, except that the temple slaves 
in question actually belong to Maren, Marten and Bar-Maren. Do these inscriptions, then, 
suggest that the gods take a more active interest in the moral conduct of the inhabitants of 
Hatra than we have seen elsewhere? 
This is unlikely. A more plausible solution may be sought in the fact that, as Kaizer 
observed, the inscriptions distinguish between those inside and those outside Hatra:
178
 in the 
case of the inscription quoted above, this affected the punishment which was to be inflicted 
upon them. It may well be that these inscriptions were a way of forming and defining Hatrene 
civic identity. This suggestion is reinforced when once considers the gods who are named in 
                                                 
176
 H3 3: “in the month of Kanun of  63, on the advice of the gods, Shamashbarak the administrator and the 
Hatrans old and young and the inhabitants of ʻArab, all of them, and all who live in Hatra agreed and thus 
decided, that anyone who steals within this entrance-ramp and within the outer wall, if he is a native he will 
be killed by the death of the gods and if he is an outsider he will be stoned” (tr. Healey). H336 is almost 
identical. The ‘death of the gods’ as a means of execution is unclear: as Kaizer observed, the only thing we 
can say with any confidence is that it is not stoning, since stoning is listed as a separate punishment 
(2010:149); it also appears to be reserved for inhabitants of Hatra. 
177
 H342.  
178
 Kaizer 2006a:152. 
 217 
 
the inscriptions: Nergal, who is often associated with Herakles as the “pre-eminent 
protector”,179 and the divine family of Maren, Marten and Bar-Maren. In the latter case, as 
Kaizer observed, “he fact that the triad appears not only in a legal text which was set up in the 
central temenos, but also in one which was erected in one of the city gates, confirms its 
importance for the city as a whole”.180 It may well be, then, that the appearance of the gods in 
these inscriptions has more to do with the creation of a communal identity at Hatra than the 
perception that the gods punished moral wrong-doing.  
There are serious questions, however, as to how far we should consider these 
confession inscriptions as characteristic of religious life in the wider Graeco-Roman world. 
Pleket argued that the awareness of sin to which the Lydian and Phrygian inscriptions attest is 
exclusive to that area, and should be regarded as a “contribution of Oriental religiosity”:181 he 
highlighted the fact that the inscriptions found at the Asklepion at Epidauros rarely referred to 
sickness as a divine punishment,
182
 and that the mechanism of confession and reconciliation 
is not prominent in these inscriptions.
183
 Dandamayev pointed out the scarcity of 
documentary evidence for the punishment of religious crimes in the Roman Near East, and 
argued that this was symptomatic of the lack of moral focus to be found in polytheistic 
religion;
184
 as a result, he argued that it was questionable whether religious crimes even 
existed or were punishable.
185
 We have seen at Hatra that such crimes did exist,
186
 but even in 
                                                 
179
 Ibid. 146. 
180
 Ibid. 146. 
181
 Pleket 1981:156. 
182
 Ibid. 180: Asklepios, in these inscriptions, is “is very mild and remains far removed from the tough, 
punishing gods of Asia Minor”. 
183
 Pleket 1981:181. 
184
 Dandamayev 1996:44. 
185
 Similarly, MacMullen argued that most offences were against human, rather than divine, law (1981:58). 
186
 One might also consider the so-called ‘Sacred Laws’ of Palmyra, which cover offences such as theft from 
temples (PAT 0991) and the spilling of blood inside the sanctuary (PAT 1122), which once again imply 
cultic rather than moral legislation. However, as Kaizer observed, so scanty is the evidence that it is difficult 
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this instance it is not clear how significant a role the gods were understood to play in the 
punishment of the criminal. 
We find important hints as to the relationship between impiety and punishment in 
both Latin and Greek literature, which suggests that this relationship was widespread. In the 
case of Apuleius’ Lucius, his salus depends not solely upon his celibacy but upon his 
religiosis ministeriis. This command relates not to moral uprightness but to piety and ritual 
purity; it is even possible that the commandment to celibacy is also a matter of purity rather 
than morality.
187
 We see elsewhere that Isis’ commands (imperii) relate not necessarily to 
morality but to the correct manner of initiation,
188
 and Lucius is given specific ritual 
requirements (such as what food may or may not be eaten).
189
 Although there is, as we have 
seen, evidence linking immorality and punishment, there is considerably more to suggest a 
relationship between         and impiety and ungodliness. For the Christian authors, 
immorality and impiety are closely linked, because the commandments to moral uprightness 
are given directly by the divine. For the gentile, there may be a considerable gap between the 
two, because laws, whether written or not, are not bestowed by the divine (or, at least, not 
very often, as we have seen at Hatra).
190
 In discussing the ira deum in the previous chapter, it 
was observed that sacrifices must be made to avoid the wrath of the gods, and that this was 
                                                                                                                                                        
to come to any firm conclusions about the inscriptions as a group (2002:167). For fuller discussion, see 
ibid.167-177. 
187
 Compare, for example, the relationship between intercourse and imputity in Leviticus 15; for the relationship 
between sexuality and cult in both the Graeco-Roman world and in the Levitical code, see Harrington 
2001:190-201. In Apuleius’ account, however, there is no indication that this command is restricted to 
Lucius’ temple service, but it is to be applied to his life as a whole. As a result, there is probably a moral 
element to the command in addition to the concern for ritual purity. For discussion of the extent of 
commitment to Isis and similar cults, see Beard, North and Price 1998a:292ff; for some, temple service 
marked their primary (or indeed only) role (such as the castration of the Galli). 
188
 Apuleius Metamorphoses 11.19. 
189
 Ibid. 11.22, 23. 
190
 Cumont argued that this was a fundamental weakness of traditional Roman religious practice: that the just 
man would not be rewarded, and the immoral punished, was, in Cumont’s view, a fundamental factor behind 
the popularity of ‘mystery cults’ (1911:37). However, Cumont failed to sufficiently recognise a distinction 
between immorality and impiety. 
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commonly accepted: we may assume that the same is true of impiety. Impiety can cover 
many forms, and could range from reverence and sacrifice to the gods
191
 to ritual purity. For 
example, Plutarch criticises the ambiguous attitude of the Romans towards human sacrifice, 
after they killed and buried two Gauls and two Germans in the forum; however, this is 
presented not as a matter of immorality, as we might expect, but of impiety, because it 
belongs to the world of the gods.
192
 
 
4.7.2 Lucian 
We see in Lucian that there is a much greater concern with impiety than with 
immorality on a religious level. On the Syrian Goddess provides us with numerous cultic 
regulations applied to the priests. If they see a corpse, for example, they must purify 
themselves before entering the temple;
193
 there are also ritual laws for the offering and for the 
shaving of one’s head, clothing and so on.194 These are not moral restrictions, but relate to 
cultic purity: any infringement of them is considered an act of impiety, although Lucian does 
not elaborate as to the consequences. Lucian also demonstrates in his comic works that 
impiety is considered a serious offence. For instance, Hermes suggests that for men to hate 
one another is perfectly reasonable, but for them to hate the gods is unacceptable,
195
 which 
suggests a clear distinction between immorality and impiety. It is clear from Lucian’s works 
that impiety could take many forms. In Philaris, it is decided not to return a statue offered as 
                                                 
191
 For more on this, see below, 5.2.5. 
192
 Plut. Mor. 283f. This is one of the few occasions on which Livy criticises the response of the decemviri to a 
prodigy, not because the act is immoral, but because the gods have failed to be placated (22.57.2-7; see 
Davies 2004:68). Beard, North and Price argued that such practices were characteristic of dark magic, as a 
“monstrous perversion of legitimate animal sacrifice” (1998a:23 ), which reinforces the impiety, rather than 
the immorality, of the act. The same distinction is apparent in Plutarch’s discussion of the punishment of 
Vestal Virgins for breaking their chastity rules (Plut. Mor. 285e-f). 
193
 Luc. Syr. D. 53. 
194
 Ibid.54-6. 
195
 Luc. Tim. 35. 
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a gift to the god, because this would cause considerable offence;
196
 during the conversation 
between Damis and Timocles mentioned above, Herakles and Poseidon decide to kill Damis 
for his impiety, expressed as atheism, until Zeus intervenes and rebukes them for being 
rash.
197
 Zeus himself takes offence at the insolence of the Epicureans, who denied the gods’ 
sovereignty and control, and determines to wipe them out.
198
 Another issue raised by Lucian 
is the desecration of the gods’ statues:199 it is clear that temple-looters did not always receive 
the punishment that was thought fit.
200
  
 
 
4.8 Excursus: the tripartite theology: religion, philosophy and ethics 
 
The key to understanding this issue may be found, once again, in Varro’s tripartite 
theology. I have already discussed the relationship between myth and cultic religion,
201
 and 
concluded that although the distinction may not be an absolute one, there is nevertheless 
some necessary separation between the two fields. In addition, it was seen in Plato’s 
arguments against poetry that the relationship between philosophy and myth is equally 
tenuous. This leaves us with the final relationship, that between cultic religion and 
philosophy. A brief analysis of this relationship may help to put into context the distinction 
between immorality and impiety highlighted above. The force of this distinction is 
immediately apparent in the works of numerous philosophers. Plato is particularly critical of 
certain forms of religious life;
202
 Epicurus did the same in order to remove mankind from 
                                                 
196
 Luc. Phil. 2.1-2. 
197
 Luc. Iupp. trag. 24. 
198
 Lucian Icar. 32-3. 
199
 For more on this practice, see above, 3.7.1.1. 
200
 The issue is raised in Luc. Iupp. conf.  9 and Iupp. trag. 19. 
201
 Above, 3.2.3.1.  
202
 Plato “demonstrated by unremittingly philosophical analysis the weaknesses of traditional notions of Greek 
piety, of the inherited myths about the gods and heroes, and of established views about the nature of the 
gods” (Most 2003:306). See also Hunt 2003:7 . However, this criticism is not necessarily intended to 
undermine religion itself, but rather to bring it onto a higher level (Meijer 1981:221). Meijer suggested that 
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slavish fear of the gods.
203
 Seneca, too, is particularly critical of traditional religion, with the 
mechanics of do ut des within sacrificial cult a particular target, and reinterpreted traditional 
prayers, which he regarded as base, to ask for sound mind and health.
204
 Not only are 
traditional prayers base, according to Seneca, but they are actively harmful: et si esse vis felix, 
deos ora, ne quid tibi ex his, quae optantur, eveniat. non sunt ista bona, quae in te isti volunt 
congeri; unum bonum est, quod beatae vitae causa et firmamentum est, sibi fidere.
205
 This is 
seemingly because our real needs are easily met by nature, and it is the lesser needs (those 
which we ask from the gods) that cause us distress.
206
 It is worth remembering that the 
distinction between philosophy and religion only holds for civic religious life: as Most 
observed, ancient philosophers tended not to object to religion itself, but were more 
concerned with the form this took, and concerned themselves with determining a form of 
religion which would hold up to rational examination.
207
 Nor did all philosophers reject 
traditional religion in such vitriolic terms: Marcus Aurelius frequently exhorts himself to 
                                                                                                                                                        
Plato took prayer itself extremely seriously, although it does not necessarily follow, as he argued, that he had 
encountered a “profound devotional experience” (ibid. 2 0). 
203
 “For Epicurus, physics, which includes theology since the gods exist as part of nature, serves the function of 
freeing men from their fear of such false terrors as divine intervention (which does not exist) and death 
(which is nothing to us)” (ibid. 31 ). Piety and religiosity are not a problem for Epicurus: however, 
expressing these through sacrificial cult is, because this encourages unnecessary religious fear. 
204
 Seneca Ep. 10.4. See also ibid. 41.1. He elsewhere notes that the best way to worship the gods is not through 
sacrifice but by acknowledging first their existence, and then their majesty (ibid. 95.50). See also De ben. 
1.6.3 on the reinterpretation of traditional offerings. 
205
 Ibid. 31.2-3: ‘if you wish to be happy, pray to the gods that what they hope for you would not happen. They 
are not good things, which they wish to be bestowed upon you: there is one good, which is the cause and the 
foundation of a blessed life, which is to trust yourself’. He may be referring to magic, and particularly 
prayers for harm, rather than blessing: among these are so-called ‘revenge prayers’. These called upon the 
divine to exact retribution on a known, or, more commonly, unknown wrongdoer. Epicurus is said to have 
remarked that, if all man’s prayers were granted, mankind would be wiped from the face of the earth, such is 
the extent of their malice (Usener 1887:259, n.388). For a discussion of these harmful prayers, and the 
reasons behind them, see Versnel 1976,1981:19-23 and 1991:75-79. Although Burkert argued that “success 
and honour for one is usually inseparable from humiliation and destruction for another” (1985:73-4; cf. 
Versnel 1981:25), and that harm is therefore a part of most prayer, this is not the same as a prayer which 
focusses exclusively on the cursing of another. See also Chaniotis 2007:23. 
206
 Epictetus 4.10-11, 25.4. 
207
 Most 2003:306: “the fundamental tendency of the vast majority of ancient Greek and Roman philosophers is 
not at all to debunk religion, but to reinforce religiosity”. Goar argued that Cicero considered religion and 
morality indistinguishable (1978:54), but this is only true because Goar has failed to distinguish Cicero’s 
philosophical reflections and his assessment of cult: this is exactly the kind of distinction which I emphasise 
here and which must be made in this context. 
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worship the gods (although it is not clear what form this would take; elsewhere he suggests 
that the gods require nothing more of us than upright living),
208
 whilst Epictetus 
acknowledges the importance of thanking the gods for their gifts through sacrifice.
209
  
Seneca makes it clear that morality was one amongst several areas for reflection, 
amongst which action and practice were the key elements: philosophiae tres partes esse 
dixerunt et maximi et plurimi auctores: moralem, naturalem, rationalem. prima conponit 
animum. secunda rerum naturam scrutatur. tertia proprietates verborum exigit.
210
 This 
distinction is equally apparent in Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations: on a number of occasions he 
emphasises the dual importance of living well in respect to both God and man
211
 (that is, 
religion and ethics), but the fact that both are repeatedly emphasised strongly suggests that 
the two are not to be directly associated: morality, in Marcus Aurelius’ thought, functions 
parallel to religion, and whilst both are crucial, they do not appear to overlap.
212
 This 
becomes still more apparent if we look at the conduct of priesthoods: Plutarch emphasises 
that the restrictions placed on priests revolve around cultic purity and not around their moral 
                                                 
208
 M.Aur. Med. 2.5. 
209
 Epictetus 1.4.32. 
210
 Seneca Ep. 89.9: ‘the majority of authors, and the greatest ones, say that philosophy is divided into three 
parts: the moral, the physical and the rational. The first consists of the soul; the second considers the 
universe; the third examines the meanings of words’. Gill argued that this three-part curriculum was 
considered one of the defining features of the school (2003:37); Seneca notes that this separation is not 
universally accepted: the Peripatetics added the civic branch, whilst the Epicureans did away with the 
rational (ibid. 89.10-11). The same distinction between branches is found in Plutarch and attributed to 
Chrysippus (Moralia 1035a). Algra demonstrated that the contemplation of God belonged to the natural (or 
physical) branch because the Stoic notion of God was to be understood as the governing principle of the 
universe (2003:153). Seneca goes on to separate between three further areas of the moral branch: the 
speculative (which assigns a function and worth to everything), the impulsive, and the action (which brings 
one’s actions and impulses into harmony): this last is the culmination of moral philosophy (ibid. 89.14). For 
the importance of harmonising one’s words and actions see also ibid. 20.2 and Plut. Mor. 1033a-c (in which 
the Stoics are criticised for their failure to do exactly this). This division of the moral branch is also used by 
Epictetus, albeit in a slightly different form: the first branch is that of desires and aversions, whilst the 
impulsive branch focusses on controlling these. Gill argued that such typologies were subdivisions of ethics 
rather than a parallel to the tripartite division of philosophy itself (2003:43). See also Inwood 2003:3, Klauck 
2000:365 and Schofield 2003:254. 
211
 M.Aur. Med. 3.9, 5.32, 6.30, 7.31.  
212
 Although Ando argued that there was far more place for consideration of practical, ethical religio in one’s 
private life, and that this accounted, in part, for some of the tension between public and private religion 
(2008:106). However, this distinction is less clear than Ando claims: see above, 3.2.3.1. 
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uprightness,
213
 and we see the same concept in the writings of Valerius Maximus.
214
 This is 
in keeping with Lucian’s observation in On the Syrian Goddess, noted above, that the only 
rules of the temple were cultic, not ethical.  
Crucially, Plato demonstrates that morality not only does not, but cannot belong to the 
religious world based on sacrificial cult:    δ              ,  δ                           
 δ        .215 If morality were connected with religion, then we could commit sin and 
prosper with no consequences because we could simply appease the gods by offering them 
sacrifice. This is not to say that God does not punish wrong-doing: we saw above that Plato 
emphasised the distinction between correctional suffering (which is a good) and arbitrary 
suffering.
216
 However, this just retribution cannot be averted with sacrifice, and the idea that 
it could be is incompatible with Plato’s vision of the good man who aspires to virtue and to 
become godlike by being satisfied in his situation. 
Ware argued that Stoicism showed a “markedly increased religiosity”217 over other 
philosophical groups: “in relating moral progress to God, the Stoic view was markedly 
different from contemporary philosophical movements for whom moral development 
generally was regarded as a human achievement in which the divine played no appreciable 
                                                 
213
 Plut. Mor. 274a-e. See also the restrictions placed on the flamen dialis (289e-f). 
214
 He narrates the story of Quintus Sulpicius, whose apex slipped from his head during sacrifice, and as a result 
was stripped of office (Val.Max. 1.1.5); similarly, a number of different flamines  were removed from office 
because entrails had been taken to the altars of the gods parum curiose (‘with insufficient care’, 1.1.4). Ando 
began his 2008 work by quoting Val.Max. 1.1.1 (2008:2) and highlighted the importance which the passage, 
and Maximus’ work as a whole, placed on orthopraxy, or the correctness of ritual practice. See also Mueller 
2002 and Beard, North and Price 1998:32. 
215
 Pl. Resp. 365e-366a: ‘but if we believe in this, one should do wrong, and then sacrifice after the wrongs’. See 
Meijer 1981:249. See also Xen. An. 5.7.32:    δ    ,                                δ                   
   β   (‘how, by Zeus, are we to sacrifice to the gods while we continue to commit impious deeds?’). The 
emphasis on sacrifice suggests that         β  may have moral, as well as cultic, implications: the needs of 
piety have presumably been satisfied through the sacrifice. 
216
 Pl. Resp. 380d. To think that “the gods are determined to spite him and (he) can only protect himself with the 
utmost caution” is characteristic of δ    δ        or superstitio (Meijer 1981:259). See below, 5.2.5.1. 
217
 Ware 2008:268. See also Harrington 2001:188-90.  
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role”.218 He highlighted Seneca, Moral Epistle 41 as the clearest example of this. However, it 
is clear from other letters that this relates not to God in any common sense but to the divine 
as the rational soul.
219
 Ware himself admitted that Seneca’s perception of the divine as an 
internal, rational divine spirit clearly distinguished the Stoic from the role of the external, 
personal Holy Spirit in sanctification as found in Paul.
220
 Despite Ware’s claims, it is clear 
that this internal spirit is distinct from the understanding of the gods as found in civic 
religion, and belongs to philosophical reflection and practice.
221
 
The fact that ethical discussion clearly belongs to the field of philosophy and not of 
civic religion clearly explains the distinction between immorality and impiety discussed 
above. It also explains why Lucian’s On the Syrian Goddess, which is primarily concerned 
with ritual practice and its origins, contains so little ethical or moral discussion.
222
 None of 
our three Christian authors appear to acknowledge this distinction, and thus focus heavily on 
the morality (or lack of it) of their opponents: even Meliton, who largely ignores this area, 
does so because he is concerned primarily with spiritual error (and therefore grace), rather 
than because he recognises the separation of morality and religion. 
 
 
 
                                                 
218
 Ibid. 268. 
219
 Seneca Ep. 66.12, 73.16. 
220
 Ware 2008:278. 
221
 That is not to say that religious life had no place at all for reflection: I cannot entirely agree with Long, who 
argued that the “poverty of Roman religion as a context for ethics and spirituality” helps to explain the 
flourishing of philosophy (2003:186). As argued before, there may well have been space for this kind of 
thought in private cult. 
222
 Although we must also remember that On the Syrian Goddess is modelled on the writings of Herodotus. Is 
the absence of ethical discussion to be attributed to this stylistic imitation? Herodotus is not averse to ethical 
discussion in its place, and so the root cause of the absence should be understood as the distinction between 
moral considerations and religious practice. 
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4.9 Christianity and Stoicism 
This discussion leads us to the final object of this chapter, namely the relationship 
between these Christian authors and mainstream philosophical and moral thought.
223 As 
noted, Tatian begins his work from the perspective of a convert from the Greek wisdom 
(  φ  ),224 whilst Aristides also attacks gentile philosophers directly on a number of 
occasions. Whilst there are no such explicit attacks to be found in Meliton, he does focus 
heavily on philosophical issues like šrrʾ (‘truth’) and ṭwʽyy (‘error’), and he is referred to as a 
pylswpʾ in the opening and closing paragraphs. This focus in itself is no revelation: Lightfoot 
observed that both Meliton and Aristides derived their interpretation of error in particular 
from the Stoic Epictetus.
225
 This is not strictly true: as observed above, Aristides and Meliton 
differ considerably in their interpretation of error. Nevertheless, there are key parallels that 
must be drawn. A number of scholars have identified close links between the doctrines of 
Christianity and Stoicism:
226
 both are strongly theistic, for a start.
227
 This section will focus 
on two Stoic authors in addition to Epictetus:
228
 the Roman author Seneca,
229
 and the writings 
                                                 
223
 I do not intend to go into vast detail here, as the role of philosophy has less relevance for the religious life of 
the Near East than topics discussed above, although there is limited evidence: I quoted above a fragmentary 
inscription from Apamea recording Aurelios Bel Philippos (1.5.2; see Rey-Coquais 1973:66ff), who was a 
priest of Bel and simultaneously the leader of the local Epicureans. Similarly, we know of a number of 
philosophical authors who hailed from the Near East (such as Maximus of Tyre); however, it is unclear how 
far their works should be considered of specific relevance to the Near East. 
224
 Tatian Or. 1.3. 
225
 Lightfoot 2007:66. Pouderon and Pierre, however, observed that the opposition of truth and error in this way 
was a commonplace of early apologetic literature (2003:322). 
226
 See e.g. Ware 2008; Engberg-Pederson 2008; Malherbe 1987; Pohlenz 1949; Klauck 2000. Long (2003:210) 
discussed the dependence of Lactantius and Tertullian on Stoic works, and Cicero in particular. 
227
 Although, as Algra noted, ‘god’ and ‘gods’ were often interchangeable, since it was recognised that different 
attributes of god were sometimes given names (2003:165-6). For a brief summary of Stoic arguments for the 
existence of god, see Algra 2003:159-165. For the opposing argument that it is in fact Middle Platonism 
which bears the most resemblance to Christianity, see Hunt 2003:104, who argued that by the time Tatian 
was writing, Stoicism was on the wane (ibid. 97-8). 
228
 For the relationship between Epictetus and New Testament writings, see Bonhoffer 1911. Similarly, Hunt 
focussed on Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus in her comparison of Tatian and the Stoics (2003:93). 
229
 As Inwood observed, we must exercise caution in assessing Seneca’s true position: “Seneca’s  own deepest 
motivations lie hidden behind a façade constructed, paradoxically, largely of his own philosophical 
convictions” (2005:10). Whether or not Seneca genuinely ‘believed’ these things, however, is largely 
unimportant: the fact remains that he wrote them, and intended them to be a statement of a Stoic position. 
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of the emperor Marcus Aurelius. In the case of Seneca, his similarity to Christianity was such 
that on occasions he was even considered to have been a Christian: Tertullian, for instance, 
refers to him as saepe noster.
230
 This perceived connection may make it easier to identify 
common ground between the two schools of thought, and also to assess the degree of Stoic 
influence on our three authors. The reasons for focussing on Marcus Aurelius are less 
straightforward. There is no conceivable way in which the text to which we have access, 
which was written by Marcus to himself, could have been available to any of our authors. 
However, they form an important contrast with the writings of Seneca, which were designed 
for public consumption:
231
 Marcus’ Meditations represent his own private considerations, and 
may help to balance the rhetoric of the Latin philosopher.
232
 However, there is a final 
consideration: I argued in the introduction that Meliton’s text was probably addressed to 
Antoninus Pius rather than Marcus Aurelius, but this is not definite, and in either case Marcus 
is addressed in the letter (either as ʾnṭwnynws qsr, ‘Antoninus Caesar’, or as one of his sons). 
It is possible, then, that at the very least Meliton’s text was intended to have some direct 
relevance to the Stoic emperor. Tatian, too, was an almost exact contemporary of Marcus 
Aurelius: Tatian lived 120-180 AD, Marcus Aurelius 121-180 AD. It is uncertain when the 
Address to the Greeks was composed, as noted in the introduction, but that too may have 
been intended to have specific relevance to Marcus Aurelius as emperor: even if neither 
Meliton nor Tatian had access to his own writings, it is possible that his Stoic views would 
                                                 
230
 Tert. De anim. 20: ‘often one of us’. 
231
 Long argued that the two are very similar in tone, being “highly rhetorical, sententious, and artfully 
constructed” (2003:192). However, the addressees, and thus the purpose of the texts, must be understood as 
being quite different. 
232
 The Meditations, written in Greek, “serves as a type of philosophical diary, in which the emperor drew on 
(largely) Stoic principles to construct a framework to meet the challenges of human life as he experienced it” 
(Gill 2003:35-6). Gill points out that although the Meditations themselves make an explicit claim of 
allegiance to Stoicism, Marcus Aurelius’ style includes a mix of Heraclitean, Platonic and Cynic elements 
(ibid. 49). Given the claims made in the introduction to the work, however, I shall treat the text as being 
reflective of Stoic thought. On the rhetoric of the Meditations, see Rutherford 1989. 
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have been well enough known for a direct philosophical appeal to make good sense. It should 
be noted that this section is not a direct comparison of Stoicism and Christianity; that would 
be an endless task that would ultimately not benefit the questions this thesis poses. Instead, it 
is searching for instances that may or may not be direct reference to certain elements of 
Stoicism, and to Epictetus, Seneca and Marcus Aurelius in particular.  
 
4.9.1 Meliton 
Meliton never refers explicitly to philosophy, despite being described as a pylswpʾ; 
his attacks are limited to the worship of images and the error this causes. Nevertheless, 
certain points show remarkable similarity to Stoicism in general and to Seneca’s work in 
particular. The idea of a coming judgement is a constant one in Christian literature (both 
Tatian and Aristides refer to it, but not in any great detail): what makes Meliton’s account 
unusual is the description of a great fire, which consumes the world. This discussion is found 
in the context of God’s original judgement on the world, in the form of the great flood: hnwn 
ʾnwn mškḥyn dlʾ nʾqdwn. ʾmty dʾtʾ mmwlʾ dnwrʾ ʽl kwlh ʽlmʾ. dbḥd gyr zbnʾ hwʾ hwʾ mmwlʾ. 
wrwḥʾ wʾtḥrbw gbrʾ gbyʾ bgrbyʾ ḥsyntʾ. wʾštbqw zdyqʾ ltḥwytʾ dšrrʾ. twb dyn bzbnʾ ʾḥrnʾ hwʾ 
hwʾ mmwlʾ dmyʾ. wʾbdw klhwn bnynšʾ wḥywtʾ. bswgʼʾ dmyʾ. wʾtnṭrw zdyqʾ bkwylʾ dqysʾ. mn 
pwqdnʾ dʾlhʾ. whknʾ ʽtyd bzbnʾ ʾḥryʾ: dnhwʾ mmwlʾ dnwrʾ: wtʾqd ʾrʽʾ ʽm ṭwryh. wnʾqdwn 
bnynšʾ ʽm ṣlmʾ dʽbdw: wʽm glypʾ dsgdw lhwn. wnʾqd ymʾ ʽm gzrth. wntnṭrwn zdyqʾ mn 
rwgzʾ.233 The association of the fire with the great flood immediately suggests parallels with 
                                                 
233
 Meliton 9.7-8: ‘these people (sc. the Christians) are able to escape destruction when the flood of fire comes 
upon the whole world. For there was once a flood and a wind, and the chosen men were destroyed by a 
mighty north-wind, but the righteous were left as a demonstration of truth. But again, at another time, there 
was a flood of water, and all men and animals perished in a multitude of waters. But the just were saved in 
an ark of wood by the command of God. So will it be in the last times: there will be a flood of fire, and the 
earth will be burnt up, together with its mountains and the people will be burnt up together with the images 
which they made, and the carvings which they worshipped; the sea will be burnt up together with its islands; 
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Stoic ideas about the cyclical           and the flood: dicimus enim ignem esse qui occupet 
mundum et in se cuncta convertat; hunc evanidum languentemque considere et nihil relinqui 
aliud in rerum nature igne restincto quam umorem; in hoc futuri mundi spem latere. ita ignis 
exitus mundi est, umor promordium.
234
 Both fire and flood are explicitly connected on 
numerous occasions in Seneca’s work,235 as they are in Meliton’s. Even if Meliton is not 
attacking Seneca himself, the direct association of flood and fire in his account, in a manner 
which does not feature in the New Testament, suggest that he may be indirectly targeting 
Stoic theory, even while he relies on the text of 2 Peter. 
There are a number of rhetorical similarities between Meliton’s Oration and Stoic 
works. In one instance, Meliton addresses his readers as those bk hw wlbr mnk hw wlʽl mnk 
hw.
236
 This bears a remarkable resemblance to Seneca: prope est a te deus, tecum est, intus 
est.
237
 This, in turn, resembles Epictetus:                         .                          
       .238 This similarity may give weight to Lightfoot’s argument that Meliton relied 
heavily on Epictetus. However, the context of the phrase in Meliton suggests that this is not 
the case: he makes this point as part of his argument against mistaking the created object for 
the creator God. In Seneca, by contrast, the phrase forms part of his argument against the 
necessity of prayer and ritual: we do not need to constantly pray to external gods, because 
                                                                                                                                                        
but the just will be guarded from wrath’. There are striking similarities with 2 Peter 3:10-12 in the imagery 
of this passage: see Cureton 1855:95, who was certain that Meliton was directly referring to the epistle. 
234
 Seneca Q Nat. 3.13.2-3: ‘we say that it is fire which takes hold of world and transforms everything into itself. 
This becomes feeble, fades and settles, and, when the fire has been put out, nothing remains in the natural 
world but water: in this lies the hope of the world to come. Thus fire is the end of the world, and water its 
beginning’. For the understanding of the           as the act of a benevolent rather than a destructive God, 
see Algra 2003:170-3. See also Hunt 2003:92-3 and Klauck 2000:354. 
235
 See also Q Nat. 3 Pref.5, 3.28.7, 3.29.5-8, 3.30.6. For an extended discussion of the mechanics of the flood, 
see ibid. 3.27.4-15. See also Inwood 2005:170-3. 
236
 Meliton 8.6: ‘in whom He is, and outside of whom He is, and above whom He is’. 
237
 Seneca Ep. 41.1; ‘God is near you, he is with you and within you’. As noted above, this refers not to any 
external conception of God, but to the rational spirit, which is a part of the divine. See also ibid. 66.12, 
73.16. 
238
 Epictetus 2.8.11: ‘you are a fragment of god; you have a piece of him within you’. 
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god is always with us. This is an entirely different usage to that of Meliton.
239
 Again, the 
context is different in Epictetus: the fact that we carry a part of the divine within us is used to 
distinguish us from irrational animals. It is, therefore, extremely unlikely to be a direct 
reference to either author, and is almost certain a coincidence based on theological similarity 
in this area.  
A second similarity is seen in the use of the truth as a whip or goad: šrrʾ dyn: mtḥšḥ 
bmltʾ ʾyk dbʽwqsʾ. wmḥʾ lʾylyn ddmkyn. wmʽyr lhwn. wʾmty dmtʽyryn. bh bšrrʾ ḥyryn. ʾp 
mstklyn. wšmʽyn wpršyn mdm dʾytwhy. mn mdm dlʾ ʾytwhy.240 Epictetus similarly highlights 
the role of truth and reason as a whip: the Spartans accept the whip as being entirely 
compatible with reason, and so should we.
241
 However, again, the context is so different that 
the similarity must be entirely coincidental. For Meliton, the truth is used to rebuke a man 
and change his path; Epictetus uses the image in order to encourage us not to bemoan our 
sufferings, but to accept them with rationality. 
 
4.9.2 The Syriac translator of Aristides 
The Syriac translator of Aristides is more explicit than Meliton in his attacks on 
philosophers (pylswpʾ). This appears four times in the text, always in derogatory terms: this is 
particularly surprising, given that he identifies himself as pylswpʾ (unlike Meliton who is 
only identified in this manner in the introduction). It will become apparent that Aristides’ aim 
is to present Christianity as a superior practice to that of the gentile pylswpʾ. However, 
                                                 
239
 This is hardly surprising: Meliton is the least likely of the three Near Eastern Christian authors to have read a 
Latin philosophical work (assuming that we include the Greek writer of the original of Aristides’ Apology’). 
240
 Meliton 1.4: ‘but truth uses the word like a goad and strikes those who sleeping and awakens them. And 
when they wake they look at the truth and understand it; they hear it and distinguish that which is from that 
which is not’. As Cureton pointed out, šntʾ can mean ‘madness’ as well as sleep, but the metaphor of 
‘awakening’ suggests that the translation ‘sleep’ remains preferable (1855:85) 
241
 Epictetus 1.2.1-2. 
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Aristides does not identify any one group, but simply attacks the class of philosophers.
242
 It 
was noted in the previous chapter that Aristides associates them with authors (sywmʾ); he also 
attacks the philosophical worship of the ʾsṭwksʾ.243 I suggest that the reason Aristides groups 
philosophers and artists together in this attack is because he is concerned about the depiction 
of God given by both groups (that is, of immoral, vulnerable beings by the artists, and 
senseless elements by the philosophers).
244
 Neither of these corresponds to Aristides’ 
understanding of a loving and personal God, and as such they are both mistaken. It is clearly 
not philosophy itself that is a problem for Aristides: indeed, he is happy to borrow 
philosophical concepts and draw on other authors to serve his own ends (such as Xenophanes 
on image worship and Plato on the example set by the gods): it is partly for this reason that 
Aristides identifies himself as pylswpʾ. It is the philosophical understanding of the divine, 
rather than the philosophical process, which is Aristides’ target: as such, it is not surprising 
that we find little which we might compare directly with Epictetus, Seneca or Marcus 
Aurelius. 
 
4.9.3 Tatian 
                                                 
242
 Pouderon and Pierre argued that this was due in part to Aristides’ theological approach, and it was impossible 
for him to avoid using terms loaded with Platonic or Stoic significance: “le  ieu d’Aristide, ce n’est pas 
seulement le Dieu de Jésus-Christ, c’est aussi, d’une certaine façon, le  ieu des philosophes” (2003:65). 
However, this does not necessarily constitute an active, conscious engagement with these groups, which is 
the purpose of this section of the investigation.  
243
 Aristides 20.4, 21.1. The pylswpʾ are also mentioned at 5.3 and 5.4, in which Aristides attacks them for 
introducing the elements (ʾsṭwksʾ). As argued above (2.3.2), although ʾsṭwksʾ is a transliteration of the Greek 
           , the association with the barbarians rather than the Greeks makes it unlikely that we should 
interpreted them as the First Principle: nowhere in the text are the ʾsṭwksʾ explicitly idenfitifed with Greek 
philosophers. Pouderon and Pierre suggested that here the pylswpʾ should be identified with astronomers, 
particularly since they are here associated with the barbarians (Chaldeans in the Greek of Barlaam and 
Josaphat) (2003:332-3).  
244
 Pouderon and Pierre 2003:365.  
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In Tatian, by contrast, we find more evidence to this end. As noted, his apology 
begins by rejecting contemporary Greek wisdom (  φ  ).245 He is clearly hostile to 
philosophy in general: he contrasts philosophising with a serious search for truth, which 
presumably is the path of Christianity,
246
 without specifying any one philosophical school. In 
one passage, as noted above, Tatian attacks the unseemly deaths of a number of famous 
philosophers;
247
 this bears a remarkable resemblance to a similar observation by Marcus 
Aurelius.
248
 Although it is impossible that Tatian is directly referring to that passage, it may 
show an awareness of popular Stoic thought. Tatian simply follows this thought to its 
conclusion and suggests that their deaths highlight the moral laxity of their lives.
249
  
Tatian’s attack on Graeco-Roman   φ   is also significant: it may well refer to the 
rational mind, which, according to Seneca, is the definition of God and which we carry within 
us.
250
 On occasion, Tatian adopts philosophical arguments without much hostility: for 
example, he argues that mankind resembles God only when he ceases to act as an irrational 
animal.
251
 This argument is found in almost identical form in the writings of Epictetus: it is 
                                                 
245
 Tatian Or. 1.3. 
246
 Ibid. 3.3. On Tatian as philosopher first and foremost, see Elze 1960. See also Grant 1960:355-6. 
247
 Tatian Address 2.1-2. See above, 5.3.2. 
248
 M.Aur. Med. 3.3. In this account, Hippocrates died of illness, unable to cure himself; Heraclitus filled up 
with water and died covered in dung; and Democritus and Socrates were both killed by vermin. The parallels 
between these two accounts were also highlighted by Rutherford (1989:146), but he does not discuss them at 
any length. 
249
 Tatian also attacks philosophers as a group, accusing them of wasting time growing beards (Or. 19.1): cf. 
ibid. 25.1. On the same accusation, see Luc. Hermot. 18 and Sen. Ep. 64.3. Epictetus defends against this 
preconception, which must indicate that it was popular (4.8.10). 
250
 quid est deus? mens universi. quid est deus? quod vides totum et quod non vides totum (‘what is God? The 
mind of the universe. What is God? Everything which you see, and everything which you do not’, Seneca Q 
Nat 1 Pref. 13). See also 1 Pref. 14 (totus est ratio) and Epictetus 1.1.  
251
 Tatian Or. 15.2. This is a reference to man as the       of God in Genesis 1:26: see above, 2.3.1. 
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only the rational nature (which is what transforms us into the likeness of the divine) that 
separates us from the irrational beasts.
252
 
None of Tatian’s points here are necessarily limited to Stoicism. However, on two 
occasions, Tatian attacks Stoic thought directly and explicitly. Firstly, he ridicules the notion 
of cyclic regeneration:     δ                                                          
         λ        λ    ,     ὡ             δ                          λ        δ    
                                                            .253 This is the only occasion 
in any of the three apologies when a specific philosophical group is identified by name, 
which may suggest that the Stoics are a particular target for Tatian; the fact that he refers to a 
particular doctrine indicates a close familiarity with the Stoics.
254 Secondly, he suggests that 
the soul (      ) can be saved from death by living uprightly and according to wisdom;255 
this is probably a reference to the Stoic conception of the soul or reason that lives within us 
and is trained by just living to make us more and more like the divine.
256
 Seneca repeatedly 
                                                 
252
 Epictetus 2.9.2; see also 2.10.2.  I do not suggest that this idea was exclusive to Stoicism: as Rowe pointed 
out, Plato relies on the idea that man can become godlike, remain human, or become an animal depending 
upon his use of philosophy (2003:113).  
253
 Tatian Or. 6.1: ‘for this reason we believe that there will be a resurrection of the body after the ending of the 
world: not, as the Stoics teach, going round in circles, being born and dying in an endless cycle, with no 
benefit to them’. This is presumably in contrast to the Christian resurrection, which is once for all time, and 
with a specific purpose (namely the glory of God). Marcus Aurelius discusses cyclic regeneration in some 
detail (Med. 2.14), while Epictetus thinks in terms of ‘cosmic recycling’: one has an existence, but not a 
personal one (3.24.94). See Hunt 2003:93 and Klauck 2000:358-61. 
254
 Hawthorne argued that Tatian displays an “unconscious sympathy for them and an affinity with some of their 
principles” (196 :177), and that this is most evident in his discussion of the soul. He also highlights Tatian’s 
attitude towards the disturbances of the world, which appear to show Stoic tendencies (Or. 11.1; Hawthorne 
1964:188). As I have shown, Hawthorne’s point is a valid one; I do not go into more detail on the similarity 
of their teachings where these similarities are unconscious, because these instances do not intend to engage 
with Stoicism. It is sufficient here to observe deliberate reference. For a fuller discussion of these 
similarities, see ibid. 177-178. In contrast, Hunt suggested that, since it is the Middle Platonists who receive 
the least brutal treatment from Tatian, he is more likely to be influenced by them, along with his mentor 
Justin (2003:104). However, Stoicism remains the only philosophical school to be explicitly attacked. For a 
summary of Tatian’s philosophical allusions, see Hunt 2003:74-109 and Hawthorne 1964:178-9. 
255
 Tatian Or. 13.1-3. 
256
 Admittedly, this is not exclusively true to Stoicism: the view ultimately derived from Plato, as shown above, 
and “it was in fact commonly agreed in the imperial period that the ultimate goal of philosophy was to 
become like the divine” (Rives 2007: 1) by using the divine as a model. See above, 5.2.5. See also Hunt 
2003:68. Hawthorne argued that Tatian’s division of two kinds of spirit (the divine, of which God is 
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emphasises that the goal of philosophical living is freedom, and that only philosophy can give 
us that freedom: ad hanc te confer, si vis salvus esse, si securus, si beatus, denique si vis esse, 
quod est maximum, liber.
257
 This freedom is freedom from fear, from want and from worry, 
and it is this freedom that makes us like the divine: hoc enim est, quod mihi philosophia 
promittit, ut parem deo faciat.
258
 It should be noted, however, that this does not make us 
immortal, but merely secure and blessed: Seneca elsewhere notes that the only difference 
between the wise man and the gods is that the gods live longer.
259
 Marcus Aurelius, similarly, 
notes that the role of philosophy is to keep the inner δ      pure.260 Obedience to this 
δ     , which is expressed through satisfaction with our lot,261 elevates us to a godlike state: 
   ῇ δ                  δ                                                    
             ,          δ ,     β  λ       δ     .262 The same principle (that this 
freedom makes us godlike) is found in Epictetus:  δ   δ                          λ         
                                                                                                                                                        
constituted, and the material, of which the demons are constituted) in Or. 12.1 should be considered a 
“frontal attack on the Stoics” (196 :167). However, as observed in the previous chapter, this should 
probably be considered an attempt to construct a hierarchy of nature (3.7.3), with God at the top, followed 
by the demons, mortals and beasts respectively. There is nothing to suggest that such an attack is directed 
against the Stoics necessarily. 
257
 Seneca Ep. 37.3: ‘take yourself to this, if you wish to be saved, if you wish to be secure, or blessed, and if 
you wish to be that which is the greatest of all – free’. See also 8.7, 14.11. 
258
 Ibid. 41.8: ‘it is this, which philosophy promises to me: that it will make me equal to God’. See also 31.8.11, 
41.4, 75.18, 92.29 and Q Nat. 1 Pref. 6.  
259
 Seneca Ep. 53.11. It would be misleading to suggest that Seneca had hopes of reincarnation or immortality 
(Klauck 2000:357; cf. Rutherford 1989:180); however, rationality did offer the Stoics true happiness in the 
association with the divine through freedom from worry (Inwood 2005:249). 
260
 M.Aur. Med. 2.17. 
261
 It was seen above that satisfaction, rather than grumbling at the gods and Fate, was the mark of the good man 
in Plato, and hence the danger posed by the poets. Epictetus strongly endorses this position, and argues that 
it is the hallmark of the true Stoic:       δ                           λ                               
                             φ     ,                   ,                   ,              ,    
φ       ,      λ         (Epictetus 2.19.26-7:’let one of you show me the soul of a man which wishes to 
think in the same way as God, and never to blame either God or man, nor to miss anything, nor to be harmed 
by anything, nor to be angry, nor envious, nor jealous’). 
262
 M.Aur. Med. 5.27: ‘he dwells with the gods, the one who shows them his soul, satisfied with its lot and doing 
whatever the δ      wishes’. As for Seneca, this is not a guarantee of immortality: “this imagined flight 
remains strictly hypothetical, rather than a foreshadowing of the soul’s future fate” (Rutherford 1989:158). 
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     λ                                             .263 However, Tatian has already 
established at the beginning of his apology that philosophical schooling is not wisdom: the 
only wisdom belongs to the path of Christianity, and Stoic teaching is therefore unable to 
give us the kind of soul that survives death. He does not necessarily reject the Stoic 
conception of the soul, but does reject the fact that Stoic notions of just living can have any 
effect on it: Christianity, in a sense, accomplishes what Stoicism could not.
264
 This is made 
explicit in his account of his own conversion: δ                         ῇ         
    λ           ῇ               λ     δ                    ,               β  β     
φ λ   φ                 .265 The contrast between Greek and Roman philosophy and 
Christian philosophy, in the failure of one and the success of the other, is made quite clear.  
 
4.10 Concluding remarks 
Of our three authors, then, Tatian shows the most direct reference to Stoic philosophy: 
on a number of occasions, as highlighted, he appears to borrow from Seneca. This is not 
unexpected; we already know that he has experimented with various forms of philosophy, 
and, although Tatian does not explicitly tell us that this included the teachings of the Stoa, 
given their popularity this is not unlikely. It is not clear, however, whether the points made 
above indicated direct influence (that is, that Tatian read the works of Seneca and Epictetus) 
                                                 
263
 Epictetus 1.12.21: ‘whenever you are alone, you should call this ‘rest’ and ‘freedom’, and consider yourself 
akin to the gods’. See also 2.1.21, 2.18.19. Elsewhere, the ability to restrain one’s        is given as the 
definition of true virtue (ibid. 3.22.13). See Krentz 2008:128-130 for more on         in Epictetus. 
264
 Tatian establishes elsewhere that Christianity is a philosophy (Address to the Greeks 31.1), which makes it 
comparable to the failed philosophies he elsewhere attacks. See also 25.1:                               
                φ λ   φ    (‘what great or astounding thing are your philosophers accomplishing?’). The 
context makes it clear that the philosophers are set in contrast to the success of Christianity, for they fail to 
achieve any knowledge of God. For Tatian’s view of Christianity as a philosophy to rival Graeco-Roman 
schools, see Hunt 2003:109 and 110-143. Not all Christians saw it this way, however, for Tertullian asked: 
quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis? (‘what have Athens and Jerusalem (sc. Christianity) got to do with one 
another?’, De praescr. haeret. 7.9).  
265
 Tatian Or. 35.1: ‘having said farewell both to Roman arrogance and Athenian cold logic (both incoherent 
teachings), I sought out the philosophy which you consider to be barbarous’.  
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or simply an awareness of common Stoic thought. However, it shows a clear interaction with, 
and aggressive rejection of, gentile philosophy and literature of the period. The final chapter 
of this dissertation will examine exactly what impact this rejection might have had. 
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Chapter Five: ‘Bless those who persecute you’ (Rom. 12:14): Christian persecution and 
the motivation of hostility 
5.1  Introduction 
The preceding chapters have clearly highlighted three conclusions that can be drawn 
about Near Eastern Christian attitudes to gentile religious life. Firstly, talking about ‘Near 
Eastern Christian attitudes’ in itself presents a problem: there is such variation in the 
approach and attitude of Meliton, Tatian and the Syriac translator of Aristides that it is very 
difficult indeed to point to a given perception of an issue and describe it as ‘the Near Eastern 
Christian attitude’. Nowhere is this clearer than in the treatment of iconolatry: although all 
three authors are hostile to it, their attitudes vary hugely, from Tatian, for whom iconolatry is 
secondary to the moral problems raised by idolatry as a whole, to Meliton, for whom the 
worship of images is the sum total of gentile cultic practice. Secondly, we can observe that 
these attitudes, although varying in detail, are universally hostile towards gentile religious 
life, and towards the gentiles who practice it. Thirdly, the presentation given by these sources 
is often, although not always, an inaccurate picture, particularly when we compare it with the 
picture given by gentiles themselves in literature and epigraphy. 
These conclusions are hardly surprising; in calling for a rejection of one’s former 
existence and committing oneself exclusively to Christ, a hostile attitude to the former way of 
life is inevitable. Equally, there is no particular pressure on Christian authors to present an 
accurate depiction of gentile religious life:
1
 rhetorical exaggeration would serve very well to 
undermine the basis of that religious life and associated conduct.  
                                                 
1
 Clark made a similar point: she argued that while Livy might present an account of Hannibal’s speech before 
the Battle of Zama, for instance (however inaccurate), there was no reason for Christians to record the view 
of their opponents (2004:17). Nor is this point limited to the depiction of gentile religious life: Hunt 
observed that part of the problem in discussed heresy in this period is that the views of heretics are not 
recorded, for there was no reason for Christians to do so (2003:5). For more on the relationship between 
internal and external text, see above, 1.4. 
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However, these conclusions raise a further question: namely, what role did this 
attitude, particularly as expressed through Christian literature, play in motivating hostility and 
persecution in the Near East? Is it possible that hostility and inaccuracy in Christian 
presentation of gentile religious life may have generated such resentment in their non-
Christian neighbours that this contributed to the persecutions which were so prominent in the 
second and third centuries? As I have said, the conclusions noted above are not revolutionary 
in themselves, which makes it all the more surprising that little scholarship has been done on 
this area: these concluding remarks will attempt to address the possibility a little more fully. 
The application of this question to the Near East offers both a challenge and an 
opportunity. We are so greatly limited in our source material from the Near East that it is very 
difficult to identify exactly what gentiles in the area thought of their Christian neighbours (as 
we shall see, Lucian refers to them, explicitly at least, on only a single occasion). On the 
other hand, as discussed in Chapter One, Christianity is a Near Eastern cult in its origin: we 
have an opportunity to study the impact of the Christian attitudes such as we find in Meliton, 
Tatian and the Syriac translator of Aristides close to that point of origin. 
 
5.2 Theories of opposition 
The scholarly debate surrounding the motivation behind the persecution of early 
Christians is most clearly epitomised by the dialogue regarding Pliny Letters 10.96-97 
between de Ste. Croix and Sherwin-White.
2
 This discussion has created a number of ‘theories 
of opposition’ by which to explain the hostility demonstrated towards Christianity, 
                                                 
2
 De Ste. Croix 1963 and 1964; Sherwin-White 1964. See also Walsh 1991. 
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particularly in the second century.
3
 The arguments of these scholars, by and large, depend 
upon the works of Tacitus and Pliny the Younger; Tacitus’ Annals 15.44 discusses the 
persecution of Christians in the context of the great fire of 64, whilst Pliny wrote to Trajan to 
enquire after the correct judicial practice relating to Christians whilst governor of Bithynia. It 
will be argued that these Latin sources have little relevance to Near Eastern Christians and 
their literary output: Edwards et al. argued that there was a considerable difference in attitude 
towards Christianity in the West and the East, and suggested that the latter was more 
‘tolerant’.4 However, as I have demonstrated in the dissertation thus far, there is sufficient 
overlap between religious life in the East and West to mean that what was considered 
inappropriate conduct in Rome would likely be considered equally inappropriate in Dura-
Europos on the Euphrates, or at Vindolanda on Hadrian’s Wall. In addition, we are sadly 
limited in our choice of material: the number of gentile literary sources on Christianity in the 
East from this period (that is, the first two centuries) is even more limited than those dealing 
with religious life in general. Our only useful source in this respect is a passage in Lucian’s 
Peregrinus, which is not used in the debate between de Ste. Croix and Sherwin-White. 
Because of the limited availability of source material, I intend to evaluate these Latin 
passages (namely Tacitus and Pliny), but also to assess the understanding of Lucian’s 
Peregrinus. As will be seen, Lucian’s attitude is hostile, but the reasons for that hostility are 
less clear. The passage is too extensive to quote in full, but I shall refer to key parts of it.
 5
 
 
                                                 
3
 Engberg (2007:26) attempted to distinguish between ‘motives’ and ‘causes’: the former, he said, are superficial 
and easily identified, whilst the latter may be more individual, more profound and perhaps even 
unconscious. Almost certainly some incentives were deeply personal and perhaps unrecognised, but they 
certainly could not be identified in the sources. It is more useful, therefore, to talk of ‘motives’ rather than 
‘causes’, even if Engberg’s distinction is accepted. 
4
 Edwards et al. 1999:2. For more on tolerance in this context, see below, 5.2.5.  
5
 The relevant passage is found in Luc. De mort. Peregr. 11-13. Edwards defended Lucian’s text on the grounds 
that it provides a believable, albeit satirical, presentation of Peregrinus as the antitype of a Cynic (1989). See 
also Engberg 2007:22-8.  
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The relevant Tacitus passage reads: sed non ope humana, non largitionibus principis aut 
deum placamentis decedebat infamia quin iussum incendium crederetur. ergo abolendo 
rumori Nero subdidit reos et quaesitissimis poenis adfecit quos per flagitia invisos vulgus 
Chrestianos
6
 appellabat. auctor nominis eius Christus Tiberio imperitante per procuratorem 
Pontium Pilatum supplicio adfectus erat; repressaque in praesens exitiabilis superstitio 
rursum erumpebat, non modo per Iudaeam, originem eius mali, sed per urbem etiam quo 
cuncta undique atrocia aut pudenda confluunt celebranturque.
7
 Pliny’s letter (Letters 10.96) 
and Trajan’s reply (10.97) are too extensive to be quoted in full here, and will be quoted in 
part when relevant. Finally, Hadrian’s rescript to the governor of Asia, Minucius Fundanus, 
will be quoted.
8
 However, unlike Trajan’s reply to Pliny, we do not have the questions that 
                                                 
6
 Manuscript M has Chrestianos; Miller (1994:xxix-xxx) preferred Christianos, on the grounds that suggestions 
of a group of Jewish zealots called the Chrestiani (‘good men’) is stretching credibility.  However, 
Woodman suggested that a later scribe changed it to Christianos based on the introduction of the name 
Christus in the following sentence (2004:325). This interpretation is almost certainly the correct one. He 
further suggested that it is possible that two forms of the name did exist, and that Tacitus “would be drawing 
a muted contrast between the common (i.e., pagan) name for the sect, evidently attributed to the Christians 
through a confusion with the Greek word chrēstos (‘good’, ‘honorable’), and the true origin of the name” 
(2004:325). The suggestion that a second form of the name did exist is reinforced by Suetonius Claudius 
25.4: Iudaeos impulsore Chresto assidue tumultuantis Roma expulit (‘he drove out from Rome the Jews, 
who were rioting at the urging of Chrestus’). Engberg (2007:100) presented three possibilities for the 
interpretation of this line: that there was a local troublemaker by the name of Chrestus; that a would-be 
messiah had proclaimed himself Chrestus; and that the new cult was causing unrest amongst the Jews in 
Rome. Whilst he admitted that we cannot be certain of this last interpretation (2007:90), it seems the most 
likely: if Tacitus understood that Christ was the auctor of the new cult, it seems reasonable to suppose that 
Suetonius would also have been aware of this. The implication of the form Chresto, however, is that 
contemporary classical authors were not certain either how to identify to followers of the new cult, or of the 
etymology of their name (hence the confusion between ‘follower of Christ’ and ‘good man’). On the 
etymology of Christians and Chrestiani, see also Pouderon and Pierre 328-9; on Christ as the founder of the 
cult, see also Luc. De mort. Peregr. 11. 
7
 Tac. Ann. 15.44.1-3. ‘But neither human effort, nor the generosity of the princeps, nor the appeasement of the 
gods could get rid of the rumour that the fire had been ordered. Therefore in order to get rid of this rumour, 
Nero supplied defendants and afflicted with the choicest punishments those whom the crowds called 
‘Christians’, hated for their immoralities. The founder of this name was Christ, who, whilst Tiberius was 
Emperor, was afflicted with punishment by the procurator Pontius Pilate. This deadly superstitio was 
suppressed for the moment, but soon burst out again, not only in Judaea, the origin of this evil, but even 
through the City, where all hateful and shameful practices flock and are celebrated’. 
8
 The rescript survives (in Greek) at the conclusion of Justin’s First Apology and in Euseb. Hist. eccl. 4.9.1-3. 
However, both of these are written in Greek and must therefore be a translation of the Latin (notwithstanding 
Hadrian’s philhellenism, a letter addressed to the (Roman) governor of Asia would be written in Latin, not 
Greek), which raises further complications in using the rescript for the purpose of direct comparison. As 
discussed above (1.4.1), Pouderon and Pierre highlighted the Rescript as a major obstacle to the 
understanding that Aristides delivered the Apology in person to Hadrian (2003:41-2). 
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prompted Hadrian’s response (which is quoted by Justin at the end of his First Apology, and 
again, presumably with Justin as the source, in Eusebius’ Church History), and therefore we 
must be careful not to take it out of context. 
 
5.2.1 The flagitia (or ‘immorality’) theory 
Let us begin, then, with an overview of the basic theories of opposition and their 
connection to the works of Tacitus and Pliny. Sherwin-White and Walsh favoured the 
‘immorality theory’.9 According to this theory, hatred of Christians was based on the rumours 
of evil practice, most notably ritualistic incest and cannibalism (based, no doubt, on a 
misinterpretation of the consumption of ‘the body and blood of Christ’ during the Lord’s 
Supper, and the Christian practice of calling one another ‘brother’ and ‘sister’); they were 
therefore punished for these flagitia. This theory depends upon the fact that both Tacitus and 
Pliny highlight the flagitia with which Christians are connected. Tacitus notes that Christians 
are those quos per flagitia invisos vulgus Chrestianos appellabat. Pliny writes: nec 
mediocriter haesitavi, sitne aliquod discrimen aetatum, an quamlibet teneri nihil a 
robustioribus differant; detur paenitentiae venia, an ei, qui omnino Christianus fuit, desisse 
non prosit; nomen ipsum, si flagitiis careat, an flagitia cohaerentia nomini puniantur.
10
 Like 
Tacitus, therefore, Pliny also criticises the flagitia associated with the Christians. The 
repetition of the term flagitia certainly seems to reinforce Sherwin-White’s argument. It is 
also extremely significant that both Tacitus and Pliny strongly connect these flagitia with the 
                                                 
9
 Sherwin-White 1964; Walsh 1991; their arguments are well summarised by Enberg 2007:71-76. A similar 
approach was adopted by Guterman, who argued that cults were occasionally repressed because they were 
disorderly or immoral, rather than because they were foreign” (1951:11). 
10
 Plin. Ep. 10.96.2: ‘I am more than a little uncertain as to whether a distinction ought to be made on the 
grounds of age, or whether the feeble and the more sturdy ought to differ [in the punishment they receive]; 
whether a pardon ought to be granted to the penitent, or, if someone has been a Christian once, he should not 
benefit by ceasing to be one; whether it is the name itself, or the immoralities which adhere to the name, 
which are to be punished’. 
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name of Christianity, a fact that Sherwin-White surprisingly fails to highlight. In Tacitus’ 
case, the Christians are so named in connection with the immoralities; Pliny suggests that 
they somehow ‘cling’ to the name (cohaerentia nomini). It is clear that the name ‘Christian’ 
was punishable in its own right; Trajan responds to Pliny that simply being a Christian is 
enough to warrant a death sentence,
11
 and no other charges are necessary.
12
 The most 
important point in Sherwin-White’s argument is that Pliny clearly expects to find some 
unspecified flagitia connected with the Christian name, and confesses himself frankly baffled 
not to have done so. Hence his query to Trajan as to whether evidence of the flagitia is 
actually necessary: nomen ipsum, si flagitiis careat, an flagitia cohaerentia nomini puniantur. 
Accusations of immorality frequently appear in attacks upon Christianity – or, at least, 
refutation of such accusations are a key part of Christian apologetic, so it may be safely 
assumed that they were considered a dangerous part of gentile rhetoric.
13
  
Lucian does not appear to have anything negative to say about the Christians; quite 
the reverse, in fact. When Peregrinus was thrown in prison (and rightly so, in Lucian’s view), 
the Christians demonstrate a genuine humanitarian concern for him, bringing him both 
money and moral support.
14
 In Lucian’s view, the Christians are foolish, misguided (for they 
treat Peregrinus as a god), and child-like (for Peregrinus’ knowledge of their lore makes them 
all appear childish), but the satirist appears to have only positive things to say about their 
moral conduct. If the Christians were opposed for their flagitia, then it is not a charge that 
Lucian thought important to reflect in his account. 
                                                 
11
 Ibid. 10.97.2. si deferantur et arguantur, puniendi sunt (‘if they are brought before you and proven (to be 
Christian), they must be punished’). 
12
 Sherwin-White 1964:25. 
13
 Justin, for example, attempted to deflect these accusations by blaming them on Gnostic heresy (1 Apol. 
1.26.7). 
14
 Luc. De mort. Peregr. 12-13. 
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De Ste. Croix vigorously opposed the position of Sherwin-White on the centrality of 
flagitia, arguing that it was clear that both Pliny and Trajan regarded it as essential to acquit 
repentant Christians. Pliny questions an ei, qui omnino Christianus fuit, desisse non prosit, 
whilst in reply Trajan confirms that qui negaverit se Christianum esse... veniam ex 
paenitentia impetret.
15
 De Ste. Croix suggested that this in itself invalidates the ‘immorality 
theory’: “if you take charges of cannibalism seriously, you do not pardon the cannibal simply 
because they tear up their membership cards of the Cannibal’s Club”.16 Furthermore, if the 
charge were based on immorality, then Pliny’s failure to find evidence of flagitia would be 
enough to throw the accusation out. We know from other sources that the potential 
repercussions against would-be prosecutors bringing false charges could be extreme: in his 
rescript to Minucius Fundanus, Hadrian gives the governor explicit instructions:        
    φ                            , δ  λ  β              δ              φ                
  δ        .17 The delatores must therefore have been fairly sure that Pliny would prosecute 
even in the absence of absolute evidence; de Ste. Croix argued that Trajan’s confirmation of 
this attitude implies that there is something inherently wrong with Christianity itself, quite 
apart from any related flagitia.
18
 He does admit that flagitia may have played a part, even if 
not a substantial one: “there is not the least suggestion in Pliny’s letter or in Trajan’s reply 
                                                 
15
 Pliny Ep. 10.96.2:  ‘(I am uncertain) whether, if anyone was once a Christian, he should not benefit by ceasing 
to be one’; 10.97.2: ‘If anyone denies that he is a Christian... pardon is to be granted as a result of his 
repentance’. This seems to be confirmed by the Syriac Martyr Acts, which suggest that, if the defendants 
confess and repent, they are to be acquited (Mart. Sham. Gur. 42). See also Mar Mari 26. 
16
 De Ste. Croix 1964:31. See also Engberg 2007:317. 
17
 ‘If anyone brings the matter forward for the purpose of blackmail, investigate strenuously and be careful to 
inflict penalties adequate to the crime’ (tr. Loeb). Euseb. Hist. eccl.  .9.3. “ nder such circumstances, the 
accuser would have to be quite certain of the accused’s devotion before daring to make any such accusation” 
(Engberg’s 2007:208-9). Trajan’s reply to Pliny is a stern warning against anonymous charges; with this in 
mind delatores would be unlikely to press fabricated or unlikely charges. For repercussions against 
prosecutors in criminal trials, see e.g. Tac. Ann. 3.37.1, which describes how two equestrians, Considius 
Aequus and Caelius Cursor, were punished by the Senate in AD 21 for bringing false charges against the 
praetor Magius Caecilianus.  
18
 De Ste. Croix 1964:30. 
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that on this occasion the “flagitia” were actually the ground of persecution, although Pliny 
was prepared to regard persecution for “flagitia” as a theoretical possibility”.19 
How does this theory fit with the evidence of our Near Eastern Christian sources? 
Meliton is little use here; morality is not a concern to him, since, as observed above, ‘sin’ and 
‘error’ are spiritual rather than ethical. However, both Tatian and the Syriac translator of 
Aristides defend Christian moral practice vigorously against gentile accusers. Aristides 
writes: nšttqwn mkyl lšnyhwn dmmllyn sryqwtʾ wʽšqy lkrsṭyn’. wnmllwn mkyl šrrʾ;20 he goes 
on to show that Christian conduct is exemplary, in contrast to that of their accusers.
21
 Tatian 
adopts a very similar approach, and is even more explicit in his engagement with 
cannibalism, discussing the stories of Kronos, Zeus and Pelops.
22
 On the surface, both of 
these passages appear to engage with exactly the debate that Sherwin-White favours, namely, 
the supposition that Christians were perceived as wicked or immoral. However, I argued 
above, in the case of Aristides, that this sort of apologetic is not his main aim: demonstration 
of the moral superiority of Christian practice is intended to convince gentiles to recognise 
their own sin and to convert. Although Aristides is concerned with these accusations (as 
highlighted in the passage above), the main aim of this section is quite clearly missionary. 
Tatian is more explicitly concerned with these accusations of flagitia:    βλ            ,   
  δ     λλ         δ       λ               λ                              
           23 This is clearly intended to convince gentiles that the Christians are not wicked 
                                                 
19
 Ibid:30. 
20
 Aristides 27.6-28.1: ‘now let the tongues of those speaking emptiness who slander the Christians be silenced, 
and let them now speak the truth’. 
21
 See above, 4.5.1. 
22
 Ibid. 25.3. For the passage, see above, 4.5.3. 
23
 Tatian Or. 25.3: ‘what harm do we do to you, men of Greece? Why are you disgusted by those who follow the 
word of God as if they were the most defiled of all?’. 
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or immoral; we can only conclude, therefore, that Tatian was aware of such accusations.
24
 
However, as with Aristides, this is not his major aim. Tatian’s defence of Christianity is 
based on a rational exploration which sets it alongside Classical philosophy,
25
 and moral 
apologetic is merely a part of this. For both Tatian and Aristides, then, it is clear that 
accusations of immorality, and particularly incest and cannibalism, were part of the dialogue 
with gentiles, but they were not prominent enough to be considered a major threat. We may 
therefore discard the flagitia theory as the primary cause of Christian persecution in the Near 
East. 
 
5.2.2 The contumacia (or ‘obstinacy’) theory. 
The second option, again proposed by Sherwin-White, is the ‘obstinacy theory’.26 He 
once again demonstrated this in Pliny’s Letters 10.96; he argued that once Pliny discovers 
that the charges of flagitia are unfounded, his anger is instead directed at the obstinacy of 
those Christians who refuse to repent. Pliny writes: neque enim dubitam, qualecumque esset 
quod faterentur, pertinaciam certe et inflexibilem obstinationem debere puniri. fuerunt alii 
similis amentiae,
27
 quos, quia cives Romani erant, adnotavi in urbem remittendos.
28
 This 
                                                 
24
 Unfortunately, we have nothing to tell us the grounds on which Tatian’s mentor, Justin, was put to death, as it 
is possible that it was on the grounds of flagitia and that Tatian therefore hopes to refute similar accusations. 
However, as Hunt convincingly argued, the Address probably dates to before Justin’s martyrdom (2003:3). 
See above, 1.4.3. 
25
 See above, 4.9. 
26
 Sherwin-White 1964. 
27
 There may be a parallel between the use of amentia in Pliny and the insanity of the Bacchanalia in 186 BC. 
The charge features in a number of other instances: Saturninus, in Acts of the Scillitan Martyrs, suggests that 
Christians can be pardoned if they abandon their amentia (1). Lucian was extremely critical of the naivete of 
the Christians in welcoming Peregrinus (Peregrinus 11-12); see Engberg 2007:227. It may well be that 
weakness of mind was a feature of charges raised against Christians, but it can hardly be the basis of any 
legal charge. 
28
 Pliny Ep. 10.96.3-4: ‘nor do I doubt that their stubbornness and inflexible obstinacy ought to be punished, 
whatever they confess to. There were also similar raving individuals whom, because they were Roman 
citizens, I have added to the list to be sent to Rome’. Considerable scholarship has been done in comparing 
the treatment of Christianity with the persecution of the Bacchanalia; Nagy argued that for Pliny and other 
Roman elites, “le Christianisme évoquait sans aucun doute le souvenir de Bacchanales” (2002:191). See also 
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theory would account for his willingness to acquit those who do repent. He further justifies 
his argument by highlighting an inscription from Roman Sardinia;
29
 this records how the 
governor is clearly more concerned with the threat posed by contumacia and seditio than with 
the actual border dispute that prompted it.
30
 Lucian says nothing on this subject; the 
Christians are astoundingly naïve,
31
 but do not oppose authority in any sense. At most, one 
                                                                                                                                                        
Grant 1981:161. However, Nagy is guilty of putting a Plinian spin on the events of 186. It seems to me 
unreasonable to assume that, after a gap of nearly three hundred years, the precedent of the Bacchic cult 
would necessarily occur to Pliny: it is certainly misleading to suggest that such a precedent actively shaped 
Pliny’s account, as Nagy suggested.  As with the case of Christianity, the majority of the debate focusses on 
the cause of this persecution: while Livy’s account, found in 39.8-19, focusses heavily on the immoral 
practices of the participants, we also have the senatus consultum recording the Senate’s response (ILS 18; 
see Beard, North and Price 1998b:288-291 for an account of these parallel sources), which appears to ignore 
such practices altogether: “le texte épigraphique de Tiriolo ne recourt à aucun de ces griefs; il se content de 
menacer ceux qui auraient appartenu à une des associations bachiques interdites, et dont le «crime» serait 
précisément de se soustraire à cette interdiction, se révélant ainsi comme des ennemis de la res publica” 
(Pailler 1988:140). However, this does not mean that immoral practices were irrelevant to the senatus 
consultum, but simply that legislation already existed for dealing with such practices, and that therefore the 
senatus consultum did not need to concern itself with them. Other readings focussed more on the 
interpretation of the Bacchanalia as either a political threat or as a superstitio: Davies, for example, argued 
that the danger of the cult was that it lay outside accepted religious structures, and therefore jeopardised the 
res publica (2004:81); Nagy insisted that the internal organisation of the cult posed a real threat to the state 
(2002:181). See also Guterman 1951:37. In contrast, Pailler suggested that the reaction of the authorities 
epitomised the climate of religious panic which pervaded at the end of the Punic Wars: he highlights the 
sacrifice of two Gauls and two Greeks, discovered in the forum (discussed by Plutarch above), as an 
example of this (1988:156; see also Goar 1978:21). It is worth observing that Livy’s account follows exactly 
the same pattern as the discovery of a prodigy: some previously unknown occurrence, breaking natural or 
moral boundaries, is reported to the Senate, who vote, consult the Sybilline books when necessary, and take 
action. We see the same procedure in the discovery, description and punishment of the cult in Livy’s 
account. It is possible that Livy therefore interpreted the cult as a prodigy (and therefore associated it 
explicitly with divine anger): as Davies argued, this pattern is essential to understanding Livy’s 
interpretation of religion and his explanation of events (2004:29). However, it lacks any of the technical 
terminology which Livy usually applies to prodigies (such as nuntiatum est; see Davies 2004:32-41). 
However, even if we are to interpret this as the treatment of the Bacchanalia as a superstitio, there is no other 
evidence in the text to reinforce this, although, as Janssen pointed out, “die Feier der Bacchanalien zwar 
nicht expressis verbis als eine Form von superstitio bezeichnet, aber sämtliche Voraussetzungen sind da, um 
sie als solche zu kennzeichnen” (1975:153). Furthermore, there is no evidence in the senatus consultum to 
suggest the same: the likely conclusion, in agreement with Nagy and Davies, is that the Bacchanalia 
represented a coniuratio, and was therefore punished for different reasons for those applied to Christianity 
three centuries later.  
29
 Sherwin-White 1964:26; see ILS 5947, which is a composite text recording the decisions of governors 
between AD 66 and 69. 
30
 Sherwin-White also argued that we should translate Marcus Aurelius’ famous objection to Christian 
martyrdom        λ             as ob meram contumaciam (1964:26, M.Aur. Meditations 11.3); however, 
this is a somewhat hypothetical justification, and in any case, Marcus Aurelius’ strictly philosophical (and 
personal) musings, while they offer insight into the attitudes of Stoicism, have no place in a strictly legal 
context. 
31
 Engberg 2007:227. 
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could accuse them of supporting a man jailed by the authorities, but Lucian does not suggest 
that this is in any way reprehensible. 
Of the Near Eastern Christian authors, only Tatian engages with the issue explicitly. 
One might argue that Meliton’s description of the emperor as a sklʼ (‘fool’)32 displays 
extreme contumacia; however, if we are assuming, with Lightfoot, that the text never reached 
any emperor,
33
 one must question how valid this assumption would be. Tatian, on the other 
hand, clearly attempts to defend Christians against accusations that they were uncooperative: 
           φ        λ      β   λ   , ἕ               . δ  λ        δ            
         ,     δ  λ            .34 Again, we must conclude that Tatian was aware of these 
charges, and tried to defend against them. The fact that this line of defence is limited to this 
passage, and that it does not appear in either Meliton or Aristides, however, suggests that 
such accusations were not particularly prominent in gentile attitudes to Christianity in the 
Near East. 
It is worth noting that, in the (much later) Martyrdoms of Habbib and of Shamuna and 
Guria, the governors presiding at their respective trials are clearly concerned with the 
resistance of the defendants to authority. In the Martyrdom of Habbib, the governor is 
angered by the lack of respect that Habbib shows him, for instance.
35
 More tellingly, in both 
accounts, the governor repeatedly threatens the defendant(s) with death if they do not comply 
with the emperors’ will (ṣbyn’ mlk’). This phrase is continually repeated, particularly in the 
                                                 
32
 Meliton 7.6. 
33
 Lightfoot 2007:62. See above, 1.4.2. 
34
 Tatian Or. 4.1: ‘the emperor orders me to pay taxes; I am prepared to pay. Lords order us to serve and to 
service [possibly in the army]’; I recognise the service’. Early Christian thought often interpreted the Roman 
empire as part of God’s will for the world (Clark 2004:8), probably based on the observation that the 
Christian should obey earthly rulers (1 Pe. 2:13; Rom. 13:1). Such suggestions probably find their origin in 
Jesus’ instruction to    δ                                                   (‘give to Caesar what is 
Caesar’s, and to God what is God’s’, Mt. 22:21). 
35
 Mart. Hab. 12. 
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Martyrdom of Shamuna and Guria: on eight different occasions, the Christians’ resistance to 
the will of the emperors is highlighted in a manner that suggests that this is a key element of 
the charge.
36
 However, closer attention reveals that the ‘will of the emperors’ is in fact 
equated with the need to sacrifice to the gods, and to Zeus in particular:
37
 the obstinacy of the 
Christians was apparently not an issue in its own right. 
Furthermore, Engberg pointed out that, while it does have its attractions, the 
contumacia theory is severely limited; if anger at Christians were prompted by their 
obstinacy, then there would be no reason to charge them with an offence that only becomes 
apparent during the trial itself.
38
 De Ste. Croix raised further objections: first and foremost, he 
observed that the word contumacia is not used once in our available material: Pliny uses 
pertinacia and obstinatio, which are not such politically loaded terms;
39
 and secondly, Pliny’s 
‘sacrifice test’ was imposed only upon those Christians who repented in order to test their 
sincerity, and not upon those who obstinately refuse to repent.
40
 Also, the ‘obstinacy theory’ 
fails to account for the fact that Christians are clearly charged for the name itself, that is, for 
no other offence than for being Christian. Obstinacy almost certainly made the situation 
worse, but cannot have provoked the charge in the first place. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 Mart. Sham. Gur. 7, 11, 19, 21, 28, 36, 42, 46. 
37
 Ibid. 2; Mart. Hab. 1. 
38
 Engberg 2007:192. Janssen questioned whether we might broaden the definition of contumacia to include a 
refusal to sacrifice to the gods (1979:132): this would remove Engberg’s objection, but requires us to 
abandon the legal charge of contumacia. 
39
 De Ste. Croix 1963:18; Sherwin-White, countering, observed that such a “prosaic lawyer’s word” (196 :26) 
has no place in a strictly literary context. 
40
 Engberg 2007:192. 
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5.2.3 The coniuratio (or ‘political’) theory. 
Sherwin-White’s association of contumacia and seditio does provide a third option: 
the ‘political theory’. The motives behind such persecution are, according to de Ste. Croix, 
numerous. The Christians were known to worship a convicted political criminal; their loyalty 
to the empire was called into question by their refusal to swear by the emperor’s genius; they 
repeatedly threatened the imminent end of the world; they had a barely veiled hatred of Rome 
most evident in the Revelation of John; and their secretive nature led to suspicion of political 
conspiracy.
41
 This theory has its attractions; firstly, the accusation of political conspiracy may 
also be seen in the suspicion of the secretive nature of the Bacchic cults that led to their 
repression in 186 BC.
42
 Secondly, it seems to find some support in our sources; Tacitus 
explicitly names Christ as a convicted criminal in order to cast doubt on the political 
legitimacy of Christianity, whilst Suetonius identifies them as frequent troublemakers.
43
 
                                                 
41
 De Ste. Croix 1963:16. Clark highlighted a number of features of Christianity which could contribute to this 
understanding: they often met under the cover of darkness, shared food, and, significantly, shared oaths; she 
also argued that the cell network which Christianity relied upon was typical of conspiracy (2004:19-20). Cf. 
Johnson 2009:8. 
42
 See below for discussion of ‘sedition’ in the supression of the cult. 
43
 This interpretation was noted in the discussion of the etymology of the name, as was Suetonius’ association of 
the new cult with a group of troublemakers (Suet. Claud. 25.4). Laupot (2000:233-247) has argued that 
Tacitus Fr. 2 (surviving in Sulp. Sev. Chron. 2.30.6-7) demonstrates that Christiani were identified 
explicitly as a group of Jewish troublemakers known as ‘Nazareans’ distinct from Pauline Christians; that we 
should therefore identify the Chrestianos of Ann. 15.44 with this group; and that Tacitus attacks them for 
their troublemaking and association with riots. Most scholars believe the authorship to be genuine, based on 
certain features of style and phraseology (the use of quippe instead of nam, and the “typically Tacitean” at 
contra (Laupot 2000:237), for example). Laupot therefore argued that the use of stirps (‘branch’ or 
‘descendant’) to identify Christians is a genuinely Tacitean survival and is based on the fact that stirps 
translates the Hebrew nśr (as in the Vulgate of Isa 14:19), which in turn transliterates to 
                    (identified with Christians in Acts 11.26). Laupot argued that it was coincidence, and 
that Severus (and his authorship) would not have been aware of the connection; he further argued that 
Severus could not have redacted the account sufficiently without exposing himself to his peers (2000:243). 
As a result, he suggested, the usage reflects a close identification of the ‘Christians’ and ‘Nazareans’, a 
group who is explicitly associated with the Jewish revolt; this group is in turn to be identified with the 
victims of Annals 15.44, and the destruction of the temple should be seen as an extension of the punishments 
inflicted on them by Nero (245). However, there are problems with this interpretation; Laupot himself 
admitted that the use of religiones (2.30.7) in place of the more familiar superstitiones (as Annals 15.44) is a 
Severan redaction (2000:234); it would surely be more plausible to suggest that the use of stirps is similarly 
a Christian interpolation, especially since Paul uses the connection in Rom. 11:16-2  (using the Greek 
 λ δ  ). This means that Tacitus’ identification of the Chrestiani and a group of rioters known as 
‘Nazareans’ cannot be taken for granted. Secondly, he suggests that Ann. 15.44 refers “unmistakeably” 
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However, two major objections remain. One is methodological: it is a misleading approach to 
separate the political from the religious in the ancient world (and we may therefore dismiss 
Sherwin-White’s claim that “the Roman official is indifferent to the religious aspects in the 
known cases, provided that the Christian sheds his contumacia”)44: such a dichotomy is a 
clear anachronism. The second problem with the ‘political’ theory lies in the fact that Pliny is 
clearly happy to acquit repentant Christians, as noted above. No governor in his right mind 
would risk acquitting a potential traitor simply because he claimed to have repented.
45
 
There is no evidence in the texts to suggest that Near Eastern Christians felt that they 
were considered a political threat. However, one point raised in this discussion requires 
further exploration, namely the Christian refusal to swear by the emperor’s genius.46 I have 
not discussed Near Eastern Christian attitudes to emperor-worship
47
 in this thesis, nor do I 
intend to do so extensively here. In a large part, this is due to the scarcity of material, since 
Tatian, Aristides and Meliton barely dwell on it. Also, emperor-worship is one area in which 
there may be a substantial difference between the Greek East and the Latin West.
48
 In Italy, 
worship of the emperor was restricted to his genius while he was alive; after death (assuming 
the Senate took steps to deify him), temples might be erected to him as a divus. In the East, 
                                                                                                                                                        
(2000:233) to Christiani – but, as demonstrated above, there is indecision over whether to read Christianos 
or Chrestianos. As a result, the groups referred to in the two passages cannot be explicitly identified. 
Laupot’s argument challenges the interpretation of Tacitus’ passage, but relies too heavily on troublesome 
suppositions.  
44
 Sherwin-White 1952:211. 
45
 Nagy (2002:178) attempted to maintain “cette distinction subtile entre coniurationes ordinaire et 
coniurationes d’origine religieuse”, and that this distinction accounts for the relative tolerance of the 
imperial authorities until the third century. However, there is little evidence that the authorities would have 
perceived such a distinction, or if they did, that it affected their treatment in any meaningful way. 
46
 Gradel observed that all men possessed a genius, and “its cultivation did not therefore impute divinity, or 
rather divine status, to its ‘owner’, as did the ‘heavenly honours’ (caelestes honores)’ (2002:7). I have in 
mind the worship of an emperor’s genius which places it beyond the norm. 
47
 I avoid the phrase ‘imperial cult’, because it implies a structured set of processes, often viewed as part of a 
restoration of religion in the early empire; rather, it should be viewed as the restructuring of religion, 
“drawing on the longstanding traditions of Rome, though increasingly focussing on the person of the 
emperor himself” (Beard, North and Price 1998a:169  see also Gradel 2002:7). 
48
 On these differences, and on the functioning of emperor-worship in the western world, see esp. Gradel, who 
felt uncomfortable maintaining this dichotomy (2002:13) and Fishwick 1987. 
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however, such steps were often taken before death. Emperors tried to discourage this sort of 
practice, but with limited success: it seems to have been an accepted part of the running of 
religious life in the Eastern half of the empire.
49
 In Pliny, it appears that offering sacrifices to 
the emperor was part of displaying their loyalty to him, and therefore to the empire at large.
50
 
What evidence is there in Meliton, Aristides and Tatian to suggest that the failure to 
participate in emperor-worship was an accusation levelled at Christians in the Near East? 
Only Meliton appears to engage with the subject. At the beginning of the Euhemeristic 
historiolae, he observes: ʼnʼ dyn ʼmr ʼnʼ. dʼp swlʼ ʼmrt ʽlyhwn dlṣlmʼ hw dmlkʼ dmytw sgdyn. 
whdʼ pšyqʼ lmdʽh. hʼ gyr ʼp hšʼ. lṣlmʼ hw dqsrynʼ sgdyn wmyqryn: ytyr mn dlhnwn qdmy’.51 
Indeed, the entire section appears to be an expansion of this principle:
52
 the gods are 
worshipped on exactly the same basis as the emperor, namely as recognition of the benefits 
which they offer mankind.
53
 However, Meliton is surprisingly neutral on the subject; he does 
not expose the worship of emperors to polemic in the same way as he does the worship of 
images. The absence of polemic in all three authors is somewhat surprising, particularly 
given the prominence of ruler-cult in the Near East. However, it also reflects a similar lack of 
discussion in New Testament material: on the only occasions in which the emperor appears, 
                                                 
49
 Wissowa 2003:348. This was due in no small part to the legacy of Hellenistic ruler-cult, although Millar 
argued that in numerous areas the impact of Hellenism could be considered relatively slight (2006:23). For 
more on the influence of this practice in the development of imperial cult, particularly in the East, see esp. 
Sartre 2001; see also Beard, North and Price 1998a:145-7, Chankowski 2011, esp. 4-5, and Price 1984. 
50
 I do not suggest that such sacrifices were ‘merely’ a statement of loyalty: there is, as in all sacrifices, a 
religious significance. I intend here to show the purpose which Pliny appears to assign to them (in contrast to 
sacrifices to the Roman gods as a whole). Butcher argued that it was largely due to this statement of loyalty 
that Christianity encountered more opposition from the ‘imperial cult’ than from any other cult (2003:370), 
at least in its early stages: as I shall show, however, this interpretation is a little too simplistic.  
51
 Meliton 3.2: ‘but I say also that the Sybil said about them that they worship the images of dead kings. It is 
easy to understand, for even now they worship the images of the Caesars even more than their former gods’. 
52
 I argued above (3.2.1) that the historiolae were included as part of the discussion of emperor-worship in order 
to make the text more relevant to a supposedly imperial readership. 
53
 As Gradel pointed out, the divine world functioned as a form of ‘spectrum’ without fixed boundaries, in 
which it was possible for an individual to be ‘more’ divine because of his actions. As a result, we should 
abandon traditional dichotomies of ‘man’ vs. ‘god’ (2002:27-9). See also Beard, North and Price 1998a:141, 
Versnel 2000:105 and Chaniotis 2011:173-6. 
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the attitude that is promoted is that of subservience and obedience.
54
 The worship of the 
emperor, at first glance, stands hugely at odds with both Christian and Jewish theology:
55
 it is 
worship not just of the man-made, but of man himself, in the place of God the Creator. Why, 
then, is there such little attention paid to it, either in the New Testament or in our Near 
Eastern sources? The answer may be quite simple: polemic against the worship of the 
emperors could very easily have been seen as sedition,
56
 as Pliny’s use of sacrifice as a test of 
loyalty clearly demonstrates.
57
 Meliton, Aristides and Tatian have shown no reluctance to risk 
offending their neighbours, as I shall further demonstrate below; however, that is an entirely 
different matter to getting on the wrong side of the authorities. Since persecutions in the first 
and second centuries were led by individuals, rather than by local government, it would be 
good sense for the Christians to try and avoid angering the authorities as well: the 
consequences of government involvement in persecution becomes clear in the third century, 
with the consequences of Decius’ decree.58  
 
 
 
                                                 
54
 Rom. 13.1. This attitude is promoted on the basis that the emperor (and, indeed, all authorities) are installed 
by the will of God, and rule according to that will. See above, 5.2.2. 
55
 Although Pollini argued that later reverence for the Christian emperors indicated that the problem was not 
with imperial cult in itself, but with the fact that the emperors represented polytheism (2008:181). 
56
 Caligula’s response to the destruction of his statues in Jerusalem is probably to be attributed to concerns over 
seditio rather than megalomania (ibid:192-3). 
57
 Hekster argued that it was under Trajan that the deified emperors became some kind of ‘set’. If this is the 
case, then Pliny’s sacrifice test is designed to ensure loyalty not just to the ruling emperor but to the imperial 
house and the empire at large (2007:108). 
58
 It seems unlikely that Decius’ decree was specifically targeted at Christians; see esp. Rives, who argued that 
the effects on Christianity were only part of a wider set of innovative religious reforms (1999:135). 
Similarly, Green argued that it was aimed at uniting all citizens (which was, by now, everyone) and should 
therefore not be considered to be specifically focussed at Christians (2010:143). In contrast, Gradel argued 
that no emperor could be unawae of the consequence of his actions on Christians, and that it must have been 
a calculated manoeuvre (2002:368). Beard, North and Price observed that by the third century, governors 
were expected to hunt down brigands, thieves, and the sacreligious, and argued that Decius’ decree formed a 
deliberate part of this change in policy (1998a:238-9). Engberg suggested that this debate is in itself 
misleading, and that the treatment of Christianity before and after 250 should not be as clearly separated as is 
traditionally done (2007:21). 
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5.2.4 The civitas (or ‘citizenship’) theory 
A second ‘political’, or perhaps more accurately ‘socio-political’, theory was 
suggested by Rives; he argued that since religious authority and political authority were 
inherently intertwined (notably in the fact that the priesthoods were held almost universally 
by magistrates, at least in traditional cult),
59
 the authorities would inevitably feel challenged 
by rival claims to religious knowledge and authority; this, in his view, is the reason for 
Roman attitudes to self-proclaimed ‘holy men’ such as Jesus of Nazareth and Apollonius of 
Tyana.
60
 Whilst the priests did not hold a monopoly on religious interpretation (which, even 
in public cult, was an inherently private business),
61
 religious knowledge was supposed to be 
derived within the structures of ‘traditional’ cult, based around prodigy, expiation, sacrifice 
and oracular utterances. Suspicion of those who sought religious knowledge elsewhere is best 
demonstrated by the threat posed by magic, which offered dangerous means to aims which 
could (in theory) be achieved along more traditional lines.
62
  
Green expanded on this theory, arguing argued that the problem with Christianity was 
that it was a “religion without any national identity or laws”.63 Christianity was not, therefore, 
inherently tied up with the survival of the state, and Christians could not be classed as ‘true’ 
citizens.
64
 Green demonstrates at length the difficulty that Christians had in claiming 
‘citizenship’, given their reluctance to participate in games, festivals, or even sign written 
                                                 
59
 Rives 2007:44, although he did not name it as such: the idea of the civitas theory is my own creation, to help 
it sit alongside the theories discussed by de Ste. Croix, Engberg and Sherwin-White. For detailed discussion 
of the political role of priests, see Beard, North and Price 1998:23-30 and Gordon 1990. 
60
 Rives 2007:166. On the phenomenon of these individuals, see Georgi 1976. 
61
 Rives 2007:45. No single religious group claimed to have absolute authority over interactions with the gods 
(Beard, North and Price 1998:21). 
62
 Rives suggested that erotic love, so often the focus of magical enchantments, could be attained through prayer 
and sacrifice to Venus/Aphrodite (2007:172). See  avies’ discussion of Livy’s presentation of Scipio 
Africanus’ unorthodox approach to the divine (200 :127-30). 
63
 Green 2010:124.  
64
 Guterman, who argued that the failure to honour the traditional gods represented alliance to a different state, 
and therefore put one at odds with the Roman people (1951:21-3). 
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contracts (which required an oath to the gods):
65
 their social involvement in the life of the 
state would have been very limited. This argument is much more convincing than the 
‘sedition’ theory: Christianity’s ‘separateness’ from the life of the state may have been 
considered harmful without necessarily accusing them of sedition, simply assuming that 
Christians were not ‘good citizens’; in a society which relied upon community and 
unification, emphasised through social contracts such as patronage, this would have been 
considered repulsive and made persecution almost inevitable.
66
 
We might suggest that the distinction of mankind into Greeks, Barbarians, Jews and 
Christians found in the Syriac translation of Aristides reflects just such a concern:
67
 firstly, it 
appears to remove Christians as a social group from the world around them, and secondly, it 
clearly derives their religious authority as a group from Christ. Christians are therefore 
established not simply as a separate ethnic group, with their own concerns, but as a separate 
priesthood.
68
 However, Aristides does not make a great deal of this distinction: he simply 
uses it to characterise the different religious and moral practices of different groups. Taken 
together with the fact that there is no such discussion in either Meliton or Tatian, this suggests 
that this was not a major feature of the dialogue with gentiles in the Near East. 
It should be noted that labelling these as ‘political’ theories is somewhat misleading; 
they seem to have more to do with society or religion than politics. However, it is very 
difficult, and very dangerous, to distinguish between the religious and the secular in the 
ancient world – largely because, as observed above, the magistrates and priests were the same 
people. A challenge to religious authority, then, also constituted a challenge to political 
                                                 
65
 Green 2010:125.  
66
 Ibid:132. 
67
 Aristides 3.2. 
68
 See e..g. 1 Pet. 2:9, quoting Exod. 19:6. 
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authority: it can be labelled a ‘political’ theory in this sense, but caution must be exercised in 
such a distinction.  
 
5.2.5 The superstitio (or ‘ungodliness’) theory 
This leaves the fifth option: the ‘ungodliness’ theory favoured by de Ste. Croix and 
Engberg.
69
 Scholars often object to this theory on the grounds that polytheistic religion is 
assumed to be more tolerant than monotheistic cult;
70
 however, this represents a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the nature of tolerance in the ancient world: indeed, Pollini argued that 
the very ideas of ‘tolerance’ or ‘intolerance’ could not be appropriately applied to polytheistic 
religious life in the Near East:
71
 a willingness to accept foreign gods did not imply a 
willingness to accept foreign practices.
72
 If Christians are convicted for ‘ungodliness’, then 
this accounts for Pliny’s willingness to acquit the repentant; it also accounts for the fact that 
Christians are clearly charged on the basis of their nomen. Christianity is clearly understood 
to be explicitly associated with some abhorrence.
73
 It must be noted that Tacitus, Pliny and 
Suetonius, although their accounts are otherwise distinct, all describe Christianity as a 
                                                 
69
 De Ste. Croix (1963/4) did not explicitly label his preference as such; the term ‘ungodliness theory’ is derived 
from Engberg’s excellent assessment of de Ste. Croix’s debate with Sherwin-White (2007:76). Engberg used 
‘ungodliness’ rather than ‘atheism’ because the word atheist,      , does not have the same negative 
connotations as in modern understanding (ibid:197).  
70
 As e.g. Berlin: “the tolerance of ancient polytheistic societies for both internal and external religious diversity 
stands in marked contrast to the exclusivity that is the hallmark of monotheistic religions” (1996a: )  cf. 
Wissowa 2003:336, who argued that tolerance was “characteristic of all polytheism” (2003:336). See also 
MacMullen 1981:2. Guterman argued that tolerance was selective rather than assimilative with regards to 
foreign cults (1951:27); however, as we have seen, his claim that the Roman state had a largely laissez-faire 
policy is misleading (ibid:119): as we saw in the letters between Pliny and Trajan, it is impossible to talk 
about a ‘policy’ of tolerance in any sense.  
71
 Pollini 2008:186. Beard, North and Price argued that the concept of tolerance was inapplicable to religious 
life in the Graeco-Roman world as a whole (1998a:212). 
72
 Davies observed of Livy that, whilst the historian was accepting of foreign gods, he was far less so on their 
rites (2004:81). For more on the understanding of tolerance in this context, particularly in the Near East, see 
e.g. Sartre: the openness of Syrian Hellenism “does not authorize us to imagine a society of universal 
tolerance and harmony” (2008: 8).  
73
 De Ste. Croix 1964:25. 
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superstitio.
74
 Although Tacitus does criticize Christianity’s wickedness, as noted above, the 
context makes it clear that an altogether greater issue is at stake. He mentions Christianity in 
the context of what is a perfectly legitimate process of attempting to propitiate the gods by 
means of sacrifice in order to alleviate the effects of the fire.
75
 This is immediately followed 
by Tacitus’ attack upon this ‘deadly superstitio’. The implication is clear: the Christians 
represent a disruption of the pax deorum, and it is they who must be eradicated in order to 
restore it. This interpretation is confirmed by his later note which criticises Nero for his 
brutality, but adds that the Christians did indeed deserve to be punished.
76
 Since he does not 
discuss immoral conduct, we must conclude that the threat is posed not by incest or 
cannibalism but by some form of improper religious conduct. 
We note this also in Lucian’s text. He writes:                             δ        
        λ                        β                       .77 If Lucian’s tone should 
encourage us to think he is sympathetic (as the Loeb translation ‘poor wretches’ implies), 
then the term of reproach,        δ       , should force us to think again. Whilst it can 
simply mean ‘wretched’, it is used consistently in tragedy to describe to plight of the lead 
character, and is often associated with abandonment by the gods; LSJ even suggest that it 
could imply being possessed by an evil spirit.
78
 If Lucian, as is likely, wishes to present the 
Christians in a tragic sense, then he does not intend us to feel sympathy for them, but to 
understand that they have brought their fate upon themselves. The Christians’ conduct, and 
                                                 
74
 Suetonius describes the Christians as genus hominum superstitionis novae ac maleficae, ‘a race of men of a 
new and wicked superstitio’ (Nero 16.2). 
75
 For discussion of this process in Livy and Tacitus, see above, 3.2.2.1, and Davies 2004. 
76
 Tac. Ann. 15.44.4: novissima exempla meritos (‘deserving of being made new examples’). On the above 
understanding, Christians were to blame for the fire, but only in the sense that they provoked the divine 
anger by their superstitio – they were, in a sense, ‘indirectly’ responsible. Engberg (2007:225) suggests that 
Tacitus himself did not believe this, but that it was an accurate reflection of the prevailing opinion of his 
times. However, see Davies’ comments (above) on Tacitus’ ‘belief’. 
77
 Luc. De mort. Peregr. 13: ‘those poor wretches think that they will be immortal and live for all time’ (tr. 
Loeb). 
78
 LSJ s.v.    όδ     , citing Antipho 5.43. 
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particularly their claim to have knowledge that will make them immortal, not only leaves 
them in this desperate (and apparently deserved) position, but also influences their conduct in 
the world. Lucian, it seems, is in full agreement with Pliny and Tacitus in opposing Christians 
on the basis of their religion.
79
 
 
5.2.5.1 Defining superstitio 
Is it possible to form a clearer definition of superstitio that could be applied to 
Christianity? Superstitio is far more serious than the English translation ‘superstition’ would 
imply; as noted above, Tacitus describes it as exitiabilis (‘deadly’).80 Rives identified two 
potential strands which might constitute the ‘ungodliness’ of Christians:81 the first, which he 
labelled as atheism, does not describe the failure to ‘believe’ in the divine, but rather to 
honour the divine in a correct way.
82
 The second strand is that of superstitio, which he 
described as an incorrect or ‘excessive’ religiosity.83 We might then distinguish between a 
‘positive’ and ‘negative’ criticism: one focuses on what the Christians fail to do, one 
describes what they do. Tertullian acknowledged that gentile hostility is founded upon 
Christian rejection of traditional cult;
84
 it is the ‘negativism’ of Christianity, and not its 
‘positivism’, that is most frequently attacked. This seems to be true for the most part; the 
governor of Egypt, for example, asks Dionysus, Bishop of Alexandria:                λ    
                                                 
79
 Engberg 2007:227. 
80
 Tac. Ann. 15.44; see also Scheid 1984:24-5 and Janssen 1979:133. Horace described superstitio as a morbus 
mentis (Sat. 2.3.79-80), emphasising its seriousness. 
81
 Rives 2007:183. 
82
 Walsh argued that atheism is not a problem in Roman eyes: he suggested that whilst some may have been 
irritated or considered it a threat to the pax deorum, “most would not have cared as long as conditions were 
generally peaceful” (1991:256). However, this does Romans a great disservice by suggesting that they did 
not take such attacks on the pax deorum extremely seriously.  
83
 Rives 2007:184.  
84
 Tert. Apol. 24.1. 
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          ,                 ,               φ                    .85 De Ste. Croix argued 
that this is the case: “it was not so much the positive beliefs and practices of the Christians 
which aroused gentile hostility, but above all the negative elements in their religion: their 
total refusal to worship any god but their own”.86 Rives was correct to observe two elements 
to the criticism of Christianity, but it is not at all clear that they should be so firmly 
distinguished. Tacitus charges both Egyptian and Jewish rituals with superstitio; he calls the 
Egyptians dedita superstitionibus gens,
87
 and the grounds for this charge are that they 
worship Serapis above all other deities. The Jews are described in very similar terms: they 
are a gens superstitioni obnoxia, religionibus adversa.
88
 Charges made against the Jews are 
based not on incorrect performance of their rites (they, at least, were happy to offer sacrifice 
to their God, unlike the Christians), but rather on their ‘excessive’ religion – that is, their 
single-minded commitment to a single deity at the expense of other gods (and thereby 
endangering the pax deorum).
89
 If superstitio can be understood in this sense, then atheism is 
                                                 
85
 Euseb. Hist. eccl. 7.11.9: ‘who prevents you from worshipping this god, if he is a god, along with the natural 
gods?’ Significantly, the governor, Aemilianus, allows worship of the Christian God as long as he is only 
one amongst others. The emperor Severus Alexander was reported to have sacred images of the deified 
emperors – and added to these images of Christ and Abraham (SHA Sev. Alex. 29.2). 
86
 De Ste. Croix 1963:24. 
87
 Tac. Hist. 4.81.2: ‘a race given over to superstitio’. Beard, North and Price argued that by Tacitus’ period, 
superstitio comes to be used as an easy means of referring to foreign religion (‘foreign’ in the sense of 
different or bizarre rather than simply ‘from another land’), and that therefore the application to Jews and 
Egyptians is not as specific as suggested here (1998a:222); see also Lieu 2004:274. However, whether or not 
the charge is specifically aimed at Jewish and Egyptian rites in particular, the fact remains that some features 
of these rites were considered bizarre and therefore superstitio. It should be noted that Tacitus is not critical 
of all other religious systems (ibid:222), and this is in keeping with other classical authors: Pliny the Elder, 
for example, applauds a fire-walking cult of Apollo (HN 7.19). 
88
 Tac. Hist. 5.13.1: ‘a race prone to superstitio and hostile to correct religious practice’. He does, however, have 
a grudging respect for the antiquity of their cult: hi ritus quoquo modo inducti antiquitate defenduntur 
(‘these rites, whatever their origin, are sanctioned by their antiquity’, ibid. 5.5). This is in distinct contrast to 
the Christians, as the historian notes explicitly that their cult was founded only during the reign of Tiberius: 
they do not even have the validation of antiquity to support the supposed supremacy of their cult. On the 
antiquity of the Jews and other reasons for the concessions made to Judaism, see Guterman 1951:103-5; 
Clark 2004:6; Beard, North and Price 1998a:223. 
89
 The Jews are criticised for abhorrent practices, but these (which are notably circumcision and the refusal to 
eat pork, as well as ‘ritual characteristics’ such as excessive lust and xenophobia) are not located within a 
ritual context. Unless their critics understood these practices to be a part of their ritual life, it seems unlikely 
that they would be counted amongst the charges of superstitio.  
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a part of the charge of superstitio and not an alternative to it.
90
 
Janssen has added an extra level of understanding, based on the Ciceronian definition 
of the abstract noun superstitio,
91
 which Cicero understands as being derived from the Latin 
noun superstes, meaning a ‘survivor’: that is, one who prays day and night that his or her 
children might survive. This leads to the understanding of Rives, Walsh and others that 
superstitio must be considered an ‘excessive’ form of religio; however, Janssen also 
suggested that superstitio is opposed to religio not just in degree but because it sought the 
preservation of the individual rather than the res publica Romana.
92
 This is an ingenious 
theory which could certainly be applied to Christian eschatology, which did emphasise the 
salvation of the few and the destruction of the whole (and especially of Rome); however, it is 
uncertain that all three of Tacitus, Suetonius and Pliny would have become aware of Christian 
eschatological doctrine by their time of writing. Furthermore, there is not a hint of this 
                                                 
90
 Walsh disagreed: he argued that atheism was not included in the charge of superstitio, which was primarily 
concerned with foreign or excessive cults (1991:260). We may find some support for this position in 
Plutarch (De superst. 6.167d), who observes that the atheist (     ) is far less dangerous than the one with 
δ    δ        (‘fear of the divine’) because this latter involves a wrong understanding of the divine:        
                               ,    δ                            (‘the former think that they do not exist, 
the latter that they exist and do evil’). Russell argued that the weak mind tended towards δ    δ        and 
the headstrong towards atheism (1968:134). However, in this sense, δ    δ        is only a partial 
translation of superstitio: according to the definitions given above, δ    δ        is closer to a violation of 
pietas than of religio, whereas superstitio clearly includes the incorrect conduct of rite. However, Plutarch’s 
understanding of δ    δ        does highlight that it was possible to have both ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ 
interpretations of the divine: the huge number of inscriptions across the empire highlighting the benevolence 
of the gods emphasises this ‘correct’ attitude (Rives 2007:98). This is reinforced by Cicero, who also claims 
that superstitio is a timor inanis deorum (‘pointless fear of the gods’, Nat. D. 2.42): that is, an incorrect 
understanding of the divine. Solmsen highlighted three means of interpretation in Cicero’s text: the ratio 
civilis, the ratio fabularis and the ratio physica (1944:59; see Cic. Nat. D. 2.70-2, although Solmsen noted 
that these terms are not used explicitly). Adoption of the wrong interpretation (and therefore understanding) 
of the divine leads to superstitio. We must be cautious in assuming that Cicero’s works necessarily represent 
genuine religious sentiment, although this is more vital in his speeches than his philosophical works 
(Heibges 1969:304). 
91
 Cicero Nat. D. 2.28. Janssen noted that Plautus uses superstitiosus to mean ‘clairvoyant’ (Curcilio 3.1.28), but 
claims that Cicero’s is the original understanding (1979:139). See also Janssen 1975: “dann ein besonders 
wichtiger formaler Zusammenhang zwischen superstes und superstitiosus hergestellt worden” (1 0). He also 
discussed, and dismissed, the connection between superstitio and various Greek terms, particularly         :  
“weil er bei Plautus und Ennius für superstitiosus die Bedeutung ‘wahrsagend’ ‘weisagericht’ vorfand... der 
ursprünglich Wortsinn von superstitio sei ‘Darüberstehen’ – ‘Hinauftreten’ und das Wahrsagen sei zu 
verstehen als eine r mische Version der griechischen               ” (137)  “lässt sich nun keine 
Verbindung zwischen superstitio und          herstellen” (138). 
92
 Janssen 1979:142. 
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meaning in the use of superstitio of Jews and Egyptians. Jews were recognised as 
troublemakers, but no more than that, whilst the Egyptians, although once the enemy, were no 
longer. The idea of personal rather than public salvation may have some weight, but it is 
unlikely and certainly cannot be proven. The main weight of superstitio lies in features of 
Christian ritual, together with their rejection of the Roman gods. 
De Ste. Croix was adamant that we should adopt the ‘ungodliness’ theory. He argued 
that “the reproaches of flagitia seem to have been essentially appendages of some more real 
complaint” 93 this is certainly reflected in the account of Tacitus, and also in that of Pliny, 
once he discovers that such accusations have no ground: he writes ‘nihil aliud inveni quam 
superstionem pravam, immodicam’.94 The fourth century apologist Lactantius provides the 
final word in this respect; he claims that nimirum religio ueri cultus est, superstitio falsi. 
Lactantius’ inversion of the terminology here would only make sense if Christianity was 
commonly identified as a superstitio and treated as such.
95
 
As will have been seen thus far in the thesis, Meliton, Tatian and the Syriac translator 
of Aristides focus almost entirely on religious matters. This takes different forms: Meliton is 
concerned with the practice of image-worship, Aristides with the powerlessness and 
immorality of gentile gods, and Tatian with the superiority of Christianity as a philosophy. 
However, it is clear that Near Eastern Christianity viewed issues surrounding the gods and 
religious practice as the key area in their dialogue with their gentile neighbours. This focus on 
                                                 
93
 De Ste. Croix 1963:21. 
94
 Plin. Ep. 10.96.8: ‘I found nothing except a depraved and unrestrained superstitio’. Nagy argued that we 
should consider this a form of acquittal: “d’habitude, on considère cette constatation de Pline comme une 
sorte d’acquittement, comme l’expression de sa conviction que les Chrétiens ne sont pas coupables de 
crimes de droit commun” (2002:189). However, this ignores the fact that the guilty Christians were punished 
nonetheless. Nagy may well be right to observe that Christianity was more than an ordinary superstitio 
(ibid:178), but Pliny’s comment implies that the fact of the superstitio was the fundamental offence: with no 
other charges attached, they were condemned to death on the strength of this charge alone. 
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 Lactant. Div. inst. 4.28.11: ‘religio is the worship of the true God, superstitio of the false’. See Beard, North 
and Price 1998a:215 for discussion of the contrasting elements in this passage. 
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the religious, rather than the moral or political, is not entirely surprising: all three advocate a 
change in deity, not in lifestyle or citizenship (or, at least, not exclusively, and not literally), 
and therefore religious debate inevitably takes centre stage. However, it strongly suggests that 
Near Eastern Christianity was more likely to be opposed as a superstitio than as a coniuratio 
or because of its flagitia. This is also seen in the Martyrdoms of Habbib and of Shamuna and 
Guria: although, as noted above, they are required to obey the emperor’s will (ṣbyn’ mlk’), 
this takes the form of sacrifice to the gods, and to Zeus in particular. It is the fact that 
Christians fail to sacrifice to the gods that led to the charges against the martyrs, and it is 
therefore on these grounds that Christianity in the Near East was primarily opposed. 
 
5.3 The evolution of hostility 
Sherwin-White did not deny that by Lactantius’ time the battle certainly was fought 
over ‘ungodliness’;96 however, he pointed out, rightly, that de Ste. Croix’s methodology 
begins late and works backwards. As a result, he argued, we should consider a situation 
whereby the ‘immorality theory’ developed into the ‘obstinacy theory’, finally becoming the 
‘ungodliness theory’ at some point in the late second century; as proof, he pointed out that the 
last time flagitia is used seriously as a charge is in the events at Lyons in AD 177.
97
 By the 
time Origen replied to Celsus in the fourth century, he did not feel sufficiently threatened by 
allegations of immorality to defend against them.  
It is almost certain that the theories should not be separated as clearly as I have done 
above: there are clearly overlaps between, for example, the denial of the gods and one’s 
                                                 
96
 Sherwin-White 1964:25. 
97
 Ibid. See also Euseb. Hist. eccl. 4.7.14. 
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political and social life.
98
 Sherwin-White’s suggestion that we should talk of an ‘evolution’ of 
gentile attitudes certainly has attractions in this respect; however, it does not account for the 
clear fact that all of our classical authors take objection to some religious feature of 
Christianity: otherwise they would not so consistently stress that Christianity was an 
unwelcome superstitio.
99
 
 
4.3.1 Chimerical, xenophobic and realistic hatred 
Engberg provided a theory that may help to resolve this issue. Building on the 
approach of Langmuir in his study of medieval anti-Semitism, Engberg identified three 
separate forms of hatred or hostility: the realistic, whereby hatred of an external group is 
motivated by careful consideration of a wide range of information; the xenophobic, whereby 
hatred of an external group is motivated with some, but by no means all, evidence; and the 
chimerical, whereby hatred of an external group is motivated by judgements based on little or 
no evidence at all.
100
 Engberg associated the different theories of opposition with these three 
forms of hatred,
101
 which can be accepted with some limitations; accusations of incest and 
cannibalism are motivated by chimerical hatred; once one gains some knowledge of 
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 As we see in Tert. Apol. 10.1. Given the close relationship between politics, society and religion, this is hardly 
surprising. See Green 2010:120-7. Indeed, Lieu argued that there is no need to concern ourselves with the 
precise reason for the charges made against Christians (2004:254), but this ignores the fact that Pliny 
demonstrates a clear determination to bring the correct legal charge; it also undermines our assessment of the 
relationship between Christians and their gentile neighbours. Furthermore, Beard, North and Price argued 
that accusations of superstitio also included elements of political subversion (as in the attack on the Jews), 
and was primarily concerned with the threat that ‘irregular’ religious practice posed (1998a:220-2); rejection 
of superstitio therefore provided political unity amongst the elite (ibid:299). 
99
 It is true that Tacitus’ attitude says more of his own time than of the reality under Nero in the middle of the 
first century. As Engberg (2007:217) observed, the historian’s chief concern is to make sure that the motives 
are recognisable (and plausible) to his readership. As such, it may be accepted that Tacitus’ presentation is 
accurate for the beginning of the first century. Sherwin-White suggested that we must not accept it for the 
middle of the first century, but it seems unlikely that matters would have changed as rapidly as would be 
necessary for the total change of attitude Sherwin-White favours. 
100
 Langmuir 1990:325-328; Engberg (2007:30-1). 
101
 Surprisingly, however, he limited his discussion to the ‘immorality’ and ‘ungodliness’ theories. As a result, 
his account of how a chimerical hostility might eventually be replaced by a realistic one is somewhat vague; 
a fuller examination of the different theories in this context would have been more useful. 
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Christianity (as we see with Pliny in his letter to Trajan), these claims cannot be supported by 
the evidence, but the impression of some more ‘general’ immorality remains, which 
represents a xenophobic hostility; the suspicion of treason might also be classed as a 
xenophobic hostility. Finally, when one understands more about Christianity, one realises that 
the true threat is their refusal to worship or sacrifice to the traditional gods, thus putting the 
pax deorum, and thereby the Roman state, in jeopardy. Whilst this may seem ‘unrealistic’ to 
us, it is entirely compatible with ancient modes of thought, especially as expressed by the 
ancient authors, and must therefore be accepted as realistic hostility.
102
 This development is 
most notable in Pliny: he begins with a chimerical hatred, assuming some foul ritual practice 
such as cannibalism or incest; when this is proved by his interrogations to be false, he adopts 
a xenophobic hostility, assuming some more general immorality connected with the name of 
‘Christian’; finally, a fuller study leads to a realistic hostility, in which he recognises the true 
threat of Christianity, in its failure to acknowledge the gods. This would explain the fact that 
Celsus does not appear to charge Christianity as immoral (at least, in the surviving evidence): 
he had clearly studied the teachings of Christianity in order to attack it, and his considerable 
knowledge of Christian doctrine made it unrealistic to accuse them of cannibalism or 
incest.
103
 Thus, it seems possible that all the above theories are ‘correct’ from an early period, 
and that each individual’s motivation depended upon the degree to which he was aware of the 
nature of Christianity: this will certainly have increased over time, as Sherwin-White argued, 
but also allows for the fact that gentiles in the late first and early second centuries may have 
had a realistic hostility of Christianity based on its status as a superstitio. 
It seems that it is difficult to separate the different motivating factors in the response 
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 Engberg 2007:201. 
103
 Cameron highlighted Celsus as an excellent example of this process: by the end of the second century, 
gentile authors were much better informed about Christianity, albeit no more sympathetic (1991:44). 
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to Christianity. Walsh, quite correctly, suggested that such an attempt is always going to 
fail:
104
 the vast majority of people operate with a wide variety of motives rather than just one. 
Indeed, there are others not mentioned here, such as financial motivation.
105
 Indeed, Engberg 
argued that immorality and ungodliness are inherently intertwined.
106
 However, this is an 
oversimplification: as was seen in the previous chapter, morality is not an inherent part of 
religious life in the ancient world. Engberg also argued that obstinacy is a symptom of 
ungodliness: “when an individual no longer honoured and respected the gods, the logical 
outcome would be, according to the Roman mind, clashes with authorities and vice versa”.107 
However, whilst both Jewish and Bacchic superstitio is associated with opposition to Roman 
authority, Egyptian superstitio is not.   
It is, however, misleading to try and identify the sole motivating factor. Given the 
close association between religious and politics, a clear separation is in many cases 
impossible: certain features of the ‘political’ theory would almost certainly be termed 
superstitio (such as seeking religious knowledge and power through magical or other non-
traditional means).
108
 It is highly unlikely that Pliny would have noted a difference between 
being ‘politically’ and ‘religiously’ motivated. On the other hand, it is clear that the charges 
of immorality do not stand up under examination, and it seems unlikely that a solely 
‘political’ theory would have been treated with the relaxed attitude we see from the 
authorities: indeed, prosecutions were initiated by private individuals, and one fails to see 
how they were affected by Christianity’s ‘antisocial’ behaviour. The core of the issue 
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 Walsh 1991:268. 
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 As in the story in Acts 19:24-41, where the silversmiths of Ephesus riot because, seemingly, they will be put 
out of a job. On the apologetic role of this passage, see Fiorenza 1976:17-8 and Alexander 1999. 
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 Engberg 2007:161. 
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 Tacitus, for example, claims that Vitellius turned to superstitio after the failure of his coup d’état – that is, 
superstitio as an alternative source of knowledge and/or power (Hist. 3.58.3). 
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therefore must be the fact that Christianity is recognised as a superstitio.  
 
5.4 The βλ  φ     (or ‘slander’) theory 
There is one further element which de Ste. Croix mentioned in passing, but which 
deserves more attention than he gave it, as it may help to answer the question posed at the 
beginning of this chapter: namely the role that Near Eastern Christian texts could have played 
in the development of persecution. It is clear that Christian doctrine and ritual practice were 
considered dangerous to the pax deorum; however, de Ste. Croix suggested that so-called 
‘voluntary martyrs’ may have had a considerable role to play in motivating hostility.109 He 
noted that “if even a few Christians of the late first and early second centuries had a similar 
craving for martyrdom (as so many others certainly did later), and gave practical expression 
to it, especially if they did so by insulting pagan cults, it would be even easier to understand 
how persecution quickly became endemic in many parts of the Roman world”.110 Similarly, 
Green noted that Minucius Felix displays in Octavius “a frighteningly provocative assault on 
Romanitas”,111 but did not elaborate on just how this was ‘provocative’. A feature of 
Christian ‘ungodliness’ was surely their active attacks on gentile religious life, in literature or 
practice. That this in itself was considered a threat is made explicit in both Origen’s Against 
Celsus and the Acts of the Scillitan Martyrs. Origen defends against suggestions that 
Christians ‘blaspheme’ the ‘manifest’ god,112 while in the Acts the governor Saturninus 
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 These ‘voluntary martyrs’ can be seen in considerable numbers from the Antonine period onwards; for an 
excellent example, see Tert. Ad Scap. 5.1. On this phenomenon, see also Green 2010:132. 
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 De Ste. Croix 1963:24, my italics. 
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112
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similarly claims that the Scillitan martyrs speak mala de sacris nostris.
113
 It is not clear at all 
what we are to make of Celsus’ use of the word βλ  φ      it was defined by LSJ as, 
amongst other things, ‘blasphemy’, ‘irreverence’, and ‘slander’.114 The idea of ‘blasphemy’ in 
gentile religious life is, on the surface, a fanciful one; as Ando argued, that religious life is 
based on empirical knowledge and not on faith,
115 and without faith, how can one blaspheme? 
However, some of this difficulty can be dealt with by distinguishing between concepts of 
βλ  φ     and heresy.116 Heresy requires a core central doctrine and/or authority, whose 
religious teachings are contravened.
117 βλ  φ     requires only that a figure, mortal or 
divine, is slandered: even without central religious authority, the possibility of βλ  φ     is 
entirely plausible.
118
 We saw in Chapters 3 and 4 that, using this definition of βλ  φ    , the 
three Near Eastern Christian authors repeatedly blasphemed both human and divine 
figures.
119
 Similarly, it was observed in Chapter 1 that ‘faith’ (implying a personal conviction 
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 Ando 2008:ix. 
116
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conduct of rite, not the proper interpretation (Rives 2007:116). The lack of such doctrine is one reason for 
scholarly assumptions that polytheistic religion was universally tolerant: “dogmatism and intolerance toward 
the beliefs of others was alien to ancient religions, since the complete absence of the concept of false faith or 
of any forms of heresy were typical of them” ( andamayev 1996: 0). 
118
 As noted above, Plutarch is critical of δ    δ       , which involves an incorrect assessment of or attitude to 
the divine, which he regards as more dangerous than failure to acknowledge the gods at all. Cicero’s On the 
Nature of the Gods shows the hostility that could be provoked by what is seen as an incorrect perception of 
the gods: Velleius, the Epicurean, refers to other doctrines as delirantium somnia (‘the dreams of madmen’, 
Cic. Nat. D. 1.15), whilst Cotta, the Academic, claims that Velleius’ doctrines are not even compatible with 
common sense (1.22). I do not believe that βλ  φ     is a technical term, and therefore we cannot 
necessarily identify such attitudes as explicitly ‘blasphemous’ as one might identify a superstitio; however, 
the sense of wrong attitude to the divine, whether explicitly diagnosed as such or not, is clearly a problem. 
Cicero is commonly understood as a sceptic (see e.g. Burriss 1924:101, 1926:536 and Heibges 1969:304) 
but, as Davies argued for Livy and Tacitus, this word has no frame of reference in this context (2004:2). 
Nevertheless, we must be cautious in assuming that Cicero’s works necessarily represent his own beliefs, 
although this caution is more vital in his speeches than his philosophical works (Heibges 1969:304). 
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 Dandamayev argued that the concept of blasphemy did exist in the Near East, but was exclusively limited to 
“reproaching gods for their indifference to the sufferings of human beings and for ungratefulness for the 
sacrifices offered to them” (1996:  )  this is the same charge which Plato lays agains the poets (see above, 
4.4). However, Dandamayev does not deal at all with the potential repercussions of blasphemy in this sense. 
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and possible a significant relationship with the deity) should be distinguished from ‘belief’ 
(which is simply something one holds to be true); it is entirely possible to blaspheme one’s 
beliefs without even approaching an understanding of faith in gentile religious life. One does 
not need to be passionately, even ‘faithfully’, committed to a belief for the challenging of that 
belief to be considered offensive (or even ‘blasphemous’, if we dare use the word). It seems 
reasonable to assume that βλ  φ     was considered a part of the problem posed by 
Christianity, although it may have been indistinguishable from other areas of their religious 
conduct.  
We see this particularly in the much later Acts of Mar Mari the Apostle, which details 
the miracles performed by one of the disciples of Addai. During his journeys, he occasionally 
faces opposition from the gentile inhabitants of the cities that he visits. In Erbil, for instance, 
the inhabitants are angry because Mar Mari tore down their statues and insulted their gods;
120
 
this shows exactly the kind of reaction such conduct might be expected to provoke. Similarly, 
Mar Mari incurs the wrath of the ruler of Shahqirt, somewhere east of Kirkuk, when he 
accuses him of worshipping demons;
121
 when he makes a similar claim to the priests of an 
(unspecified) temple in Seleucia, they become equally irate.
122
 Although the text itself was 
written much later than the period with which I am concerned, the Acts of Mar Mari clearly 
shows an awareness that Christian attitudes towards gentile religious life could cause grave 
insult. 
Given the level of hostility we see in Meliton, Tatian and the Syriac translator of 
Aristides, combined with their often inaccurate presentations of local religious life, it would 
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in fact be very surprising if their gentile neighbours did not take offence:
123
 even if they did 
not encounter the texts themselves directly,
124
 it is unlikely that the attitudes we see in these 
three authors were not reflected in Christian treatment of their neighbours. This is made even 
more plausible when we consider the Near Eastern Christian attitudes towards the morality of 
the gentiles themselves: although not always specific or extensive, the three authors discussed 
in this thesis are universally hostile. In this instance, the βλ  φ     is directed not at the 
beliefs of the gentiles but at the gentiles themselves: if this attitude was reflected to any 
degree in daily life, I find it impossible to believe that the gentiles would not react extremely 
badly.
125
 
That is not to say that Christians could not live alongside others without huge 
resentment;
126
 archaeological excavations at Dura-Europos, for instance, show that a 
Christian house church lay just at the foot of a Roman watch tower.
127
 This building may 
have particular relevance to this thesis, since a Greek fragment of gospel harmony found 
there is largely assumed to be a witness to Tatian’s Diatessaron.128 I do not intend to focus on 
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the relationship between Tatian and the house church,
129
 but the connection serves to 
emphasise the importance that Tatian’s work has for this region. 
Assuming that local gentiles were aware that the house belonged to Christians, then 
hostility and persecution cannot have been as frequent as authors like Tacitus and Pliny might 
make it appear, at least in the Near East: the house church was evidently in use for a long 
period,
130
 and this would not have been the case had they caused such offence to their 
neighbours, either by their attitude or their conduct. We may make a similar conclusion from 
the paintings in the baptistery: in contrast with those found in the adjactent Synagogue, which 
explicitly emphasise “the superiority of Judaism over other religions”,131 these paintings 
show little interest in engaging with local religious life, let alone in a hostile manner. They 
are largely images from the life of Jesus, or gospel metaphors.
132
 Such imagery “evokes as 
space in initiate mythology” 133 it is internal and has little engagement with the world around 
it.
134
 In only two instances do we find imagery that deals at all with their non-Christian 
neighbours: the battle between David and Goliath,
135
 and a woman who may be the 
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 For which see Mell 2010:205-260, esp. 257-9. Dirven suggested that the appearance of Adam in the painting 
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Samaritan whom Jesus encountered at the well.
136
 Kraeling suggested that the depiction of 
 avid is “something of a surprise, especially considering the fact that the episode portrayed 
shows the decapitation of the Philistine giant” 137 he interpreted the image as an explicit 
depiction of the victory of Christ over Satan on the cross, and suggested that Christians 
should draw confidence from this in their conflict with their non-Christian neighbours.
138
 
Korol and Rieckesmann, however, argued that the ordinary Christian would not immediately 
make this association.
139
 Whether or not this image was intented to highlight conflict with the 
gentile world, it is evident that such conflict was not an important part of the imagery of 
baptistery: one may therefore question how prominent such conflict was in the day-to-day 
lives of the Christians who worshipped there. 
Admittedly, the Dura-Europos house church is a unique example before the fourth 
century AD,
140
 but this does not imply that others did not exist,
141
 or that religious conditions 
in Dura-Europos were dramatically different to elsewhere in the empire. If it is correct that 
Christians and gentiles could live alongside one another without regular antagonism, then this 
may be another reason for suggesting that Christian βλ  φ     may have been a significant 
factor in motivating gentile resentment. If gentiles took objection to Christianity solely 
because of flagitia, coniuratio or superstitio, then one would expect hostility to be far more 
consistent. However, if instances of Christian βλ  φ     were part of the problem, then 
hostility and persecution would only arise in response to instances of this attitude. One cannot 
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imagine that Christians dealt with their neighbours in as consistently a hostile a manner as 
Meliton, Tatian and the Syriac translator of Aristides display (in a rhetorical context), but 
such attitudes must have surfaced occasionally. I suggest that these instances may have 
provoked great resentment, which, in turn, would have led to a vicious cycle of increasing 
resentment and hostility on both sides. 
 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
Such is the scarcity of literary sources in the Near East in particular, and in the Roman 
world at large, on the subject that one cannot provide a conclusive answer to this point, and I 
do not for a moment suggest that βλ  φ     was the sole, or even the primary, cause, but we 
may consider that βλ  φ     was a feature of Christian superstitio,142 and was part of a 
much bigger dialogue. During this thesis, however, it has become apparent that Near Eastern 
Christian attitudes, as far as we can judge from the limited evidence available, were both 
inaccurate and unnecessarily aggressive, both against the gentiles themselves and against 
their beliefs, although it is difficult to characterise such attitudes in more specific terms: in 
light of this, it would be surprising if these attitudes did not play a bigger role in the dialogue 
with gentile religious life than has previously been acknowledged. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Translation of the Syriac Oration of Meliton the Philosopher 
Please note that all chapter numbers are my own insertion to facilitate referencing. This 
translation uses Cureton’s 1855 edition. 
<1.1> The speech of Meliton the Philosopher who in the presence of Antoninus Caesar, and he spoke 
to Caesar, that he might know God, and show him the way of truth, and he began to speak as follows: 
 
<1.2> Melito said “It is not easy to quickly bring a man143 to an upright way, the sort of man who was 
previously held for many years in error. Nevertheless, it may happen: the mention of truth is 
acceptable to the man who has come back from error, even if just a little. <1.3> For just as when a 
cloud parts just a little and there is fair weather, in the same way, when a man turns towards God, 
immediately the dark cloud of error which restrains him from seeing the truth is removed from his 
faith. For error, like sickness and sleep, seizes for a long time those who are under it. <1.4> But truth 
uses the word like a goad and strikes those who are sleeping and awakens them. And when they wake 
they look at the truth and understand it; they hear it and distinguish that which is from that which is 
not. <1.5> For there are men who call unrighteousness uprightness; they believe that it is 
righteousness when one man strays together with many others. But I say that it is not a good reason 
that a man should stray with many. For it if only one should go astray, his transgression is great; how 
much greater will be the transgression when many stray! 
 
<1.6> But the error that I speak of is this: when a man leaves whatever truly exists and worships 
whatever does not truly exist. But there is that which truly exists: it is called God, and He truly exists; 
everything exists in His strength. <1.7> He was not made in any way and neither did He come into 
being. He existed from the beginning of the age, and He will exist to the end of the age. He is not 
changed, and everything else is changed. Sight is not able to see him; the mind is not able to 
comprehend him; words are not able to explain him. <2.1> And those who love Him call him ‘the 
Father and God of truth’. Therefore, if a man leaves the light and says that another god exists, from 
what he says it is clear that what he calls ‘god’ is something from those things that are created.  2.2> 
For if a man should call fire ‘god’, it is not God, because it is fire  if a man will call water ‘god’, it is 
not God because it is water. <2.3> And this earth which we tread upon, and these heavens which we 
see, and the sun and the moon and one of these stars which run along according to divine will and do 
not stop, not journeying by their own will  and if a man calls gold or silver ‘gods’, which we use as 
we wish, these things are not (God). <2.4> And these pieces of wood which we burn, and these stones 
which we shatter, how are these things gods? For they are useful for men. Those who exchange in 
their words the great God for those possessions which continue to exist according to divine will as 
long as they exist – how will these people not be found to be in great sinfulness? 
 
<2.5> But nevertheless, I say that as long as a man does not hear, does not distinguish, and does not 
understand there is a Lord for these creatures, he should perhaps not be blamed, because no man 
blames a blind man, even though he may walk extremely badly. <2.6> For men also, while they were 
seeking God, stumbled on rocks and on wood, and those who were rich stumbled upon gold and 
silver, and were hindered in their stumblings from that which they were seeking. 
 
<2.7> But now a voice has been heard in all the earth, saying that there is a God of truth. An eye has 
been given to every man that he might see with it. There is no excuse for the spirit of those who are 
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ashamed of the multitude who stray with them, but wish to travel on the righteous path. For those 
ashamed to be saved must perish. <2.8> Because of this I advise them to open their eyes and see, for 
light that does not envy is given to everyone that they might see by it. But if, when light has dawned 
on us, a man shuts his eyes so that he will not see, he must go to the pit!  
 
<2.9> But why is a man ashamed of those who stray along with himself? It is better for him to 
persuade them to follow him, and, if they are not persuaded by him, save himself from their company. 
For there are men who, are not able to rise from the earth, their mother, and because of this, they also 
make gods that which is the earth, their mother. <3.1> They are condemned in the judgements of 
truth, for they apply the name of Him who is not changed to those objects which are changed, and do 
not fear to call ‘gods’ anything which is made by the hands of men, and dare to make an image for 
God whom they have not seen. 
 
<3.2> But I say also that the Sybil said about them that they worship the images of dead kings. It is 
easy to understand, for even now they worship the images of the Caesars even more than their former 
gods. For from these former gods both tribute and produce are paid to Caesar, as for one greater than 
this. <3.3  Because of this, those who resent them and diminish Caesar’s revenues are put to death. 
For it is determined how much the worshippers will give to the treasuries of kings in various places, 
and how many bags of water from the sea they will give. <3.4> For such is the wickedness of the 
world of those who worship and fear that which does not feel. Many of these, who are crafty either for 
the sake of gain or because of empty splendour, or power over the masses, both worship that which 
does not feel, and encouraging those without understanding to do the same. 
 
<3.5> I will write and show, according to what I know, how and for what reasons images are made 
for kings and tyrants, and they became like gods. The sons of Argos made an image for Herakles, 
because he was an inhabitant of their city and he was strong, and in his strength he killed evil beasts, 
and especially because they feared him. For he was violent, and he seized the wives of many people. 
For his lust was plentiful, like that of Zurdi the Persian, his companion. <3.6> Again, the sons of Acte 
worshipped Dionysus the king, because he introduced the vineyard into their country. <3.7> The 
Egyptians worshipped Joseph the Hebrew, who was called Serapis, because he provided them with 
corn in the years of the famine. <3.8> The Athenians worship Athena, the daughter of Zeus, the king 
of the island of Crete, because she built the town of Athens, and she made Ericthippus her son the 
king there, who was born to her from adultery with Hephaistos, the son of a wife of her father. She 
was always making partnership
144
 with Herakles because he was her brother from her father. <3.9> 
For Zeus the king loved Alcmene, the wife of Electyron, who was from Argos. <4.1> She committed 
adultery with him, and game birth to Herakles. The sons of Phoenicia worshipped Balthi, the queen of 
Cyprus, because she loved Tamuz, the son of Cuthar, king of the Phoenicians. She left her kingdom 
and she went and dwelt in Gebel, a walled city fortress of the Phoenicians, and at that time she made 
all the Cyprians subject to Cuthar the King; because before Tammuz she loved Ares, and committed 
adultery with him, and Hephaistos, her husband, caught her, and was jealous of her. <4.2> He came 
and killed Tammuz in Mount Lebanon, while he was hunting boars. And from then on, Balthi 
remained in Gebel, and she died in the city of Aphiki, where Tammuz was buried. <4.3> The Elamites 
worship Nuh, daughter of the king of Elam. And when her enemies took her captive, her father made 
an image for her, and a temple in Shushan, a palace which is in Elam. <4.4> The Syrians worship 
Athi, a Hadibite, who sent the daughter of Belat, a nurse. She healed Simi, the daughter of Hadad, the 
king of Syria, and after some time, when Hadad had leprosy, Athi entreated Elisha the Hebrew; he 
came and he healed him from his leprosy. <4.5> The people of Mesopotamia also worship Cuthbi, a 
Hebrew woman, who delivered Bakru, the father of Edessa, from his enemies. <4.6> But about Nebo, 
who is worshipped in Mabog, what can I write to you? For all the priests who are in Mabog know that 
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it is an image of Orpheus, a Thracian magus. Hadran is the image of Zaradusht, a Persian magus. Both 
these magi used enchantments at a well that was in a grove in Mabog, in which was an unclean spirit. 
It harassed and assaulted against everyone who passed by, in the whole place in which was situated 
the fortress of Mabog. <4.7> These magi commanded Simi the daughter of Hadad to draw water from 
the sea and pour the water into the well, so that the spirit would not come up and attack, according to 
that which is a mystery in their Magianism. In the same way, mankind persists and makes images for 
their kings and worship them: I will not write further on this. 
 
<4.8> But you, a man of free mind, and experienced in the truth, if you will consider these things, 
discuss with yourself, and if they form womanly clothing for you, remember that you are a man. 
Believe in Him who is truly God. Open your mind to Him, and entrust your life to Him. He is able to 
give you life for eternity and which does not die. <5.1> For everything is in His hands. Reckon all 
other things according to what they are: images as images, and carvings as carvings. <5.2> And 
whatever is made, do not put it in the place of that which is not made. But let Him, the God who lives 
forever, be readily in your mind. For your mind itself is His form. It is not seen and is not touched and 
not to be painted. By its will the whole body is moved. <5.3> Know, therefore that if at all times you 
serve Him who is not moved, then, just like Him who exists forever, likewise, you will stand before 
Him forever, when you have set aside the visible and corruptible, when you live and know <Him>. 
Your works will be infinite riches and unfailing wealth  for you. <5.4> But know that the greatest of 
your good works is this: that you know God and serve Him. And know that He does not ask anything 
of you: He needs nothing. Who is this God? He who is truth, and His word is truth. But what is truth? 
That which is not fashioned, and not made, and not painted: that which has not been brought to into 
being is called truth. Therefore, if a man worships something that he has made with his hands, he does 
not worship the truth, nor the word of truth. 
 
<5.5> But I also have much to say on this subject. I am ashamed for those who do not perceive that 
they are superior to the work of their hands, and do not perceive how they give gold to the craftsmen 
who make gods for them, and give them silver for their decoration and honour; they move their 
possessions from place to place and worship them. <5.6> And what wickedness is greater than this: 
that a man should worship his riches and abandon the one who gave the riches to him? That he should 
dishonour man and worship the image of man? That he should kill a beast, and worship the image of a 
beast? <5.7> It is clear that they worship the skills of their companions. For they do not worship the 
treasures while they are in the money-bag, but once the craftsmen fashion images from them they 
worship them. They do not worship the property of gold or silver, but once the engravers have 
sculpted them, they worship them. <5.8> You who lacks in understanding, what has been added to 
gold that you now worship it? If it is because it resembles a winged beast, why do you not worship the 
winged beast? If it is because it resembles a beast of prey, the beast of prey itself is before you. <6.1> 
And if the craftsmanship itself is beautiful to you, let the workmanship of God be beautiful to you, 
who made everything, and in His likeness made the workmen, who strive to do like Him but are not 
like Him. 
 
<6.2> But perhaps you might say: ‘Why did God not make me that I might serve Him but not 
images?’. When you say this sort of thing, you seek to become a useless tool, and not a living man. 
For God made you so beautiful, according to what was beautiful to Him. He has given to you a free 
mind. <6.3> He set before you possessions in great number so that you might distinguish everything, 
and that you might choose for yourself what is beautiful. He set before you the heavens, and put in 
them stars; He put before you the sun and the moon, and every day they too run their course in it. He 
set before you the multitude of the waters and restrained them by His word. He set before you the 
wide earth, when it is still and continues before you in one manner, so that you should not trust that it 
continues by the nature of its own existence: He causes it to quake as often as He wishes. <6.4> He 
put before you the clouds, which bring waters from on high and gives the earth sustenance at His 
commandment, in order that from these you may understand that He who moves these things is 
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greater than all of them: you may receive thankfully from Him who gave to you a mind by which you 
may distinguish these things. 
 
<6.5> Because of this I encourage you to know yourself, and to know God. You must understand how 
there exists within you that which is called a life. By it, the eye sees; by it the ear hears; by it the 
mouth speaks. See how it uses the whole body, how He is pleased to remove the life from the body, 
and it falls and is corrupted. <6.6> Therefore, from this, which exists in you and is not seen, 
understand how God also moves the whole world in His power, just like the body, and that whenever 
He wishes to withdraw His power, the whole world also, like the body, falls and is corrupted. 
 
<6.7> But why the world was made, and to what end it passes, and why the body exists, and why it 
falls, and why it continues, you cannot discover unless you raise up your head from this sleep into 
which you have sunk, and opened your eyes and seen that there is one God, the Lord of all, and serve 
Him from your whole heart. <6.8> Then He permits you to know His will. For everything which is far 
from the living God is dead and buried in the body. Because of this you roll on the ground before evil 
spirits and shadows and you ask empty petitions from that which has nothing to give. <7.1> But you, 
raise yourself from those who lie upon the ground and kiss stones, giving their food as sustenance for 
the fire, and offering their clothes to images. Although they are sentient, they wish to serve whatever 
is not sentient. <7.2> Ask petitions that do not waste away from the God who does not waste away for 
your soul, which is imperishable. Your freedom will be seen sufficiently: be careful of it. Praise God 
who made you, and gave you a free-born mind, that you might act just as you wish. <7.3> He set 
before you all these possessions, and demonstrated to you that if you follow evil, you will be 
condemned by your evil deeds, but if you follow goodness you will receive from Him many good 
things, with life forever and which does not fail. 
 
<7.4> Therefore there is nothing which will hinder you from overturning your evil way of life, 
because you are a free man, or from seeking and finding out who is the Lord of all, and serving Him 
from your whole heart, because in Him there is no reluctance to give knowledge of Himself to those 
who seek it, according to their ability to understand Him. 
 
<7.5> Let it be the prime concern for you, that you should not deceive yourself. For if you say about 
that which is not God, ‘this is God’, you are deceiving your soul, and you sin before the God of truth. 
<7.6> Fool, can God be bought? Is God that which is in need? Does God need to be guarded? How do 
you buy God like a slave, and serve Him like a lord? How do you ask Him to give to you, as one who 
is rich, and give to Him as one who is poor? How do you suppose about Him that He will give you 
victory in war? When your enemies conquer you, they would strip Him too. 
 
<7.7> Maybe one who is a king will say: ‘I am not able to act well because I am a king  it is for me to 
do the will of the masses’. The one who speaks thus really deserves ridicule: for why does the king 
not lead the way to all good things, and persuade the people who obey him: to act in purity and to 
know God in truth, and set for them in his own life examples of all fine deeds, which is fitting for 
him? <7.8> For it is disgraceful when a king acts very badly, yet he judges and condemns those who 
stray. But I believe that a kingdom is able to be governed in peace in this way: when the king knows 
the God of truth, and is prevented by fear of Him <8.1> from harming those men who obey him, 
judging everything with uprightness, as a man who knows that he also is ready to be judged before 
God. At the same time, those who are under his authority and are prevented by the fear of God from 
straying against their king, they are prevented by the same fear from straying one against another. 
<8.2> By this knowledge of God, and fear of Him, all evil can be removed from the kingdom. For if 
the king will not stray against those who are in his hand, and they do not stray against him, or one 
against the other, it is evident that the whole country dwells in peace. <8.3> There will be many 
blessings there, that amongst everyone the name of God is glorified. For what blessing is greater than 
this: that the king will redeem from error all who are under his hand, and by this good deed make 
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himself pleasing to God? <8.4> For from error arise all of those evils, but the greatest of the evils is 
this: when a man does not know God, and instead of God worships that which is not God. 
 
<8.5> But there are men who say ‘for the honour of God we make the image, that we may worship 
the image of the God who is concealed’. But they do not know that God is in every land and every 
place and is never absent, and there is nothing which has been made and He does not know it. <8.6> 
But you, feeble man, in whom He is, and outside of whom He is, and above whom He is, have gone 
and bought for yourself wood from the carpenter, and it was carved and made into an image which is 
insulting to God. You offer sacrifices to this, and do not know that the eye that sees everything sees 
you, and that the word of truth rebukes you, and says to you: ‘how can the God who is not seen be 
sculpted?’  8.7> Rather you make the form of yourself, and worship it. Because the wood has been 
sculpted, do you not perceive that it is still wood, or that it is stone? <8.8> The craftsmen takes gold 
according to its weight in the balance; and what you have made into an image, why do you weigh it? 
Therefore you are a lover of gold, and not a lover of God. <8.9> Are you not ashamed, in case it is not 
enough to demand of the maker as to why he stole from it? Though you have eyes, do you not see? 
And though you have a mind, do you not understand? Why do you roll on the ground and offer 
supplication to things that do not feel? Fear the one who moves the Earth and causes Heaven to 
revolve, and tosses the sea, and moves the mountain from its place and who is able to make Himself 
into a fire and consume everything. <9.1> If you are not able to clear yourself of guilt, do not add to 
your sin, and if you are not able to know God, be able to know that He exists. 
 
<9.2> But again, there are people who say: ‘whatever our fathers have left to us we revere’. 
Therefore those whose fathers left them poverty strive to gain riches! Those whose fathers did not 
instruct them desire to be instructed, and to learn what their fathers did not know. <9.3> And why do 
the children of the blind see, and the children of the lame walk? For it is not good to follow one’s 
predecessors, those whose way of life was very wicked; rather, turn away from their way of life, lest 
that which befell your predecessors also happens to you. <9.4> Because of this, find out whether your 
father led a good way of life; if so, follow after him; but if your father led a very evil way of life, let 
your way of life be good, and let it be so for your children after you. <9.5> But grieve for your father, 
who lives an evil way of life, so long as your grief is able to help him. But speak to your children 
thus: ‘there is a God, the Father of all, who did not come into being, and neither was He in any way 
made, and by His will everything exists. <9.6> He made the light, that His works might see one 
another. He conceals Himself in His power from all of His works. It is not permitted for anything 
changeable to see Him who is not changeable. But those who remember His words, and enter into that 
covenant which is not changeable, see God as far as they are able to see Him. <9.7> These people are 
able to escape destruction when the flood of fire comes upon the whole world’. For there was once a 
flood and a wind, and the chosen men were destroyed by a mighty north-wind, but the righteous were 
left as a demonstration of truth. But again, at another time, there was a flood of water, and all men and 
animals perished in a multitude of waters. But the just were saved in an ark of wood by the command 
of God. <9.8> So will it be in the last times: there will be a flood of fire, and the earth will be burnt 
up, together with its mountains and the people will be burnt up together with the images which they 
made, and the carvings which they worshipped; the sea will be burnt up together with its islands; but 
the just will be guarded from wrath, like their companions of the ark were from the waters of the 
flood. Then those who do not know God, and those who made images for themselves, will groan for 
themselves; when they see their images being burnt up along with themselves, <10.1> and no-one is 
found to help them. 
 
<10.2> But when you become informed about these things, Antoninus Caesar, and also your children 
together with you, you will leave for them an inheritance which is for eternity and which does not 
fade away; you will deliver your soul, and also the souls of your children, from what will come to 
pass for all the world, in the judgement of truth and righteousness. <10.3> Just as you acknowledge 
Him here, He acknowledges you there. But if you reckon Him to be superfluous, He will not reckon 
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you amongst those who acknowledge and confess Him. These (facts) may be sufficient for your 
Majesty; if they are too many, still accept them. 
 
<10.4> Melito ended here. 
 
 
Appendix B: Translation of the Syriac Apology of Aristides 
 
Please note that all chapter numbers are my own insertion to facilitate referencing. This translation 
uses Rendel Harris’ 1893 edition. 
 
<1.1> Again, an apology which Aristides the philosopher made before Hadrian the king about the 
worship of God.  
<1.2> ‘To Caesar Titus Hadrian Antoninus Augustus Pius. From Marcianus Aristides, a philosopher 
of Athens. 
<1.3> I, O King, came into this world by the grace of God. When I considered the heavens and the 
earth and the seas, and looked upon the sun and the rest of creation, I marvelled at the arrangement of 
the world. <1.4> I understood that the world and all that is in it is moved by the will of another, and I 
understood that the one who moves them is God, who is concealed in them and hides from them. 
<1.5> This is well known, that the one who moves is more powerful than the one who is moved. It is 
apparent to me that I should investigate concerning him who is the mover of all, what sort of thing He 
is or how He exists, for He is not comprehensible in His nature; but it is not good for me that I should 
argue about the steadfastness of His rulership so that I might comprehend it fully. <1.6> For no man 
is able to perfectly comprehend it. But I say about the One who moves the world, the He is God of all, 
who made all on account of man. <2.1> It is apparent to me that it is beneficial that men fear God and 
not offend man.  
<2.2> But I say that God was not born and was not made, and has a nature that is continuous, which 
has no beginning and no conclusion; undying, perfect and incomprehensible. <2.3> By ‘perfect’ I say 
this: that He has no deficiency, that He does not need anything; but everything needs Him. And that I 
say that He has no beginning: that everything that has a beginning also has an end, and that which has 
an end is vulnerable to dissolution. <2.4> He has no name, for whatever has a name is associated with 
created things. He has no likeness, and is not composed bodily parts. But he who possesses (such a 
composition) is associated with things that are fashioned. He is not male, nor is He female. The 
heavens do not contain Him; but the heavens, and everything which is both visible and invisible, are 
contained in Him. <2.5> He has no enemy, for there is no man who is more powerful than He. He 
does not possess fury or anger, for there is nothing that is able to stand against Him. <2.6> 
Forgetfulness and carelessness are not in His nature, for He is wisdom and understanding, and in Him 
exists everything which does exist. <2.7> He does not ask for sacrifice or libation; none at all from 
those things that are visible. He does not ask anything from men; but all things ask from him.  
<2.8> Because these things have been spoken to you by us regarding God, <3.1> as far as our minds 
our able to reason about him, let us come now to the race of men, in order that we may know which of 
them hold a portion of the that truth which we have spoken about, and which err. 
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<3.2> This is obvious to you, o King, that there are four races of men in this world: Barbarians and 
Greeks, Jews and Christians.  
<3.3> The Barbarians thus calculate head of the race of their religion from Kronos and from Rhea 
and the family of their gods; but the Greeks calculate from Helenus, who was said to be from Zeus. 
But from Helenus was born Aeolus and Xythus, and the family that was brought forth from Inachus 
and from Phoroneus, but finally from Danaus the Egyptian and from Cadmus and from Dionysus.  
<3.4> But the Jews calculate the head of their race from Abraham, who begat Isaac. And from him 
was born Jacob, who begat twelve sons who left from Syria to Egypt, and they were called the race of 
Hebrews by their lawgiver. But finally, they were named Jews. 
<3.5> The Christians, then, calculate the beginning of their religion from Jesus Christ, and he is 
named the Son of God Most High, and it is said that God came down from Heaven, and from a 
Hebrew Virgin took and assumed flesh, and in a daughter of Man lived <4.1> the Son of God. This is 
taught from the Gospel (which recently was said among them that it was preached): if you will read it, 
you will understand the power that is in it. <4.2> This Jesus was born from the family of Hebrews; 
but he had twelve disciples so that some dispensation of his of his might be fulfilled. <4.3> He was 
pierced by the Jews, and he died and was buried, and they say that after three days he rose and 
ascended to heaven. Then these twelve disciples went out into the known parts of the world and 
taught about his greatness with all humility and modesty. <4.4> And because of this, those who to 
this day believe in this teaching are called Christians, who are renowned. There are these four races of 
men, just like I said before: Barbarians and Greeks, Jews and Christians.  
Wind, then, serves God, and fire serves angels, but water serves evil spirits and earth serves man. 
<4.5> Let us begin from the Barbarians, and gradually let us proceed to the rest of the genealogies of 
the nations, so that we might understand which from them hold the truth regarding God and which 
from them err. <4.6> The Barbarians, then, because they did not comprehend God, erred with the 
elements
145
 and began to serve created things in place of their Creator, and because of this they made 
likenesses and shut them up in temples. 4.7 And behold! They worship them when they guard them 
with great care, that their gods may not be stolen by looters.  And the Barbarians did not understand 
<5.1> that everything that watches is greater than that which is watched, and anything which creates 
is greater than that which is created. <5.2> If it is the case, therefore, that their gods are too weak to 
deliver their own salvation, how is it that they might deliver salvation to mankind? The Barbarians 
have therefore erred with a great error, that they worship dead images that are not of benefit to them. 
<5.3> It occurs to me to wonder, o King, regarding their philosophers, how they have also erred and 
named ‘gods’ those likenesses which are made for the honour of the elements, and the wise men do 
not understand that also these elements are corruptible and dissoluble. <5.4> For if a small part of the 
element is dissolved or corrupted, all of it is dissolved or corrupted. If, then these elements are 
dissolved or corrupted and are compelled to serve another which is harder than it, and they are not by 
their nature gods, how indeed can they call ‘gods’ those likenesses which are made in their honour? 
Great, therefore, is this error that the philosophers bring upon their audience. 
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<5.5> Let us therefore turn, o King, to those elements themselves, in order that we may show 
regarding them that they are not gods, but creations which are corruptible and changeable, which is in 
the likeness of man. But God is incorruptible <6.1> and unchangeable and invisible, whilst He sees 
and overturns and changes all things. 
<6.2> Therefore those who suppose regarding the earth that it is a god, they have already erred in 
this, since it is broken and planted and delved; and since it receives the foulness of the waste of 
mankind and animals and of cattle; and since at times it becomes useless, for if it is burned it becomes 
dead; for from baked clay there springs up nothing. <6.3> Again, if water is collected on it, it is 
corrupted together with the produce; and see! it is trampled by men and by cattle, and it receives the 
impurity of the blood of the slain; it is dug and filled with the dead and it becomes a grave for bodies. 
<6.4> A holy, venerable, blessed and incorruptible nature cannot accept this (impurity). Therefore, it 
is apparent to us that the earth is not a god, but a creation of God.  
<6.5> In a similar way, again, they err who suppose regarding water that it is a god. For water was 
created for the use of man, and in many respects was made subject to him. <6.6> For it is changed, 
and it receives dirt and is corrupted and loses its own nature, when it is boiled with many things, and 
it receives colours which are not its own; also, it is hardened by cold, and it is mixed with the waste of 
men and of cattle and with the blood of the slain it is mingled and mixed; and by workers it is forced 
by means <7.1> of the straits of the streams to flow and to be drawn, which is not its own will, and to 
go into gardens and into other places in order that it might be cleanse and carry out the waste of 
mankind, and to cleanse in it the defilement and to supply the use of man of itself. Because of this it is 
not possible that water should be a god, but it is a word of God and a part of the world.  
<7.2> Furthermore, those who suppose that fire is a god err greatly; because also it was created for 
the use of mankind, and in many respects it was made subject to them, and in the service of food and 
for the preparation of ornaments and the remaining (things), those which your majesty is familiar 
with, whilst in many respects it is extinguished and consumed.  
<7.3> And again, those who supposed that a breeze of wind is a god also err in this. This is known to 
us: that these winds are made subject to one another, since at times they are increased; and at times 
they diminish and cease, according to the commandment of Him who makes them subject. <7.4> For, 
since they were created by God for the sake of men, so that they might fulfil the need of the trees and 
of the fruits and of the seeds, that they might transport ships on the sea, those which bring essential 
goods to men, from a place where they are found to a place where they are not found, and they endow 
different parts of the world. Since, then, the wind is at times increased and at times it is diminished, 
<8.1> there is one place where it does good and another where it does harm, according to the will of 
Him who rules; also, men are able, by means of well-known tools, to capture it and to compel it so 
that it might fulfil the needs which they demand of it. <8.2> Over its own life it has no power at all. 
Because of this it is not possible that the winds should be called gods, but a work of God. 
<8.3> Likewise also those who suppose that the sun is a god err. For look! We see it, that by the 
necessity of another is moved and rotated and runs its course, and it goes from step to step, when each 
day it rises and sets, so that it may warm the shoots of plants and vegetation and may bring forth, in 
the air which mixed in it, every herb which is upon the earth. <8.4> And there is a role for it in 
calculation (of time), together with the rest of the stars in its course. And although it is one in its 
nature, it is mixed with many parts, according to the benefit of the needs of men – and not by its own 
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will but by the will of Him who rules it. <8.5> Because of this it is not possible that the sun should be 
a god, but a work of God, and in the same way the moon and stars.  
<8.6> But those who suppose regarding the men of old that some of them are gods: these have erred 
greatly, as you (yes, even you!) o King, are aware of, that man consists of four elements and of <9.1> 
life and of spirit. Because of this he is even called ‘the World’, and without one of these parts he does 
not exist. He has beginning and end; he is born and he is also subject to decay. <9.2> But God, as I 
said, has none of these things in His nature. He is not made and He is not corruptible. And because of 
this, it is not possible that we should represent as God one who is by his nature man, to whom at 
times, when he searches for happiness, grief happens; for laughter, and mourning befalls him; one 
who is wrathful and jealous, envious and regretful, together with the rest of the other faults, and in 
many ways corrupted more than the elements and the beasts. 
<9.3> From this, o King, it is right for us to understand the error of the Barbarians, in that they did 
not investigate concerning the true God, they fell away from the truth, and they went after the desires 
of their own minds when they served elements, which are subject to dissolution, and dead images; on 
account of their error they did not perceive what was the true God.  
<9.4> Let us now return to the Greeks in order that we might know what idea they have regarding the 
true God. The Greeks, then, because they are wiser than the Barbarians, have erred even more than the 
Barbarians, since they have introduced many manufactured gods. Some of these they represented as 
male and some female, and so that some from <10.1> their gods were found to be adulterers and 
murderers, mistaken, jealous, wrathful, furious, patricides, thieves and plunderers. <10.2> Some of 
them, they say, were lame and injured; some of them were sorcerers, and some of them were totally 
insane. Some of them played the harp, and some of them wandered on mountains. Some of them were 
slain outright, some of them struck by lightning. <10.3> Some of them were even made subject to 
men. Some of them fled, and some of them were stolen by then hands of men. <10.4> See! Some of 
them were wept over and grieved for by the sons of men; some, they say, descended to Sheol (Hades); 
some of them were badly wounded; some were transformed into the form of beasts so that they might 
commit adultery with the race of mortal women. <10.5> Some of them were accused for intercourse 
with males; some, they say, were married to their mothers and sisters and daughters; they say of their 
gods that they committed adultery with the daughters of men, and from them was born a certain race 
which was also mortal. <10.6> And about some of the goddesses they say that they competed 
regarding their beauty, and came for judgement before a man. Therefore, o King, the Greeks have 
brought forward wicked, ridiculous and foolish ideas regarding their gods and regarding themselves, 
in that they call such kind of people ‘gods’ who are not gods at all. <11.1> From this men took the 
opportunity that they might commit adultery and fornication, and to plunder and to commit everything 
evil, detestable and abominable. For if those who are called their gods have committed all these things 
which I have written above, how much more will men commit them, those who believe that they (sc. 
the gods) have done these things! <11.2> From the impiety of this error – see! men have been 
afflicted with frequent wars and great famines, bitter captivity, bereavement of all things; and see! 
they are enduring. All of these things affect them from one cause alone: when they endure them, they 
do not perceive in their minds that because of their error these things happen to them.  
<11.3> Now let us come to the account of these, who are their gods, in order that we may 
demonstrate accurately about all these things which we said above. From before anything else the 
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Greeks introduce as a god Kronos, who is interpreted as Chiun. <11.4> The worshippers of this god 
sacrifice to him their children, and some of them they burn while they are still living. About him they 
say that he took as a wife Rhea, from whom he fathered many sons. <11.5> From her he also father 
Dios, who is called Zeus. Finally he went mad and, out of fear of an oracle that was spoken to him, 
began to eat his children. Zeus was stolen away from him and he did not realise it. <11.6> Finally 
Zeus bound him and cut off his manhood, and cast it into the sea, from where, as they say in the story, 
Aphrodite was born, <12.1> who is called Astera. And he cast Kronos, while he was bound, into the 
darkness. Great, therefore, is the error and the mockery which the Greeks introduce regarding the 
head of their gods, in that they have said all of these things about him, o King. It is not possible for a 
god to be bound or amputated, or it is great misfortune.  
<12.2> After Kronos they introduce another god, Zeus. They say about this one that he received 
authority and became king of all the gods. They say about him that he was transformed into cattle and 
into anything else in order that he might commit adultery with mortal women, and that he might raise 
for himself sons from them. <12.3> Since at one time they say that he was transformed into a bull on 
account of his passion for Europa and Pasiphae; and again we was transformed into the form of gold 
on account of his passion for Danae; and into a swan on account of his passion for Leda; and into a 
man on account of his passion for Antiope; and into lightning on account of his passion for the Moon: 
so that from these he fathered many children. <12.4> For from Antiope, they say, he fathered Zethus 
and Amphion; from the Moon, Dionysus; from Alcmene, Herakles; from Leto, Apollo and Artemis; 
from Danae, Perseus; from Leda, Castor, Polydeuces and Helen; and from Mnemosyne he fathered 
nine daughters, those who are called Muses; <13.1> from Europa, Minos, Rhadamanthus, and 
Sarpedon. But finally he was transformed into the form of an eagle on account of his passion for 
Ganymede the shepherd.  
<13.2> Because of these stories, o King, great evil has befallen the men who live during this present 
time, since they imitate their gods, and commit adultery and are defiled with their mothers and their 
sisters, and in sleeping with males, and some of them dare even to kill their fathers. <13.3> For if he 
who is said to be the head and king of their gods does these things, how much more will his 
worshippers imitate him? Great is the madness which the Greeks introduced into their stories about 
him! <13.4> For it is not possible that a god should commit adultery or fornication or to draw near to 
sleep with males, or to kill his father. Otherwise he is more wicked than a destructive demon.  
<13.5> Again, they introduce another god, Hephaistos. And they say of him that he is lame and wears 
a cap on his head, and holds in his hand tongs and a hammer; he works as a blacksmith, so that from 
this he may find his necessary nourishment. Now then, is this god so needy? It is not possible that a 
god should be needy or lame, for otherwise he is very weak.  
<13.6> Again they introduce another god, and they call him Hermes. <14.1> They say that he is a 
man who loves avarice and lusts after profit, a magus and that he is maimed and an athlete and one 
who translates words. <14.2> But it is not possible that a god should be a magus, or avaricious, or 
maimed, or coveting whatever is not his, or an athlete. For if it is found otherwise, then he is no use. 
<14.3> After him they introduce another god, Asklepios. They said that he is a physician, and he 
prepares medicines and bandages so that he may satisfy his need of nourishment. Is this god needy, 
then? <14.4> Finally he was struck by lightning from Zeus on account of Tyndareus the 
Lacedaimonian, and so he died. If, then, Asclepius was a god and yet when he was struck by lightning 
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was not able to help himself, therefore how is he able to help others? <14.5> It is not possible that the 
divine nature should be in need, or that it should be struck by lightning.  
<14.6> Again, they introduce another god, and call him Ares. They say of him that he is a warrior 
and is jealous, coveting sheep and things that are not his, and obtains possessions through arms. 
<14.7> He is the one whom they say at last committed adultery with Aphrodite, and was bound by a 
small boy, Eros, and by Hephaistos the husband of Aphrodite. <15.1> But it is not possible that a god 
should be a warrior or a prisoner or an adulterer.  
<15.2> Again, they say of Dionysus that he is indeed a god who celebrates festivals in the night and 
teaches drunkenness. He snatches off women who are not his; finally they say that he went made and 
left his female attendants and fled into the wilderness; in his madness he ate snakes, and finally he 
was killed by Titan. <15.3> If, therefore, Dionysus was a god, and when he was slain was not able to 
help himself, how is he able to help others? 
<15.4> They introduce Herakles, too, and says of him that he is a god, who hates the hateful, a ruler 
and a warrior, and slayer of the wicked. Of him, they say that in the end he went mad and killed his 
children and threw himself into the fire and died. <15.5> If, then, Herakles is a god, and in all of 
these evils was not able to stand up for himself, why do others ask for help from him? It is not 
possible that a god should be mad, or drunk, or a killer of his children, or destroyed by fire.  
<15.6> After him they introduce another god, and call him Apollo. They say of him that he is jealous 
and changeable; at times he holds a bow and quiver, but at times a lyre and plectrum. He prophesies 
oracles to men, so that he may receive from them a reward. Does this god, then, need a reward? 
<16.1> It is disgraceful that all of these things should be found in a god. 
<16.2> After him they introduce Artemis as a goddess, the sister of Apollo. They say that she is a 
huntress and she carries a bow and arrows, and wandered around on mountains while leading dogs, 
either to hunt deer or wild boar. <16.3> But it is disgraceful that a virgin should wander about on 
mountains by herself, and hunt the trail of beasts. Because of this it is not possible that Artemis should 
be a goddess.  
<16.4> Again, they say of Aphrodite that she is indeed a goddess. Sometimes, indeed, she dwells 
with the gods; but sometimes she commits adultery with men. Sometimes she has Ares as a lover, but 
sometimes Adonis, who is Tammuz. <16.5> Sometimes, indeed, Aphrodite grieves and mourns for 
the death of Tammuz. They say that she descended to Sheol in order to ransom Adonis from 
Persephone, who was the daughter of Sheol. <16.6> If, then, Aphrodite is a goddess but was not able 
to help her lover in his death, how can she help others? This is not possible to listen to, that the divine 
nature should come to mourning and grieving and adultery.  
<16.7> Again, they say of Tammuz that he is a god, and is indeed a hunter and an adulterer.  They 
say that he himself was killed by a blow from a wild boar, and was not able to help <17.1> himself. If 
he is not able to help himself, how is he able to oversee the human race? It is not possible that a god 
should be an adulterer or hunter, or that he should die of violence. 
<17.2> Again, they say of Rhea that she is indeed the mother of the gods. They say of her that she 
had at one time a lover, Attis, and that she took joy in corruptible men. But finally she established 
lamentations, and grieved for Attis, her lover. If, then, the mother of the gods was not able to help her 
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lover and to rescue him from death, how is she able to help another? <17.3> It is disgraceful, 
therefore, that a goddess should lament and weep, or that she should have joy over corruptible beings.  
<17.4> Again, they bring forward Kore and say that she is a goddess, and she was snatched away by 
Pluto and was not able to help herself. If, therefore, she is a goddess and is not able to help herself, 
how is she able to help others? For a god who is snatched off is very weak.  
<17.5> O King, the Greeks have introduced all these things regarding their gods, and have devised 
and said (these things) concerning them. From this all men have taken the opportunity to do all 
wickedness and all impiety: in this way, the whole earth has been corrupted.  
<18.1> But the Egyptians, because they are more evil and ignorant than all of the peoples who are 
upon the earth, they have erred more than anyone. For the idolatry of the Barbarians and Greeks was 
not enough for them, but they also introduced the nature of beasts, and said about it that they were 
gods. <18.2> Also, of the creeping things which are found on dry land and in the sea, and of the 
plants and of the grass, they said of them that some of them are gods. They have been corrupted in all 
madness and impiety, more than all the nations that are upon the earth. <18.3> From ancient times 
they served Isis, and said that she was indeed a goddess. Indeed, she had a husband, Osiris, her 
brother. But when, indeed, Osiris was killed by his brother Typhon (i.e. Set), Isis fled with her son 
Horus to Byblos in Syria, and stayed there for a time until her son was grown. <18.4> He fought with 
his uncle Typhon and killed him. Then Isis returned and wandered about with Horus her son, and she 
sought the corpse of her husband Osiris, and bitterly lamented his death. If, therefore, Isis is a goddess 
and was not able to help Osiris her brother and husband, how is she able to help others? <18.5> It is 
not possible that the divine nature should be afraid and flee, or to weep and wail. Otherwise it is great 
misfortune. <18.6> But of Osiris, they say that he is a beneficent god. He was killed by Typhon and 
was not able to help himself, and it is known that this cannot be said about God.  
<18.7> Again, they say of Typhon, his brother, that he is <19.1> a god, killer of his brother, and was 
killed by the son of his brother and by his wife, since he was not able to help himself. How can one 
who is not able to help himself be god? 
<19.2> Because the Egyptians are more ignorant than the rest of the nations, these and similar gods 
were not enough for them. But also, they place the name of ‘god’ upon beasts which are merely 
lifeless. <19.3> For some men among them worship sheep, but others the calf, and some of them the 
pig, and others a river-fish; some of them the crocodile or the hawk, or the sea-fish, or the kite, or the 
vulture, or the eagle, or the raven. Some of them worship the cat, and others the fish Shibbutha; some 
of them worship the dog, and some of them the serpent, and some of them the asp; others the lion, and 
others garlic and onions and thorns, and others the leopard, or anything which is like them. <19.4> 
The wretches do not perceive that in all of these things they are nothing, while every day they look 
upon their gods, which are eaten and are destroyed by man, even by their companions, and (look 
upon) some of them being burned and some of them while they die and decay and become manure, 
and they do not understand that they perish in many different ways.  
<19.5> Therefore the Egyptians do not understand that things like these are not gods, for their 
salvation is not within their own hands.  If they are too weak for the salvation of themselves, then, 
concerning the salvation of their worshippers, how will they have the strength to help them? 
Therefore with a great error <20.1> have the Egyptians erred, more than all of the nations who are 
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upon the face of the earth.  <20.2> But it is a wondrous thing, o King, concerning the Greeks: that 
although they are greater than the rest of all the nations in their reasoning and in their rhetoric, that 
they should err after dead idols and images which are not alive, while they see their gods, which are 
sawn and polished by their makers, and shortened and cut and burned and shaped and transformed 
into every shape by them. <20.3> And when they age and come to an end by the length of time, and 
when they are melted down and broken into pieces, how do they not understand regarding them that 
they are not gods? And those which are not capable of the salvation of their own lives, how are they 
able to protect men? <20.4> But even the authors and philosophers among them who have erred 
introduce regarding them that they are gods, things like this which are made for the honour of God 
Almighty. <20.5> Being in error, they compare them to God; no man has seen to whom He is similar. 
Nor is man able to see Him, and in these things they introduce ideas regarding the divine as if 
deficiency were found in Him, in that they say that He receives sacrifice and demands offerings and 
libations and slayings of men and temples. <20.6> But God is not needy, and He does not seek for 
any of these things. It is known that men are in error in these things that they suppose. But their 
authors <21.1> and philosophers introduce (this idea), and say that the nature of all of their gods is 
one. But they have not understood God, our Lord, that while He is one He is in all. They are in error, 
then, for if the body of man were of many parts, one part of the body does not fear its companion; but 
whilst it is a composite body, all is equal with all. <21.2> Therefore so also God, who is one in His 
nature, has one essence which is fitting for Him, since He is equal in His nature and His essence, nor 
does he fear Himself. <21.3> If, therefore, the nature of gods is one, it is not right that a god should 
persecute a god, nor kill him, nor do to him what is evil. 
<21.4> If, therefore, gods were persecuted or stabbed by gods, and some of them were snatched away 
and some of them struck by lightning, it is known that the nature of their gods is not one. From this it 
is clear, o King, that it is an error to speculate on the nature of their gods, and that they reduce them to 
a single nature. <21.5> If, then, it is right that we should marvel at a god who is visible and does not 
see, how much more worthy of marvel is this, that men should believe in a nature which is invisible 
and sees all! Again, if it is fitting that men investigate the works of craftsmen, how much more fitting 
that man should praise the maker of the craftsmen!  
<21.6> For see! while the Greeks establish laws, they do not understand that by their laws they are 
condemning their own gods. For if <22.1> their laws are just, their gods are unrighteous, who 
violated the law, since they kill one another and performed enchantments and committed adultery, 
plundered, stole, slept with males, together with the rest of their other deeds. <22.2> But if their gods 
are beautiful and, like they say, did all these things, then the laws of the Greeks are unrighteous, and 
are not established according to the will of their gods, and in this the entire world has erred.  
<22.3> As for the stories of the gods, some of them are parables, some of them are physical, some of 
them hymns and songs. These hymns and songs, therefore, are empty sayings and noises. But as to the 
physical, if they were done like they say, they are not gods, because they have done these things, and 
suffered and endured these things. And these parables are meaningless words, which have no power at 
all in them.  
<22.4> Let us now come, o King, to the histories of the Jews, and let us see what sort of idea they 
have about God. The Jews, then, say that God is one, Creator of all and Almighty, and that it is not 
fitting that we should worship anything else, except if it is this God alone.  <22.5> In this they appear 
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to be nearer to the truth than all of the nations, in that they worship God exceedingly, and not His 
creations. <22.6> They imitate God by the power of the love of man which they have, since they are 
indeed compassionate towards the poor, and they ransom the captive, and bury the dead, and do things 
which are similar to these, things which are acceptable before God and attractive to men, these things 
which they received from their fathers formerly. <23.1> But they too have strayed from accurate 
knowledge, and they suppose in their minds that they worship God, but in the manner of their actions, 
their worship is to angels and not to God, since they observe Sabbaths and new moons and the 
Passover and the great fast, and circumcision and purity of food. Even these things they have not 
perfectly observed.  
<23.2> But the Christians, o King, since they wander about and, in seekingm have found the truth, 
just as we comprehended from their writing, are closer to the truth and to correct knowledge than the 
rest of the nations. <23.3> For they know and believe in God, the maker of the heavens and the earth, 
in whom are all things, and all things are from Him. He does not have another god as a companion. 
They received from Him these commandments that they have engraved upon their minds, which they 
observed in trust and expectation of the world to which is to come. <23.4> Because of this they do 
not commit adultery and do not fornicate, they do not bear false witness, they do not conceal 
something held in trust, and they do not covet that which is not theirs. They honour their father and 
the mother, and do good to those who are their neighbours. When they are judges, they judge justly, 
and do not worship idols which are in the image of man. <23.5> Whatever they do not wish another to 
do to them, they do not do to others. They do not eat from the food that is the sacrifice of idols, for 
they are pure.  Those who harm them <24.1> they comfort and make them their friends and they do 
good to their enemies. Their wives are pure like virgins, o King, and their daughters are modest. Their 
men restrain from all unlawful copulation, and from all impurity, in the hope of reward which is to 
come in another world. <24.2> But the servants and handmaidens, or their children if any of them 
have any, they convince to become Christians because of the love which they have towards them, and 
when they have become Christians, they call them with no distinctions ‘brothers’. <24.3> They do not 
worship foreign gods, and they walk in all humility and kindness, and deceit is not found amongst 
them, and they love one another. They do not turn their gaze away from widows, and the orphan they 
set free from him who harms him with violence. <24.4> The one who has gives without grudging to 
the one who has not.  When they see a stranger, they bring him to their homes and rejoice in him like 
in a true brother. For they do not call ‘brother’ those who are in the flesh but ‘brothers’ who are in the 
spirit and are in God. But when one of their poor passes from the world, and any one of them sees 
him, according to his wealth he attends to his funeral. <24.5> If they heard that one of them is 
imprisoned or oppressed because of the name of their Christ, all of them attend to his needs, and if it 
is possible that he should be freed, they free him. If there is among them a man who is poor or needy, 
and they do not have the necessities in abundance, they fast for two or three days so that they might 
supply the needy with their necessities of food. <24.6> They observe the commandments of their 
Messiah with great caution; they live uprightly and chastely, like <25.1> the Lord their God 
commanded them. Every morning and at every hour, on account of the graces of God towards them 
they praise and glorify him. Over their food and over their drink they give thanks. If any righteous 
person of them passes from the world, they rejoice and give thanks to God. <25.2> They accompany 
his corpse as if he were journeying from one place to another. When a baby is born to one of them, 
they praise God, and again, if it happens that it dies in its infancy, they praise God greatly, as for one 
who passed from the world and was not a sinner. <25.3> Again, if they see that one of them has died 
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in his wickedness or in his sins, about this one they lament bitterly and sigh, as for one who is ready to 
go to punishment. 
<25.4> This is the commandment, the law of the Christians, o King, and their way of life. As men 
who know God, they ask from Him petitions which are fitting for him to give and for them to receive. 
In this way they fulfil the course of their lives. <25.5> And because they know the graces of God 
towards them, see! Because of these comes the beauty that is in the world. It is true that they are those 
who have found the truth, since they wander around and search for it, and from what we have 
understood, we know that they alone are near to the knowledge of the truth. <25.6> But the 
kindnesses that they do, they do not announce in the ears of the masses, and they take care that 
nobody should be aware of them, and they conceal their gift, as one who has found a treasure <26.1> 
and hides it. They toil to become righteous as one who expects to see their Messiah and to receive 
from him promises that were made to them of great glory. <26.2> But their words and 
commandments, o King, and the glory of their labours and the expectation of the reward of 
repayment, according to the deeds of each one of them, which they expect in another world: you are 
able to know these things from their writings. It is enough for us that we have briefly informed your 
Majesty regarding the way of life and the truth of the Christians. <26.3> For, truly, their teaching is 
great and wonderful to the one who wishes to examine and to understand it. Truly this is a new 
people, and the divine is mingled in it. Therefore, take the writings and read them, and see! you will 
find that I do not bring forth these things from myself, nor do I speak as their defendant, but as I read 
in their writings I speak these things truly, and (I speak truly about) those things which are to come. 
<26.4> On account of this I was compelled to demonstrate the truth to those who wish it, and who 
seek the world that is to come. I have no doubt that the earth exists because of the intercession of 
Christians. <26.5> But the rest of the nations are deceived and deceivers, since they kneel before the 
elements of the world, just as the gaze of their understanding is not willing to pass them by, and they 
grope as if in darkness, because they are not willing to know the truth; like drunkards, they stumble, 
shove one another and fall over.  
<26.6> Up to this point, o King, I have spoken.  For as regards, the remainder, as <27.1> was said 
above, there are found in their other writings sayings which are difficult to speak, or that someone 
should repeat them, these things that are not only spoken but actually done.  
<27.2> But the Greeks, o King, because they practice obscene things in sleeping with males, and with 
mother and sister and daughter, turn the ridicule of their defilement upon the Christians; but the 
Christians are upright and holy. The truth is set before their eyes, and their spirits are long-suffering. 
Because of this while they know their error and are buffeted by them, they endure and bear them. 
<27.3> All the more abundantly do they pity them as men who are lacking in knowledge, and on their 
behalf offer up prayers in order that they might turn from their error.  And when it happens that one of 
them turns, they are ashamed before the Christians of the deeds that have been done by him. <27.4> 
He confesses to God when he says ‘I did these things without knowledge’ (i.e. in ignorance), and he 
cleanses his heart and he is forgiven his sins, because he committed them without knowledge 
previously, when he was blaspheming and cursing the true knowledge of the Christians. <27.5> The 
race of Christians is truly blessed, more so than all of the men who are upon the face of the earth. 
<27.6> Now let the tongues of those speaking emptiness who slander the Christians be silenced, 
<28.1> and let them now speak the truth. For it is better for them to worship the true God than to 
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worship a buzzing which is without intelligence. <28.2> For the truly divine is whatever is spoken by 
the mouths of the Christians. Their teaching is the gateway of light. Therefore let all of those who do 
not know God approach Him and receive from Him words which are not corruptible, those which are 
everlasting and from eternity. <28.3> Let them anticipate, then, the judgement of power which is to 
come by the power of Jesus the Messiah upon the whole race of men. 
<28.4> The apology of Aristides the philosopher ended here. 
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